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This thesis compares the ethical theories of two 8
th
 century Indian philosophers, 
Śāntideva and Śaṅkara.  In order to construct their ethics from philosophical premises, 
a metaphysical approach has been taken.  A comparison of these two philosophers has 
never been made, nor has there been any major comparative study of the ethics of 
their two traditions, Indian Madhyamaka Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta.  In opening 
the way for further comparisons between these two schools, I wish to question the 
manner in which scholars have consistently divided them along self/non-self 
(ātman/anātman) lines.  The key to the comparison is thus the notion of individuated 




Once the full implications of Advaita metaphysics are understood, whereby all 
consciousness is ultimately that of the one brahman, then, at the individuated level of 
consciousness, the ethical situation is strangely similar to the Buddhist with their 
notion of non-self (anātman).  We thus have two rival schools positing a radical 
notion of the individual as having no unified centre of moral agency.  Both schools 
adopt a methodology of Two Truths, the relative and the ultimate, in order to allow for 
both a provisional ethical framework and the potential for world transcendence.   
 
It was decided that the most convenient form of ethical comparison was a qualified 
form of altruism, here called “constructive altruism”.  This is a form of other-
regarding ethics which allows for the concept of a non-giver, i.e. a person who has 
realised selflessness and has seen through the “illusion” of individuation.  This person 
then takes it upon himself to construct the other so as to gain a focus for the 
compassionate activity of teaching.  The aim of such teaching is the liberation (mokṣa) 
of freedom-seeking disciples from this cyclic existence (saṃsāra) and its prevalent 
potential for suffering (duḥkha). 
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Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
 
This thesis grew out of an on-going project begun by Prof. Ram-Prasad Chakravarthi 
(Lancaster University) and Prof. Jonardon Ganeri (University of Sussex).  The project 
was entitled “Hindu Responses to Buddhist Critiques”.   I was based in Lancaster 
throughout the project, with Ram-Prasad as my sole supervisor.  The project was 
necessarily cross-curricula and it was therefore fitting that mid-way through the 
project the Department of Religion merged with the Departments of Philosophy and 
Politics.  The main debates surrounded the meaning of the “self”, and how the self 
functioned in metaphysics, psychology and ethics.  The basic methodology was to 
focus on the Indian texts, with occasional reference to parallel Western debates.   
 
I came into the Project as a winner of a Doctorate scholarship offered by the AHRC.  
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As a Buddhist, I was concerned with the Project’s title, which seemed set up to favour 
the “Responses” over the “Critiques”.  But as it turned out, my supervisor, Ram-
Prasad, was as anxious as I to give a balanced account of the debates, which we both 
recognised as being a valuable exchange of cross-cutting Indian ideas.  Given the time 
to find my own thesis within the general area of Buddhist and Hindu comparative 
studies and Indian Philosophy, I began by reading the Brahmanical material. 
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On reading Śaṅkara, I was first interested to note how his critique of the Yogācāra was 
so similar to that of Śāntideva.  In reading his views on self, it soon became apparent 
that his concept of brahman as the ultimate Self, along with his views on the 
provisional nature of the world, led to an evaluation of the individual most similar to 
that of Madhyamaka.  I became particularly interested in his insistence on the 
continuation of the lineage, and the need for a realised teacher to pass on the 
knowledge to his students.  It seemed that his brahman-knower, who had transcended 
personal identity, was willing to remain in society with the sole aim of benefiting 
others.  This seemingly “altruistic” concept resonated with the teachings I had 
received from the Dalai Lama on the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva. 
 
The idea of comparing Śāntideva and Śaṅkara with regard to metaphysics and ethics 
appealed to Ram-Prasad, and we almost instantly agreed on a working title: “A 
Selfless Response to an Illusory World”.  This catchy title, which captures the 
“tension” of the Two Truths so dramatically, has remained an inspiration to me 
throughout the research and writing process.   I thank Ram-Prasad for bringing me 
onto this project, for allowing me the freedom to choose my own thesis, and for his 
attention and fathomless expertise throughout these four years. 
 
I also wish to thank Prof. Peter Harvey, who helped me become a critical thinker.  I 
wish to thank H.H. the Dalai Lama, who planted the seeds of the Bodhicaryāvatāra in 
my limited consciousness back in 2003.  I prostrate to my root guru, the late Chogye 
Trichen Rinpoche, who one glorious day in Kathmandu, placed me on the path.  I 
wish to thank also Dr. Irina Kuznetsova for teaching me Sanskrit. Thanks are also due 
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There is no doubt that a comparative ethical study of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism and 
early Vedānta is long overdue.  And it is quite evident that this particular 
metaphysical/ethical analysis of Śāntideva’s Madhyamaka and Śaṅkara’s Advaita 
Vedānta is just the beginning of what will hopefully be a sustained and probing 
recovery and rediscovery of the Sanskritic source material. 
 
Moreover, one anticipates that it will be a practical rediscovery; one which involves 
ethical questions as well as metaphysical ones, one which will hopefully lead on to 
novel approaches which aim at accessing the workings of consciousness and thus to 
the potential training of the human mind.  With the advent of the cognitive sciences, it 
may well be that Indian philosophy has come of age and is finally being taken 
seriously in the Western academy. 
 
In addition to keeping abreast of cognitive science, the modern writer on Buddhism 
and Hinduism aspires to be a combination of historian, philologist and analytic 
philosopher.  And Chapter 1 is unapologetically aimed at the latter of these.  The 
question of “self” has dramatically returned to the arena of analytic philosophy and 
may well prove to be the most telling philosophical “problem” of the current century.  
Without any plea from the Buddhists themselves, Western scholars of self have helped 
themselves to ancient Indian texts, typically in translation, and have introduced the 
Buddhist notion of non-self into the modern debate.  It is hardly feasible any more for 
a Western academic to remain enclosed within their departmental walls.  The 
Indologist feels the need to answer Descartes, Locke and Hume just as urgently as the 
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Western philosopher of self feels the urge to quote from the Pāli Canon, the Bhagavad 
Gītā or the Upaniṣads.   
 
Unfortunately, such inter-disciplinary flirtations have often come at a price.  Blanket 
statements have been made on all sides and confusion abounds.  When the Buddha 
denied the ‘self’, was he also denying the ‘person’?  Are the Buddhists saying, along 
with the Bhagavad Gītā, that there is no fault in killing the person before you, because 
that is not who they really are?  When Śaṅkara claims that one simply cannot deny the 
self, is he thus forced into standing on the ātman (self) side of the fence, with the 
anātman (non-self) Buddhist on the other?  In allowing for the possibility of an 
exchange of ‘self’ or ‘consciousness’ between two ‘men’; is Locke therefore 
accepting Indian notions of rebirth?  These are but a few of the questions that arise 
from the confusion of terms.   
 
Thus Chapter 1 is an attempt to discover some clarity, with a particular focus on 
showing that the Buddhist so-called denial of self is no absolute denial, and that 
Śaṅkara’s notion of self as brahman-consciousness leaves room for him to sit very 
much alongside a Buddhist, like Śāntideva, on the question of moral agency.  It thus 
calls upon scholars to reconsider how we distinguish Buddhism and Hinduism, and 
asks whether the ātman/anātman dichotomy is at all sustainable. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on methodology, and especially the question of how one ought to 
approach the comparison of two sets of ethics.  This will involve a major critique of 
the virtue ethics approach to comparison and will hopefully show how ineffectual that 
methodology is.  It will further be proposed that any attempt to map Indian ethics 
(without qualification) onto pre-existing Western typologies is bound to fail.  The 
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structural approach to ethics taken here will be shown to be one where the reader 
attempts to discover what the writers were up to in their own works.  It is a method of 
rediscovery, gaining a sense of how each writer constructed their ethics from 
philosophical premises.  It therefore relies most heavily on an understanding of the 
revisionary metaphysics involved. 
 
It just so happens that both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva construct their ethics in a similar 
fashion, and it must be admitted that it was this startling similarity that prompted 
further research and the idea of this comparison.  That is why this is no comparison 
for its own sake, but one read out of the material.  Interestingly, both will construct 
their ethical systems from essentially metaphysical premises.  And while those 
premises appear polar opposite with regard to the self, the resultant ethics are 
shockingly similar. 
 
While the argument against using Western notions to categorize Indian writers is 
strongly upheld, naturally one often finds oneself constrained by the discourse.  Thus, 
the use of the English language on the study of Buddhism over the past 50 years or so 
has imposed certain terms onto the writer.  All such terms have been heavily 
scrutinised throughout this thesis and none more so than my ethical term of choice, 
‘altruism’.  Clearly this term was originally assumed to cover the notion of a person as 
a fully-fledged ‘self’ occasionally over-riding its own selfish desires in order to do 
some particular deed of benefit to others.  I thus call on the reader to understand that 
the altruism that is proposed by both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara is a “qualified” form of 
altruism, where no such self exists from the side of the doer.  Not only that, but the 
receiver, the other, is a constructed other.  That is, they are given provisional status by 
the wise and compassionate teacher, who uses this status as a means of focusing 
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attention on that particular being for soteriological purposes.  I will thus speak of 
“constructive altruism”, for the other is constructed for constructive reasons.   While 
not quite content with the use of the word ‘altruism’, it is consistent with all the 
Western literature on Mahāyāna Buddhism, and no one will be surprised to hear 
Śāntideva’s ethics referred to as “altruistic”.  Its inclusion into the discourse of 
Śaṅkara’s Advaita may be somewhat novel.  But once the reader acknowledges that 
Śaṅkara also constructs the other in a manner very similar to Śāntideva, I am sure it 
will become obvious why the term “constructive altruism” equally applies to Advaita.  
Nevertheless, this may not become fully evident until Chapter 6. 
 
The aim of Chapter 3 is to give the reader an introduction into the worldview of 
Śaṅkara and Śāntideva so that the force of the main comparative chapters (4 to 6) will 
have sufficient impact.  The problem of course is how much to put in and how much 
to leave out.  I have had to assume some knowledge on behalf of the reader with 
regard to both Buddhism and Brahmanism.  I have thus tried to position Śaṅkara and 
Śāntideva within their respective traditions.  The fact that they were both living 
around the same time and place, i.e. 8
th
 century India, adds extra interest to the 
comparison, though perhaps it would have remained just as relevant even if this were 
not the case.  Two things stand out in Chapter 3: first, the fact that there had been 
some obvious borrowing of theories and methodologies amongst the traditions of 
India before and around this period; and second, the fact that Śaṅkara and Śāntideva 
continued to see other sects as, in a certain sense, enemies.   It is this traditional 
tension that sets up the comparison and highlights the significance of them forging 




Chapter 4 is the core of the comparison.  There were perhaps other ways of 
comparing their writings, and they probably agreed on more issues than those drawn 
on here.  However, I decided to highlight three points of contact due to their 
immediate relevance to the question of ethics.  The first point of interest (4.1) was that 
both writers wished to deny the Buddhist Yogācāra “idealistic” world-view.  Now 
some Buddhologists may feel immediate irritation here at the idea that the Yogācāra 
were in fact offering an “idealistic” metaphysics.  This I acknowledge and try to 
address in as much detail as space will allow.  However, it is important to note that 
both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva paint the Yogācāra in a very similar manner.  I will argue 
that they both find an idealistic world-view incompatible with the ethical traditions 
they wish to uphold.  It therefore renders the question of the Yogācāra’s actual views 
irrelevant to my thesis.   
 
The next section of Chapter 4, (i.e. 4.2), returns to the question of self found in 
Chapter 1, zooming in on their common denial of the ultimacy of the individuated 
self.  At this point in the thesis, it will become apparent that the ātman/anātman 
distinction is unsustainable, and I will make a call for all future scholars to bear this in 
mind when discussing Buddhism and Hinduism.   
 
Finally, in Chapter 4.3, I intend to show that despite their denial of the individuated 
self at the ultimate level of discourse, there is no such denial at the provisional level.  
Thus, it can be said that they maintain a common response to tradition-based conduct 
in the sense that they both allow the normal framework of their respective religions to 
remain in place even though their metaphysics should theoretically force their 
collapse.  This will highlight how both adopt the Two Truths to locate their 
soteriologies within a functioning ethical system which stands as potentially 
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transcendable.  Nevertheless, even the knower of final truth does not walk away from 
this framework, but plays along with it as if it were reasonably established. 
 
At this point in the proceedings, the reader will be well aware that both Śaṅkara and 
Śāntideva are making the standard religious claim that their lineages are able to breed 
certain beings, typically males, who have gained a certain knowledge which allows 
them to act in a certain manner and to make certain authentic pronouncements worthy 
of the heed of their followers.  Chapter 5 thus aims at adding flesh to this notion of 
knowledge and wisdom.  Though any attempt to verbalise the ineffable will 
necessarily fail, an account is given of how these writers saw the connection between 
practice and knowledge and subsequent liberation.  Perhaps it will come as little 
surprise to those involved in Religious Studies to see just how similar the two 
accounts are.  But we should not forget that simply because we have become familiar 
with the similarity, it does not make it any less significant.  Remember, we are talking 
here of two separate and often conflicting religious traditions. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the decision taken by both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva that the 
knowledge gained by these rare ones should, if not must, be passed on to those who 
are both academically deserving and spiritually prepared for it.  This fact in itself 
makes Śaṅkara’s ethics just as compassionate as Śāntideva’s, for it should not be lost 
on the reader that the knower-of-brahman need not do anything, and may, if he so 
wishes, just sit there awaiting final liberation.  That he does not, but turns back, as it 
were, and gives his full attention to those worthy seekers is indeed an altruistic 
response in any sense of the word.  That this knower has realised the non-existence of 
the individuating self (jīva) makes it particularly noteworthy, for, like the Buddhist, he 
must reconstruct the other from old knowledge of caste, gender, etc.  His altruism is 
7 
 
thus a qualified one, a constructive altruism.  I have here, in Chapter 6, invented a 
graphical means of representing the Two-Truths strategies used by Śaṅkara and 
Śāntideva in their ethical constructions, and it is hoped that this will prove useful to 
those new to the ethics of Śaṅkara and/or Śāntideva, and perhaps will even offer a new 
window to those more familiar with these writers. 
 
Once we have accepted that both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva are offering a form of 
constructive ethics, we need to ask just who those ethics are aimed at.  That is, we 
may rightly wish to inquire into their respective inclusivity.  Thus, one further modern 
trend is here, in Chapter 7, placed under critical analysis, that being the notion that 
Advaita and Mahāyāna ethics are somehow ‘egalitarian’ and ‘universal’.  These views 
are not simply being spouted by unknowing Western scholars, but can be found 
amongst the so-called authentic modern voices of the traditions themselves.  We must 
therefore be extremely careful not to read these universal claims back into the original 
Sanskrit texts.  Such notions are simply not there.   
 
With this in mind, I chose, in Chapter 7, to examine Śaṅkara’s views on caste 
alongside Śāntideva’s views on women.  The premise, in both cases, is that these 
categories should collapse under pressure from ultimate metaphysical analysis.  
However, as we soon learn, they in fact do not collapse, but remain intact, and 
probably did so until the 19
th
 century, when they came under attack from academic 
liberals.  Not only do I wish to highlight this lack of egalitarianism and universality in 
their ethics, I wish to show that their lack of concern about such matters would tend to 
cut away somewhat at standard Western notions of altruism.  However, the notion of 
constructive altruism remains unscathed, because the knower need only reconstruct 
those he chooses.  So there is no fault in the ethical models described in Chapter 6. 
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1. Introduction to the Self 
 
 
This thesis will primarily concern itself with the question of moral agency and ethical 
conduct within a world devoid of individual agents or ‘souls’.  The delusion of agency 
is coupled with the ‘illusory’ nature of phenomena, whose seemingly permanent 
presence is to be critically scrutinized. 
 
It is more than a hundred years since Nietzsche’s “madman” ran through the streets of 
Europe (G.S. 125).  And while the flames of atheism and doubt may well have been 
fuelled by science and scepticism alike, the “old deep trust” (343) in a personal God 
and for a necessary Absolute being is still very much alive.  My interest here does not 
concern the “gruesome shadows” (108) per se, but will necessarily involve the re-
evaluation of their role.  “How much must collapse” asked Nietzsche; what will 
happen to “our entire European morality” (343)?  Barring Communism, that 
monstrous failure, has the European really been capable of an answer?  Meanwhile, 
the American still calls on the Good Lord to protect their “crusades”.  Perhaps then, 
we should leave the West and travel east.  Could it be that there are moral lessons to 
be learnt from somewhere as distant as 8
th
 century India?  
 
From an Indian perspective, we do not have to consider God “dead”; an agnostic 
stance will suffice.  God may sing and dance in the shadows if he likes.  The universe 
is here about us as a brute fact, a place of suffering.  That is why Buddhism in India 
has often been labelled “agnosticism” (e.g. Vivekananda, 2009: 6) rather than 
“atheism”.  But if the Buddhist understanding of the world has been essentially “man-
centred”, then my argument here is that the same may be said of Śaṅkara.  This is 
especially true when we consider his views on liberation.  In other words, Śaṅkara’s 
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central concern was the “current bondage of the human condition” (Suthren Hirst, 
2005: 94).  Liberation from this world is a human task, a gnoseological project.
1
  Even 
Otto (1957), the great defender of a theistic Śaṅkara, felt compelled to admit that 
“Śaṅkara is so deeply interested in the subjective pole of salvation, that the other is 
scarcely noticed by him” (p189).  Śaṅkara is hardly interested in looking good in 
God’s eyes.  That is, when it comes to the ultimate means of liberation, God (Īśvara) 
has but little importance.  Śaṅkara’s interest lies more in a cognitive shift.  As he puts 
it, the “non-dual realisation is a mere mental modification” (advaita jñānaṃ manovṛtti 
mātram) (Ch.U.Bh., intro).  This discovery that one is in fact brahman-consciousness 
is followed by immediate liberation from suffering (jīvan-mukti), and the salvation of 
others who continue to suffer within transmigratory existence.   
 
Suffering is thus the consequence of a basic misunderstanding.  Hence, no devil, but 
ignorance (avidyā) shows itself to be the great enemy, and even God is subject to it 
(B.S.Bh. II.i.14).  That is, “Pure Consciousness (defined by egoity) has the 
omnipresent ignorance as its adjunct” (Grimes, 1991: 297).  This ignorance, or not-
knowing (a-jñānaṃ), according to Śaṅkara, is the “root” (mūlaṃ) of transmigratory 
existence (saṃsāra) (U.S. Metric, 1.4-5) and stems from the clinging to the transitory 
world of name and form (nāma-rūpa) (B.S.Bh. II.i.14).  For both Śaṅkara and 
Śāntideva, this ignorance shows itself as egoism (ahaṃkāra) and culminates in the 
clinging to a self as body, or as individuated soul (jīva).  According to Śāntideva, all 
misfortunes in the world are due to clinging to such a false self (BCA. 8.134).  
Similarly, Śaṅkara sees the cause of suffering as ignorance of the nature of self.  If one 
could only see that there were no difference between your self and the Self of 
                                               
1 No parallel with Gnosticism is implied here.  By ‘gnoseology’, I simply mean a system which posits a 




brahman, one would be released from suffering.  Hence, “That one is other [than 
brahman] is due only to the [error of] accepting the doctrine of difference” (bheda 
darśana mātreṇa ca tato ‘nyatvam) (U.S. Prose, 1.30).  
 
The gnoseological response then becomes threefold:  
1) create doubt in the deep-seated belief in our ultimate individuality 
2) question the origin and validity of our private cognitions, and 
3) re-evaluate our embodied existence 
 
For Śāntideva, the Mādhyamika Buddhist, there is no all-powerful God with his hands 
upon the world, and the Buddha remains as example and guide, not as Lord Creator.  
And even the Buddha is ultimately to be viewed as “illusion-like”, for “Merit comes 
from a Conqueror [Buddha], who is like an illusion, as if he was truly existent” 
(māyopamāj jināt puṇyaṃ sad bhāve ‘pi kathaṃ yathā) (BCA. 9.9a).  But far from 
being a nihilistic thesis, Śāntideva adds perfect wisdom and compassion to 
Nietzsche’s infinite nothing (G.S. 124-125).  For Śaṅkara, the Advaitin, the personal 
God (Īśvara) is likewise to be seen as part of the illusion (māyā) from which we must 
awaken, a construct, which along with individuation, awaits dissolution into universal 
consciousness.  A popular Advaita text states, when ignorance and illusion is 
overcome, “there is neither God nor soul” (na paro na jīvaḥ) (V.C. 244).2  And as for 
the attributeless (nirguṇa) brahman, it is so bare a concept, it can “hardly be the 
                                               
2 The Viveka Cūḍāmaṇi (from here on, V.C.) is treated here as probably not written by Śaṅkara.  
However, it may be assumed to be a gloss on Śaṅkara’s authentic works.  While Dasgupta took it to be 
genuine (1975, Vol.II: 79) and Hacker “provisionally” so (in Halbfass, 1995: 49-50), it is now assumed 
to be post-Śaṅkara (Mayeda, 1992: 10, n.33).  Nelson and Skoog both reject its authenticity (in Fort & 
Mumme, 1996).  However, it will be drawn on to show how its views compare with Śaṅkara’s, due to 
its ease of reference and extreme popularity.  Most recently, Coward (2008: 134-135) and Fasching 
(2011: 208) claim Śaṅkara as the author of the V.C, and even Metzinger (2004: 550) quotes from it.  So, 




Creator God” (Matilal, 2004: 40).  Again, this is no nihilistic thesis, for ethics remains 
paramount.  As Black (2008: 3) suggests, the “Upanishadic notion of the self is not 
merely a philosophical insight, but a way of being in the world”.  It is an “art of 
living” in accordance with religious precepts (Saha, 2009: 2).  In place of an infinite 
nothing, Śaṅkara speaks of “infinite” (anantaṃ) “knowledge and truth” (satyaṃ 
jñānam) (T.U.Bh. II.i.1).  More in line with Nietzsche; both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara 
seek liberation in terms of gnoseological illumination, and all three are intent on 
producing their “free-spirits”.   
 
So the Western reader will begin to see the virtue in this thesis if and when they 
consider the problem that arises when the certainty of a personal I-Thou relationship 
with God is seriously doubted.  More specifically, as we become agnostic about God, 
the notion of a personal, God-given, ‘soul’ becomes a redundant concept.  And 
consequently, we lose the line of reference on which to pin our certainty about the 
locus of our individual ‘self’.  This lack of ground coupled with a lack of historical 
anchor, lends itself to a sceptical attitude towards the question of whether or not there 
is any foundation at all for morality.   
 
The problem, as framed here, is not an emotional one, nor is it necessarily existential.  
It is not whether one may live a life with more or less fear of death, though 
fearlessness is indeed a “spiritual achievement” (Brassard, 2000: 49) prized by both 
Advaita and Buddhism.  It is not about freedom to act beyond the institutional walls.
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Nor is the problem about whether or not a lack of ‘self’ would take away our claim to 
                                               






  The problem, as framed here, is more philosophical, more ‘global’.  
It is whether or not ethics has any meaningful place in a world where the individuated 
self is not simply doubted, but ultimately denied.  With one eye on the current trends 
in cognitive science, I believe this question will come to play a major part in future 
ethical discussion.  And an ethical question of particular interest to me is whether or 
not ‘altruism’ remains possible within a metaphysics of non-individuation.  When I 
speak of ‘altruism’ here, I mean more than just the occasional jump into a lake to save 
a drowning child.  Rather, I am pointing at a total outlook on being and beings, an 
ethical world-view.  A detailed analysis of how we may qualify our terms of reference 
to allow for other-regarding ethics within such revisionary metaphysics will thus be 
offered.
5
  More generally, we might ask, just how do metaphysical claims impact upon 
our ethics? 
 
If we are to understand the question from Śāntideva’s or Śaṅkara’s perspective, we 
need to be familiar with the distinction between what they call the ‘ultimate’ 
(paramārtha) truth and ‘conventional’ (saṃvṛti, vyāvahārika) truth.  For simplicity, 
we might say that ultimate truth is that seen by the wise, and is the final description of 
what this world is like in “reality” (tattva), essentially in terms of metaphysics.  The 
conventional is the world of ‘common people’ (prakṛtā janāḥ), the ‘worldly’ (loka), 
and, in Indian terms, is the place of work, ritual and ethical action (Dharma).  This 
sense of worldly convention is explicit in Nāgārjuna’s notion of “worldly 
                                               
4 For such examinations, see Keown, et al (1998), and Bilimoria, et al (2007). 
 
5 A “revisionary metaphysics” is one which holds that what is there is ultimately different from what is 
ordinarily taken to be there.  In other words, it is a counter-intuitive metaphysics, and contrasts with a 
more “conservative metaphysics”, or “realist metaphysics”.  In India, this would include the Mīmāṃsā 
and Nyāya.  On this definition, modern science may well be called upon to support a revisionary 
metaphysics, including that of non-self (see Westerhoff, 2009: 208-210). 
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conventional truth” (loka saṃvṛti-satyaṃ) (MMK. 24.8), and both Śāntideva and 
Śaṅkara will show their debt to Nāgārjuna, the founder of Madhyamaka.   
 
Nevertheless, the wise look upon the conventional world as a dream-like world, a 
place where the seeming permanency of objects is likened to a magical display, a 
mirage.  In this “illusory” world, the majority of men and women go about their 
business, praying to their Gods, stoking their sacrificial fires, selling their wares.  It is 
a world in need of a moral structure, and both the Mādhyamikas and the Advaitins 
will give provisional value to it.  The question of just how much of this conventional 
world the wise really “share” with us is a matter to be addressed throughout the thesis.  
For now, it is enough to say that conventional truth is not necessarily the same as 
consensus.  It is the external world of ‘things’, where ‘beings’ are taken seriously.  
When we get to the ultimate level of discourse, the validity of ‘beings-as-independent-
subjects’ will be put into question.  At this level of understanding, to use Parfit’s 
(1971) phrase, there is “no underlying person” (p25).  Or, as Metzinger (2004: 549) 
more recently put it, there is “no one in the cave”. 
 
But this does not mean that there is no person at all.  For the Advaitin, it means that 
the person does not possess an individuated self (jīvātman) which would separate him 
from brahman.  As for the Buddhist, it means that there is no need to posit any 
substratum that supposedly maintains one’s individuality, one’s identity over time.  Of 
course, Śaṅkara thus supposes that the Mādhyamika Buddhist does indeed deny the 
person (Ch.U.Bh. II.xxiii.1), because a non-agency thesis combined with (what he 
took as) their non-existence (asat) thesis would amount to either nihilism or 
incoherence.  But Śaṅkara consistently fails to take account of the Madhyamaka’s 
acceptance of dependent origination.  Emptiness, for the Mādhyamika Buddhist, is 
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emptiness of something, just as consciousness is consciousness of something.  
Emptiness and phenomena are not two distinct things, but two characterizations of the 
same thing.  Things are empty because they are dependently originated.  If phenomena 
were not empty of inherent existence, it would be impossible for phenomena to be 
transformed in dependence on causes.  So a constructed person is empty because he is 
a constructed person.   
 
So Parfit, who we may thank for reviving the analytical interest in the Buddhist non-
self thesis, is wrong if he sees the Buddhists as totally denying the person (see Ganeri, 
2007: 162-166).  The Buddha never denied the person that stands before you.  Hayes 
states that the topic of one of the first of the Buddha’s discourses was about “why 
none of the constituents of a person qualifies as a self” (in Keown & Prebish, 2007: 
28, stress mine).  But how could one make any sense of this if the Buddha was also 
denying the ‘person’?  It is evident, even under Madhyamaka’s revisions, that the 
mere imputed person is not to be refuted.  Only by distinguishing between the notions 
of ‘self’ and ‘person’ can one make sense of the Buddhist concept of the selflessness 
of the person.  In a forthcoming paper, Ram-Prasad (2012) claims that Parfit has 
changed his mind about Buddhism and has come to see them as “reductionists”, and 
Ram-Prasad himself is generally correct when he states here that “Buddhists are 
reductionists about persons” (ibid.).  In fact, Siderits (2007a: 69) continues to liken 
Parfit’s reductionism to Buddhism, which is why Parfit is of interest to our thesis.6 
 
However, while Siderits (2000: 417) has admitted that Śāntideva sometimes adopts 
“Reductionist assumptions”, he more generally argues that the “Madhyamaka rejects 
Reductionism” (2003: 111, note c).  This is so if we take ‘reductionism’ to be the view 
                                               
6 For an extended discussion of Buddhism and Western Reductionism, see Siderits (2003). 
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that things, like persons, can be reduced to other kinds of things, such as, what Siderits 
has called “psychophysical elements” (p24).  So while the Mādhyamikas do 
deconstruct the body into its component parts, the deconstruction, unlike that of 
Abhidharma, does not end in a final list of true existents.  King (1995) has made the 
same point with regard to the Prajñāpāramitā texts, for which “there is no level at 
which the reductionist process can conceivably end” (p112).  Such a deconstruction, 
then, for the Mādhyamika at least, is a sceptical one, leaving nothing in the place of 
the ‘body’ or ‘being’ it started out with; that is, nothing except dependent origination 
(see Chapter 3.2).  Śāntideva, then, unlike Śaṅkara, would agree with modern 
philosophers of the mind, like Metzinger, who claim that there is no “unchangeable 
essence” behind the notion of ‘self’ (Metzinger, 2004: 563). 
 
Even so, we should note, along with Perrett (2002), that Indian Buddhist Reductionists 
“were not Eliminativists about persons” (p377).  And while a distinction can be drawn 
between the general Buddhist view and the Prāsaṅgika (more minimalist) view, the 
Prāsaṅgikas (with whom Śāntideva has been historically lumped) 7  remained on a 
“middle path with respect to the issue of personal identity” (p382).  Now, Siderits 
(2003) has argued that the “distinction between Reductionism and Eliminativism 
cannot be drawn without using the distinction between conventional and ultimate 
truth” (p116); but my argument is that Śāntideva can be read as flickering between the 
two.  The distinction is thus non-graspable.  For Śāntideva, then, the unenlightened 
person does indeed have enough ground to take care of their own livelihood, and so 
prudential concern is far from being “irrational” (see Siderits, 2003: 13).  Prudence is 
                                               
7 The concept of sub-schools within the Mādhyamikas of India was likely a Tibetan invention 
(Williams, 2009: 65), the terms ‘Prāsaṅgika’ and ‘Svātantrika’ never being employed by the Indian 




only irrational if seen from an ultimate perspective, but when one shifts perspective, 
when one flickers between the Two Truths, prudence is rational indeed.  In fact, 
prudence may go on to form the basis of a compassionate outlook (BCA. 8.92ff).  
Thus, Śāntideva writes: 
yady apy anyeṣu deheṣu mad-duḥkhaṃ na prabādhate     | 
tathāpi tad duḥkham eva mamātma sneha duḥsahaṃ     || 
tathā yady apy asaṃvedyam anyad duḥkhaṃ mayātmanā     | 
tathāpi tasya tad duḥkham ātma snehena duḥsahaṃ     || 
mayānyad duḥkhaṃ hantavyaṃ duḥkhatvād ātma duḥkha vat     | 
anugrāhyā mayānye ‘pi sattvatvād ātma sattva vat     || 
 
Even though my pain does not torment the body of others, that pain on the 
other hand is unbearable for me based on the love for myself. 
Although the suffering of another cannot be experienced by me personally, 
nevertheless, for him that pain is unbearable because of self-love. 
I should dispel the pain of others, just as I do my own, based on the fact 





Furthermore, in his call for a selfless response to the world of suffering beings, 
Śāntideva reconstructs his own deconstruction of the person, so the person is 
definitively reinstated.  That is, the bodhisattva returns to the “cave”, as it were, and 
projects a fixed self onto other beings for their own sake (see Chapter 6.1).
 9
  This I 
have labelled “constructive altruism”.  If his predecessor, Nāgārjuna “neither denies 
the world nor affirms it” (Bhattacharya, 1998: 91), then Śāntideva, I argue, both 
denies it and confirms it.   
 
Initially, Śāntideva establishes a rather negative view of people and society in order to 
persuade men to renounce the world of politics and desire.  He then deconstructs the 
world of objects in order to bring on a glimpse of emptiness.  Finally, he reconstructs 
                                               
8 All translations from the Sanskrit are my own (unless otherwise stated).  I have tried to write the 
Sanskrit in a “pulled apart” form to help non-specialist readers follow the words (except in cases where 
this would lead to ambiguity in the Sanskrit). 
 
9 Naturally, the “cave” metaphor is borrowed from Plato’s Republic (2007: 240-248).  For its modern 
application in the debate about self, see Kapstein (2001: 216) and Metzinger (2004: 547ff). 
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the world of beings in order to convince monks into a compassionate response to 
others (see Chapter 6.1).  We ought never to lose sight of these strategic means, for 
such manipulation requires that we contextualise each and every manoeuvre.  
Śāntideva thus begins with a provisional sense of the ‘person’, which includes their 
status and their gender (see Chapter 4.3 & 7).  He later works from a self-imposed 
‘delusional sense’ of the person (Chapter 6.1).  So while Giles (1993) claims that the 
“no-self theory lets the self lie where it has fallen” (p175), we will see that Śāntideva 
verily picks it up again!  Ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), then, does not, pace 
Sprung (1973: 44), bring the relative truth (saṃvṛti-satya) of persons to an end; it 
merely restructures the way in which one constructs the other (for we all construct 
others in one way or another).   
 
Now, for Parfit (1971), psychological continuity is more central to ethics than 
personal identity, and this continuity is a “matter of degree” (p25).  This equates with 
what Goodman (2009: 13) calls the “loose unity” of our causal continuity.  Peter 
Harvey thus identifies the false notion of a “unitary” person, suggesting the Buddha 
accepted more a “person as a cluster of changing physical and mental processes” (in 
Keown & Prebish, 2007: 569).  Of course, we should never presume that modern 
Western philosophers of the self are speaking the same language as Buddhologists.  
For example, we should be careful not to misread Parfit to be saying that his “matter 
of degree” also applies to rebirth, even when he says that psychological continuity can 
be regarded as “more important than sameness of body” (Parfit, 1971: 13); for Parfit 
clearly places the person within the brain (or parts of it) and seems to take “body” as 
being everything bar the brain.  For the pre-scientific, Indian tradition, the brain (if 
acknowledged) would be considered just another part of the body (deha), along with 
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the sense organs (indriyā), of which the mind (manaḥ) is but one. 10  That is, according 
to Indian religions, mind is made of “matter” (bhautika) (see Ch.U.Bh. VI.v.1).11  
And, though consciousness (cit, vijñāna) is said to interact with the body in this life, it 
would primarily be mental imprints/tendencies (saṃskārā/vāsanā) which gave rise to 
psychological continuity across lives (see B.S.Bh. III.i.1 & Ch.U.Bh. VI.ix.3).  
 
Limiting our study to this life then, psychological continuity is not so much a question 
of whether me at t1 is the same me at t2.  The question is flawed from the start by the 
assumption that ‘me’ picks out the individual.  We would have already assumed too 
much.  Nor is the Reductionist analysis a complete denial of the relationship between 
me (t1) and me (t2).  Rather, what Parfit (along with the Indian tradition) is saying, is 
that both me (t1) and me (t2) are constructed by past states of affairs and by present 
conditions.  If your name remains Derek through t1 and t2, then we have a legitimate 
right to pick you out with the name “Derek” on both occasions.  But we do not have 
the right to assume that you are unchanged.  Nor should we fall prey to what Siderits 
(1997: 463) calls “naïve semantic realism”, believing Derek to be anything beyond 
that of a convenient designation.  In arguing that the Buddhist allows for the 
convenient designation of the person on “pragmatic grounds”, Giles (1993: 176) thus 
inadvertently removes the Buddhist as a “candidate for utter elimination” (Siderits, 
1997: 460).  This manoeuvre is one of both Reduction and Construction.  Through 
similar manoeuvres, Parfit (1984: 281-282) was able to drop the concept of a 
permanent self, later making the emotional claim that he consequently had less fear of 
                                               
10 Wallace notes that Buddhists have “long ignored the brain’s influence on the mind” [i.e. 
consciousness] and “attribute little if any significance to it” (in Houshmand, et al, 1999: 163). 
 
11 Notably, the Upaniṣads say that the mind (manaḥ) is made of “food” (annamayaṃ) (Ch.U. VI.v.4), a 
verse cited by Śaṅkara (U.S. Prose, 1.22) to prove to the pupil that the mind is part of the world of 




death.  But more importantly, for this thesis, he also claimed that he was “more 
concerned about others” (p281).  He therefore appears to agree with the Buddhists, 
who claim that letting go of the concept of ‘self’ leads to a greater degree of 
compassion for others, making one more prone to selfless action, or ‘altruism’. 
 
But what, you may ask, of Śaṅkara?  While Western scholars are currently ready to 
admit that, “Buddhism has some valuable contributions to make” with regard to the 
question of personal identity (Giles, 1993: 185), how is Śaṅkara to fit into this 
company of what we might assume to be self-denying atheists?  For one, you might 
point out that Śaṅkara firmly believed in ātman.  And two, you might think he 
believed this ātman to be God.  These may seem like valid objections, but they are 
confused.  For one thing, God as Lord (Īśvara) plays very little role in either Śaṅkara’s 
soteriological or ethical project.  To be liberated is simply to understand that one’s 
consciousness is no other than the one consciousness (brahman).  For the sharp-witted 
seeker of Self, it need have no further theological grounding.  For such a seeker, it is 
not about sitting alongside God (Bṛ.U.Bh. III.v.1); it is not even about “union” 
(saṃyoga) with brahman (U.S. Metric, 16.39-40).  It is about knowing that one’s 
apparent (ābhāsa) individuality is not one’s ultimate status.  Indeed Metzinger (2004: 
550) correctly noticed that Śaṅkara’s intent was to avoid confusing ourselves with 
“the shadow” self.  But we should also realise that “the shadow” (chāyā) for Advaita 
is more than just the body.  It is also the apparent individuated self (jīva), which is 
taken to be true Self, like the “reflection” (chāyā) of one’s face in a mirror (U.S. 
Metric, 12.6).  The task, for the Advaitin, is thus to “de-individuate the jīva” (Ram-
Prasad, 2002: 7), that illusory subject which sets up a locus for relationships 
(saṃbandha) with God and the world (Ch.U.Bh. III.xiv.4).  Only then does the seeker 




As for ethics, Śaṅkara’s main concern is with the freedom from socially imposed 
obligation that comes with a certain form of knowledge (see Chapter 5.1).  This 
knowledge is then to be passed on (see Chapter 6.2).  But this is not so much about 
doing God’s work as about the continuation of lineage.  In fact, he is explicitly 
rejecting the ritual that ties the Brahmin priest to the Gods.  As for brahman, it plays 
no major part in Śaṅkara’s ethical project other than the fact that when one sees 
brahman and ātman as non-dual, then one is beyond ethical obligations.  Śaṅkara’s 
soteriology, which is in fact a gnoseology, is less one of grace, faith and works, but 
more one of realisation.  One only need wake up and then wake up others.  And here 
lies his principal ethic.  Placed in these austere terms, the Buddhist would have no 
objections to such a life.  I therefore believe that we could justifiably work with 
Śaṅkara’s gnoseological and ethical project without reference to ‘God’ with all its 
Western connotations.   
 
However, we may need to be more cautious when it comes to the case of Kṛṣṇa as 
Lord (Bhagavan).  For there is no getting away from the fact that Śaṅkara looks up to 
Kṛṣṇa of the Gītā.  He certainly never denies Kṛṣṇa his role of exemplary teacher of 
mankind, or as pure consciousness manifest.  Nevertheless, while Kṛṣṇa is seen as the 
spokesman of social (egoless) ethics; the brahman-knower, as conceived by Śaṅkara, 
stands firmly outside this dutiful bond to Kṛṣṇa (see Chapter 4.3).  Furthermore, the 
list of qualities that Śaṅkara applies to Kṛṣṇa12 (Bh.G.Bh., intro) are elsewhere, in his 
major works, denied applicability (B.S.Bh. II.ii.44-45).  So once again, I feel we are 
justified in bracketing God (be it Īśvara, qualified (saguṇa) brahman or Kṛṣṇa) from 
                                               
12 These are: knowledge (jñāna), sovereignty (aiśvarya), power (śakti), strength (bala), valour (vīrya), 




Śaṅkara’s main gnoseological concerns.13  We will, however, draw on the Bhagavad-
Gītā Bhāṣya for his views on provisional ethics (see Chapter 4.3).14 
 
Unlike other Brahmanical schools, Śaṅkara’s Advaita does not hold to the theory of 
multiple ‘selves’, either standing in direct relation to a personal God (re: Dvaita 
Vedānta), or ritually working towards their own private salvation (re: Mīmāṃsa).  In 
fact, even these non-Advaitic schools claim ātman in a “purely formal” manner (Ram-
Prasad, 2011: 220), where ātman pertains to essence rather than personhood.  By 
personhood, I mean an individual with a unique psychological make-up, which 
emerges through social interactions.  But, in a forthcoming paper, Ram-Prasad (2012) 
states that ātman is “too austere for the rich content of individuation”.  So Doniger 
(2010) only confuses the issue by claiming that the “person is the individual soul, the 
atman, or self, which is identical with the brahman” (p168).  While the average Hindu 
may well believe himself to have an ever-lasting individual ‘soul’ (jīvātman); this, 
according to Brahmanical tradition, is a mistaken view.   
 
The mistake, as interpreted by the non-Advaitin, is to assume that one’s actions relate 
to the ātman within, the mere witness (sākṣin) of actions (cf. Bhagavad Gītā).15  The 
                                               
13 This may be unpalatable for many modern Advaitins and they may well be equally justified in 
removing these brackets from their religious worldview.  Much will depend on which of Śaṅkara’s texts 
one takes to be authentic and to which one gives priority.  For example, Otto (1957) arrived at a theistic 
understanding of Śaṅkara through his admitted focus on the Gītā-Bhāṣya (p. xvii).  In taking the Gītā-
Bhāṣya to be an exception to the norm (in that it is greatly outnumbered by non-theistic works), and in 
taking it to be less authoritative to Śaṅkara than the Upaniṣads, I come to a very different conclusion, 
believing that Śaṅkara adopted the Gītā for its emphasis on provisional ethics.  This, I believe, explains 
why Śaṅkara commented on it, despite its obvious theistic bias, and not just because it “enjoyed a very 
high standing” (Klostermaier, 2007: 74). 
 
14 Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Gītā is the earliest extant version (Chari, 2005: xxiii). 
  
15 The Gītā accepts “self-body dualism” (Perrett, 1998: 7) and multiple “indestructible selves” (p18). 
Thus Rosen’s (2002) discussion of the Gītā’s ethics plays on the eternality of “all souls” (p13).  
Śaṅkara does not accept this view of multiple selves (Bh.G.Bh. 2.12; B.S.Bh. II.iii.50).  For the extent 
to which this divides the various Schools of Vedānta, see Chari (2005). 
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mistake, as interpreted by the Advaitin, is that the (socially and psychologically 
constructed) person takes consciousness as being their own, as “mine”; thus failing to 
recognise the singular nature of brahman (Ch.U.Bh. III.xiv.4).  This mistake is what 
allows for the existence of jīvas (in the plural) and their transmigration.  Here jīva is 
used in a manner similar to the Jains, and is comparable with the ātman of other 
Brahmanical schools.  It is no more the pure witness, but is subject to phenomena 
through association with the individual person’s mental apparatus.  The best that such 
a person could hope for, that is, prior to brahman-knowledge, is a symbolic 
meditational and/or devotional relationship with God (Ch.U.Bh., intro).   
 
On the other hand, to see brahman is to see the falsity of the jīva “trope” of 
consciousness, putting an end to rebirth.  For Śaṅkara, then, we are not given a ‘soul’ 
by God.  Nor is it the ‘soul’ that sees and knows itself to be Self, as claimed in the 
Bhagavad Gītā (6.20) and echoed by Otto (1957: 4).  To the Gītā’s (6.20) “seeing the 
Self by the self” (ātmanaṃ paśyann ātmanī), Śaṅkara adds the words “received 
through one’s own mental apparatus” (upalabha mānaḥ sve) (Bh.G.Bh. 6.20), which 
is Śaṅkara’s way of stressing that there is only one self which reveals itself locally.16  
In the final analysis, there is only the attributeless (nirguṇa) all-oneness (sarvathā-
aikyam).  The liberated person, the jīvan-mukta, lives out his days in this ultimate 
consciousness, not as an all-knowing soul, but as brahman embodied, until the karma 
which maintains his body runs out (B.S.Bh. III.iii.32; Ch.U.Bh. VI.xiv.2).  For such a 
gnoseology, culminating in an ideal cognitive state, it is sufficient to reduce ātman-
                                                                                                                                       
 




talk to consciousness-talk.  It is therefore a rather bland Advaitin metaphysics that is 
being offered here.
17
   
 
The consciousness in this consciousness-talk, according to Śaṅkara, is also your 
consciousness and mine.  Derek’s consciousness at t1 and t2 are nothing other than 
brahman.  Consciousness, as true reality, has remained unchanged, only the 
(adventitious) mental imprints in Derek’s mind have changed.  That is, the 
“consciousness of individuals is ontologically identical (though phenomenologically 
different) from that universal consciousness” (Ram-Prasad, 2001a: 178).   And so, at 
the conventional level of discourse, Śaṅkara admits psychological continuity in 
basically the same manner as the Buddhists do.  Mental imprints (saṃskārā), deriving 
from action (karma), which itself derives from the mistaken belief in individual 
agency (kṛtvā), produces the clinging to individual goals.  That is, all imprints are due 
to ignorance (avidyā).  Thus, while accepting rebirth as a phenomenon, his assessment 
of it is essentially negative.  This assessment is in accord with early Buddhism.  
However, we shall see how later Buddhists, like Śāntideva, gave a re-evaluation of 
rebirth in light of the compassionate wish to be reborn for the benefit of others. 
 
It would seem then that any division of Indian philosophical schools into ātmavādins 
and anātmavādins18 (e.g. Perrett, 2002: 377) is insufficient to bring out the import of 
Śaṅkara’s non-dual move.   For example, both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara must answer the 
(Nyāya) objection that, “connection between action and fruit is impossible without an 
[individuated] self” (na karma phala saṃbandho yuktaś ced ātmanā vinā) (BCA. 
                                               
17 I trust that my focus on Śaṅkara’s selfless ethics will save me from the accusation of offering a 
“bloodless gnosis” (see Lipner, 2010: 248).  
 




9.70).  The Dalai Lama, perhaps before he became fully acquainted with Vedānta, also 
seems to overlook Śaṅkara when he writes: 
The non-Buddhists could not even assert the mere selflessness of 
persons, and from that, therefore, they derive the necessity of asserting 




Harvey (1987), on the other hand, does draw the distinction between those that believe 
in an “individual, inner self” (i.e. non-Advaita) and those that believe this self to be 
“universal” (i.e. Advaita).20   He claims that, from a Buddhist point of view, the 
former “encourages selfishness”, while the latter “can encourage impartiality to all” 
(p32).  This seems to be based on the principle that, “As we think the ultimate reality 
to be, so we behave” (Radhakrishnan, 1989: 80).  Yet, believing in an individual 
ātman would only encourage selfishness if one wrongly assumed it to be about a 
private self, somehow linked with one’s own history; that is, by confusing selfhood 
with personhood (see Gītā).  In the words of Śāntideva: “However, egoism, which is 
the cause of suffering, increases from the delusion that there is a self” (duḥkha hetur 
ahaṃkāra ātma mohāt tu vardhate) (BCA. 9.77a).  Here, he takes self to be the 
embodied person, “this dream-like form” (evaṃ svapnopame rūpa) (9.87a), which 
consciousness grasps as being real.   
 
In his Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya (I.i.1), Śaṅkara usefully lists all the different ways in 
which Indians have understood the meaning of ‘self’: as body-only (deha-mātraṃ) 
[Common people (prākṛtā janā) and the Lokāyata School], as mind (cetana), as 
momentary consciousness-only (vijñāna-mātraṃ kṣaṇika) [i.e. Yogācāra], as empty 
                                               
19 The (translator’s?) use of the phrase “independent person” merely adds to the confusion. 
 
20 I should also mention here that, this year, Siderits, et al (2011: 4) have tried to overcome this 
category problem by dividing self-views into three types: substantialist (non-Advaitin), non-
substantialist (Advaitin) and non-self (Buddhist).  This move is a welcome one that will no doubt have 




(śūnya) [i.e. Madhyamaka], as soul separate from the body and/or from God (Īśvaraḥ) 
[i.e. other Vedāntins], and as brahman [Advaita].  Halbfass (1983: 91-92) interprets 
Śaṅkara here to be claiming that even the Madhyamaka are referring to an “absolute 
ātman” when they speak of śūnya; however, he should not be taken this way.  If we 
examine the Upadeśa Sāharsrī, we see that Śaṅkara’s (mistaken) view is that the 
Madhyamaka are total nihilists (vaināśika pakṣatvāt), who believe the body (deha) 
and the self (ātman) to be non-existent (asattvaṃ) (U.S. Prose, 2.55).  
 
But whilst accepting that everyone (barring the Mādhyamika) believes that, in one 
form or other, they have a self, and that no one believes, “I do not exist” (na nāham 
asmīti) (B.S.Bh. I.i.1), Śaṅkara also denounces egoism (U.S. Prose, 1.6) and 
attachment to personhood (see Chapter 3.1).  When claiming that, “The existence of 
the self cannot be denied” (ātmanaḥ pratyākhyātuṃ aśakyatvāt) (B.S.Bh. I.i.4), he 
need only be read as implying the mere “inability to deny the particularity of 
consciousness” (Ram-Prasad, 2001a: 165).   This is so if the ‘non-substantialist’, by 
definition, “sees the self as just consciousness itself” (Siderits, et al, 2011: 4).  And 
there is surely no controversy with the Buddhists here, for who could deny one’s own 
consciousness?   
 
For Advaita, then, the “gnoseological project is the cultivation and disciplining of 
jīva-consciousness through analyzing away the inauthentic features of self found in 
egoity [ahaṃkāra]” (Ram-Prasad, 2011: 221).  And it should also be pointed out that, 
just as knowledge of virtue may co-exist with non-virtuous action, so believing in 
non-self may co-exist with egoism.  Thus, while extreme ‘egoism’ may well be the 
opposite of extreme ‘altruism’, it does not follow that a belief in non-self is 
necessarily altruistic.  The removal of egoity is a gradual affair, and so Buddhists are 
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as prone to it as Hindus.  Indeed, Śāntideva himself cries out, “Oh, why do you not get 
rid of this ‘I’ notion?” (hāhaṃkāraṃ na naśyasi) (BCA. 8.179b).  Thus, a view 
acknowledged by both the Buddhist and the Advaitin is that negative emotions emerge 
from a wrong conception of self, and that one must therefore start by inhibiting one’s 
identification with this false ego-sense.   
 
Śaṅkara’s philosophy would therefore, along with Śāntideva’s, sit outside Parfit’s 
(1971: 26) “principle of self-interest” and, theoretically at least (see my Chapter 7), 
should pass his “principle of impartiality” (Parfit, 1971: 26).  In fact, we might note 
here how Śaṅkara, in his commentary to the Īśā Upaniṣad (5-6), links two Vedic 
verses to explicitly claim a potential view of impartiality and universalism.  First he 
highlights the verse “The Self that is within all” (ya ātmā sarvāntaraḥ) (Bṛ.U. 
III.iv.1), and then links it with the verse: 
yatsu sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmany evān upaśyati   | 
sarva bhūteṣu cātmānaṃ tato na vijugupsate   || 
 
When a man sees all beings in this Self, and the Self in all beings, he 
feels no hatred (Īś.U. 6).   
 
It is also worth comparing this to the Bhagavad Gītā’s: 
sarva bhūtastham ātmānaṃ sarva bhūtāni cātmani    | 
īkṣate yoga yuktātmā sarvatra sama darśanaḥ    || 
 
One who has his mind self-absorbed through yoga, and who has the 
vision of universal sameness, sees his self existing in all things, and all 
things in his self (6.29). 
 
In his commentary (Bh.G.Bh. 6.29), Śaṅkara claims that such a sense of universal 
belonging even extends to “inanimate” (sthāvara) objects.  Besides presenting us with 
the potential for an Advaitin environmental ethics, two important teachings follow 
from this: 1) Just as one who is fully satisfied can have no desire (G.K. 1.9), so he 
27 
 
who is one with the Self can feel no hatred; and 2) from the ultimate perspective of 
Self-knowledge, the other is non-different from oneself.
 21
  This gives an interesting 
twist to the notion that a motivational model of altruism, which focuses on the 
person’s intentions, must allow for “combinations of self-in-others and others-in-self” 
(Krebs & van Hesteren, 1994: 105).
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Śaṅkara’s call for non-hatred can also be gleaned from the Upadeśa Sāharsrī, where 
he illuminates us about the signs of true knowledge: 
śiṣyasya jñānā grahaṇaṃ ca liṅgair buddhvā agrahaṇe hetūn adharma 
laukika pramāda nityānitya viveka viṣayāsaṃjātadṛḍha pūrva śrutatva 
lokacintāvekṣaṇa jātyādyabhimānādīn tat pratipakṣaiḥ śruti-
smṛtivihitaiḥ apanayet, akrodhādibhir ahiṃsādibhiś ca yamaiḥ, 
jñānāviruddhaiś ca niyamaiḥ     ||  
 
When [the teacher] sees by signs that knowledge has not been grasped 
by the pupil, he should remove the causes of non-comprehension, 
which are: [past] sins, worldly heedlessness, lack of firm preliminary 
learning concerning the discrimination between what is eternal and 
non-eternal, listening to worldly opinion, pride of caste, etc – by means 
contrary to those causes, and enjoined by the scriptures, that is non-
anger, etc., non-violence, etc., and those observances which are not 
contrary to knowledge (U.S. Prose, 1.4). 
 
Now Harvey (1987) has claimed that the [Advaitin] universal view “does not 
encourage respect for the individuality of different persons” (p32), by which he means 
“different mind-and-body combinations” (ibid.).  Here Harvey is defining an 
individual in the early Buddhist manner as a combination of mind and form (nāma-
rūpa).  When Perrett (2002) argues that “Indian Buddhist Reductionists … were not 
                                               
21 Cf. Cooper & James (2005: 32) on the connection between Naess’ “deep ecology” and “Self-
Realization”.  Śaṅkara attacks the Buddhist for not believing that inanimate objects were sentient 
(cetanāḥ), accusing the Buddhist of being “dry” (asāra) (Ch.U.Bh. VI.xi.2).   But Jacobsen (1997) 
notes how, for the Buddhist, cetanā means “volition”, which implies a “degree of freedom” (p386).  For 
a recent look at Buddha’s thoughts on trees and plants, see Gombrich (2009: 52-53).  But also note how 
later Buddhism, in China and Japan, came much closer to Advaita.  Thus, Harvey’s (2000) description 
of Dōgen’s ethics as, “Each aspect of nature has an intrinsic value as part of ultimate reality” (p177).    
 
22 Also see Malinar (2007: 111ff) on the Gītā’s “Self of the selves of all beings” (sarva bhūtātma 




Eliminativists about persons” (see above), he has in mind this definition of a person, 
with an implicit link to the concept of the five aggregates (the skandhas).  I shall not 
take up this discussion of respect for individuality here, other than to note two things, 
one regarding Hinduism and the other Buddhism.   
 
First of all, in revealing the concept of a singular brahman, the Advaitin indeed aims 
at the undermining of the conception of the individual, and this ought to be seen as a 
soteriological device.  This need not affect their ethics.  In fact, the Bhagavad Gītā 
specifically addresses its entire discourse to an individual, Arjuna, and Śaṅkara’s 
commentary makes this even more explicit by arguing that certain individuals should 
be exempt from Dharma (as social ethics), whereas Arjuna, in his current state of 
gnosis, or lack of, should not.  As we shall see (Chapter 4.3), social ethics, for 
Śaṅkara, take place within a more preliminary conception of personhood, one which 
adopts a more “extended sense of self” (Ram-Prasad, 2011: 222) which assumes 
social responsibilities.
23
  It is therefore not true that there is “no ‘other’ in Advaita 
Vedānta”, as Krishna (2007: 110) claims.  Secondly, I will simply note that when the 
Madhyamaka School denies the five aggregates ultimate status (see MMK. 4.1-7), we 
may have to ask if this also jeopardizes their respect for the individuality of different 
persons.  Given that Śāntideva did not openly endorse the varṇa system (see Chapter 
7), we will need to develop a more analytical method of investigation.  However, his 
obvious gender bias (see Chapter 7.2) and his even more obvious division of people 
into bodhisattva and non-bodhisattva categories (see Chapter 6.1) does hint at the fact 
that distinctions still apply. 
 
                                               
23 For the source of Ram-Prasad’s notion of an “extended sense of self”, see Zahavi (2008: 138-139) 
and Damasio (2000: 16-17). 
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Now we are in a position to understand how both a Mādhyamika Buddhist, like 
Śāntideva, and an Advaitin, like Śaṅkara, are both going to deny individual 
personhood at the ultimate level, but are both willing to admit the person at the 
conventional level.  They would both be content with Harvey’s (1987) description of a 
man as “not just the sum of heredity and social, psychological … conditions”, but as 
having a “long past in a line of rebirths” (p45).  That is, the man is not only socially 
constructed, but is an accumulation of his own karmic history, and is therefore to be 
taken as a conventional person-as-continuity.  While the name “Derek” may pick out a 
specific embodied person in this life, it may not be used to pick that ‘person’ out in a 
future life.  However, at the conventional level, the future being (human or otherwise), 
whose past karma is connected to Derek, will indeed be part of Derek’s continuum 
(saṃtāna).  Derek dies, but the continuum lives on.  Just as it is for an understanding 
of modern thinkers like Parfit, so this model of continuity is central to understanding 
Advaita and Madhyamaka ethics.   
 
To re-iterate, at the conventional level, man does enjoy the fruits of his actions and, 
according to the laws of karma, will benefit or suffer on the basis of past actions of 
body, speech and mind.  Hence, both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva would accept the 
classical pan-Indian truth that a man “becomes something good through good action 
and something bad through bad action” (puṇyo vai puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati, pāpaḥ 
pāpeneti) (Bṛ.U. III.ii.13).  And while the Buddha may have shifted the nature of 
karma back to “intention” (cetanā), the notion that “people make their own ‘destiny’ 
by their actions” (Harvey, 1990: 40) remained a central tenet of Buddhism. For 
example, Śāntideva writes that, “Suffering and happiness are the result of action” 
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(karmaṇaḥ sukha duḥkhe) (BCA. 9.122a). 24   However, at the ultimate level of 
analysis, there is no underlying entity to which all this happens.  The belief that there 
is a single, unique, entity throughout life to which all these events happen is a 
mistaken one.  Śāntideva and Śaṅkara, if they were alive today, would agree with 
Metzinger (2004: 563) that, “No such thing as selves exist in the world”.  These are all 
but shadows. 
 
As we have already noted, Parfit suggests that through his insight into the lack of 
personhood, he was liberated from the fear of death and from a selfish attitude 
towards his own needs.  This is understandable, for “fear and attachment are closely 
interdependent and the absence of one inevitably leads to the nonoccurrence of the 
other” (Brassard, 2000: 48).  So we will find both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva stressing 
both the state of non-fear (nirbhaya) and non-attachment (anāsakti).  To let go of the 
self is possibly the most fearful thing for man.  But as we now know, Śāntideva and 
Śaṅkara are not denying our personhood, only the notion of a permanent individuated 
essence behind the person. It is this denial of the ultimacy of the individuated self by 
both traditions that gave rise to the “Selfless Response” found in the title of this thesis.  
But a man free of attachment and fear is surely free to be ‘selfless’ in a more altruistic 
sense, for fear and attachment “can stand in the way of acting on one’s obligation to 
help others overcome suffering” (Siderits, 2003: 201).   
 
 
                                               
 
24 For a new look at the similarities and differences in karma doctrine in Vedānta and early Buddhism, 
see Gombrich (2009).  I will not make much of the move towards intention: firstly, because I believe 
that the idea that it “created a vast gulf” between Buddhism and Brahmanism (p43) is an exaggeration 
which fails to take into account the more extended meaning of karma in Hinduism (see Olivelle, 1992: 
61).  Also see Lipner (2010: 251) on the importance of intention in Rāmānuja’s interpretation of the 
Gītā.  Secondly, the “gulf” all but disappears when we consider Śaṅkara’s non-ritualism which 
dissociates karma from ritual action. 
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So, we can see how the term ‘Selfless’ may come to have three meanings in this text: 
 
1) I will use ‘selfless’ (nirmamaḥ) to indicate an ethical approach to the world, a 
form of conduct which aims to eradicate egoism, first by eliminating hatred 
and desire, and then by removing ignorance, especially the ignorance that 
leads to the assumption that one is an individuated self.  For Śaṅkara, this 
ignorance, or nescience, takes the form of non-knowledge (a-vidyā, a-jñānaṃ) 
of the true ‘Self’, which is brahman.  Śaṅkara thus holds that our 
consciousness, our sense of presence, is but an aspect of brahman’s 
consciousness, which is all-pervading.  For Śāntideva, ignorance may be taken 
as either a false belief in an individuated self (ātman), or again as avidyā, in 
the sense of non-realization of the inter-dependence of all phenomena 
(pratītyasamutpāda), spoken of as emptiness (śūnyatā).   
 
2) This leads to the second meaning of ‘selfless’ (better ‘self-less’), the 
metaphysical view held by both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva that the individual has 
no permanent individuated ‘self’.  For Śaṅkara, this amounts to saying that 
when the true Self (brahman) is known, the “imagined” individuated self (jīva) 
is no longer given any credence.  However, this imagined self is given 
provisional status by Śaṅkara, who takes it to be that which transmigrates as a 
“subtle self” (liṅgātman) for those who fail to know brahman (Bṛ.U.Bh. 
IV.iv.2).  Here, the self is individuated in the sense that it is the same ‘self’ that 
leaves one body and takes up another body, which accounts for karmic 
continuity.  But such transmigration ends with knowledge of brahman, and 
with this knowledge the (illusory) jīva also ends.  As such, this provisional self 
is impermanent.  Even so, being provisional, it is not non-existent, and as such 
32 
 
Śaṅkara may lean on the jīva (as well as the authority of the Vedas) as a focus 
of moral agency.  The jīva, for Śaṅkara, was therefore a “point of contact 
between metaphysics and ethics” (Isayeva, 1993: 218).  Of course, this “agent” 
will be shrouded in nescience, and thus all action prior to the dawning 
knowledge of brahman is, to varying degrees, deluded action.   
  
For Śāntideva, there is no such provisional self, self-talk almost being a 
“taboo” in Buddhism (Collins, 1982: 12 & 71-77), just as the doctrine of 
difference is formally “forbidden” (pratiṣiddha) in Advaita (U.S. Prose, 1.26-
30).  Nevertheless, Śāntideva will also make use of the fact that people believe 
themselves to be individuated in his call for a regime of daily meditation 
leading to a personal commitment to selfless conduct.  Even here though, 
under ultimate meditational analysis, impermanence applies to every moment 
of consciousness.  Hence, even though the ‘person’ who meditates and takes 
on the Bodhisattva Vow may be accepted as real, there is no permanent 
underlying self as ātman or as jīva.  So, although consciousness is in some 
sense individual and eternal (in the sense of being both beginning-less and 
end-less), it is nevertheless to be seen as impermanent (anitya) due its 
momentariness (kṣaṇikatva).  Transmigrations still take place, yet this is due to 
a consciousness-as-continuum rather than any permanent underlying 
individuated entity.  In fact, due to the Vow (praṇidhāna) demanded by 
Śāntideva’s ethics, transmigrations ought never to come to an end, as the 
“karmic potency of the vow falls upon successive” rebirths (Matics, 1971: 18).   




3) Finally, the third use of ‘selfless’ (better ‘Self-less’) applies only to Śāntideva, 
for his theory that all is inter-dependent also acts as a denial of any substratum.  
There is therefore no brahman, no universal ground of all consciousness, the 
only ‘Self’ that Śaṅkara acknowledges in the ultimate sense. 
 
Due to the delusions of mankind, people are bound to this world, and so both Śaṅkara 
and Śāntideva are forced into accepting a conventional cultural reality.  Both will 
argue that the way these average worldly beings see the world is fundamentally 
flawed.  For Śaṅkara, this world is not made up of independent objects and beings, but 
is in fact all but a transformation of the one brahman.  For Śāntideva, neither objects 
nor beings exist from their own side.  Nothing has the independent existence assumed 
by the worldly; everything is inter-dependent, existing due to causes and conditions.    
 
Both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva will argue that the worldly grasp at this world, imagining 
that by owning (impermanent) objects they will somehow find permanent happiness.  
Even the religious, who seek an (impermanent) divine realm for an (illusory) self, are 
surely deluded.  However, it is here in this world of nescience that religion finds its 
true meaning.  Therefore, both will equally denounce any attempt to deny this world 
of beings and physical objects.  Hence, both will make strong appeals against any call 
for an idealism which might deny the role of ethical action and intention.   
 
Both will go on to make use of a language of Two Truths (satya-dvaya), the 
conventional and the ultimate.  Convention may be adopted in order to benefit those 
caught up in the ‘false’ or ‘mistaken’ (mithyā) image of the world, but these 
conventions are not to be taken as ultimately valid.  The common aim of Śaṅkara and 
Śāntideva will be the liberation (mokṣa, mukti) of beings from nescience (avidyā).  
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Liberation for Śaṅkara is a state of freedom which comes when one has dropped the 
mistaken belief in an individuated self and thus become one with the all-knowing 
universal consciousness (see Chapter 5.1).   Liberation for Śāntideva is the state of 
freedom which comes when one has dropped the false notion of self and gained a 
realisation of emptiness, the fact of dependent origination (see Chapter 5.2).  Both will 
posit a living example, an embodied human being who is at once complete with the 
wisdom of the tradition, yet somehow beyond that tradition, an ideal of moral conduct, 
yet somehow beyond traditional moral law. 
  
For Śaṅkara, the liberation which comes about when one sees that all is brahman is 
more than gnoseological, it is also the more final liberation from the cycle of rebirth.  
This is therefore the brahman-knower’s last incarnation.  Even so, whilst still 
embodied, the liberated Advaitin (jīvan-mukta) will act selflessly and without fear of 
death.  For Śāntideva, liberation is purely in gnoseological terms.  He will demand 
that the bodhisattva use this insight to liberate other beings, not just in this life, but in 
future lives.  His insight into self-lessness is thus, paradoxically, a call to the ‘self’ to 
use that (ontological) self-lessness to be more actively selfless.  The ‘self’ is 
maintained to a certain degree through what we might call a “voluntary delusion” (see 
Chapter 2).  Śāntideva then plays on the fact that we have now had an insight into 
non-self, but that we also remember what it was like to believe in a self (see Chapter 
6.1).  The bodhisattva thus has, what Metzinger (2004) calls, the “availability of 
earlier processing stages” (p566).  By fully adopting the ultimate view of emptiness 
(śūnyatā) towards one’s own ‘self’ one is free to be (emotionally) selfless.  By 
maintaining and accepting a deliberately delusional attitude towards the ‘selves’ of 
others, one is motivated into (ethically) selfless action.  Such moments of volition, 
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brought about by the general willingness to help others, generate the mental 
formations which guarantee rebirth.   
 
Adhering solely to the ultimate side of Buddhist analysis, Stone (1988) has claimed 
that “if we exist at all we come and go in a moment” (p532).  Whilst accepting 
Siderits’ (1997: 461) critique that Stone mistakenly identifies the Buddha with 
Eliminativism, this statement of momentariness would have some appeal to a 
Mādhyamika like Śāntideva.  Nevertheless, Śāntideva would want to add that the label 
‘person’ has its value at the level of moral decision-making, thus reclaiming the 
Reductionist ground.  Whilst developing my theory of “flickering” in both Śāntideva 
and Śaṅkara (see Chapter 2), I will also argue throughout the thesis that their basic 
acceptance of provisional reality allows for a much more permanent sense of the 
other, one which assumes fellow interlocutors. 
 
Perhaps we can imagine Śaṅkara’s non-dualistic response as being: “We ‘exist’ up 
until the moment that we realize that all is brahman, from whence ‘we’ no longer 
exist”.  But even here, the enlightened are entitled to turn back towards the world with 
sufficient compassion to see the “we” in us.  In either case, Madhyamaka and Advaita 
demonstrate a thesis which assumes an ultimate lack of individual agency combined 
with an acceptance of that agency on both conventional and ethical grounds.  This 
being the case, we may feel uneasy with Siderits’ (1997) description of persons as 
“conceptual fictions” (p464).  Even if Giles (1993: 176) turns out to be right in 
assigning such a view to Hume (on the basis of his “bundle” theory) - a debate I will 
not pursue here - the ethical commitments of the Buddhist and Advaita traditions in 
India (as well as Tibet) should warn us against any such claim with regard to our 
Eastern counterparts.  In fact, both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara wish to take these persons 
36 
 
(as “Derek” and “Mark” and “James” and “you”) as very much part of their reality.  It 
would therefore seem that both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara are in an ideal position to 
answer those who know not how one could possibly live with such a counter-intuitive 
truth of non-individuation.   
 
Let us see then how these two apparently opposing versions of revisionary 
metaphysics, espoused by Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, impact on the ethics of their 
traditions.  How do these traditional ethical stances hold up to the theories of radical 
non-duality and emptiness, respectively? How indeed is one to live with the truth of 
non-individuation?  What are the cognitive and emotive states of living liberation?  
Further, let us perhaps learn from their endeavours, and judge for ourselves whether 






Objectives and Hermeneutics: 
 
This thesis continues a modern trend in Indian philosophy, the treatment of Buddhist 
and Brahmanical thinkers side by side, being subjected to analytic scrutiny (Ganeri, 
Kapstein, Ram-Prasad, etc).  It is not my intention to show one system of thought to 
be superior to the other, nor to use one to show up the faults of the other.  Rather I 
wish to present both on equal terms, as two answers to what they perceived as one 
fundamental question: how should one respond meaningfully to a world that is like an 
illusion, a world that is not quite what we perceive it to be?  How ought we to react to 
this conscious, embodied existence that is fundamentally flawed, filled with suffering?   
 
Yet this is no comparison for its own sake, simply placing two independent treatises 
side-by-side, showing up their similarities and differences.  Rather, what I wish to 
demonstrate here is that two thinkers, from apparently conflicting religions, with 
radically opposite metaphysical starting points, may even so adopt a methodology that 
is remarkably similar, not only in structure, but in content and purpose.   To reiterate, 
that a confirmed ātmavādin (self-doctrine follower) may so closely parallel an equally 
confirmed anātmavādin (not-self doctrine follower) in the denial of individual agency 
and may so similarly argue for the ethical and soteriological consequences that follow 
from this intuition is nothing less than remarkable. Such a coincidence of 
philosophical analysis by two authoritative voices surely demands that we take a fresh 




Furthermore, while this thesis is set up as a comparison of Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, it is 
also, by default, a comparison of the Hindu Advaita Vedānta School and the Indian-
Buddhist Madhyamaka School.  That I chose Śaṅkara to represent the views of 
Advaita Vedānta surely needs no explanation, his Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya generally 
being considered the School’s foundational text.  However, my choice of Śāntideva to 
represent the Indian Madhyamaka School may well come as a surprise to some.  True, 
like Śaṅkara, Śāntideva is viewed as an “authentic” voice within the tradition, a voice 
that continues to be quoted to this day.  But unlike Śaṅkara, Śāntideva’s 
pronouncements do not constitute the “seeds” of his tradition’s rhetoric, which (most 
scholars agree) are to be found in the writings of Nāgārjuna.   Thus, most discussions 
of the Two Truths would take Śaṅkara and Nāgārjuna as their two major protagonists 
(e.g. Sprung, 1973: 2-3).   
 
My choice then of Śāntideva (as opposed to Nāgārjuna) needs further explanation, and 
can thus be reduced to three broad reasons: 
1) It is believed (by most modern historians) that Śāntideva was 
contemporary with Śaṅkara, which means that they were debating 
within the same Indian philosophical milieu. Nāgārjuna is 
presumed to have lived several centuries earlier. 
 
2) I wish to demonstrate how both Advaita and Madhyamaka opposed 
and refuted the views of the Yogācāra.  Nāgārjuna pre-dates the 
rise of the Yogācāra School.25 
 
3) I wish to highlight the value that both traditions put on embodied 
conduct, and Śāntideva is indeed the most dominant Mādhyamika 
voice on this issue.
26
 
                                               
25 For an alternative view, which has Nāgārjuna living for 600 years (!) and thus witnessing the rise of 
the Yogācāra School, see Hopkins (1996: 356-364). 
 
26 The Wallaces state that Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra is the “primary source of most of Tibetan 
Buddhist literature on the cultivation of altruism” (Wallace & Wallace, 1997: 7).  In contrast, 
Westerhoff (2009) notes that, in Nāgārjuna, the “specific ethical consequences of Madhyamaka thought 
are virtually absent” (p215), and that it was left to later writers to explore those ethical dimensions 
(p216). Finnigan and Tanaka (2011) write that, “The Mādhyamika thinker most famous for his 
explicitly ethical concern is Śāntideva” (p222). 
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There are those who would like to obliterate the difference between Madhyamaka and 
Advaita Vedānta by collapsing one into the other.  This is done by either making the 
emptiness (śūnyatā) of Madhyamaka into an Absolute (e.g. Murti, Conze & Ninian 
Smart)
27
, or else by taking the quality-less (nirguṇa) brahman of Advaita Vedānta to 
be a form of emptiness (e.g. Dasgupta)
28
 or by simply claiming that Buddhism is a 
form of Hinduism (e.g. Radhakrishnan & Vivekananda).  But what I say here is, no, 
let emptiness be empty (even of itself) (BCA 9.32), and let the quality-less brahman 
be full of its being (sat) and its consciousness (cit) (U.S. Metric, 17.13).  In other 
words, let these schools be the opponents, or even “arch-antagonists” (Klostermaier, 
2007: 357), they themselves assumed they were.  But having allowed them this much, 
let us then demonstrate just how close they were, not in doctrine or tradition, but in 
objectives and methodology. 
 
Hence this thesis will follow Śaṅkara and Śāntideva as they both struggle to construct 
a philosophy which will attempt to leave their respective conduct-oriented traditions 
                                                                                                                                       
 
27 Conze (1967) claims that, “the system of the Mādhyamikas was based on the implication of a vision 
of the Absolute” (p215).  This notion turns emptiness into a ground, which it is not.  Conze’s (2001: 
105) “ineffable Oneness” and “Spirit” sound more like Advaita than Buddhism (cf. V.C. 482).  Conze 
(2001: 90) leans on Murti; but King (1995: 233) rightly states that the “absolutism that scholars such as 
T.R. Murti find in the mainstream philosophical texts of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism simply is not 
present!”.  While limiting himself to the work of Nāgārjuna, Streng (1973) also speaks up against the 
view of Conze and Murti.  For Murti’s response to Streng, see Murti (1973: 22-23).  On the 
Madhyamaka School as a whole, Williams emphatically states, “There is no Absolute” (in Crosby & 
Skilton, 1995: xxiii).  Huntington (1989: 22) also calls the absolutist view a “fatal misconception”.  
Hopkins (1996) points out that the “division of the two truths is not an ontological division” (p418), 
thus warning against the use of the term “Absolute” (p420).  Matilal (1973) likewise points out 
Madhyamaka’s “non-committal attitude in ontology” (p55).  Ninian Smart (1964) was therefore wrong 
to speak of Madhyamaka and Advaita as “two forms of Absolutism” (p105).   
 
28 Dasgupta’s (1975) statement, that it is “difficult indeed to distinguish between pure being and pure 
non-being” (p493) would seem to have the backing of one Anthony Flew (2005: 44).  However, as 
Murti (1973: 10) points out, Vedānta starts by taking ātman as ultimately real, whereas Buddhism starts 
by rejecting its ultimacy.  So, historically speaking, we can never simply collapse one tradition’s beliefs 
into the other.  While Vedānta is asking how to define this Being, Madhyamaka is saying that there 
never was such Being.  These are widely different standpoints.  Dasgupta’s mistake is to ignore history, 
while Murti’s mistake, in return, is to reify Madhyamaka’s emptiness.  Needless to say, this does not 
imply that Flew (2005) was wrong in his evaluation of the history of ideas (p88), for Flew’s goal was 




intact, whilst at the same time putting forward a radical view of the absence of an 
ultimate moral agent.  We will come to understand that both wish to: 
1) Deny the ultimacy of the individual agent. 
2) Deny the (Yogācāra) denial of the world. 
3) Leave intact a form of conduct consistent with moral agency. 
 
In the broadest sense I see this comparison as having the following logic:  Having 
highlighted how radically opposite the metaphysics of Śāntideva and Śaṅkara are,  I 
will go on to show how this, quite surprisingly, leads the two models to agree on their 
denial of the ultimacy of the individuated self, the philosophical core of the 
comparison.  I will then propose that they both continue to subscribe to the ethics of 
their respective traditions.  They will both insist that the ideal person, who truly knows 
reality (tattva), will naturally act according to the Law of moral correctness 
(Dharma), albeit in an unconventional manner.  A liberated being approaches the 
world according to a Two-Truths (satya-dvaya) model, by which I mean a system 
whereby it is assumed that there are certain people who can see reality as-it-is (yathā-
bhūmata) and who stand out against the vast majority who cannot.  These people are 
aware of the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), of how things truly are.  At the other 
end of the spectrum, there are the common folk, who are only privy to the relative 
world of objects and means.  In taking this epistemological approach, I will be 
speaking of “Truths” more often than “Realities”, though the notion of “Two-
Realities” will also feature in my analysis of Śaṅkara’s view of the world (see Chapter 
6.2).  The relative truth is referred to under various Sanskrit terms, ‘vyāvahārika’, 
‘prātibhāsika’, or ‘saṃvṛtti’.  Often, however, the term adopted by both Śāntideva and 
Śaṅkara is ‘loka’, the ‘worldly’.  Here they are either bowing to consensus or 
contrasting it with the views of the wise.  Though never claiming to be liberated or 
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enlightened, both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara will adopt this mode of epistemological 
(and/or) ontological analysis.   Our first and primary hermeneutical tool then is this 
Two-Truths stance, and an awareness of the shifts in truth-levels.   
 
It is noteworthy that Śāntideva begins his chapter on wisdom (prajñā) in the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra (from here on, BCA) with these verses: 
saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaś ca satya-dvayam idaṃ mataṃ    |  
buddher agocaras tattvaṃ buddhiḥ saṃvṛtir ucyate     || 
tatra loko dvidhā dṛṣṭo yogī prākṛtakas tathā     | 
tatra prākṛtako loko yogilokena bādhyate     || 
 
It is declared that there are two truths, the conventional and the 
ultimate.  Reality is not within the scope of the intellect.  The intellect 
is said to be [grounded in the] conventional.  Thus people are seen to 
be of two types, the ordinary and the yogis.  The views of the ordinary 
are superseded by those of the yogi (BCA. 9.2-3).  
 
The yogi then is not simply an intelligent person; he is one with a superior insight into 
nature.  Likewise, Śaṅkara will state that only the brahman-knower (brahma-jñānin, 
brahma-vid) is privy to the ultimate view of things, not the ritualist, believing as he 
does in a separate God: 
ātma-jñānasya kartavyatvāt   |  ātmā ca aśanāyādi dharmavān na 
bhavatīti sādhana phala vilakṣaṇo jñātavyaḥ; ato ‘vyatirekeṇa 
ātmano jñānam avidyā ‘anyo ‘sāvanyo ‘ham asmīti’ ‘na sa veda’ ... 
śrutibhyaḥ 
 
Self-knowledge is to be attained, and the self - being devoid of the 
attributes of hunger, etc. - is to be distinguished from the means and 
fruits of ritual action.  To understand the self as being identified 
with these is ignorance.  As it says in [this] Upaniṣad [I.iv.9]: “He 
[who worships another God thinking] ‘He is one, and I am another’ 
does not know” (Bṛ.U.Bh. III.v.1). 
 
Nor is the one who insists on relying on the intellect, privy to the ultimate: 
api ca mithyā-jñāna puraḥ sare ‘yam ātmano buddhy upādhi 
saṃbaṃdhaḥ   |   na ca mithyā-jñānasya samyag-jñānād anyatra 
nivṛttir astītyato yāvad brahmātmatān avabodhaḥ tāvad ayaṃ buddhy 




Moreover, this connection of the self with the adjunct of intellect has 
forever been associated with misunderstanding and misunderstanding 
cannot come to an end except through right knowledge.  Hence, so 
long as there is no realisation of the Self as brahman, so long does the 
connection with the intellect persist (B.S.Bh. II.iii.30). 
 
There is a problem with this model however.  It leads one to believe that something is 
either ultimate or relative.  That is, it leads to an either/or methodology.  But to jump 
to this conclusion would be to completely misinterpret both traditions.  What we need 
to realise is that knowledge or wisdom is not an all or nothing situation.  Both 
Śāntideva and Śaṅkara will offer a gradual approach to complete knowledge.  Taber 
(1983) has argued that Śaṅkara’s philosophy is “transformative”, by which he means 
that he accepts certain virtues and practices as “necessary means” to liberation (p5).  
Śāntideva is working within the classic six pāramitā (perfections) schema of means 
(i.e. generosity, morality, patience, effort, meditation) and wisdom.
29
  Reaching a new 
stage of perfection implies a new level (bhūmi) of understanding, so there are clearly 
those that must partially know the whole truth.   
 
It is interesting that Kohlberg’s “much discussed work on moral development” (Scott 
& Seglow, 2007: 69-70) also describes six “hard” stages (Krebs & van Hesteren, 
1994: 106) of moral development which successively transform and displace each 
other.  I do not intend to make too much of this here for two reasons: 1) Śāntideva’s 
stages do seem to be “softer” than those found in, say, the Daśabhūmika Sūtra, and 2) 
Kohlberg-like “hard-stages” models seem to be going out of vogue (Krebs & van 
Hesteren, 1994: 108).  In fact, they were already coming under attack in the late 
1970’s for being too rigid and for ignoring social factors (Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 
                                               
29 That is: dāna, śīla, kṣānti, vīrya, dhyāna and prajñā.  While this is not made completely explicit in 




1978: 22).  Krebs and van Hesteren (1994) prefer a model based on what they call a 
“soft conception of stages” which implies “quantitative increases in cognitive capacity 
or competence” (p107).  It is particularly interesting that they suggest that people 
“may well behave at a high level in one domain and at a low level in another” (ibid.).  
This would presumably allow a yogi, who had reached a certain level of “seeing”, to 
remain prone to seeing the world in a manner more in line with the conventional 
norms of perception.
30
  It would also allow for a yogi to cognize the world in terms of 
“old stage-structures” (p110).  Also, given that people are able to “flexibly shift” 
between stages (Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1978: 150-151), there seems no reason 
why we should not allow for involuntary and/or voluntary “flickering” between levels, 
a notion I will draw on throughout this thesis. 
 
In the Buddhist tradition, those that partially know the truth are sometimes referred to 
as ‘bodhisattvas’, and at other times as ‘yogis’.  It is therefore of paramount 
importance that Śāntideva follows the above introductory verses with the following 
line: “Moreover, the views of some yogis are superseded by the views of others of 
even higher wisdom” (bādhyante dhīviśeṣeṇa yogino ‘py uttarottaraiḥ) (BCA. 9.4a).31  
Commentaries indicate that a yogi is anyone who has attained the path of seeing 
(darśana mārga)32 (Sweet, 1977: 56-57).   The Dalai Lama states that, “when one 
cognises emptiness directly for the first time, the path of seeing is attained” (Gyatso, 
1975: 45), and one enters the first stage (bhūmi).  In the Śikṣa Samuccaya (from here 
                                               
30 On the notion of “bi-levelled” seeing in Vedānta, see Timalsina (2006: 146). 
 
31 The Śikṣa Samuccaya (Compendium) even divides the ignorant into categories (Ś.S. 180-181), 
speaking of the “more deluded” types (mūḍhatarāṇām). 
 
32 This is the third path (mārga) of five, as described by Vasubandhu and Asaṅga.  These are the paths 
of preparation (sambhāra), application (prayoga), seeing (darśana), cultivation (bhāvanā) and 




on, Compendium), Śāntideva distinguishes between those who have entered the stages 
(bhūmi-praviṣṭam) and “ordinary” men (pṛthag-jana) (Ś.S. 140).  Of these ordinary 
men, Śāntideva says that their minds waver (cala cittatāyā).  But once we understand 
that “even an ordinary man” (pṛthag-jano ‘pi) can be a bodhisattva (Ś.S. 6), we see 
that they are only “ordinary” when compared with those bhūmi-praviṣṭam, and are 
thus an intermediate category, the so-called “commencing” bodhisattva (ādikarmika-
bodhisattva).
33
  But there is also an indication that one may fall back from a higher 
level of realisation.  In the BCA, Śāntideva says that a male bodhisattva may still fall 
under the spell of a beautiful woman because “at the time of seeing her, the influence 
of emptiness [in him] is weak” (tad dṛṣṭi kāle tasyāto durbalā śūnya vāsanā) (BCA. 
9.31b).   Thus, we see that meditation on emptiness can lead to “different degrees” of 
wisdom (prajñā) (Williams, 2009: 79) as it “proceeds through a number of stages” 
(p80) (see Chapter 5.2).  It is due to such experience and development that one yogi’s 
wisdom may be said to be higher than another’s.34 
 
With a similar stress on gradualism and levels of wisdom, Śaṅkara states that the 
scriptures, “gradually remove [the pupil’s] ignorance about [the Self]” (śanais tad 
viṣayam ajñānaṃ nivartayituṃ) (U.S. Prose, 1.42).  And again:  
cittopadhi viśeṣa tāratamyādātmanaḥ kūṭastha nityasyaika rupasyāpy 
uttarottaramāviṣkṛtasya tāratamyamaiśvaryaśakti viśeṣaiḥ śrūyate    || 
 
One hears about the Self – unchanging and eternally uniform though it 
is – that there remains a difference in the degree of manifestation of 
glory and power, caused by the gradation of the minds through which 
it is conditioned (B.S.Bh. I.i.11).   
                                               
33 I take this to mean either a person who came to Buddhism through the Mahāyāna, or one who has 
converted from the Śrāvaka (individual liberation) path.  The Compendium was intended for such 
people (Ś.S. 356). 
 
34 Kelsang Gyatso (1994: 287) interprets the notion of higher yogis (BCA. 9.4a) to be referring to those 
of the Prāsaṅgika School, but I find this doubtful (see note 7 on p15). Cf. Dalai Lama (2005: 30) and 





Moreover, “It is known that the gradation of authorization is determined by people’s 
abilities, predilections, etc” (prasiddhaṃ cārthitvasāmarthyāvid vattādhikṛtam 
adhikaitāratamyam) (B.S.Bh. I.4).  Furthermore, Śaṅkara talks of those aspirants of 
slow or middling understanding (manda madhya pratipattṝn prati), who must rely on 
meditation and symbolic devices (Ka.U.Bh. I.ii.17).
35
  Again, Śaṅkara says of 
meditation on the letter ‘OM’, that: 
tānyotāny upāsanāni sattva śuddhi karatvena vastu 
tattvāvabhāsakatvāt advaita jñāna upakārakāni 
 
These recitations are supplementary aids towards a non-dual 
realisation by way of presenting a flash of true reality through the 
purification of the mind (Ch.U.Bh., intro). 
 
Moreover, Śaṅkara even admits that a brahman-knower may remain with his wife and 
desire worldly objects due to deep-seated tendencies which “cannot suddenly be 
dropped” (na sahasā nivartayituṃ) (Ch.U.Bh. VIII, intro).  But if the “empirical world 
of multiplicity” truly disappeared from the consciousness of a brahman-knower (see 
Deutsch, 1973: 84), how would this knower even recognise his wife or any other thing 
as being an object of particular value?  Gandhi (2009: 150) once said: 
The idea that the Brahman is real and that the visible universe is 
illusory is simply beyond the capacity of our reason to comprehend.  
How difficult it must be, then, to live according to it, to live forever 
absorbed in the Atman. 
 
Gandhi adopts this move to demonstrate the advantages of the path of karma-yoga in 
tandem with devotion to a personal God; but I adopt it to show that the majority of 
seers are simply not “forever absorbed”, be they Hindu or Buddhist.  In fact, Gandhi 
later adopts such a view when he states that the free ethical reign given by Kṛṣṇa to 
                                               
35 On the irony of Śaṅkara attacking the Buddha for (supposedly) adopting different levels of teaching 
to meet aspirants’ needs (B.S.Bh. II.ii.32) and yet praising the Upaniṣads for doing the same thing, see 
Halbfass (1983: 90-91). 
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one without a sense of “I” (Bh.G. 18.17) is in fact written about an “imaginary, ideal” 
figure (Gandhi, 2009: 191).  In other words, no such person exists.  And we should 
note that Śaṅkara speaks of “teachers who are almost omniscient” (sarva-jña kalpair 
ācāryaiḥ) being capable of imparting brahman knowledge (P.U.Bh., intro).  So when 
comparing the Advaitin teacher with their students and others, we are talking about 
relative wisdom rather than omniscience versus ignorance. 
 
This calls for a second hermeneutical tool, for we now have those that fully know 
reality, those that partially know reality (through glimpses of its nature), and those 
that simply know not.  While the first tool was ontological in nature, this will need to 
be more epistemological.  It is of paramount importance to realise that both Śāntideva 
and Śaṅkara assume the average person to be epistemically deluded.  As Śāntideva 
puts it:  
lokena bhāvā dṛśyante kalpyante cāpi tattvataḥ    | 
na tu māyā-vad ity atra vivādo yogi lokayoḥ    || 
 
Ordinary people see existent things and imagine them to be real.  They 
do not see them as illusion-like.  This is where there is dispute 
between the worldly and the yogis (BCA. 9.5). 
 
And even the Brahmins come under attack from Śaṅkara: 
kartṛ bhoktṛ sva-bhāva vijñānavataḥ taj janita karma phala rāga 
dveṣādi doṣavataś ca karmavidhānāt  ... tasmāt avidyādi doṣavat eva 
karmāṇi vidhīyante; na advaita jñānavataḥ 
 
Rites are enjoined for a person who naturally has the notion of being 
an agent and an enjoyer, and who is possessed of the defects of 
attraction for and aversion against the results of such rites ... Therefore 
rites are enjoined only for those who have such defects as ignorance, 
etc., but not for one who is possessed of non-dual knowledge 
(Ch.U.Bh., intro). 
 
But the yogis themselves are prone to certain errors until they are fully enlightened.  
And though not as explicit as Śāntideva about levels of knowledge, Śaṅkara will also 
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note this tendency to err by those who have yet to be fully established (sthita) in 
brahman (Bṛ.U. Bh. I.iv.10).  And as we have just seen, these errors can compromise 
the ascetic ideals of Śaṅkara.  Flaws aside, they are still to be known as men of 
realisation.   
 
I will refer to these people in the middle category as having a “flickering” 
consciousness, i.e. one which flickers between common delusions and knowing the 
ultimate truth.  In the case of Śāntideva, we see that flickering is apparently imposed 
on the bodhisattva in order to maintain a focus for a compassionate response to those 
who suffer.  He writes: 
yadi sattvo na vidyeta kasyopari kṛpeti cet     | 
kāryārtham abhyupetena yo mohena prakalpitaḥ     || 
kāryaṃ kasya na cet sattvaḥ satyamīhā tu mohataḥ     | 
duḥkha vyupaśamārthaṃ tu kārya moho na vāryate     || 
 
[If you argue] “For whom is compassion if no beings exist?”  [We 
respond] For anyone who [our voluntary] delusion projects for the sake 
of what must be done.  [Objection]  Whose is the task to be done if 
there are no beings?  [Response] True, the work is indeed delusional, 
but in order to bring about the end of suffering, the delusion which 
conceives the task is not restrained (BCA. 9.75-76). 
 
In the case of Śaṅkara, flickering is my way of saving him from contradiction when he 
claims that one needs to have given up the world of form in order to be enlightened, 
but then speaks of those enlightened ones who still fall under the illusion of form.   
 
Śaṅkara’s ingenious solution is to speak of the strength of past tendencies which, once 
in a while, may create obstacles to clear seeing.  He writes:  
bādhitam api tu mithyā-jñānaṃ dvi-caṃdra jñāna vat saṃskāra vaśāt 




However, mistaken cognition, even when annulled, continues for a 
while owing to the influence of past tendencies, like the cognition of 
two moons [due to an eye condition]
 36
 (B.S.Bh. IV.i.15). 
 
Again, in the Bṛ.U.Bh, Śaṅkara says that there are those who hold that brahman-
knowers maintain desire for sexual union (saṃbandhaṃ) and accuses them of not 
having listened to the Upaniṣad (Bṛ.U.Bh. II.iv., intro).  And yet, in the Ch.U.Bh, 
Śaṅkara makes what appear to be two contradictory statements about the relationship 
between men of knowledge and women.  First he tells us that a man of knowledge 
(viduṣaḥ), unlike the worldly, does not amuse (krīḍati) himself with women 
(VII.xxv.2), and then he tells us that, due to past habits dying hard, the spontaneous 
detachment brought about by realization may not be sufficient to hold back the force 
of lustful tendencies, and so injunctions of celibacy, etc. (brahmacaryādi) become 
necessary (VIII, intro).  But if one who desires after women cannot possibly know the 
Self, then how does this situation arise?  The answer lies in the above notion of latent 
tendencies (saṃskarā/vāsanā). 
 
Here I wish to note that my concept of “flickering” is more useful than Marcaurelle’s 
either/or interpretation of Śaṅkara’s position.  Marcaurelle (2000) states that, for 
Śaṅkara, “one can either identify with the desireless and actionless Self or with the 
personality of a householder nourished by desire, but not with both at the same time” 
(p132, emphasis mine).   But where there are latent tendencies, there is also flickering, 
                                               
36 The two-moon (dvi-candra) analogy is repeated at B.S.Bh. III.ii.21 and C.U.Bh.II.xxiii.1, where the 
eye condition is given as “timira” and “taimirika” respectively.  The same condition is mentioned in 
Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā (58.7-9), which includes the phrase “taimirika dvi-candra”.  Skoog (1996: 
66) refers to the condition as “diplopia”, whereas Arnold (2005: 149) relates it to “cataracts”.  The term 
“timira” is also found in the U.S. (Prose, 1.40), with Jagadānanda (1941: 29) referring to the condition 
as “amaurosis”.  It is also found in the Diamond-Sūtra (32) as one of the nine analogies of illusion. 
Conze (2001: 70) relates it to “blindness” or “cataract”.  Monier-Williams’ Sanskrit Dictionary offers 
“partial blindness” as a possible translation (p447), which seems very apt. 
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and as such one can indeed live as a householder with desire for one’s wife whilst at 
the same time having periods of brahman-consciousness.   
 
As well as these temporary losses of brahman-consciousness, there are also temporary 
breakthroughs.  Thus, Śaṅkara speaks of those who chant certain mantras having a 
“flash” (avabhāsaka) of true reality (Ch.U.Bh., intro). 37   Śaṅkara’s view is that 
brahman-consciousness can be both gained and lost.  The monastic life (without wife, 
sons or duties) is the best way of ensuring that most of one’s time is spent in 
brahman-consciousness, guaranteeing final liberation.  He writes: 
tac caitat paramārtha darśanaṃ pratipattum icchatā varṇāśramādy 
abhimānakṛtapāṅktarūpaputravittalokaiṣaṇādibhyo vyutthānaṃ 
kartavyam   | 
 
And a man who wishes to attain this view of the ultimate truth should 
abandon the fivefold form of desire for sons, wealth and worlds, 
which result from misconceptions about caste and life order, etc.  
(U.S. Prose, 1.44) 
 
Flickering consciousness, or temporary lapses, is therefore a most useful means of 
interpreting Śaṅkara’s way of allowing for the behaviour of the enlightened 
householders.  In fact, as I will argue throughout this thesis, Śaṅkara’s moves with 
regard to the actions of knowers will not do unless one accepts the notion of 
flickering.  In other words, the issue is not whether the person is fully enlightened or 
not, the point is that the person can be enlightened at timex and slightly deluded at 
timey, and that he may flicker between these states.   
 
                                               
 
37 The V.C. speaks of “the mind continually returning inwards” (pratyag-avasthitaṃ manasya) (276), 





In the case of Śāntideva, this flickering is admitted, and is said to go “unrestrained”.  
In other words, it is voluntary.  In the case of Śaṅkara, it seems less than voluntary.  
The brahman-knower, who Śaṅkara feels should be celibate (see Chapter 3.1) lapses 
into lustful thoughts due to past habits.  However, when we consider the case of 
teaching (see Chapter 6.2), we will come to understand that Śaṅkara’s ideal teacher 
must be capable of distinguishing a Brahmin male from a non-Brahmin female even 
though the brahman-knower is said to be beyond seeing the world in such dualistic 
terms.  My theory of flickering would allow for this level of conventional seeing by 
claiming that the knower switches to a more provisional view of reality.  In a sense, 
this is more a case of oscillating between Two Realities, but because Śaṅkara has 
already admitted the negative effect of past tendencies, I prefer to stay with the notion 
of flickering, which is perhaps a more dynamic form of switching.  Whether this mode 
of switching is also to be seen as erratic is another question and is beyond our 
knowledge.  Whatever the speed or frequency of switching, my argument is that it 
must take place. 
 
Now Śaṅkara may be comforted by recent research that seems to show that the 
“higher a person’s level of development, the lower the probability that he or she will 
invoke low stage forms of thought and behaviour” (Krebs & van Hesteren, 1994: 
110).  Nevertheless, the point has been made that enlightenment is not an all or 
nothing situation and this is another essential point which will help us understand the 
question of self.  To repeat, I am claiming that both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara can be 
saved from contradiction if we assume that their knowers of reality flicker between 
seeing the world in ultimate terms and in seeing it provisionally.  By seeing the world 
in ultimate terms, they are capable of its transcendence.  And by seeing the world 
provisionally, they allow themselves the ability to act compassionately for others.  
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Flickering also allows them to see themselves as having no individuated self whilst 
maintaining the notion of an individuated self in the other.  Also, through the notion of 
flickering, we can gather that those of less than perfect understanding may still have 
moments or flashes of absolute truth which provide them with religious authority. 
 
When we come to the ethical implications of such epistemological assumptions, it 
may also be worth bearing in mind that Monroe (1998) has come to similar 
conclusions with regard to altruism, which she describes as “running along a 
continuum” (pp7 & 16-18).  Behaviour is never purely altruistic or purely self-
interested, but always lies somewhere between.  Both our models refuse either/or 
categorizations.  Krebs and van Hesteren (1994) also see this as a key feature of their 
model, claiming that it “supplies a basis for surmounting problems with either-or, 
egoism-altruism dichotomies, implying that most helping behaviours are guided by 
both egoistic and altruistic goals” (p104).   
 
De Silva (1994) brings the gnoseological and the ethical fields together, when he says 
that “the more penetrating our insight into the no-self doctrine is, the more vibrant 
becomes the self-transcending emotions of compassion and kindness” (p312).  As the 
self here is the ego-centred (illusory) individuated self, this is equally capable of 
incorporating the Advaitin realisation of the “nothing” that one is (Deutsch, 1973: 48).  
De Silva’s (1994: 312) quoting of Iris Murdoch’s - “The humble man, because he sees 
himself as nothing, can see other things as they are” - surely justifies my claim.  Both 
the affective and the cognitive faculties, including the ability to see reality as-it-is, are 
thus meaningfully tied to the denial of the individuated self.  It is only compassion for 
others that prevents the Mādhyamika and the Advaitin from seeing them as, what 




Krebs and van Hesteren’s (1994: 114-115) Table of “Stage Alignments” (see below) 
is of much interest here, for it shows theorists positing completion stages with regard 
to self and to morality.  According to Krebs & van Hesteren (1994: 134), the first 
social scientist to study altruism was Harvard Sociologist, Sorokin, who argued for a 
“supraconscious” level of development, which, he claimed, leads to cases of “supreme 
altruists”.  Now, two of the examples he gave were, interestingly enough, Gandhi and 
the Buddha.  So it would seem that Hinduism and Buddhism do indeed have much to 
offer in the field of ethics, especially in the domain of altruism.   
 
 Maslow Gilligan Kegan Kohlberg 
Stage     
0 Physiological survival  Incorporative  
0/1   Impulsive self  




2   Imperial self Individualism, 
instrumental purpose 
and exchange 








Interpersonal self Interpersonal 
conformity 
4 Esteem and  
self-esteem 
orientation 
 Institutional self Social system and 
conscience 
4/5  2nd transition from 
goodness to truth 
  




6 Self-actualization Non-violence  Universal ethical 
principles 
7    Universal love 
  
Table 1: Stage Alignments (selected columns) from Krebs & Hesteren (1994) 
 
Examining the table in detail, we have a possible comparison with Śaṅkara in 
Maslow’s “self-actualization” and Gilligan’s “non-violence”.  Gilligan’s transition 
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from sacrifice to truth also seems to parallel somewhat Śaṅkara’s view of the Vedas as 
a transition from ritual action (karma) to knowledge (jñāna).   And for a possible 
comparison with Śāntideva, we have Kegan’s “Inter-individual self” and Kohlberg’s 
“Universal love”, which appear to match up with the Madhyamaka view that the 
realisation of inter-dependence gives rise to an absolute compassion.  
 
Unlike our Western theorists, with regard to ethics, both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva will 
both face the same paradox of why selfless persons should be concerned with 
following the ethical prescriptions at the conventional level.  Both will need to answer 
why a liberated being should even bother to help those who are seen as being without 
individuated selfhood.  They will both mix ultimate and conventional truth in their 
responses in what may seem like a paradoxical manner, both relying on the analogy of 
dream and illusion.  However, they will both strongly deny idealistic theories of 
reality, which, I will argue, are potentially dangerous to their ethical systems, for such 
theories might be seen as questioning the reality of persons even at the conventional 
level.  By comparing Śāntideva’s worldview with Śaṅkara’s, it will be shown that a 
selfless response to an illusion-like world is a common factor in both models.  A 
critical reflection on these models will assess whether the lack of moral agency is a 
meaningful notion and whether it is a positive factor in the pursuit of ethics. 
 
It will therefore be shown that both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara prescribe forms of ethical 
conduct which seem to assume an agent whilst also insisting on the lack of ultimacy 
of this agent.  They will both open themselves to similar criticisms, namely “Who is 
the actor?” and “Who are they acting for?”.  If these criticisms can be overcome, both 
models might suggest that a denial of an ultimate individual-as-moral agent is a notion 
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worthy of consideration.  I will argue that the way to overcome them is through the 
notion of Two Truths and the implied flickering between them. 
 
Comparison and Tension: 
 
In a recently published book on Śāntideva, Clayton (2006) felt the need to give a 
lengthy explanation of the validity of comparison as a human act.  She concluded that 
it is through comparison that “we come to know, integrate, and articulate knowledge 
of anything” (p12).  To a certain extent, as an academic seeking my own comparative 
methodology, I am happy to accept her conclusion.  However, I would like to add 
some “tension” to this conclusion, for it all seems a little too neat, too positivist, and 




Three questions keep arising: 1) Can these philosophies actually be understood by the 
“uncommitted” mind?; 2) Can we actually compare systems which deal in non-
dualistic frameworks and Two-Truth hierarchies and come away with anything like 
certain knowledge?; and 3) Should we, as academics, even be aiming so high?  
 
It is beyond question that we must aim for clarity of articulation, but we ought never 
to assume that what we articulate is fact.  After all, metaphysics and ethics are not 
mathematics.  Our interpretation can only ever be tentative.  The interpretive 
(mystical) question - “Do relative matters filter back into the ultimate?” may have to 
be restated academically as - “Do those truths accepted within provisional reality have 
                                               
38 For a particularly stirring critique of “positivist” epistemologies, see Code (1998).  For similar 
concerns about “rationalism” and “value-free objectivity” within the context of Madhyamaka studies, 




an effect on the ultimate truths being posited?”  The thesis here is that they do, but 
only partially.  In order to remain coherent to the world, the relative discourse must 
put pressure on the ultimate view, but the ultimate view can only be allowed to bend, 
never to break.  The resulting “tension”, generated by the awareness of these two 
views, shall always be there, not only in all truth claims, but in all prescriptions to act.  
Both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara are equally subject to this model, for they equally flicker 
between the Two Truths in their description of the world.  All we can do then is try to 
give each philosopher the best reading we can, and to articulate our findings in the 
clearest manner possible, being as sympathetic to their project as possible, whilst 
remaining objectively critical.  Comparison, at its best, helps to tease out features of 
one model which are more evident in the other model. 
 
It would be wonderful if we could overcome the temptation to use such labels as 
‘contradictory’ or ‘ambiguous’ or ‘paradoxical’ for the philosophy of Advaita and 
Madhyamaka.  Although the temptation is indeed great, we need to resist it for two 
important reasons: 1) It offers an essentially negative account of the overall system, 
and 2) It actually says nothing.  And so Taber (1983) wrote of Śaṅkara, “His 
statements only appear as contradictions when one interprets them rigidly in terms of 
the ordinary human conceptual system” (p52).  Śaṅkara was trying to express the 
concept of brahman, while believing that “brahman is inexpressible” (brahma 
nocyate) (Bh.G.Bh. 13.12).  On Nāgārjuna, Bhattacharya (1998) writes, he “tries to 
express the Inexpressible.  All his expressions, therefore, are bound to remain 
inadequate” (p90).  Inada (1993) wrote: “It is trite to say that language can never reach 
reality per se, and yet we must remind ourselves of this to restitute the Śūnyavāda 
from the charge of nihilism” (p13).  Of course, Śaṅkara was one of those who made 
the charge, and so we need to offer a sympathetic reading of the thesis that “all is 
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empty”.  Likewise, we must try to explain what Śaṅkara meant by “all is self”.  
Further, we must attempt to articulate the differences in these competing Two-Truth 
hierarchies.  The problem that both reader and writer face is how to understand 
something that is “presented in a way that deviates from the only mode of 
understanding we know” (Taber, 1983: 52); hence, the disquiet. 
 
And so, I wish to hereby introduce the notion of “tension”.  I will often return to this 
“tension” as my third hermeneutical tool (the others being the “Two Truths” and 
“flickering”).  It will act dynamically throughout, often hidden from view, primarily 
as a warning that the Two Truths are not totally distinct fields of analysis, but cross 
over into each other’s domains.  We can therefore see how this discursive notion of 
“tension” is closely related to the psychological notion of “flickering”, a 
phenomenological feature of those who are on the path.  
 
In working out this model, I am of course indebted to others who have puzzled over 
similar problems.  With regard to the ultimate mode of being, and my notion of 
“flickering”, I am indebted to Harvey’s work on the final state of a Buddhist 
practitioner (the arhat) according to the Pāli Suttas.  I wish to quote Harvey (1995: 
222) at length here: 
[W]hereas the ‘early Suttas’ see the full realization of nibbāna as an 
‘unsupported’, objectless state of discernment, where other mental 
factors are absent and activity in the world does not seem possible, the 
Mahāyāna  sees ‘non-abiding’ nirvāṇa as compatible with action in 
the world.  Only if the Arahat rapidly alternated between objectless, 
nibbānic discernment and object-directed states of discernment could 
these two perspectives be brought together...  The ‘early Suttas’, 
though, contain no hint of an enlightened person choosing to remain 
in saṃsāra after death.  From the perspective of the ‘early Suttas’, the 
unsupported nibbānic state would be either dwelt in for specific, 






Now I am aware that this interpretation of nibbāna as a beyond death continuation of 
“unsupported discernment” (appatiṭṭhitena viññāṇena) is highly contested (see 
Gethin, 1997, and Bodhi, 2000: 421, n314), but we need not enter into this debate.  All 
we need for our purposes is the concept of “flickering” between a relative state and an 
absolute state of seeing.  Now Harvey does not actually use the term “flickering” here, 
though “rapidly alternated with normal consciousness” may surely be taken as 
synonymous.  Harvey does, however, use the term “flickering” in his translation of the 
canonical Dhammapada verse “Phandanaṃ capalaṃ cittaṃ durakkhaṃ 
dunnivārayaṃ” (33a), which Harvey (1995) translates as “The flickering fickle citta, 
difficult to guard, difficult to control” (p114).39  The context of the verse shows that 
“flickering” (capalaṃ) here is to be seen as negative, and might well be translated as 
“wavering”.  In other words, it matches Śāntideva’s use of the term “cala” to describe 
ordinary men who waver in thought (Ś.S. 140).  In a similar vein, Harvey (1995: 114) 
speaks of “competing mind-sets” and “empirical, functioning selves”, which need to 
be controlled.  Perrett (1998: 30) usefully talks of a “scrutinizing subset” of beliefs 
which, changing over time, leads to “self-revision”.  Śāntideva sees the task of the will 
in similar terms: 
sarvānya cintā nirmuktaḥ sva cittaikāgramānasaḥ     | 
samādhānāya cittasya prayatiṣye damāya ca    || 
 
Freed from all other concerns, with one-pointed mind, I shall exert 
myself in taming this mind and towards meditative concentration 
(BCA. 8.39). 
 
Eventually, according to certain Mahāyāna texts, such as the Daśabhūmika Sūtra, 
when one has reached the eighth bhūmi, one is “acala”, unwavering, firm and 
                                               




immovable; one’s knowledge is non-regressive (see Cleary, 1993: 764-776).40  So we 
might reasonably talk of two types of “flickering”: the first being the minds of 
common folk which flicker between one thought and another, which I will refer to as 
“wavering”, and the second being the mind of a partially enlightened being which 
flickers or oscillates between objectless consciousness and relative existence.  For 
both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, the former is to be overcome via a single-minded 
approach to liberation from nescience.  As for the latter, I argue that both Śaṅkara and 
Śāntideva will rely on it for the sake of compassionate activity. 
 
My second debt, though more indirect, goes to Hume.  In one place, Hume tells us that 
“existence and non-existence destroy each other, and are perfectly incompatible and 
contrary” (Treatise, I.iii.1).  This seems a reasonable enough argument and one that 
Paul Williams (1998a: 107-112) draws on in his critique of Śāntideva.  However, 
Hume later goes on to state that it is “easy for us to conceive any object to be non-
existent this moment, and existent the next” (Treatise, I.iii.3, emphasis mine).  
Elsewhere, Hume also states that, “whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly 
conceived, implies no contradiction” (EHU, IV.ii.18).   
 
So, for example, we might imagine a virtual car race.  When a child is about to enter 
into the game, they do not actually believe they are entering a truly existent race.  
However, midway through, they might find themselves believing the race to be real.  
At other moments, they see that it is only a game.  They thus flicker between existence 
and non-existence.  Hume wishes to use this capacity of our imagination to question 
the necessity of a causal account of phenomena, whereas I wish the reader to note that 
a flickering consciousness may well see ‘objects’ and ‘social games’ as alternatively 
                                               
40 I will justify my use of the Daśabhūmika Sūtra below (see Chapter 3.2). 
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existent and non-existent, and may thus learn to see things as empty of inherent 
existence or as illusion-like.  In other words, to stretch the analogy, noticing that the 
game is a virtual one does not deny the car’s conventional existence.  Unlike Hume 
then, I adopt his statement about conception as a response to his statement about 
existence and non-existence, and thus deny his either/or interpretation.  Again, this 
demonstrates how the “tension” between the ultimate and the relative view might be 
approached through the notion of “flickering”. 
 
My third debt goes to Bernard Williams (1976: 46-63) and his famous hypothetical 
experiment, whereby two people agree to undertake an exchange of ‘selves’.  This 
may be taken to imply either an exchange of bodies, or an exchange of brains, or an 
exchange of memories.  One body is to be given a prize; the other is to be tortured.  
These people, A and B, are to decide which body should get which treatment 
(assuming the choice is made on “selfish grounds”).  The problem, of course, is 
whether we see our ‘self’ to be the body or whether we see it to be mental data.  
Williams’ treatment of this experiment is fascinating, and I will return to it later.  But 
here I simply wish to highlight three points: 1) Williams refuses to merely 
acknowledge these as “borderline cases” and leave it at that (p58), 2) He refuses to sit 
comfortably with the notion of “ambivalent concern” for the self (p60), and 3) He 
acknowledges the “artificial” neatness of the experiment (p62).    Where Williams 
talks of the “risk” in making such a choice about a future self (p63), I would like to 
talk of the “tension” in this choice.   
 
In terms of ethics, one might feel a little uneasy about the language of “tension” and 
“flickering” and the lack of fixity that these terms conjure.  It could be argued that 
ethics demands a firmer, more objective, base.  One may even feel that ‘flickering’ 
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conjures up an erratic state of mind.  But like Bernard Williams, I feel we must accept 
that the ground on which we state these problems of the self is indeed “shaky” by 
nature (p62).  Not only is the ground generally “shaky”, but more specifically, it is the 
concern for the ‘ambivalent’ self that provides the starting point for the ground of 
Śāntideva’s case for selfless conduct; and of course the question “What is the nature 
of this ‘ambivalent’ self?” is the catalyst of Śaṅkara’s gnoseology.  Indeed, it is the 
fact that they both so ardently deny our reality and yet so fervently reaffirm it that 
makes their work so relevant.  For Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, these were no “effete 
intellectual puzzles” (see Solomon, 1994: 9).  In fact, I believe that we modern 
philosophers of self can learn much from these medieval thinkers, who positively 
grasped both horns of the bull of Two-Truths, who overcame the ambivalence of 
either A or B by affirming the “tension” of both A and B.   
 
I therefore urge the reader to keep the above mentioned hermeneutical devices in mind 
as they reflect on the teachings of these two fascinating, and at times, puzzling 
systems of thought and practice.   
 
To repeat, these are: 
1) The ontological Two-Truth models 
2) The epistemological notion of:  
 
a)   those who know reality as-it-is,  
b)  those who are deluded, and  
c) those whose cognitions flicker between these two 
 







The Virtue Model of Comparison: 
 
One model of comparison, which was made particularly dominant in Buddhist Ethics 
by Damien Keown, is that of Virtue Ethics.  Now, a Virtue Ethics, in simple terms, 
may be taken as an approach to ethics which focuses on the moral subject and the kind 
of life they ought to lead.  As the name suggests, the subject’s attention should be on 
the cultivation of a particular set of ‘virtues’ which aim at the development of 
character rather than at the development of discrete behaviour.  The set of virtues one 
ought to cultivate is often thought to be a matter of culture and tradition.  It may also 
be taken to be a question of refining one’s human nature or of grooming our God-
given qualities.  Nevertheless, one would expect that a virtuous person is one who we 
(or those with the authority to judge) would conclude was of “good” character.  Such a 
person would also be expected to reach some stage of completeness, whereby they 
lived a flourishing human existence, ending perhaps in the fulfilment of certain 
capacities, both moral and cognitive.  Thus, Keown (1992/2001) defines it as “man 
fulfilling his function through the development of his potentiality in accordance with a 
specific conception of a goal or end” (p193).   
 
In such a scheme, however, the focus remains, not so much on what the person does 
for others, but on what kind of person they are, or are seen to be.  In this way, it differs 
from a Consequentialist Ethics, which, in theory, judges actions by the effect that they 
have on the world rather than on the agent.  The classic example of a Virtue Ethics is 
that expounded by Aristotle in Ancient Greece.  It is often contrasted with the 




Having seen Keown parallel Buddhist Ethics with those of Aristotle, might we not be 
tempted here to use the same Virtue Ethics model to compare Śāntideva and Śaṅkara?  
Might we not start by collecting a list of virtues in each of their writings, and from 
there make our conclusions as to their shared ethics?  Might we not claim that both 
saw knowledge as their ultimate goal?  My answer is a resounding “no”, and I would 
like to take some time to explain why. 
 
First of all, most scholars would agree that Keown allocates a disproportionate amount 
of space to the thesis that Buddhist Ethics is analogous to an Aristotelian virtue ethics.  
Perhaps influenced by Harvey’s (2000: 51) view that Buddhism cannot be reduced to 
virtue ethics, Keown (2005b) has since loosened his position somewhat.  In some 
ways, of course, this is Keown’s own affair, but due to the prominent (and no doubt 
deserved) position he now holds within the field of Buddhist Ethics, all are now 
forced into answering his claim.  For example, while acknowledging Harvey’s 
gradualist position, Clayton (2006) still feels the need to label Śāntideva’s moral 
theory as “a type of virtue ethics” (p100), going on to call it a “supererogatory virtue 
ethic” (p101) despite the fact that she later claims that the “concept of virtue ethics ... 
is not adequate” (p109).  The confusion in her thesis clearly comes from her explicit 
attempt to answer Keown (p90).   
 
The fact is that Śāntideva’s ethics, when taken as a whole, are simply not a type of 
virtue ethics.  Śāntideva asks us to focus on others, not on ourselves.  Our own 
happiness is secondary to the happiness of others.  He writes: 
mā bhūttan mama kuśala-mūlaṃ dharma jñānaṃ kauśalyaṃ vā yan 




May there be in me no root of good or knowledge of Dharma or 
skilfulness which is not of benefit to all beings (Ś.S. 33). 
 
Rather than call this a “supererogatory virtue ethic”, Clayton (2006) would have done 
better to have stayed with “extreme altruism” (p100).  In fact, Keown (2001) himself 
equates “supererogation” with “altruism” (p138).  But, as I will argue throughout this 
thesis, active altruism does not represent a virtue ethics.  Virtue ethics stops with the 
subject and hardly considers the object, the other.  Śāntideva’s ethics, on the other 
hand, are consistently directed towards benefitting the other.  And so, contra Clayton 
(2006: 100), I would argue that Śāntideva is ultimately asking us, “What is the right 
thing to do?”, rather than “What kind of person should I be?”.  In fact, Clayton seems 
to do a U-turn, and later claims that the main question the bodhisattva asks is: “What 
will be the best thing for other beings?” (p113).  Here she is quite correct.  But this 
question does not arise from a virtue ethics. 
 
This is not to say that Śāntideva ignores the virtues.  In fact, Clayton (2006) rightly 
suggests that the virtues are emphasized at the “commencement of the spiritual path” 
(p100).  However, as Clayton further points out, at a certain point along the 
bodhisattva-path, Śāntideva’s ethics begin to “resemble utilitarianism” (p117).  And 
so it is clearly this model that we should pay more attention to.  Clayton also notes 
how, for Śāntideva, anger is seen as wrong because of its “overall loss of benefit to 
beings” and that this is the “deciding factor” (p108).  In summary, Clayton states that, 
“There is a definite sense that the bodhisattva should try to maximize the benefits to 
sentient beings” (ibid.).  And so, along with Osto (2008: 66), I am a little confused by 




More problematically, from a comparative point of view, Keown (2005a) claims that 
Buddhist ethics shares “many features with Aristotle’s notion of the good life being 
one devoted to the cultivation of virtue and culminating in a condition of happiness” 
(p286).  But surely, this pays too little respect to the two cultures involved in the 
comparison.  As Ram-Prasad (2007: 102) notes, “there is no comparison between 
what Aristotle would define as a good and what our Indian philosophers would”.   In 
fact, even those scholars who accept Buddhism as a virtue ethics play down the 
parallel with Aristotle (Cooper & James, 2005: 83).  But more importantly, for this 
thesis, happiness is simply not the culmination of Śāntideva’s ethics or of Mahāyāna 
Buddhism in general.  The bodhisattva would willingly give up his own happiness for 
the good of others.  Śāntideva writes: 
bahūnām eka duḥkhena yadi duḥkhaṃ vigacchati     | 
utpādyam eva tad duḥkhaṃ sadayena parātmanoḥ     || 
 
If the suffering of many disappears through the suffering of one, then 
that suffering must definitely be made to arise by one with 
compassion for oneself and for others (BCA. 8.105). 
 
If happiness were the telos of Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, then why is Śāntideva 
trying to, if you will forgive the phrase, get idle monks off their behinds?  I will return 
to this below.  For now, it needs emphasising that Śāntideva goes much further than a 
virtue ethics model would allow.  That is, he asks us to put these virtues to good use.  
It is the ‘other’ that is primary in Śāntideva’s ethics.  The Compendium thus prays that 
the virtues be kept hidden (pracchādita) (Ś.S. 33).  For Śāntideva, virtues are not for 
display or self-fulfilment, but must be put at the service of others.   
 
One scholar who has recently spoken out against Keown’s model is Charles 
Goodman, stating that “no form of Buddhist ethics is as similar to Aristotelianism as 
Keown claims” (Goodman, 2008: 17).  He rightly concludes that, the “analogy with 
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virtue ethics … does not represent a very valuable interpretive strategy when it comes 
to Mahāyāna ethical thought” (p31).  We seem to have come to this conclusion 
independently, yet we differ in what we want to put in its place.  Goodman (2008 & 
2009) wishes to make his own case that Mahāyāna ethics is in fact a form of 
consequentialist ethics.  Now, while it may be agreed that Mahāyāna ethics, when it 
comes to activism, sit closer to consequentialism than virtue ethics, I fail to see why 
we have to pigeon-hole them at all.  It is not an either/or proposition.  Mahāyāna 
ethics requires the virtues as a base, but asks us to put those virtues to good use.  That 
is all we need grasp.  For me, that is a call to altruism. 
 
Mark Siderits (2003) has also spoken out against Keown’s virtue ethics model, and 
like Goodman, calls for a consequentialist interpretation.  However, his call for an 
“Aretaic Conseqentialism” (p110, note b) appears to allow the virtues more of a role 
than Goodman does.  It also allows for the “cognitive limitations” (Siderits, 2007b: 
292) of our commencing-bodhisattvas, who may not have the foresight to see all the 
consequences of their actions.  For it should be noted that consequentialism asks far 
too much of us if we are expected to foresee all the effects of our actions. In the 
altruistic model championed in this thesis, the virtues combine with consequentialist 
thinking, and a bodhisattva is meant to know at what level of knowledge and power he 
stands at.   
 
I will join Siderits (2003) in his praise of Keown, not so much for reclaiming nirvāṇa 
as a “positive state of human fulfillment” (p110, note b), but for playing down the 
“transcendency thesis” of Buddhist Ethics (see Keown, 2001: 83ff).  This is 
essentially the thesis that Buddhist moral precepts have only instrumental value in 
achieving nirvāṇa, a thesis which Śāntideva’s ethics of compassion and altruism prove 
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wrong.  Keown is also to be praised for almost single-handedly opening the “western 
gate” for Buddhist ethics, allowing it to enter into the maṇḍala of modern academia.  
However, it is time for a paradigm shift, one which focuses more on an altruistic 
interpretation of Mahāyāna Buddhism. 
 
One scholar who has provided Buddhist ethics with a modern paradigm shift is 
Christopher Queen in his work on “Engaged Buddhism”.  Queen (2000: 11-17) offers 
a four-fold categorization of Buddhist ethics, leading through ‘discipline’, ‘virtue’, 
‘altruism’ and ‘engagement’.  These (largely) chronological categories are most 
useful.  Queen takes “Engaged Buddhism” to be a modern (essentially post-1960’s) 
phenomenon
41
, going one step beyond altruism in that it takes account of the “social 
and institutional dimensions of suffering” (Queen & King, 1996: 10).   Queen (2000) 
sees early Buddhism as focusing its attention on discipline and virtue.  The rise of 
Mahāyāna Buddhism brought altruism into the foreground.  However, this altruism 
does not “ignore self-cultivation” (p14).  I thus agree with Queen that pre-modern 
Mahāyāna ethics, and especially the ethics of Śāntideva, are best represented by the 
term ‘altruism’, but an altruism that depends upon the ripening of certain virtues.   
 
I will also show that Śaṅkara’s ethics should also be seen as altruistic.  But we should 
not forget that most of the followers that Śāntideva and Śaṅkara address are monks.  
Thus, Śāntideva’s ethics, especially those aimed at the commencing-bodhisattva (see 
Chapter 3.2), and Śaṅkara’s ethics, aimed at the Advaitin teacher (see Chapter 6.2), 
are a type of altruism largely bridled by the need for discipline.  Their ethics are best 
defined then as a monastically-informed altruism.  And we might note here how the 
                                               
41 Of course, one could argue that certain Japanese “liberation movements”, such as Nichiren (see 
Metraux, in Queen & King, 1996: 365-400) were involved in “Engaged Buddhism”, but there is no 
justification for reading “Engaged Buddhism” back into Indian Mahāyāna. 
67 
 
possibility of grounding one’s ethics in the rules of a “tradition” overcomes the need 
for a pure virtue ethics (see Mohanty, 1997b: 296).  Needless to say, Śāntideva, like 
Śaṅkara, was essentially non-political, and his writings should not be used to justify 
arguments for “Engaged Buddhism”, a mistake that Goodman (2009) sometimes 
commits. 
 
In trying to collapse all Buddhist Ethics into the category of consequentialism, 
Goodman also falls into a similar trap as Keown, skipping over and re-interpreting 
those examples that are clearly virtue or duty orientated, or else adding a qualifier 
such as “character” to the term consequentialism (Goodman, 2009: 41), thus claiming 
the entire moral field.  As Meyers (2010: 2) notes, Goodman’s work “tends to efface 
elements of Buddhist ethics that do not fit neatly into the consequentialist model”.   
 
Baron once wrote: 
It is a little silly to ask whether a theory is more concerned with action 
or with character, as if theorists have to favour one over the other.  
One would expect any reasonably rich ethical theory to be concerned 
with both (Baron, et al, 1997: 36).   
 
We need to heed Harvey’s (2000: 51) warning that: 
Overall, the rich field of Buddhist ethics would be narrowed by 
wholly collapsing it into any single one of the Kantian, Aristotelian or 
Utilitarian models.   
 
Naturally, this is not to deny the fact that we cannot always avoid making reference to 
these three dominant paradigms.  In fact, we may need to make reference to all three, 
along with appropriate qualifications.  For this reason, I will not get involved in the 
Hallisey methodological debate on “ethical particularism” (see Clayton, 2006: 5ff).  
Rather, let me simply note, with Harvey (2000: 51), how Buddhism makes equal 
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demands on: 1) a good motivating will, 2) cultivation of character, and 3) the 
reduction of suffering in others and oneself.  It will later be shown (Chapter 6) that 
Śāntideva’s, and indeed Śaṅkara’s, ethics include all three.   
 
We should also bear in mind that monasteries in India are very much a communal 
culture, and the sight of an undisciplined monastic may well have a detrimental effect 
on other monks.  Thus, it is rather inappropriate to suggest the title of “act-
consequentialist” for a monk like Śāntideva, as Goodman (2009: 90) does.  It becomes 
especially irresponsible when one ponders on the possibility of “humanitarian military 
intervention” by an army of bodhisattvas (p81).  The ethical conduct of ascetic monks, 
of which Śāntideva (and Śaṅkara) are extreme cases, will be heavily influenced by 
their social context.  While the rules are frequently disregarded, in line with act-
utilitarianism, the moral of non-harming (ahiṃsa) is never disregarded.  The actual 
life of the monk is likely to be far more cautious than certain rhetoric would have us 
believe.  According to Prajñākaramati (the 10-11th century Indian commentator on the 
BCA), the bodhisattva ought not to be too heroic (vīrya) (BCA. Pañjikā, 143).  In such 
a communal culture, an act of misconduct by a single monk could cast a shadow over 
the whole community.  Thus, Mrozik (2007: 54) speaks of “communal ripening” and 
the pressure on the monks to be inspirational (prāsādika) (p76).  Hence, the 
bodhisattva reflects, “I must please my fellow-students” (saṃtoṣaṇīyā me 
sabrahmacāriṇa) (Ś.S. 150).  The Compendium adds that the bodhisattva should be 
“modest” (salajjaṃ), “cautious” (sabhayaṃ) and “peaceful” (śāntaṃ).   Through 
possessing a collection of virtues (śīla-skandha), the bodhisattva becomes a great 
being (mahā-sattvaḥ) (Ś.S. 147).  His karmic merit (puṇya) is said to be pure when his 
morality (śīla) is pure.  Hence, we can detect an equal stress on traditional “monkish 
virtues” as well as on certain rule-breaking scenarios.  Thus, Clayton speaks of a 
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mixture of “restrained good conduct” (p75) and skilful means (p103).   Hence, one 
may think of a monastically-informed altruistic ethics which constantly seeks to 
benefit, first oneself, and then others.  If Buddhism was indeed “decadent” at this time 
(Klostermaier, 2007: 302); it does not show itself in Śāntideva’s ethics. 
 
The temptation here, of course, is to follow up this discussion of Śāntideva’s list of 
virtues with a whole list of similar virtues in the writing of Śaṅkara, and indeed it 
would not be difficult to do so (see Cenkner, 1983: 50-54).  But my whole point here 
is that it would be futile.  For example, the way one ‘pleases’ one’s fellow students 
may vary in the two camps, as might their definitions of what it means to be 
‘peaceful’ or ‘modest’.   Even Śāntideva himself has two types of ‘modesty’ in mind 
in his writing, one for monks and another for lay women.  More generally, Chappell 
(1996), notes that the “same value ... can function in different soteriological contexts 
that result in different expressions” (p57).   And we might also note here how the 
Buddha often implied that the Brahmins even failed to understand the meaning of 
their own language of virtue ethics and he thus reinterpreted them for their own sake 
(see Gombrich, 2009: 183).  Similarly, within Vedānta, Lipner (2010: 213) has 
pointed out how the charge of lacking “moral integrity” was made against Śaṅkara by 
Rāmānuja, who felt that the Advaitin was incapable of grasping the proper meaning of 
ethics from scripture. 
 
What we can offer then, as a compromise, is that, in Advaita, “Moral virtues, such as 
compassion, charity, self-control, and non-injury, may be supports for the attainment 
of the spiritual end, although they are not the end themselves” (Deutsch, 1973: 102).  
These “spiritual” qualities are not the cause of liberation, but act as associate causes to 
knowledge.  Śaṅkara says that the student “should also be guided in humility, etc., the 
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virtues which are means to knowledge” (amānitvādi guṇaṃ ca jñānopāyaṃ samyak 
grāhayet) (U.S. Prose, 1.5).  These virtues, then, are merely a “means to knowledge”.  
In other words, this is not a virtue ethics, but a particular form of soteriological 
consequentialism.  However, like Śāntideva’s consequentialist thought, it certainly 
requires the virtues as a basis, virtues which have their basis in tradition.  Hence, pace 
Rāmānuja, Potter (1981) feels that Śaṅkara’s ideal renouncer “must be imbued with 
strong positive moral inclinations” (p36).  One look at Śaṅkara’s description of the 
ideal teacher proves Potter right:  
ācāryas tūhāpohagrahaṇa dhāraṇa śama dama dayānugrahādi 
sampanno labdhāgamo dṛṣṭādṛṣṭa bhogeṣv anāsaktaḥ tyakta sarva 
karma sādhano brahma-vid brahmaṇi sthito ‘bhinnavṛtto dambha 
darpa kuhaka śāṭhya māyā mātsaryānṛtāhaṃkāra mamatvādi doṣa 
varjitaḥ kevala parānugraha prayojano vidyopayogārthīṃ  
 
Now the teacher is one who is able to grasp the pros and cons of an 
argument, who understands and remembers them, who has 
tranquillity, self-control, compassion, kindness, etc., versed in the 
scriptures, unattached to enjoyments (visible or invisible), having 
abandoned all ritual actions, he is a knower of brahman, he is 
established in brahman, breaking not the rules of conduct, free from 
faults such as: deceit, pride, trickery, wickedness, deception, envy, 
falsehood, egoism and selfishness.  With the sole aim of helping 
others, he wishes to make use of knowledge (U.S. Prose, 1.6). 
 
And again, as with Śāntideva, it is when one begins to pass on this highest good that 
the true “ethical” work begins, and this I take to be a form of duty (Dharma).  Once 
again, we see a complete mix of ethical systems. 
 
As we can gather, the issue with Keown’s Virtue Ethics model goes much further than 
whether we can rightly translate from the Greek or the Pāli.42  While we may accept 
MacIntyre’s (1966) point, that a “change in language is also a change in concepts” 
                                               
42 While it is interesting to note that there is “no exact or exclusive equivalent in Sanskrit to the Greek 
aretē or Latin virtus” (Mrozik, 2007: 77), we might also note Chakrabarti’s (1997: 259) point that 
Sanskrit has no word for “thank you”, but that does not mean that gratitude was a foreign concept.  
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(p59), my position is more akin to another of his arguments, that “different forms of 
social life will provide different roles for concepts to play” (p2).  Keown (2001: 193), 
well aware of this problem, merely insists on a “formal” parallel with Aristotle.  But 
such a formal parallel tells us next to nothing.   
 
It might of course be tempting to imagine that because Śāntideva and Śaṅkara share a 
common language and a common culture that we could go beyond this formal parallel.  
So allow me to test this hypothesis.  Let us imagine that two modern-day, 
conservative, British ethicists have each offered the British Board of Education a set 
of virtues which they feel would be beneficial to teach and nurture in our secondary 
schools and beyond.  Let us imagine that the common members of these two sets turn 
out to be: practical wisdom, understanding, friendliness, courage, loyalty, and 
generosity. From this coincidence of sets, can the Government be at all certain that 
these ethicists are picking out the same virtues, giving them equivalent meaning?  One 
way of testing this is to introduce a fourth party.  Let’s call her Hilary. 
 
Let us imagine that Hilary has developed all of these virtues, and has become 
thoroughly wise, understanding, friendly, courageous, loyal, and generous.  She left 
university with honours and began her own retail business.  Her family are very proud 
of her, but let us leave pride alone for now!  Hilary, at 27, is now fully prepared to 
make a “wise” life-style choice and thus takes up yoga.  She goes beyond the fitness 
DVD stage and starts to read some spiritual texts.  She reads the Gītā, the 
Dhammapada, and one or two popular books by the Dalai Lama.  In the winter break, 
she takes her two children on a trip to India (her husband wouldn’t go).  She is hooked 
by India.  On returning, she now starts to neglect her business as she studies books on 
how to become one with the universe.  Her “understanding” of the theory and practice 
72 
 
reaches new heights, or so she thinks.  When a guru arrives for a workshop near her 
hometown, she leaves someone in charge of her business for a week and hurries off to 
the retreat.  She gazes at the guru, sits at his feet, watches his big-screen videos with 
awe.  She has found her calling.  She leaves her husband and kids and follows the 
guru back to India.  The guru starts to love her in the way she loves him.  They 
become great “friends”.  So great that she becomes pregnant.  She hides her pregnancy 
from others out of devotion for the guru.  Weeks go by, and after some agonising 
evenings, she gains in “courage” and opts to force her own abortion.  During this time, 
she has noticed how the guru has seemingly loved other women as much as her.  But 
she forgives him, for his love is of course unconditional; unlike hers.  When the Indian 
and foreign press arrive under allegations of rape of another western woman, Hilary 
remains “loyal” and says nothing of her ordeal.  When the guru receives a divine 
message to move camp to the USA, she decides to show supreme “generosity”, selling 
her business back home and placing the money at his lotus-feet.  She starts divorce 
proceedings in the hope of getting half the sale of the house.  She blindly follows her 
guru to the USA, carrying his bags to the airport …   
 
Let us return to our question.  Would Hilary thereby have passed the authors’ test of 
what constitutes a virtuous person?  Has she become a good citizen?  What would our 
governing body think?  The problem remains, does it not, that even if Hilary was 
‘wise’ and ‘understanding’ and ‘friendly’ and ‘courageous’ and ‘loyal’ and ‘generous’ 
in these situations, the source of her actions may not bear the remotest resemblance 
with the authors’ meaning of these virtues.  And the consequences of her actions may 
take her far afield from what our governing board had in mind for our modern citizen.  





The point I wish to drive home is that virtuous traits are allocated words which are 
then open to various interpretations.  This problem becomes particularly acute when 
we try to make sense of one of the so-called ‘cardinal virtues’ of Buddhism, which 
Keown (2005b: 13) translates as ‘understanding’.  What exactly does it mean to be or 
to have understanding?  In fact, when we look at the Sanskrit, we see that 
‘understanding’ is in fact a negative noun ‘a-moha’, which more literally means ‘non-
delusion’.  But what am I to be non-deluded about?  Surely this is tradition-specific.  
A non-deluded Buddhist understands there to be no abiding self.  A non-deluded 
Advaitin understands the self to be non-dual with brahman.  A non-deluded Cartesian 
understands that the self is a thinking thing which is distinguishable from the material 
body.   
 
In fact, Śāntideva provides us with a perfect example of this in his attack on the 
Sāṃkhya’s so-called “knowers” of reality.  And as those that supposedly know (jñā) 
are being compared with those that are deluded (moha), we can take ‘knowing’ here to 
be synonymous with ‘non-delusion’:  
mohāc cen nekṣate lokaḥ tattva jñasyāpi sā sthitiḥ  || 
 
If you argue that the worldly do not see [the true state of things] due to 
delusion, [we say that] those that [you claim] “know” reality are in the 
same position (BCA. 9.136b). 
  
For the Buddhists, the Buddha is the only perfect teacher and his teaching is unique to 
him.  Similarly, the Gauḍapāda Kārikā (4.99) drives a wedge between the Buddha’s 




yadyapi bāhyārtha nirākaraṇaṃ jñāna-mātra kalpanā ca advaya 
vastu sāmīpyam uktam   |  idaṃ tu paramārtha tattvam advaitaṃ 
vedānteṣv eva vijñeyam ity arthaḥ   || 
 
Even though the view [of the Buddha], which rejects the existence of 
external objects and asserts the doctrine of consciousness-only, is said 
to be similar to the notion of non-duality;  the ultimate non-dual 
reality is, however, only known through the Upaniṣads.  This is the 
meaning (G.K.Bh. 4.99). 
 
This demonstrates that it is not simply that we understand that is of relevance, but 
what we understand and how we came to understand it.  As Steven Collins once 
reportedly said, the Buddha is not saying “Make your own truth”, but “Make the Truth 
your own” (in Gombrich, 1988: 72).  It is for such reasons that we cannot simply 
compare, say, the Buddha’s categories of the ‘the immature’ and ‘the wise’ (Dhp. 
Chapters 5 & 6) with Hume’s categories of ‘the vulgar’ and ‘the wise’ (Treatise).   
 
Now we may be tempted to think that the situation is different for Śaṅkara and 
Śāntideva, for they both posit a Two-Truths model, and so, ‘the wise’, for them, are 
those that know the ultimate as well as the relative.  But even here we should tread 
very carefully.  Both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva will indeed proclaim their traditions’ 
understanding of reality in these epistemological terms, but as far as Śaṅkara is 
concerned, Śāntideva falls far short of the knowledge or understanding he has in mind, 
and vice versa.  Neither of them understands the other’s form of ‘ultimate’.  Their 
knowledge may well place them within the ‘wise’ category of their own tradition, but 
they still fall within the ‘immature’ category of their opponent’s tradition.  To make 
the basic claim then that Śaṅkara and Śāntideva both see ‘non-delusion’ (amoha) or 
‘knowledge’ (jñā) or ‘wisdom’ (prajñā) as a virtue would be quite meaningless, even 
from within the common parameters of a Two-Truths model.  Here we see just how 
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powerful metaphysics is in dividing traditions and just how weak the comparison of 
virtue models is.   
 
Likewise, when it comes to the ethical life, Aristotle may tell us that eudaimonia 
(happiness?) is the final goal (Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a), and that this, in its highest 
form, lies in a certain kind of contemplation (theoria), of which, incidentally, he says 
so little that it would be impossible to compare his notion with the vast literature that 
the Buddhists have produced on this matter.  Certainly, if Flew (2005) is correct in 
thinking that, for Aristotle, “goods exist by choice rather than by nature” (p126), then 
we would find ourselves embroiled in a most complex parallel with nirvāṇa.  But 
assuming that Aristotle is indeed advocating a life of contemplation over action, and 
Stalley, for example, thinks he is (in Aristotle, 2009: xiii); would Śāntideva be happy 
with this mode of life?  Would Śāntideva praise the ‘wise’, detached monk who sat 
there all day enjoying his own blissful contemplation?  There is textual proof that he 
would not: 
evam ādibhir ākārair viveka guṇa bhāvanāt     | 
upaśānta vitarkaḥ san bodhicittaṃ tu bhāvayet     || 
 
Having cultivated the virtue of solitude in this way, discursive thought 





sakti trāsāttva nirmuktyā saṃsāre sidhyati sthitiḥ    |   
mohena duḥkhinām arthe śūnyatāyā idaṃ phalaṃ     || 
 
Being able to remain in cyclic existence, free from attachment and 
fear, for the benefit of those suffering through their delusion - such is 
the fruit of emptiness (BCA. 9.52).   
 
By cultivating bodhicitta (thought of enlightenment), Śāntideva has in mind the need 
to generate compassion for all sentient beings and to act on this compassion.  It is this 
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capacity to act for others that justifies the view of emptiness.  Bodhicitta thus “stresses 
the altruistic motive” of the bodhisattva (Brassard, 2000: 1).  But it is only with the 
view of emptiness that selflessness is truly self-less.  In the final analysis, it is the 
bodhisattva’s ability to remain in the relative world (without defilements) that justifies 
the search for ultimate knowledge.  Śāntideva never takes epistemic certainty as an 
end in itself, but sees its value in terms of its power to overcome suffering, especially 
the suffering of others.  No doubt, if he knew of it, Śāntideva would strive to turn 
Aristotle’s hierarchy of contemplative and practical wisdom (Nicomachean Ethics, 
1177a) on its head and demand an altruistic response to the suffering of beings: 
yadi tu svecchayā siddhiḥ sarveṣām eva dehinām     | 
na bhavet kasyacid duḥkhaṃ na duḥkhaṃ kaścid icchati     || 
 
If all sentient beings were to have their wish fulfilled, no one would 
suffer.  No one wishes for [their own] suffering (BCA. 6.34). 
 
And again: 
bahūnām eka duḥkhena yadi duḥkhaṃ vigacchati     | 
utpādyam eva tad duḥkhaṃ sadayena parātmanoḥ     || 
 
If the suffering of many disappears through the suffering of one, then 
that suffering must definitely be made to arise by one with 
compassion for oneself and for others (BCA. 8.105). 
 
That is, if one has pity (daya) for one’s own suffering, including the slight suffering 
that is brought on by having compassion (daya) for others, then that suffering must be 
taken on as a duty to others.  This shows the need for a more positive, altruistic 
approach to Buddhist ethics, one which goes beyond seeing nirvāṇa as the goal of 
Buddhism.  And needless to say, the nirvāṇa of which Buddhism speaks is not the 





Altruism as an Alternative Model of Comparison: 
 
Returning then to the question of comparative ethics; one occasion where I feel 
Western ethical categories may come to our aid is when we consider more deeply the 
meaning of ‘altruism’, and especially the act of self-sacrifice for the good of others.  
Borrowing from Oliner’s (2003: 15) interpretation of Comte, we might take altruism 
to have two main phases: 1) the eradication of self-centred desire, and 2) a life 
devoted to the good of others.  It is my contention that both these phases can be found 
in the ethics of Śaṅkara and Śāntideva.   Indeed, I believe that most Advaitins and 
Mahāyāna Buddhists would agree with John Stuart Mill’s statement that the readiness 
to self-sacrifice was “the highest virtue which can be found in man” (Util. II.16).   
 
Nevertheless, having been so demanding on Virtue Ethics, perhaps we need to be just 
as critical of ‘altruism’.  For while it may be true that, “All world religions concur that 
altruism … is virtuous” (Neusner & Chilton, 2005: vii); would all religions condone 
the ‘self-sacrifice’ of a suicide bomber?  I think not.  Similarly, when we are told that 
the regard for others is “almost universally hailed as a virtue” (Rushton, 1980: 2), we 
need to ask whether that regard is limited to certain others, or whether it is universal in 
scope.  For example, would all religions condone the donation of one’s wealth to the 
rich at the exclusion of the poor?  I think not.  And so we will need to ask whether the 
altruism of Śaṅkara and Śāntideva may rightly be called ‘moral’, and we will also 
need to ask how universal their ethics are.  This argument I will leave for Chapter 7.   
 
Going back to the problem of comparing Buddhism with Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics, it is 
very interesting that Ryan claims that Mill’s sentiments about self-sacrifice and a “life 
of goodness” were “entirely foreign” to Aristotle (in Mill & Bentham, 2004: 21).  
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Goodman, who incidentally refers to Śāntideva’s ethics as “radical altruism” 
(Goodman, 2008: 12 & 2009: 90), states that, “for Aristotle, the foundational 
justification for virtuous acts is their contribution to the flourishing of the agent” 
(Goodman, 2008: 19).  Goodman (2009) also states that the welfare of all beings, 
which is so central to the ethics of Śāntideva, is “not found in Aristotle” (p42).  In 
fact, Berchman (2005) has suggested that Aristotle’s ethics may be seen as “decidedly 
self-centred” (p10).  Should we really be comparing Buddhist ethics with a self-
centred ethics?  Surely altruism is a better contender. 
 
That a utilitarian, like Mill, should give us an apparent parallel to Śāntideva is perhaps 
not so surprising when we note that Krebs and van Hesteren (1994) have defined 
“high-quality altruism” as that which maximizes the “greatest good for the greatest 
number” (p136).  But even here, we need to be careful, for we should not confuse 
Mill’s Greatest Happiness Principle with the Mahāyāna call to benefit all beings.  
Firstly, a multiplicity of socially active lives, full of temporary moments of 
contentment, is not what Śāntideva is asking his fellow monks to sacrifice their own 
happiness for.  This is so, for, like Śaṅkara, he has denounced such a social life as one 
of suffering, and feels that he (along with all others) must be led to a more ultimate 
form of bliss, even if that “bliss” is but a negation of worldly suffering (see Chapter 
3).  While Śāntideva’s rhetoric on aiding the poor and the weak often has the feel of 
“social service” (Clayton, 2006: 59) about it (e.g. Ś.S. 274), transcendence of society 
is his ultimate aim, and such a view demands a negative evaluation of existence.   
 
More important, however, is the question of the term ‘self’ in ‘self-sacrifice’.  If we 
are to talk meaningfully about the place of altruism in Śāntideva and Śaṅkara, then 
this is the key problem to address.  Śāntideva, for his part, will play on the notion that 
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there is no self from the side of the bodhisattva involved in the sacrifice of time and 
effort.  Śaṅkara will also claim that there is no (individuated) self coming from the 
side of the brahman-knower who has “no need of living” (C.U.Bh. VI.xiv.2) and who 
lives on with “the sole aim of helping others” (U.S. Prose, 1.6).  So the very meaning 
of ‘self-sacrifice’ is brought into doubt.  Hence, we need to be aware of the fact that 
altruism, in its original Western context, referred to the conscious attempt to override 
one’s selfish inclinations in order to act selflessly.  In other words, one puts one’s own 
self aside.  This self was never in doubt; it was merely down-played.  The self of 
others, or the desires of those selves, were thereby put first.   
 
But Śāntideva and Śaṅkara are making a much stronger (metaphysical) claim.  They 
are saying that there simply is no self which needs putting to one side.  The bare 
recognition of non-self (anātman) or non-duality (advaita) leads to selflessness.  Thus 
metaphysical assumptions along with their differing concepts of “common good” 
make comparison with Mill problematic to say the least.   
 
Nevertheless, a further look into utilitarian-defined altruism shows that what matters is 
not simply that one is other-centred, but also that one helps others in “less superficial 
and less transient ways” (Krebs & van Hesteren, 1994: 136).  That is, higher stages of 
altruism are 1) purer, and 2) deeper.  That Śaṅkara and Śāntideva wish to remove all 
of one’s suffering forevermore is surely testimony to their depth.43 
 
There is still a major problem with comparing their models with those of Mill.  It is 
indeed their condemnation of the superficial and transient nature of worldly life that 
                                               
43 On the difference in Buddhism between wishing others to experience “fleeting pleasures of the 




gives them their depth, but it is this very same feature that commits them to a 
transcendence of that very world.  Even though the end justifies the means in Advaita, 
this is only so if the end in question is self-realization.  Hence, the Upaniṣads 
distinguish the “good” (śreyaḥ) from the merely “pleasant” (preyaḥ) (Ka.U. I.ii.1).44 
Liberation (mokṣa) is thus the highest good (paraṃ-śreyasaḥ, niḥśreyasaḥ), a “good 
outside this miserable world” (Otto, 1957: 191).  It might therefore be argued that the 
ultimate goals of Buddhism and Advaita are, to borrow Mill’s words, “pernicious to 
society” (Util. II.19).  Both find themselves centre-stage in the “conflict between 
societal and renunciatory values” (Olivelle, 1992: 23).  Despite implicitly sharing with 
Śāntideva and Śaṅkara the belief that certain voices are “more authoritative than 
others” (Skorupski, 1998: 23), and despite therefore being an “elitist” (p29), we still 
might reasonably cast Mill as a “social egalitarian” (p2).  On the other hand, neither 
Śāntideva nor Śaṅkara were “egalitarian” (see Chapter 7), nor were they ever 
politically-minded.  And they clearly go against the current belief that “Religious 
individuals are committed to the preservation of the family unit” (Barnes, 2008: 205).   
 
To bring this conflict to life, let us imagine that a certain bodhisattva or jīvan-mukta 
was so successful in his call for renunciation that a substantial sector of society left 
their families and jobs in the search of liberation (cf. the case of Hilary).  What would 
be the outcome on society?  Disastrous, one would assume.
45
  Not that this is anti-
social behaviour.  One might still coherently claim that Buddhism and Advaita would, 
along with Hume’s average citizen, prefer what is “useful and serviceable to mankind, 
above what is pernicious” (EPM, IX.1).  And like J.J.C. Smart’s (1973) sympathetic 
                                               
44 For more on this distinction, see Mohanty (1997b). 
 
45 Brodbeck assumes that the writers of the Gītā took this threat very seriously and that the Gītā was an 
explicit reaction to the pursuit of ultimate liberation (mokṣa), which “threatened social, cultural and 
economic continuity” (in Mascaró, 2003: xvi). 
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and benevolent men, both might maintain an “ultimate pro-attitude to human 
happiness in general” (p31).  Thus, unlike Olson (1997: xiv), I do not see how the 
renouncer, be he Buddhist or Hindu, could be taken as “anti-social”, though perhaps 
he is “unsocial” (p2) or, more accurately, “asocial” (Bilimoria, 2007: 45).  Certainly, 
if altruism is necessarily “prosocial” (Rushton, 1980); then the ideal of inactivity 
(nivṛtti) of the renouncer appears to stand outside this domain.   
 
Yet, as we will see in both Śaṅkara’s and Śāntideva’s selfless ethics (Chapters 4.3 & 
6), despite their aloofness from society, there is adequate room for wilful engagement 
(pravṛtti) and other-regarding responses.  But while it might be true that, “complex 
societies cannot exist without a large degree of concern for others” (Rushton, 1980: 
10), could it not also be true that these societies would stop existing if this “concern” 
were taken to Buddhist and Advaitic extremes?  Thus, Radhakrishnan (1989: 381) 
prefers the term “super-social man” to describe the Indian renouncer, who has seen 
reality-as-it-is.  The Advaitin and the Buddhist would argue against Rushton (1980: 
197) that it is more than the “flexibility of our intelligence” which distinguishes us 
from “social insects”.  We are also capable of the transcendence of that intelligence 
and thus the transcendence of the technological society which modern sociologists, 
like Rushton, envisage.  And it may even be argued that the monk who goes about 
teaching these truths to others, performs the most important ‘social service’ of all.   
 
Such inner complexities confirm the above statement that we cannot entirely rely on 
ethical categories, be they “virtue ethics”, or “consequentialist ethics”, or even 
Western-derived “altruistic ethics” in our comparative frameworks.  Instead, we must 
forever keep an eye on the metaphysics, the soteriology, the gradualism, and the social 
traditions which underpin the author’s values, qualifying their ethics accordingly.  
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Thus, the altruism I want to link with Śaṅkara and Śāntideva is very much a 
“qualified” altruism. 
 
To be other-regarding, according to Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, one has to delude oneself 
that the ‘other’ is in fact there as a separate independent entity.  One needs to 
reconstruct their fixed personhood, as it were.  To regard the other at all is to agree to 
play by the rules of conventionality.  That is, to be selfless on their account is a 
metaphysical game.  Thus, the altruistic model presented here will not be a Western 
one, but a radically qualified one, requiring much attention to detail.  So whilst 
drawing upon Western models of altruism, I cannot over-emphasize the differences, 
namely the metaphysical underpinnings and the epistemological manipulations.  I call 
this ethical model “constructive altruism”.   
 
I therefore agree with Dharmasiri (1989) that Buddhist ethics, “cannot be satisfactorily 
analyzed through Western categories” (p. xii), and I believe the same goes for 
Advaitin ethics.  Dharmasiri talks of Western categories as being too “narrow” (ibid.) 
to account for Buddhist metaphysics, and so I believe my model of constructive 
altruism may well help to widen these categories.  Dharmasiri is indeed correct to say 
that the distinction between [Western] “altruism and egoism breaks down” (p15), but 
not for the reasons he offers.  The real issue is not that, in Buddhism, “helping others 
is a way of helping oneself” (p16), but that, in Madhyamaka (and Advaita) helping 
others is about constructing others.  This is the key difference between Western 
models and my Indian-derived model.  Constructive altruism, then, is a model that 







Like Lovin (2005: 19), I believe that the modern moral theorist is (and should be) less 
concerned with the actual norms of a system and more concerned with the 
Nietzschean question of why we ought to be moral at all (G.S. 344).  Perrett (1998) 
takes this to be one of the two major questions in ethics, whilst Hindery (1996) sees it 
as the first question that must be asked of any moral tradition.  And given the 
metaphysical revisions which underlie the model of constructive altruism proposed 
here, the why-question would seem especially urgent.   
 
The question as to why we ought to be moral might arise from a multitude of 
subjective or objective starting points.  For example, it could be taken as a sceptical 
one, essentially challenging ethical discourse en masse (à la Nietzsche).  For Hindery 
(1996), it is an epistemological question.  Alternatively, it might be asked existentially 
(à la Camus).  Here, the departure will be taken from the grounds of Śāntideva’s and 
Śaṅkara’s competing metaphysics.  The question then is, if I were one or other of 
these two thinkers, if I held either of their metaphysical views, why would I wish 
others to follow a particular ethical code?  How could I justify such prescriptions?  
This metaphysical approach will be taken for two reasons.   
 
In the first place, ethics seems to me to be inseparable from metaphysics.  As 
Gamwell (2005: 116) so nicely puts it:  
[A] theoretical explication of any given religious ethic is inseparable 
from metaphysics, and the similarities and differences among the 





If we are going to compare how two religious thinkers ask their disciples and peers to 
live within the world, then it would seem unquestionably necessary to first define just 
what those worlds are like.  That is, authors and believers do not simply live within 
the world as we currently define it, but exist within a world-view.  That world-view 
will of course depend on time and place, and so we can note from the start that 
Śaṅkara and Śāntideva both inhabited an 8th century India.   
 
Also, as the concern here has little to do with how morality functioned on the ground, 
it is even more justifiable to give primary value to world-view.  This is especially 
justified in the case of Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, for they both offered a radical 
metaphysical revision.  Thus, Deutsch (1973: 99) went so far as to claim that ethical 
questions for Advaita are present in “every metaphysical or epistemological question” 
they ask.  With regard to Śaṅkara’s broader epistemological concerns, this is no doubt 
an exaggeration.  However, we can interpret Deutsch to mean that Śaṅkara was more 
interested in searching for the ‘right’ knowledge (saṃyag-jñāna) than in verifying that 
his knowledge was ‘right’ (i.e. justified).  In other words, right knowledge, being 
brahman-knowledge, is its own justification.  Śaṅkara writes:  
kathaṃ hy ekasya sva hṛday pratyayaṃ brahma-vedanaṃ deha 
dhāraṇaṃ cāpareṇa pratikṣeptuṃ śakyeta? 
 
For when somebody feels in his heart that he has realised brahman, 





Thus Taber (1983: 13) translates saṃyag-jñāna as “self-verifying knowledge”.  In 
fact, Śaṅkara borrows this notion of “self-validating” (sva-pramāṇaka) knowing from 





 to the list of validating means of knowledge (Suthren Hirst, 2005: 66-7), 
a move that Ram-Prasad (2001a: 170-171) describes as “unfortunate”, given that an 
experience needs an experiencer, which, in Advaitic terms, implies jīva-
consciousness.  Be that as it may, Śaṅkara states that: 
anubhavāvasānatvāddhūtavastuviṣayatvāc ca brahma-jñānasya 
 
The knowledge of brahman culminates in experience which relates 
to an actual entity (B.S.Bh. I.1.2). 
 
As for the metaphysics of self, we have already noted how the concept of self was so 
pivotal to Śaṅkara’s ethics, the rejection of egoism being directly linked with his 
metaphysics of ātman.  One reaches brahman through a complete destruction of 
egocentricity.  Thus, Hopkins (1996: 187) points out the apparent contradiction in the 
Prāsaṅgika’s suggestion that labelling the highest reality “Self” would increase 
egocentricity.  In fact, Śaṅkara clears the way for a life of selfless service through an 
insight into Self: 
svayaṃvedya tva paryāyaḥ svapramāṇaka iṣyatām   | 
nivṛttāvahamaḥ siddhaḥ svātmano ‘nubhavaś ca naḥ   || 
 
It must be accepted that [the self] is ‘self-evident’, which is 
synonymous with ‘self-knowable’.  And the experience of one’s [true] 






And as we have already noted, Śaṅkara’s metaphysics and ethics meet through the 
following verse from the Upaniṣads: 
yatsu sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmany evān upaśyati   | 
sarva bhūteṣu cātmānaṃ tato na vijugupsate   || 
 
When a man sees all beings in this Self, and the Self in all beings, he 
feels no hatred (Īś.U. 6).   
                                               
46 Cf. the V.C. (474-477).   
 




If we fail to understand Śaṅkara’s views on self, it is simply impossible to understand 
his ethics.  Likewise, as Goodman (contra Keown) has pointed out, “The doctrine of 
no self is at the heart of Mahāyāna ethics” (Goodman, 2009: 96).  Finnigan and 
Tanaka (2011) have also concluded that both Candrakīrti and Śāntideva “explicitly 
connect Madhyamaka metaphysics with Mahāyāna ethics” (p231).   Śāntideva writes 
that, “the bodhisattva who thus sees reality as-it-is feels a profound compassion for all 
beings” (yathā bhūmata darśino bodhisattasya sattveṣu mahā-karuṇā pravartate) 
(Ś.S. 119).  In Śāntideva’s hands, metaphysical self-lessness becomes “the tool of 
altruistic service” (Matics, 1971: 89), that is, ethical selflessness: 
ātmānam aparityajya duḥkhaṃ tyaktum na śakyate     | 
yathāgnim aparityajya dāhaṃ tyaktuṃ na śakyate     || 
tasmāt sva-duḥkha śanty arthaṃ para-duḥkha śamāya ca     | 
dadāmy anyebhya ātmānaṃ parān gṛhṇāmi cātmavat     || 
 
If one does not let go of self, one cannot free oneself from suffering, as 
one who does not remove themselves from fire cannot avoid being burnt. 
Thus, in order to alleviate my own suffering and put an end to the 
suffering of others, I devote myself to others and accept them as ‘myself’ 
(BCA. 8.135-136). 
 
The doctrine of selflessness is thus a “philosophical concept, an ethical principle, and 
a soteriological device” (Huntington, 1989: 70).  Only when we understand 
Śāntideva’s manipulations of the concept of self can we ever come to understand his 
ethics.  If I am confusing ethics with metaphysics, then so did Śaṅkara and Śāntideva.   
 
And not only did they link ethics with a radical metaphysics, but they both offered an 
ideal type, a liberated being, who is said to act correctly because of an insight into the 
true nature of reality.  This ideal type is also based on a common ascetic/monastic 
stance functioning within a network of norms.  We may call this network ’Dharma’, 
though Śaṅkara and Śāntideva will have different definitions of what this means to 
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their traditions (see Chapters 4.3 & 6).  We can therefore respond to MacIntyre’s 
(1996: 1) warning that “Moral concepts are embodied in and are partially constitutive 
of forms of social life”, by pointing out that the two traditions under analysis share a 
huge amount of social ground, yet differ in religious lineage.  It could be claimed of 
both systems that their ethics were metaphysically grounded in a realist sense, that is, 
both confirm a common moral realism, the law of karma, which is highly 
deterministic.
48
  Furthermore, there are truths out there to be known, and there are 
humans who have exemplified such a realisation.   
 
The critical question for both systems is this: do the descriptions of their modes of 
conduct make sense within their respective metaphysical descriptions?  That is, we 
will need to ask whether an altruistic ethical stance is at all compatible with the 
respective metaphysical revisions offered.  This will include both the apparent 
discontinuity of a confirmation of worldly tradition with the goal of liberation from 
that very world, along with the more subtle problem of whether persons (as 
individuated agents) are accepted as truly existent (sat) or not, and indeed what ‘truly 
existent’ means.  Readers of Little and Twiss (1978: 231) might recognise the former 
feature as parallel to the problem of transcendent morality, and the second feature as 
parallel to the so-called “paradoxical element” in the teachings of Theravāda 
Buddhism.  An attempt will be made here to show how the transcendent morality 
thesis fails to apply to the ethics of Śāntideva or, for different reasons, to those of 
Śaṅkara.  It is also hoped that the “paradox” might be solved by introducing the 
concept of a “voluntary” delusion on the part of Śāntideva and by examining the 
complex question of residual (prārabdha) karma in Śaṅkara.   
 
                                               
48 By this I mean “doing x typically leads to y”, rather than, “one had no choice but to do x”. 
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Stating the case briefly here, comparing the two systems, we might note that at the 
universal level, their metaphysics are radically opposed, whilst at the level of agency, 
their metaphysics quite unexpectedly converge.  Neither level is compatible with the 
realist’s view of the world.  And it should be noted that the ultimate denial of 
individual agency was as equally counter-intuitive in 8
th





  Nevertheless, for Śaṅkara, all is brahman, and as such, 
anything other than brahman fails to have independent existence, including the so-
called individuated self (jīva), whose personal agency is the result of a mistaken 
cognition.  For Śāntideva, all is empty (śūnya), that is, empty of inherent or 
independent existence; hence an agreement with Śaṅkara that there is no individuated 
self.  The shocking conclusion is that the foundational ethics of these two systems turn 
out to be remarkably similar despite the radically opposed metaphysics which ground 
them.  They both respond with a call for ethical, even compassionate, action, yet they 
are both open to the “why” question.  These are the roots of my thesis. 
 
Summary of Aims: 
 
Twiss (2005) lists five broad areas for the future of comparative (religious) ethics, and 
this thesis clearly sits within the first of these, with its focus on “Comparative inquiry 
into selfhood and moral agency” (p152).   What follows then is such an examination 
into the metaphysics and ethics of two contemporary Indian thinkers.  As a guide to 
                                               
49 Both Śāntideva (BCA. Chapter 8) and Śaṅkara (Ch.U.Bh. VI.xvi.3) thoroughly accept that their 
claims are counter-intuitive, if by that we mean a view that goes against those which the average person 
(loka) instinctively holds prior to analysis (avicārita).  Both acknowledge that the commonly held view 
is that we are the “body” (deha, kāya).  Śaṅkara (Bh.G.Bh. 3.27) relates this to self-delusion (vimūḍha-
ātma).  Śaṅkara also states that, to think “I am an individuated soul, separate [from the body and mind]” 
(ahaṃ jīvaḥ kartā), i.e. the view of non-Advaitins, is not a “naturally held view of beings” (sva-
bhāvataḥ prāṇinaṃ vijñānā darśanāt) (Ch.U.Bh. VI.xvi.3). 
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such an examination, the reader may take my aims as threefold: one philosophical, 
one historiographical, and one disciplinary.   
 
The first aim, which I regard as philosophical, is to show how two very different – 
even radically opposite – views on the cosmology of self can generate strikingly 
similar accounts of the relationship between human conduct and the world within a 
‘selfless framework’.  This will form the major thread of the thesis.  The philosophical 
point to be captured by the reader is that neither Śāntideva nor Śaṅkara will require a 
view of the person as a stable individuated agent in order to posit a system of moral 
values that ought to be followed.  In fact, they will both conclude that the very belief 
in oneself as a unified moral agent is counter-productive to other-regarding moral 
thought.  The outline of their models presented here should therefore impact on the 
way philosophers of the self approach the question of ethics. 
 
The second aim, which I regard as historiographical, is to show how committed these 
two thinkers were to the continuity of their lineages, both in terms of doctrinal 
commitments and normative conduct.  It will demonstrate how the language of 
ultimate truth sets the limits on these commitments, but also how the seemingly 
opposing language of conventional truth tends to balance the weight of any ultimate 
assertions.  We may see this as a partial resolution of the “tension” introduced earlier.  
For example, Śāntideva will use ultimate-style logic to put the very idea of selfhood 
under question, but will then adopt conventional-style rhetoric to reinstate the ‘other’ 
as the raison d’être of the ethical life.  In like manner, Śaṅkara will use ultimate-style 
rhetoric to shift the focus of the seeker’s awareness from the relative world to the 
absolute realization of brahman-consciousness, whilst later reinstating those very 
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cultural categories he criticizes in order to maintain traditional social class norms, and 
thus the ‘purity’ of his lineage, both in terms of social background and education. 
 
The third aim, which is disciplinary, has two parts: 
 
The first disciplinary objective is basically to warn those who would over-stress the 
ātman/anātman distinction as a way of categorizing Hinduism versus Buddhism.  It 
will be highlighted how their ultimate views lead both thinkers into a denial of 
jīvātman as individuated self, and also how their call for a “selfless” response to 
others demands that they pay lip service to a provisional level of individuated self.  
That they both shift between these two levels, and for the same reasons, is 
demonstration enough that we need to reconsider the commonly voiced view that 
ātman/anātman is the major distinguishing feature of these two religions.   
 
One of the most recent examples of this is Hayes’ claim that anātman is “the one 
doctrine of Buddhism that distinguished it from all other teachings in India” (in 
Keown & Prebish, 2007: 28).  This follows on from Kasulis’ (1997) claim that the 
“negation of ātman” by the Buddha was an “emblem of his break from the Hindu 
tradition” (p400).  Yet, had not Ruegg (1989a) already insisted that it would be “quite 
incorrect to represent Buddhism simply (and simplistically) as invariably asserting the 
non-existence of self” (p243)?  Ruegg does not specify his reasons for this; however, 
my reason will focus on what Śāntideva actually argues for and how he does it.  To do 
justice to the Sanskrit material, we need a more nuanced approach to the question of 
self (see Chapter 4.2), which has to consider not just the Two-Truths mode of 
discourse, but also the persuasive, even voluntary self-deluding, form of emotive 




The second disciplinary objective overlaps the others.  Here I wish to point out how 
Śāntideva and Śaṅkara, as representatives of two often competing religions, actually 
share far more ground than their ultimate stances would first indicate.  It will be 
shown how their methodologies and aims, and even their inter-sectarian differences, 
are in fact cross-cutting.  This will show itself in the way that both ultimately deny 
the individuated self, both adopt the concept of Two-Truths or Two-Realities, and 
both then posit a teacher who can distinguish between these realities and who can 
equally lead others to an understanding of the Two Truths.  It will also show itself in 
their mutual attack on the Yogācāra School of Buddhism (Chapter 4.1). 
 
In order to highlight how the two thinkers so similarly answer the question of right 
moral conduct, two marginal cases have been chosen.  The first case study will 
examine how the two traditions describe the “mystical” intuitions and “effortless” 
actions of a person who is said to be liberated from conditioned existence (Chapter 6).  
This is marginal in the sense that this ‘person’, according to both systems, is said to be 
beyond the moral code, and is yet said to exemplify it.  The accounts given by Śaṅkara 
and Śāntideva will be shown to be remarkably similar.  The second case study will 
take place at the opposite boundary, concerning those who tend to be discriminated by 
the culture under examination.  The purpose here is to compare how Śaṅkara handles 
the subject of class and caste with the way Śāntideva handles the subject of women 
(Chapter 7).  Both will claim that these categories are mere labels to be left behind, 
yet both will confirm these labels within their ethical systems.  Through these means, 
it will be demonstrated how the conventional, and thus moral-making, ground of each 
tradition consistently manages to survive the ultimate level of discourse. 
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3. Situating Śaṅkara and Śāntideva 
 
 
There are essentially two major doctrinal differences between Brahmanism and 
Buddhism which have forever held them apart as separate, even opposing religions.  
The first is the Buddhist denial of the validity of the Vedic view of the cosmos and its 
sacrificial rites, and thus the authoritative testimony (śabda) of the Vedic literature.  
The second is the Buddhist denial of a permanent, essential self, be it brahman, ātman 
or jīva.  Both of these Buddhist positions, in one form or other, go right back to the 
Buddha himself, and thus precede the Mahāyāna.  
 
The contrast between Śaṅkara and Śāntideva is thus, in the main, one inherited from 
their traditions.  However, it is further sharpened by the radical (re)formulations which 
later take place; on one side, the Advaita doctrine which states that “all is brahman”, 
and on the other, the Madhyamaka doctrine which states that “all is empty”.  These 
radical metaphysical positions do two things: first, they place Śaṅkara and Śāntideva 
at opposite ends of the “Self-spectrum”; second, they threaten to undermine their own 
traditions.  Before we can judge how much they each threaten their own traditions, we 
first need to lay out the doctrines and modes of conduct that Śaṅkara and Śāntideva 




3.1 Approaching Śaṅkara  
 
In India, it is not so much originality, but fidelity to tradition that is prized most.  
While Śaṅkara may well be called an innovative philosopher, he did not claim to be 
the inventor or expounder of an original system.  The tradition that Śaṅkara wishes to 
defend has its origins in the Vedas.  Śaṅkara wishes to provisionally defend the early 
(pūrva) Vedic scriptures, with their sacrificial rites and associated social systems, 
whilst wishing to ultimately defend the later (uttara) Vedic scriptures, otherwise 
known as the Upaniṣads.  Śaṅkara asks us to accept the prescriptions with regard to 
actions as found in the early Vedas, whilst also understanding that the non-dual 
(advaita) description of brahman given in the Upaniṣads (in his interpretation) is the 
ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), and that the attainment of this knowledge leads to 
liberation from the conventional (vyāvahārika), and is verily the final goal.  And so: 
na  ... advaitātma vijñānād anyatra ātyantikī niḥśreya saprāptiḥ 
 
Absolute liberation cannot be achieved without the realisation of the 
non-dual self (Ch.U.Bh., intro). 
 
At the conventional level, Śaṅkara essentially follows the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa (see 
Halbfass, 1991: 385).  For this school, the Vedic revelation must be interpreted solely 
as injunction (vidhi) to action.  That is, Vedic sentences are incitements (codanā) to 
ritual action (karma).  Thus Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (I.i.2) defines Dharma as 
incitements to action (codanā lakṣaṇo ‘rtha dharmaḥ) (see Mohanty, 2007: 59).  
Furthermore, the Vedas are said to be the only source which can teach us about 
Dharma.  Yet, for Śaṅkara, the Vedic sayings are most potent when they speak of 




Śaṅkara has been called the greatest representative and interpreter of Eastern 
mysticism (Otto, 1957: xvi).  Others have suggested that his exegesis was “too 
rational” to be classed as mystical (Cenkner, 1983: 82).  Some have stressed that 
Śaṅkara was first and foremost, a teacher (Suthren Hirst, 2005: 1).  He will be treated 
here primarily as an exegete.  As for the teaching aspect, the focus will be on his 
insistence that one needs a qualified teacher, and on the notion that the teacher 
himself, having realised brahman, is in need of nothing.  The brahman-knower-cum-
teacher, the living-liberated being (jīvan-mukta)50, being a voluntary actor, solely 
responding to the needs of others, will be described as “altruistic”.   The basis of this 
altruism, I will argue, is a sense of compassion.   
 
The exegetical focus will be on his commentaries to the so-called Triple Canon 
(prasthāna-traya) of the Vedānta tradition: the major Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad Gītā 
and the Brahma Sūtra.  Attention will also be paid to his principal (authentic)51 non-
commentarial work, the Upadeśa Sāhasrī, where Śaṅkara pays most attention to the 
role of the teacher.  This text is divided into two parts, the Prose-section, which is a 
“handy guide for teachers”, and the Metrical-section, which acts as a “textbook for the 
pupils”; perhaps based on Śaṅkara’s own “pedagogical experiences” (Mayeda, 1992: 
xvii).  The explicit need for a teacher to pass on the ultimate knowledge of the Vedas 
is also found throughout his commentaries and it is consistently to the Upaniṣads that 
                                               
50 Skoog (1996: 75) notes that the term ‘jīvan-mukta’ appears nowhere in the Upaniṣads.   However, 
Dasgupta (1975, Vol.II: 246) has traced a reference in a late Upaniṣad, the Muktika Upaniṣad.  Despite 
the lack of explicit references to the term, Dasgupta states that “the idea seems to be pretty old” (p247).  
Śaṅkara, in all his authentic writings, only used the actual term once (Bh.G.Bh. 6.27).  Thus, Nelson 
(1996: 21) assumes that, for Śaṅkara, it had not yet become a “technical term”.  The V.C., on the other 
hand, uses the term repeatedly (e.g. 428-440). 
 
51 On the question of authentic works, see Dasgupta (1975, Vol.II: 77-82), Hacker (in Halbfass, 1995), 
Isayeva (1993: 92-98), Marcaurelle (2000: 12-13), Sundaresan (2002) and Suthren Hirst (2005: 19-25).  
An academic consensus appears to be forming around the ones selected here.  
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he turns for authority, not to his own experience.  That is why we should treat him 
primarily as an exegete. 
 
The Upaniṣads are known as śruti (revealed text), which Śaṅkara typically treats as 
self-validating (B.S.Bh. I.iii.28).  The Bhagavad Gītā, though an example of smṛti 
(remembered text), and thus one which ought to be interpreted through other texts 
(B.S.Bh. I.iii.28), is actually treated by Śaṅkara with the same authority as śruti.52  
This is no doubt because Śaṅkara takes it to be in agreement with the Upaniṣads (see 
B.S.Bh. II.i.1).  Bādarāyaṇa’s Brahma Sūtra is the most revered Vedāntic example of 
nyāya (logical treatise), and is said to closely follow the teachings of the Chāndogya 
Upaniṣad (Klostermaier, 2007: 159).   Śaṅkara, in commenting on all these ancient 
texts, was involved in what Deutsch (1988: 169) has called the language of 
“recovery”.  However, Śaṅkara has sometimes been accused of forcing the texts into 
the service of his own doctrines (Otto, 1957: xvii), or taking liberties with his 
interpretations (Isayeva, 1993: 100).  But as Deutsch (1988) more generally states 
with regard to Indian texts, the “philosopher-commentator … seeks to remain faithful 
to his authoritative sources, but in his own creative terms” (p170).  Śaṅkara was 
clearly a serious and creative thinker, endowed with “too much creativity and 
reasoning power to remain a simple traditionalist” (Mayeda, 1992: 48).  Hence, the 
religious and historical significance of Śaṅkara’s commentaries is immeasurable. 
 
Now Śaṅkara is often spoken of as “virtually the founder of Advaita” (Ram-Prasad, 
2002: 5).  However, he did not truly found Advaita and writes as if he were following 
                                               
52 The Gītā is sometimes referred to as ‘Gītopaniṣad’ (Theodor, 2010: 36).  The Mahābhārata, from 
which the Gītā was extracted, also calls itself the “Fifth Veda” (Lipner, 2010: 71).  On the accepted 




a tradition (sampradāya).  Three ancient teachers are mentioned in the Brahma Sūtra 
itself (B.S. I.iv.20-22), but little is known about them except that they are claimed by 
both Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita (Potter, 1981: 10).  Other traditional teachers are also 
mentioned by Śaṅkara (p12).  However, no study of Śaṅkara would be complete 
without mentioning his huge indebtedness to the work of Gauḍapāda, who may well 
have been the teacher of his teacher (Govindapāda). Indeed, Śaṅkara refers to 
Gauḍapāda as “parama-guru” (G.K.Bh. Salutation), which translates as either 
“teacher of the teacher” or “great teacher”.53  Aside from Bādarāyaṇa, the author of 
the Brahma Sūtra, the theoretical source of Vedānta, Gauḍapāda was possibly the 
most influential figure on Śaṅkara’s philosophy. 54    His use of the Two-Truths 
doctrine and the notion of māyā can be traced back to Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkya kārikā, 
as well as his use of the term ‘advaita’ to describe the highest reality.   
 
Now, Gauḍapāda’s text was “undoubtedly composed under the direct impact of 
Buddhist ideas” (Isayeva, 1993: 10).  Even its use of māyā (as illusiveness of the 
phenomenal world) is a Buddhist rather than Vedāntin interpretation, traceable to 
Nāgārjuna’s MMK.  This has been confirmed by Richard King (1995: 2 & 126-127), 
amongst others (see Potter, 1981: 78-79).  Furthermore, Gauḍapāda’s monism owes 
much to the Yogācāra (see Chapter 4.1).  Dasgupta (1975) took this borrowing from 
both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra to be “so obvious” that it was “needless to attempt to 
prove it” (Vol.I: 429). Mayeda (1992) thus speaks of the “buddhification of the 
Vedānta tradition” (p13).  Due to a verse in the Kārikā (4.1) where Gauḍapāda 
apparently pays reverence to the Buddha, Dasgupta (1975, Vol.I: 423) even suggested 
                                               
53 On the ambiguity of this term, see King (1995: 16). 
 
54 Of course, the Vedas themselves are said to be authorless (apauruṣeya).  For further commentarial 
influences on Śaṅkara, see Roodurmun (2002: 9-25). 
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that Gauḍapāda was “possibly” a Buddhist.  Hacker says that “There cannot be any 
reasonable doubt that the person meant is the Buddha” (in Halbfass, 1995: 36). 
Battacharya, however, believed Gauḍapāda remained a “Vedāntist”, despite the 
Buddhist influence; a view echoed by Murti (1980: 13) and by Mahadeva and Roy 
(cited in O’Neil, 1980: 54-56).  Personally, I feel that the more obvious conclusion to 
draw is that Buddhist and Brahmanical ideas are often cross-cutting and that their 
methodologies were mutually borrowed.  I therefore see Malinar’s (2007: 259) 
notion of “floating concepts and practices” as a healthy one.  In Chapter 4, I hope to 
convince the reader of this cross-cutting with regard to Śaṅkara and Śāntideva. 
 
Śaṅkara does his best to distance Vedānta from Buddhism, attempting to explain away 
all the references to the Buddha.  In a decisive passage, whilst admitting the 
similarities with Vijñānavāda doctrines and Vedānta, he insists on keeping them apart: 
yadyapi bāhyārtha nirākaraṇaṃ jñāna-mātra kalpanā ca advaya 
vastu sāmīpyam uktam   |  idaṃ tu paramārtha tattvam advaitaṃ 
vedānteṣv eva vijñeyam ity arthaḥ   || 
 
Even though the view [of the Buddha]
55
, which rejects the existence of 
external objects and asserts the doctrine of consciousness-only, is said 
to be similar to the notion of non-duality;  the ultimate non-dual 
reality is, however, only known through the Upaniṣads.  This is the 
meaning (G.K.Bh. 4.99). 
 
This is a critical statement, and supports the point made in Chapter 2 that you simply 
cannot compare religions by comparing virtues like ‘understanding’.  An ultimate 
truth for one camp is but an approximation to it in another.  Śaṅkara here refuses to 
acknowledge that the Buddha could have been enlightened even though they hold 
basically the same doctrine.  Elsewhere, in his defining work, the Brahma-Sūtra 
                                               
55 In the verse on which Śaṅkara is commenting (G.K. 4.99), Gauḍapāda claims that the knowledge of 
Vedānta is “not that uttered by the Buddha” (naitad buddhena bhāṣitam).  While Śaṅkara often debates 
with the Yogācāra as a separate school, he also takes the Buddhists (en masse) as claiming that the 
Buddha taught all “Three-Turnings” of the Dharma (B.S.Bh. II.ii.31).  So in his G.K. commentary, 
Śaṅkara speaks of this idealistic doctrine of the Yogācāra as being that of the Buddha himself. 
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Bhāṣya, he accuses the Buddha of “incoherent prattling” (asambaddha pralāpitvaṃ).  
Buddhism is there declared to be “nihilistic” (vaināśika) and “untenable” 
(anupapanna).  As such, Śaṅkara recommends that: 
sarvathāpy anādaraṇīyo ‘yaṃ sugata samayaḥ śreyas kāmair 
 
The Buddhist religion should be totally renounced by those who desire 
the highest good (B.S.Bh. II.ii.32).   
 
Śaṅkara here calls for a complete break with Buddhism.  In fact, as a good exegete, he 
ends the phrase with, “that is the intended meaning” (ityabhiprāyaḥ).  In other words, 
he traces his position back to the Brahma Sūtra itself.  Obviously, some change took 
place between Śaṅkara (the writer of the Kārikā Bhāṣya) and Śaṅkara (the writer of 
the Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya).  Thus, Mayeda (1992: 7) suggests that it was left to 
Śaṅkara to “revedanticize” the Advaita tradition.  And while Ruegg (2010: 32) sees 
this move from Buddhist thought to Vedāntic sources as a “progressive” one within 
the Kārikā itself, Śaṅkara certainly takes it one step further. 
 
Hacker suggests that Śaṅkara moved on from Gauḍapāda into a more obvious 
“Advaita period” developing a “more independent way of thinking” (in Halbfass, 
1995: 108).  We can certainly see that he moved away from the doctrine of “mind-
only”, which he most certainly upholds in the Kārikā Bhāṣya.  Here he states that an 
object (arthaḥ) perceived in the waking-state is as non-existent (abhūtaḥ) as those 
perceived in the dream-state.  It is “consciousness alone that appears as objects such 
as pots, just like in dream” (cittam-eva hi ghaṭādy artha vad avabhāsate yathā svapne) 
(G.K.Bh. 4.26).  Śaṅkara here holds a “mind-only” (cittam-eva) doctrine, in complete 
contradiction to his major works.  Moreover, Śaṅkara admits that these doctrines are 
those of the Yogācāra Buddhist (Vijñānavādino Bauddhasya), and that “they are 
accepted” (anumoditam) “by the teacher” (ācāryeṇa), i.e. Gauḍapāda (4.28).  The 
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reason they are accepted is that they “refute the views of those who maintain the 
reality of external things” (bāhyārtha vādi pakṣa pratiṣedhaparam).  He goes on to 
say that the only objection Gauḍapāda has to the Yogācāra thesis is the 
“momentariness” (kṣaṇikatva) of consciousness (ibid.).56  For Advaita, consciousness 
is always steady and unchangeable in itself. 
 
Two important points to notice here are: 1) Gauḍapāda is not simply accepting a 
particular Buddhist ontology without critique.  He in fact denies part of their thesis.  
And 2) Śaṅkara, in this Bhāṣya, is happier to sit alongside an idealist Buddhist than be 
confused with the realists. Nor can we say that Śaṅkara was merely parroting the 
doctrines of Gauḍapāda here, for he says something very similar in the Aitareya-
Upaniṣad Bhāṣya.  Here, Śaṅkara likens the waking state to the dream state:  
paramārtha svātma prabodhābhāvāt svapna-vad asad vastu darśanāc ca 
 
In the waking state there is no consciousness of one’s own self as the 





However, we should not too hastily assume that Śaṅkara’s final position is that the 
“world of everyday experience is a dream”, as Phillips (1997: 326) does; for a whole 
different picture forms when we compare the following statement from his (later) 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad Bhāṣya: 
vijñānādarthāntaraṃ vastu na ced abhyupagamyate, vijñānaṃ ghaṭaḥ 
paṭa ity evamādīnāṃ śabdānām ekārthatve paryāyaśabdatvaṃ 
prāpnoti  | 
 
                                               
56 It is noteworthy that Loy (1988: 129) unquestionably adopts such teachings of Gauḍapāda as if they 
were Śaṅkara’s.  If Hacker is right, then this methodology is questionable. 
 
57 The V.C. (170-171) also holds a “mind only” (mana-eva) doctrine “after the fashion of Gauḍapāda” 
(Potter, 1981: 335).  It repeats the notion that sense objects perceived in the waking-state are as “false” 
(mithyā) as those perceived in the dream-state (V.C. 252). 
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If no object distinct from consciousness were admitted, then the words 
‘cognition’, ‘pot’, ‘cloth’, etc., having the same meaning, would all be 
synonymous (Bṛ.U.Bh. IV.iii.7).   
 
A similar style of inquiry is found in his defining work, the Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya, 
where the following argument is offered to him by a realist opponent: 
prasiddho hy ayaṃ bhoktṛ bhogya vibhāgo loke bhoktā cetanaḥ 
śarīro, bhogyāḥ śabdādayo viṣayā iti   | 
 
It is quite obvious that there is a fundamental distinction between the 
subject of experience and that which is experienced; the subject being 
the embodied consciousness, the experience consisting of objects such 
as sound, etc. (B.S.Bh. II.i.13). 
  
His answer is that:  
upadyate evāyamasmat pakṣe ‘pi vibhāgaḥ, evaṃ loke dṛṣṭatvāt  
 
This distinction can indeed be upheld from our point of view, for it is 
seen to be so in the world (ibid.).  
 
In other words, Śaṅkara is agreeing with his opponent that the pramāṇa of perception 
(pratyakṣa) has the world of sensation as its valid domain. 58  But this does not mean 
that he accepts the opponent’s claim that the Vedas only have “validity in their own 
                                               
58 As Deutsch (1973: 69, n.6) notes, Śaṅkara tends to focus on three pramāṇas: perception (pratyakṣa), 
inference (anumāna) and scriptural testimony (śabda, śruti).  He typically places smṛti in the category 
of inference (B.S.Bh. I.iii.28).  However, as noted by Suthren Hirst (2005: 66-67), with regard to 
knowledge of the Self, he also seems to allow for experience (anubhava) as a further pramāṇa (B.S.Bh. 
I.i.2).  For Potter’s comments on anubhava, which he translates as “immediate intuition”, and other 
pramāṇas, see Potter (1981: 96-98).  For a more detailed discussion of anubhava in Śaṅkara, see 
Sharma (1992).  Also see the V.C. (477).  Now, Suthren Hirst (2005) has claimed that Śaṅkara would 
not engage with the Mādhyamikas because they “did not accept any pramāṇas” (p49).  And Matics 
(1971) claims that Śāntideva “accepts no criteria of valid knowledge” (p118).  However, this is simply 
not true.  Śāntideva clearly accepts certain Buddhist scriptures as authoritative; the Compendium is 
almost entirely made up of such authoritative citations.  He uses scripture as a means to prove the 
validity of the workings of karma, and even to justify his emptiness doctrine (BCA. 9.38-50).  He also 
accepts the yogi’s “superior understanding” as a form of knowledge (9.7-8) worthy of replacing the 
direct perception of common people (9.6).  Furthermore, for Śaṅkara (see B.S.Bh. I.i.4 & II.i.14), 
ultimately, the pramāṇas “fail to tell us about reality” (Potter, 1981: 96), culminating in a neither/nor 
position, which parallels that of Nāgārjuna (ibid.).  When brahman-knowledge is gained, the “very 
conditions under which the system of knowledge operates cease to hold” (Ram-Prasad, 2007: 128).  
That is why Halbfass (1991) claims that “Śaṅkara withdraws ultimately from the open arena of 
philosophical debate” (p36).  Furthermore, Nāgārjuna did not say that he denied the pramāṇas, but that 
he neither affirmed nor denied them (na pravartayāmi na nivartayāmi) (Vv. 30).   As pointed out by 
Westerhoff (2009: 179), Burton (2001: 194) is wrong in claiming that, for Nāgārjuna, the pramāṇas and 
their objects do not exist at all.  Rather, they have no independent existence.  Nāgārjuna’s assault was 
targeted at foundationalism, not epistemic instruments, per se (Garfield, 2011: 28-29).  Thus, the 
apparent methodological difference between Śaṅkara and Śāntideva fails from both sides.  
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domain” (pramāṇaṃ sva viṣaye bhavati) and that direct perception is to be awarded 
priority in this provisional domain.  It is rather that the Two Truths of the Vedas can 
equally allow for both domains.  For Śaṅkara, the “Veda does not simply leave this 
world to the “worldly” means of knowledge” (Halbfass, 1991: 152).   
 
Ram-Prasad (2002: 32) comments on this exchange with the realist: 
It is from this experiential situation that the systematic nature of the 
pramāṇas, together with the requirement of a systematic order of 
objects (the extrinsic world), is derived.  Objects have to be that way, 
or else experience could not be accounted for. 
 
It is here worth comparing this to Śāntideva on the conventional status of objects and 
his defence of the Buddha’s “First Turning” pseudo-realist treatment of objects: 
lokāvatāraṇārthaṃ ca bhāvā nāthena deśitāḥ     | 
tattvataḥ kṣaṇikā naite saṃvṛtyā ced virūdhyate     || 
na doṣo yogi saṃvṛtyā lokātte tattva darśinaḥ     | 
 
The Protector taught of existents in order to guide people [gradually 
into the knowledge of emptiness].  If it is objected then that these 
[“entities”] are not really momentary, but only conventionally so [the 
fact is that] there is no fault in a yogi adopting the conventional usage.  
He has a better understanding of reality than the worldly (BCA. 9.7-8a). 
 
Before we compare this view on valid means of knowledge with Śaṅkara’s, let us 
return to the latter’s response (B.S.Bh. II.i.13) to his realist opponent: 
tathāhi samudrād udakātmano ‘nanyatve ‘pi tad vikārāṇāṃ phena vīcī 
taraṃga budbudādīnām itaretara vibhāga itaretara saṃśleṣādi 
lakṣaṇaś ca vyavahāra upalabhyate   |   na ca samudrād udakātmano 
‘nanyatve ‘pi tad vikārāṇāṃ phena taraṃgādīnāṃ itaretara 
bhāvāpattir bhavati   |  na ca teṣābhitaretara bhāvānāpattāvapi 
samudātmano ‘nyatvaṃ bhavati  
 
Thus, although foam, ripple, wave, bubble, etc. (which are different 
modifications of the sea) are non-different from that sea (being 
themselves water), they still demonstrate separate actions and 
reactions in the form of breaking up and coalescing.  And yet, the 
foam, wave, etc, do not lose their individuality in relation to one 
another, even though they are modifications of the sea and non-
different from it (being themselves water).  To re-iterate, even though 
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they do not lose their individuality in one another, they are never 




We can see from the above that both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva struggle to find a place 
for external reality in their traditions’ neither/nor models.  They are thus both intent on 
creating a both/and model.  A wave both is and is not the sea.  Individuals both do and 
do not exist.
60
  One way Śaṅkara does this is by claiming that the pramāṇa of direct 
perception (pratyakṣa) can be used to validate the pramāṇa of scriptural testimony 
(śabda, śruti).  This makes him subject to normal conventions (vyavahāra) and a 
transcendental thesis.  Śāntideva, however, maintains that the perception of a yogi is 
superior to normal perception (see Chapter 7.2).  He therefore has no need to play ball 
with the conventional pramāṇa system.  His ultimate pramāṇa then is the yogi’s 
superior understanding, which amounts to their “privileged way” of describing reality 
(Brassard, 2000: 4).  This is not so much a transcendental argument, but a 
gnoseological one.
61
   
 
Śāntideva’s yogi-bodhisattva, by flickering from ultimate to conventional reality, 
commands authority in both domains.  Of course, to a certain degree, the same is true 
of Śaṅkara’s brahma-vid, who will claim self-validating knowledge of ultimate reality 
(see Chapter 5.1).  He will also claim to understand the true intent of the Vedas (see 
Chapter 6.2).  But his knowledge seems not to extend to the point of claiming to know 
the truth about whether objects exist externally or not.  He seems more concerned than 
                                               
59 Cf. V.C. (390 & 496).  This non-dual response could have been taken straight out of a Ch’an 
Buddhist text.  But let us not forget that Śāntideva (unlike Chinese Madhyamaka) would not accept its 
metaphysical basis, there being no “Absolute” ground in Indian Madhyamaka.   See note 27 on p39.   
 
60 Zaehner (1973: 187) saw a similar both/and model as a characteristic of the Gītā. 
 
61 For the argument that the Madhyamaka are in fact offering “transcendental arguments”, read the 




the Buddhist as to whether his revisionary account will be “dismissed out of hand” 
(Ram-Prasad, 2001a: 180).  But, more than fear of philosophical rejection is at stake.  
Both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva need the outside world for their traditions’ ethics to 
function.  They also need to remain sceptical of the world’s ‘solidity’, as it were, in 
order for their world-transcending thesis to have full force.  They must both make 
cognition central without falling into a mind-only position (see Chapter 4.1).  Thus, 
we see a tension between the Two Truths. 
 
Returning to the question of textual development; if we accept that the Bṛ.U.Bh and 
the B.S.Bh are his more ‘mature’ works, and if we also accept that the Ch.U.Bh was 
one of his two most important Upaniṣadic commentaries (see Suthren Hirst, 2005: 19-
25), then Hacker seems correct in his assessment that Śaṅkara moved away from 
Gauḍapāda.62  Dasgupta (1975, Vol.II: 28-29) also notes this change in Śaṅkara’s 
attitude to external objects, feeling that his various statements would amount to 
“contradictions” unless we accept a shift in thought between the time of writing the 
G.K.Bh. and the B.S.Bh..  And any sympathetic reading of Śaṅkara should try to avoid 
such contradictions. 
 
Certainly, if we examine the arguments that Śaṅkara offers against the Yogācāra in his 
mature texts (see Chapter 4.1), we have to agree with Ram-Prasad’s (2002: 25-92) 
reading of Śaṅkara as offering a “transcendental argument” with regard to externality.  
Put simply, the argument goes that we cannot prove external reality, but we have to 
take it, a priori, as given in order to tally the world with our experience (p28).  But we 
can neither prove that there is an external world, nor outright deny it (p81).  The world 
                                               
62 Admittedly, Hacker’s (and later Vetter’s) development thesis remains “inevitably hypothetical” 
(Halbfass, 1991: 144). 
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then, for Śaṅkara, has what Radhakrishnan (1989: 87) has called “pragmatic 
justification”.  Contrary to Thurman’s (1976) thesis of “absolute” metaphysics, 
Śaṅkara does not impel us to “negate our immediate reality” (p3).  The ‘mature’ 
Śaṅkara therefore sits closer to the Madhyamaka than to the Yogācāra.  We might say 
that Śaṅkara moves from an idealistic/anti-realist position to a sceptical/non-realist 
position.  This allows him to talk coherently about the world and its social structures 
without compromising the possibility of world-transcendence.   
  
If we do accept this chronology, then it could be argued that at some point in his life, 
Śaṅkara no longer found idealism to be reasonable.  But I would like to think that he 
also moved away from the mind-only position because he saw it as undermining the 
ethics of the Vedas and the Gītā.  However, he maintained the Two Truths because 
that allowed him more scope to split the Vedas in two, creating two clear domains, the 
provisional and the ultimate.  Keeping hold of the early Vedas allows for a more 
conservative traditional structure, and the Bhagavad Gītā provides him with the 
vehicle to express his views on class-based Dharma (see Chapter 4.3).  Ram-Prasad 
(2007: 126) describes the Advaitin’s position thus: 
Advaitins must reconcile a radical concept of liberation that rejects 
Vedic ritual by calling for it to be transcended with a conservative 
acknowledgement of the significance of Vedic orthopraxy. 
 
On its Advaitin methodology, the V.C. states: 
nālaṃ jahatyā na tathā ‘jahatyā kintūbhayārthātmikayaiva bhāvyam  |  
  
Neither the method of complete rejection nor that of total retention is 
fitting.  But a method based on both approaches should be adopted (247).   
 
It is this tension which comes of maintaining the Two-Truths hermeneutics along with 
an insistence on traditional ethics that makes Śaṅkara’s both/and methodology appear 
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so much like Śāntideva.  But the doctrine he holds is not that of the Madhyamaka, 
only the methodology.  When dealing with ethics, texts are explained in conventional 
terms, but when dealing with liberation, texts are explained in ultimate terms.  Thus, 
in balancing the provisional with the ultimate, both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva manipulate 
the traditional texts to suit the context.  For Śaṅkara, the wave is both wave and sea; 
for Śāntideva, the wave is both wave and empty.  They share the ‘and’, but not the 
ontology.  And, of course, they disagree on the source of their provisional ethics.  For 
Śaṅkara, the Vedic rituals must go on; for Śāntideva, they are futile.  Thus, Śaṅkara’s 
traditional Vedāntin stance remains intact despite the similarities with his Buddhist 
compatriots (see Chapter 4).  And, along with Ruegg (2010: 33), we might believe 
that he became more radically sectarian as a reaction to the obvious similarities. 
 
As for Śaṅkara’s dates, it seems that the first Western attempt was made by Tiele, who 
suggested 788-820 (see Isayeva, 1993: 83-7).  Hacker questioned these dates (in 
Halbfass, 1995: 27), and, in a separate essay, offers 680-720 (in Halbfass, 1995: 192).  
Nakamura and then Mayeda offered dates of somewhere between 700 and 750, and 
Vetter offered a wider field of between 650 and 800 (see Isayeva, 1993: 83-7).  
Olivelle (1986) accepts Mayeda’s dates of 700-750, while Mohanty (1997a: 28) 
decided on 650-700.  Tiwari (1977) traces much of this debate, and comes to the 
conclusion that Śaṅkara lived somewhere around 700 or 800 A.D. (p7).  In more 
recent studies on Advaita, Ram-Prasad (2002) posits the 8
th
 century, Cronk (2003) 
suggests 700-32, and Suthren Hirst (2005), following Alston, gives 700 A.D.  The 
historian, John Keay (2000) returns to Tiele’s dating of 788-820.  Let us accept then, 




In terms of caste and lineage, Śaṅkara seems to have a major task at hand if he wishes 
to: 1) link himself with the early Upaniṣads, and 2) see his own lineage as that of 
celibate monks.  Even though the non-celibate life was ridiculed in the Muṇḍaka 
Upaniṣad (see Olivelle, 2008: 156-157); it is quite evident that the earlier Upaniṣads 
take the lineage of “knowers” to be a lineage of householders.  The Chāndogya 
Upaniṣad, for example, is quite explicit that its lineage is one of “great-householders” 
(mahā-śālāḥ) (Ch.U. VI.iv.5).  And Śaṅkara himself makes it explicit that by 
“knowers” the Upaniṣad means “knowers of brahman” (brahma-vidāṃ) (Ch.U.Bh. 
VI.iv.7).  But in the very same commentary, Śaṅkara is quite insistent that “the monk 
alone, having ceased rites, remains established in brahman” (nivṛtta karmā bhikṣuka 
eva brahma-saṃstha) (II.xxiii.1). So insistent, in fact, that he repeats it with the 
paraphrased, “only as a mendicant who has completely given up difference can one 
remain established in brahman” (parivrājakasya eva nivṛtta bheda pratyasya brahma-
saṃstatā saṃbhavāt) (ibid.).  He simply does not want to admit that householders 
could have knowledge of brahman.  In fact, he goes one further, and claims that those 
who desire women cannot possibly have knowledge of the Self (VIII.v.4).  This is 
because lust (kāma) supposedly arises from ignorance (avidyā) (U.S. Prose, 1.20).  
Elsewhere, he makes this explicit: 
na hi turīyasyātmatvāvagame sati avidyā tṛṣṇādi doṣānāṃ 
 saṃbhavo ‘sti 
 
Indeed, there can be no possibility of such defects as ignorance, 
craving, and the like, after the realisation of the “fourth” 63 as one’s 
Self (Mā.U.Bh. 7). 
 
Moreover, once one attains to the Self, there is nothing left to be desired: 
brahma-vidaś ca āpta kāmatvāt āpta kāmasya kāmānupapatteḥ  | 
 
                                               




The knower-of-brahman has already attained the desirable, an 
incomparable desire; so he cannot therefore have any more desires 
(Bṛ.U.Bh. II.iv., intro). 
 
The Chāndogya Upaniṣad thus speaks of a self-knower as “one who has bliss in the 
self” (ātmānandaḥ) (VII.xxv.2), and Śaṅkara comments that this bliss (ānanda) is 
“without the need for union” (dvandva nirapekṣaṃ).  Furthermore, it comes to a man 
“even while living” (jīvann eva)64 (Ch.U.Bh. VII.xxv.2).  Clearly, Śaṅkara is simply 
trying to trump the bliss of sexual union with the so-called “incomparably exalted 
version” of bliss of realisation (Ram-Prasad, 2001a: 192).  As in Buddhism, it is used 
as a “sort of bait” (Chakrabarti, 1983: 171), merely to persuade would-be renouncers, 
especially those who put more value on sensual-pleasure (kāma-sukha) than on 
knowledge.  Śaṅkara’s style of argument, like Śāntideva’s, was also persuasive, but 
also like Śāntideva, he found himself involved in persuading his followers in both 
ascetic terms and in more metaphysical terms.  Thus, there is an inherent tension in his 
exegesis.  On Śaṅkara’s pure Advaitin terms, personal bliss is a faulty argument, for 
we see elsewhere that he denies that a brahman-knower could feel bliss as if it were 
something to be cognised (Bṛ.U.Bh. III.ix.28.7).  That is why scholars speak of 
Śaṅkara’s “reticence” (Potter, 1981: 91) and “reservations” (Hacker in Halbfass, 1995: 
112) with regard to bliss.  Śaṅkara is anxious to show that bliss of the self is not the 
object of a feeling (saṃvedya).  Hence: 
jalāśaya ivodakājjaliḥ kṣiptaḥ na pṛthaktvena vyavatiṣṭate 
ānandātmaka brahma vijñānāya; tadā mukta ānandātmakam 
ātmānaṃ vedayata ity etad anarthakaṃ vākyam   | 
 
Like a hand-full of water thrown into a lake, he does not retain a 
separate existence by which he could ‘know’ the blissful brahman.  
                                               




Hence, to say that the liberated man knows the blissful self is 
[ultimately] meaningless (Bṛ.U.Bh. III.ix.28.7).65 
 
More importantly, contra numerous claims for jīvan-mukti, Śaṅkara states that only 
“absolute separation from the body amounts to final liberation” (śarīra viyogo hi 
mokṣa ātyantikaḥ) (ibid.).  Thus, Śaṅkara’s acceptance of jīvan-mukti appears to 
Nelson (1996: 18) as “not entirely wholehearted”.  And it may therefore appear that 
mokṣa “belongs to Ātman, not to embodied existence” (Koller, 1997: 289).  The 
problem with this assessment, though, is that, if Śaṅkara wished to promote “post-
body liberation” (videha-mukti), then there are passages in the Upaniṣads that lend 
themselves to it, but Śaṅkara does not interpret them that way.  For example, the 
Chāndogya’s “This is brahman.  After departing from here after death, I shall become 
that” (etad brahmaitam itaḥ pretyābhisambhavitāsmīti), which seems a classic case 
for videha-mukti, is taken by Śaṅkara to refer to a qualified (saguṇa) objective form of 
brahman, not the ultimate nirguṇa-brahman (Ch.U.Bh.  III.xiv.4).  Better then to see 
Śaṅkara as being left in a similar situation to the early Buddhists who devised the 
notion of two types of nirvāṇa, i.e. “with remainder” (sopādhiśeṣa), and “without 
remainder” (anupādhiśeṣa) of the aggregates.66   Whilst physically embodied, the 
jīvan-mukta can still be said to be an “immortal” (amṛitatva), in the sense that he has 
conquered death (Ch.U.Bh. VI.xiv.2) and has, as it were, become “unembodied” 
(aśarīram) (Ch.U.Bh. VIII.xii.1).  This makes sense when we realise that Śaṅkara 
defines embodiment in terms of the mistaken cognition (mithyā-jñānaṃ) which 
                                               
65 Hacker argues here for a development in Śaṅkara’s thought (in Halbfass, 1995: 108-115).  He may be 
correct.  However, I argue that bliss is necessary as a motivator towards renunciation, but its notion is 
to be ultimately dropped.  In other words, it suits the ascetic discourse, but not the transcendental 
discourse.  Where Hacker sees chronological development, I see a “both/and” model.  Naturally, as 
already noted, I also accept that there is a Śaṅkara at t1, a Śaṅkara at t2, etc.; but not all his 
“inconsistencies” need to be ironed out in this way. 
 




identifies self with the body (B.S.Bh. I.i.4), and then defines bodilessness in terms of 
liberation (mokṣākyasyāśarīratvasya) (ibid.).  The bodiless state is thus said to be 
eternal (nitya) and inherent (svābhāvikatvāt) in the Self (ibid.), as is immortality 
(Ken.U.Bh. 2.4).  As Kuznetsova (2007) points out, in Vedānta, liberation becomes 
the new immortality, a “meta-ritual state” (p35) that usurps the privileged position of 
Vedic ritual sacrifice. 
 
There is therefore another sense in which the brahman-knower can be said to be 
unembodied and/or immortal, for the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads speak of renunciation 
itself as the “ritual death of the renouncer” (Olivelle, 1992: 89).  Thus, Dumont (1980) 
speaks of the renouncer as being “dead to the social world” (p184).  Likewise, the 
renouncing bodhisattva is said by Śāntideva to have “already died to the world” 
(pūrvam eva mṛto loke) (BCA. 8.36b).  However, the jīvan-mukta cannot claim to 
have complete liberation; that which the Buddhists would call ‘parinirvāṇa’ and 





What we can tentatively conclude here is that, in order to promote the celibate life 
over the householder’s life, Śaṅkara is willing to promote the notion of the pleasure 
that one derives from absorption in brahman.  However, in order to save his non-dual 
interpretation of scripture he is willing to give up this notion of this superior pleasure.  
Furthermore, he is even willing to give up the notion of the ultimate liberation of the 
                                               
67 Śaṅkara attacks the Buddhist’s non-self thesis on the grounds that it leads to the absurd conclusion 
(anupapattiḥ) that the fruit (phala) of liberation belongs to no subject (āśraya) whatsoever (Bṛ.U.Bh. 
IV.iii.7).  But clearly, as Rāmānuja points out (see Thibaut, 1904: 58), Śaṅkara is open to the very same 
critique.  I will not follow up this issue here for four reasons: 1) Śaṅkara’s critique affects the Śrāvaka 
concept of nirvāṇa more than Śāntideva’s, 2) all the Buddhist need say is that elimination of duḥkha 
has intrinsic value in itself, 3) I read both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara as offering such a negative evaluation 
of existence, and 4) my interest lies in ethical actions, not eschatology.  For a critical eschatological 
analysis of this debate, see Perrett (1985). 
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jīvan-mukta, advancing instead a doctrine of videha-mukti (post-body liberation).  The 
teacher thus seems to be one waiting for final liberation.  This shows that when 
Śaṅkara shifts domains, from “ascetic” discourse to metaphysics, the latter sublates 
the former.  The teacher he is left with is thus a partially-liberated one (e.g. P.U.Bh., 
intro), who we may imagine to be alternating between dualistic and non-dualistic 
modes of consciousness.   
 
Thus, we have an example of how Advaita tends to “switch back and forth” between 
ultimate and relative perspectives of the jīvan-mukta’s behaviour (Potter, 1981: 34).  
Moreover, in order to save his fundamental Advaita doctrine of non-difference, 
Śaṅkara is willing to give up the pramāṇa of testimonial authority (śabda), even that 
of the Vedic scripture (śruti), which he is supposedly defending.  In fact, he is even 
willing to claim that the “Vedas contain contradictory statements” (virūddhā śruti 
vākya) (Bṛ.U.Bh. III.ix.28.7).  Like renunciation, scripture is merely a means to 
liberation, not liberation itself.  In the final analysis, even scripture needs to be 
transcended, and ultimately speaking, it is but another aspect of conventional reality.  
This may have been a lesson he learnt early on.  Hence: 
yaḥ padārthaḥ śāstrādir vidyate, sa kalpita saṃvṛtyā   |   kalpitā ca sā 
paramārtha pratipatty upāyatvena saṃvṛtiś ca sā tayā yo ‘sti 
paramārthena, nāsty asau na vidyate   | 
 
The existence of such objects as scripture, etc. is but a conceptual 
convention.  And this conventional reality is imagined as a means of 
attaining the ultimate reality; but anything that so exists has no real 
existence from the side of ultimate truth (G.K.Bh. 4.73). 
 
What we see then, in Śaṅkara’s work, is not so much contradiction, but retraction.  
Some of these retractions are due to the shift from conventional to ultimate truth, and 
might be more rightly called sublation.  But others are due to an over-willingness to 
explain everything in absolute terms.  Thus, all action is to be given up, rather than 
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just ritual action, and all karma is burnt up by knowledge, rather than just some of it.
68
  
The brahma-vid is over-painted, as it were, to match the perfect image of brahman.  
But when Śaṅkara looks back at the world, he sees that he needs karma in order to 
have a body at all.  He sees that the antics of the Upaniṣadic brahman-knowers fail to 
live up to the perfection of the absolute.  Yet, the tradition’s need for a teacher’s 
liberating guidance, rather than the Lord’s grace, forces Śaṅkara into a situation where 
an embodied knower is necessary.   
 
Śaṅkara-the-exegete is also trapped by conflicting statements, such as the Bhagavad 
Gītā’s “The fire of knowledge reduces all karma to ashes” (jñāna-agniḥ sarva 
karmāṇi bhasmasāt kurūte) (4.37) 69 and “the knowers, those who see true reality, will 
impart that knowledge” (upadekṣyanti te jñānaṃ jñāninanas tattva darśinaḥ) (4.34).  
And so Śaṅkara is left having to explain how the knower survives at all in order to 
teach.
70
  He does this by shifting to the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VI.xiv.2), which speaks 
of a “delay” (ciram) before final liberation, and the Brahma Sūtra (IV.i.15 & 19), 
which, on Śaṅkara’s reading, explains this delay in terms of types of karma, some 
being destroyed, some not.  And from here, Śaṅkara develops his thesis of latent 
tendencies (saṃskarā/vāsanā) and residual (prārabdha) karma (see Chapter 6).  He 
must either give up the knower-cum-teacher, or he must give up jīvan-mukti.  Yet he 
appears to opt for a middle ground, a teacher who flickers between absorption into 
thusness (tattva) and conventional modes of being.  This also amounts to a retraction 
of the view that action (karma) and knowledge (jñāna) are contradictory, for the 
teacher must act (see Chapter 6.2).  And so, by observing these major retractions, we 
                                               
68 For an examination of “weak” versus “strong” subordination in Śaṅkara, see Ram-Prasad (2007). 
 
69 The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (II.ii.8) similarly reads: “One’s karma dissolves” (kṣīyante cāsya karmaṇi). 
 
70 See V.C. (462-463) 
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can gain an insight into that which Śaṅkara will let go of, that which he will fight for, 
and finally, his overall both/and position.   
 
The only way of doing this is through cross-textual analysis.  For example, in the 
B.S.Bh, just prior to admitting that ignorance continues even after knowledge, Śaṅkara 
uses the Chāndogya (VI.xiv.2) to prove that true and final liberation only comes after 
death (B.S.Bh. IV.i.15).  Oddly enough, in the Ch.U.Bh itself (VI.xiv.2), while 
drawing on the distinction between the two types of karma, Śaṅkara makes no such 
denial of jīvan-mukti, but speaks of prārabdha-karma being destroyed by experience. 
It thus seems that in the B.S.Bh he is more concerned with saving the concept of mukti 
than jīvan-mukti specifically, even though he takes the Brahma Sūtra itself to be 
speaking of jīvan-mukti, when he interprets the phrase “even of this world” (api 
aihika) as referring to living-liberation (B.S.Bh III.iv.51). 
 
Another example is offered by the question of celibacy.  Even though Śaṅkara is 
elsewhere insistent on celibacy as essential to liberation, when the text itself is found 
to be speaking of finding a wife and having children (e.g. T.U. I.xi.1), Śaṅkara accepts 
it.  Furthermore, while claiming that a brahma-vid has no desire for women and sons, 
he accepts Uddālaka of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and Yājñavalkya71, the hero of the 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as ideal teachers, even though the former teaches the truth 
of brahman to his own son, while the latter has not one, but two wives.  To reiterate, 
while Śaṅkara’s ideal teacher is a celibate monk, most of his Upaniṣadic role models 
are in fact householders, but he is willing to accept this in order to promote the 
Upaniṣads and his non-dual interpretation.   
 
                                               
71 Yājñavalkya has been called the “first exponent of Advaita Vedānta” (Roodurmun, 2002: 10). 
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However, as noted in Chapter 2, flickering consciousness, or temporary lapses, is one 
means of interpreting Śaṅkara’s way of allowing for the behaviour of the enlightened 
householders.  Seen in this light, it need not contradict Yājñavalkya’s own claim that a 
knower of Self gives up the desire for sons, wealth and other worlds, and thus takes up 
the life of a mendicant (Bṛ.U. III.v.1).  Certainly, it is as a realised mendicant that 
Śaṅkara salutes him (B.S.Bh. III.iv.9).  The question would then be one of delay (cf. 
Ch.U. VI.xiv.1) and may fit either the life-stages or the life-choices model.   
Marcaurelle (2000) suggests that Śaṅkara believed that the householder, once 
enlightened, would abandon his life-style “spontaneously” (p138).  Nevertheless, there 
is no reason why Śaṅkara’s usage of the phrase “arthasiddham” (Ch.U.Bh. II.xxiii.1), 
which Marcaurelle (2000: 139) translates as “follows naturally”, could not also imply 
a certain delay.  As Marcaurelle himself points out, Śaṅkara’s student, Sureśvara (9th 
C) suggests that Yājñavalkya only became fully liberated “after taking up the monastic 
mode of living” (p174).72    
 
The notion that an enlightened householder must spontaneously renounce is also 
found in Theravāda Buddhism in the form of the claim that a lay person who attains 
arhatship is obliged to ordain that very day, or else he will die (Miln. 264-266). And 
perhaps Śaṅkara would accept that the “lofty nature of this state cannot be expressed 
in a lay context” (Harvey, 2000: 92).  Whether liberation is possible with or without 
physical renunciation, a subject on which both Śaṅkara and (his pupil) Sureśvara were 
truly ambiguous (Marcaurelle, 2000: 174), the bottom line is that they both would 
                                               
72 Vidyāraṇya, in his Jīvanmukti Viveka (73), made a distinction between a brahma-vid and a jīvan-
mukta, seeing Yājñavalkya (see Bṛ.U.) as qualified for the first but not the second category, because he 
was morally flawed.  Only after becoming a renouncer did he became a jīvan-mukta (see Fort, 1998: 







have liked the scriptures to have unanimously and categorically stated that physical 
renunciation was a prerequisite of liberating knowledge.
73
   
 
None of this need affect Śaṅkara’s main social claim that a knower of brahman is to 
give up ritual action, this being the principal use of the term “saṃnyāsa” (Olivelle, 
1992: 59).  And Marcaurelle (2000) is surely correct in his emphasis on the “inner” 
renunciation of doership as the key to understanding Śaṅkara’s metaphysical take on 
renunciation.  He also seems correct in indicating two types of renunciation, one for 
the enlightened and one for the seeker (p185).   Perhaps, then, when Śaṅkara talks of 
“renunciation of all actions prior to steadfastness in knowledge” (sarva karma 
saṃnyāsa pūrvikā jñāna-niṣṭa) (Bh.G.Bh. 18.66), he is talking about a potential 
deepening of the knowledge of Self (see Chapter 4.3). 
 
Let us turn to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (IV.iv.22) and see how Śaṅkara deals 
with its famous statement on renunciation.  The text says, “Desiring the world [of the 
self] alone, those renouncers renounce” (etam eva pravrājino lokam icchantaḥ 
pravrājanti).  This seems rather circular, a problem which has haunted many 
translators.
74
  However, Śaṅkara does not take this as a description, but as a 
prescription.  He thus claims that, “this [sentence] is an injunction” (eṣa vidhiḥ) 
(Bṛ.U.Bh. IV.iv.22). Śaṅkara takes the meaning to be, “Therefore, desiring the world 
of the self, those who are disposed to renunciation [should] renounce” (tasmād 
                                               
73 Sarvajñātman, adopted the notion of “unseen” (apūrva) potency, contending that if someone gained 
liberating knowledge in this life before they had physically renounced (e.g. Janaka), then they must 
have renounced in a past life (Marcaurelle, 2000: 176-177).  Śaṅkara also uses this argument with 
regard to Śūdras (see note 211 on p328), for whom knowledge may dawn in this life as a result of 
“tendencies acquired in a past life” (pūrva kṛta saṃskāra) (B.S.Bh. I.iii.38) (see Chapter 7). 
 




ātmānaṃ lokam icchantaḥ pravrajanti pravrajeyuḥ). 75   This rids the text of its 
circularity.  Taber (1983) therefore reads Śaṅkara as applying the passage to those 
who have “already, to a certain degree, achieved self-knowledge” (p15).  In other 
words, Śaṅkara is admitting the existence of partial knowers, those who appear 
qualified to take the next leap into external renunciation.  Taber thus reads this back 
into the original passage, translating it as, “Aspiring to that world [of the self] alone, 
those who are disposed to renunciation renounce” (ibid.).  Again, this rids the original 
passage of its circularity.  Comparing Śaṅkara’s historical situation with Śāntideva’s, 
we see the latter (in BCA Chapter 8) attempting to establish or deepen inner 
renunciation in those who (in the majority) had already formally renounced.  Śaṅkara, 
however, despite the fact that the notion of an ascetic life had been “gaining ground” 
in the Vedic literature (Lipner, 2010: 54), was more focused on establishing formal 
renunciation in Vedānta.   
 
Thus, Śaṅkara’s claim for a life of celibacy remains more controversial than his stance 
on renunciation, for he is turning it into an injunction.  Olivelle (1992: 72) saw it as a 
“key element in renunciation”, and Śaṅkara certainly took it to be an aid to knowledge 
(T.U.Bh. I.xi.2-4).  If the “life-style of the renouncer enables us to see a tension 
between the cultural values of celibacy and procreation” (Olson, 1997: 62), then 
Śaṅkara’s insistence on celibacy adds a further tension between Advaita Vedānta and 
the Upaniṣads they claim to represent, just as Śāntideva’s insistence on celibacy puts 
him at tension with much of the Mahāyāna movement.  Yet the ambiguity in the 
Upaniṣads allows Olivelle (1992) to insist that the “householder is replaced by the 
celibate ascetic as the new religious ideal” (p43), while giving room for scholars like 
                                               




Coward (2008) to claim that “only when the responsibilities and joys of the student 
and householder stages have been fully enjoyed” does one “seek to be freed from a 
worldly and sensuous life” (pp128-129).76  Lipner (2010: 208) has noted the tension in 
these conflicting depictions, a tension Doniger (2010: 194) memorably describes as 
one of violent extremes of addiction versus abstinence.  As for Śaṅkara’s 
commentaries, they clearly tend to side with Olivelle rather than Coward, with 
abstinence over addiction.   
 
With respect to the system of stages, Śaṅkara (selectively) quotes the Jābāla 
Upaniṣad’s suggestion that a man “may even renounce directly from the stage of 
studentship” (brahmacaryād eva pravrajet) (Jā.U. 4; B.S.Bh. III.iv.17).  However, 
having selected only this possibility out of a whole list of alternatives, Śaṅkara 
essentially turns the “may” into a “should”, calling this renunciation an injunction 
(vidhānaṃ) (B.S.Bh. III.iv.18). 77   Nevertheless, Śaṅkara does go on to quote the 
passage in full (III.iv.20), where he uses the text to prove the authenticity of the life of 
the celibate (urdhvaretaḥ).  The text now loses its imperative tone and Śaṅkara 
appears more cautious, which shows how Śaṅkara still felt that he needed to ‘sell’ 
celibacy as an alternative lifestyle to the Brahmin orthodoxy.  And yet, with respect to 
the status of life’s joys and sorrows, Ingalls (1954) notes how, by the time of Śaṅkara, 
“the Vedānta had left its early joyous acceptance of the whole of life” (p306), with the 
pessimism of Buddhism having seeped into Vedānta, which now saw the world as a 
“sorry place” to be (ibid.).  Thus it is that Śaṅkara presents a rather extreme world-
renouncing view of Vedānta.   
                                               
76 Olivelle could turn to the Dharma-Sūtras, or to the Jābāla Upaniṣad (4), while Coward could turn to 
the equally authoritative, Manu-Smṛti, or the Kaṭhaśruti Upaniṣad (II.3). 
 
77 Hence compare Gambhīrānanda’s translation of the B.S.Bh. quote (pp770 & 772) with Olivelle’s 





Yet there remained a tangible tension in Śaṅkara’s work, an exegetic tension which 
comes from trying to apologise for the worldly actions of the protagonists of the 
Upaniṣads whilst putting forward his personal ascetic ideal.  Unlike Śāntideva (Ś.S. 
167)
78, Śaṅkara would not call on the theory of skilful-means (upāya-kauśalya) to 
explain these actions.  Rather, he had to retract the notion of complete enlightenment, 
replacing it with the notion of residual (prārabdha) karma (B.S.Bh. III.iii.32) (see 
Chapter 6).  Śaṅkara could find no external excuse for one who falls from celibacy 
(III.iv.43).  For Śaṅkara, unlike Śāntideva (Ś.S. 168), it is the protagonist who acts 
wrongly, not we who see him wrongly.
79
  He here shows himself to be more realistic 
than Śāntideva, which maps onto the “realistic thrust” (Black, 2008: 21) of the 
Upaniṣads.80   
 
Turning to Śaṅkara’s argument for renunciation of ritual action, we see that it relies on 
the notion of non-difference (abheda) of self (jīvātman) and Self (brahman).  Ritual 
assumes that one is a Brahmin, that is, a member of a caste.  This assumes difference 
in nature from other castes.  But one who is desirous of liberation (mumukṣu) should 
not associate one’s self with caste (U.S. Prose, 1.10-15).  How could there be castes 
when all is the nature of the single Self (Ch.U.Bh. II.xxiii.1)?  Moreover, ritual 
assumes that you are down here and the gods are up there; but “you are that” (Ch.U. 
VI.viii.7ff), and are thus, non-different (a-bheda). The subject-object dichotomy, 
                                               
78 Śāntideva here relies on the authority of the Upāyakauśalya Sūtra. 
 
79 The V.C. alternates between these possibilities.  For example, contrast verses 442 and 548.  The 
former tells us that a knower who is “outward looking” (bahir mukhaḥ) may still get caught by the 
“sense world” (saṃsṛti).  The latter tells us that “ignorant people see [the knower’s] body-likeness” 
(paśyanti deha-van mūḍha) even though he is actually wholly free of it (deha vimuktaṃ).  His body is 
“mere appearance” (ābhāsa).  Cf. 413, where ābhāsa = chāya (shadow).  Also compare the 
Upāyakauśalya Sūtra and the Vimalakīrti-Nirdeśa Sūtra on the bodhisattva’s apparent lifestyle. 
 




necessary for ritual, premised as it is on the distinction between the act and the actor, 
thus falls apart.  Furthermore, ritual has as one of its goals the going from here to a 
divine realm in the after-life.  But if you (as pure consciousness) are of the same 
nature as brahman right now, right here, then where would one need or wish to go?  In 
the final analysis, it is knowledge of reality that leads to liberation, not correct ritual 
action.  The concept of going to heavenly realms must be replaced by the concept of 
attaining knowledge of brahman.  Thus, “liberation is not a movement or activity” 
(Ram-Prasad, 2001a: 213), and brahman (as absolute consciousness) is to be reached 
epistemically (see Chapter 5.1).  So a knower cannot sincerely take part in ritual, he 
cannot be a Brahmin householder with ritual duties (Ch.U.Bh. II.xxiii.1).  Others may, 
however, continue to indulge in ritual, for they still see difference (see Chapter 4.3). 
 
Therefore, we see how the Two Truths may act as a hermeneutical key to Śaṅkara’s 
philosophy.  There is the ultimate goal of liberation and there are the conventional 
social playing grounds.  Goals related to a personal God, or to heavens, whilst being 
beyond mundane goals such as wealth and progeny, are still to be included in the 
conventional (vyāvahārika) category.  Knowledge is the only means to true liberation 
(see Chapter 5.1) and the ultimate statements of the Upaniṣads are the only means to 
such “saving” (Deutsch, 1973: 47) knowledge.  Thus Śaṅkara states that “brahman is 
known from scripture alone” (brahmaṇaḥ śāstra pramāṇakatvam) (B.S.Bh. I.i.4).  An 
ultimate Upaniṣadic statement is thus taken to be one that points to the non-duality of 
the self and brahman.  Therefore, any statement which seems to demand the need for 
ritual action or meditation on a symbol, and thus assumes a duality of subject and 
object, is taken to be a conventional statement.  Vedic listeners are thus divided into: 
1) those Brahmins who are ready for ultimate statements, 2) those who are merely 
ready for meditation, and 3) those who are simply at the stage of ritual action.  The 
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question of doing one’s own duty (sva-dharma) will be analysed in Chapter 4.3, with 
reference to the Gītā Bhāṣya.   For now, let us simply highlight how this gradualist 
method might work.  Thus, for example, Śaṅkara, accepting (and extending) 
Mīmāṃsā hermeneutical criteria, writes: 
sati ca vidhi paratve yathā svargādi kāmasyāgnihotrādi sādhanaṃ 
vidhīyata, evam amṛtatva kāmasya brahma-jñānaṃ vidhīyata iti 
yuktam   | 
 
Having granted that the Vedic sentences are intended as injunctions, it 
stands to reason that, just as such means as the ‘agnihotra’ sacrifice 
are enjoined for one desiring heavens, so the knowledge of brahman is 
enjoined for one who longs for immortality (B.S.Bh. I.i.4). 
 
In dealing with the quite lengthy Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Śaṅkara takes it as presenting 
a gradualist approach to truth, which means that non-dual (advaita) revelations take 
precedence over dualistic (dvaita) revelations (e.g. see Ch.U.Bh., intro & III.xiv.4).  In 
the middle are those meditations on symbols, recitations, etc.  And as we noted in 
Chapter 2, these may give one a “flash” (avabhāsaka) of reality, but they do not 
present total absorption in brahman.  This technique allows Śaṅkara to interpret the 
text on the lines of ultimate and non-ultimate teachings.  He returns to this gradualism 
at the end of Chapter VI, where he states that it is not instinctive to see oneself as a 
soul (jīva) apart from the body (like non-Advaita Brahmanical Schools), never mind 
to see oneself as pure consciousness (ātman) (as the Advaitins do).  That is, to think 
that “I am an individuated soul, separate [from the body and mind]” (ahaṃ jīvaḥ 
kartā) is not a “naturally held view of beings” (sva-bhāvataḥ prāṇinaṃ vijñānā 
darśanāt) (Ch.U.Bh. VI.xvi.3).  And so, people need to be led to the truth of selfhood 
in stages, from the self as body doctrine (deha atma vāda) to self as soul (i.e. Dvaita) 
to self as brahman (i.e. Advaita) (ibid.).
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  Śaṅkara, therefore, seems to have set 
                                               




himself the task of systematizing the Upaniṣads, and the Two Truths and the notion of 
gradual enlightenment are fundamental to his methodology. 
 
However, just as with the so-called “Sudden Schools” of Buddhism 82 , Śaṅkara 
distinguishes those who need to be led gradually to the truth from those (rare) sharp 
pupils (nipuṇamatīnāṃ), who can grasp it at once.83  Of the former, he says: 
yeṣāṃetau padārthau ajñāna saṃśaya viparyaya pratibaddhau, teṣāṃ 
“tat tvam asi” ity etad vākyaṃ svārthe pramāṃ notpādayituṃ śaknoti, 
padārtha jñāna pūrvakatvādvākyārthasya,  ity etaḥ tānpratyeṣṭavyaḥ 
padārtha viveka prayojanaḥ śāstra yukty abhyāsaḥ ... tatra kramavati 
pratipattiḥ  | 
 
The phrase “you are that” cannot produce a sudden realisation of its 
true meaning in those people to whom [self and brahman] remain 
obstructed by ignorance, doubt and confusion (for the meaning of a 
phrase is dependent upon the meaning of the words). For such people, 
it is necessary to resort repeatedly to the study of scripture. ... In this 
sense, gradualism is admitted (B.S.Bh. IV.i.2). 
 
Of the latter (even against the opponent’s objection that it is impossible to overcome 
the “world’s misery” (duḥkhatva) so quickly), he writes: 
yeṣāṃ punar nipuṇamatīnāṃ nājñāna saṃśaya viparyaya lakṣaṇaḥ 
padārtha viṣayaḥ pratibaṃdho ‘sti, te śaknuvanti sakṛd uktam eva 
“tat tvam asi” vākyārtham anuvitum iti tānprati āvṛtty 
ānarthakyamiṣṭam eva  |  sakṛd utpannaiva hy ātma pratipattir 
avidyāṃ nivartayatīti, nātra kaścid api kramo ‘bhyupagamyate 
 
For those of sharp intellect, however, who have no obstructions like 
ignorance, doubt and confusion, with regard to subject matter, they 
can realise the meaning of “you are that” from the very first utterance.  
So a repetition in their case is pointless.  For the ascertainment of the 
                                               
82 See Ruegg (1989b), Gregory (1987) and van Schaik (2004) for discussions of sudden/gradual 
enlightenment in Indian, Chinese and Tibetan Buddhism respectively.   
 
83 Again, given that, for Śaṅkara, this sudden grasping of truth is not necessarily a function of the 
intellect, we should not assume that the “nipuṇamatīnāṃ” map onto, say, Berkeley’s “those of quick 





Self is capable of removing ignorance in one single instant, and no 




Hence, Śaṅkara, like Śāntideva, accepts that the task of removing ignorance, doubt 
and confusion is, for most people, a gradual step-by-step assent.  And again, as with 
the Madhyamaka, much of the ignorance and confusion, etc. is taken up by the notion 
of māyā, which is usually translated as “illusion”.85  Now, given that we have already 
traced both Śaṅkara’s use of the Two-Truths doctrine and the notion of māyā to 
Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkya kārikā, and given the consensus that Gauḍapāda took this 
from the Madhyamaka School, we might reasonably trace much of Śaṅkara’s 
language on māyā to Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.  Here, the phrase “as an 
illusion, a dream” (yathā māyā yathā svapna) is used to describe the concepts of 
arising, enduring and ceasing (MMK. 7.34).  Again, the phrase “like a mirage or a 
dream” (marīci-svapna saṃnibhāḥ) occurs with regard to afflictions, actions, bodies, 
agents and karmic fruits (17.33), along with the five senses and all existents (23.8).  
We might also trace these similes back to the “Diamond” Sūtra’s list of nine, which 
includes a dream (svapnaṃ), a bubble (budbudam), an eye defect (timiraṃ), magical 
illusions (māyā), etc (Vajracchedikā, 32).  In fact, we might go even further back and 
trace the notion to the Pāli Canon (S.N.III.140-142), where the list of similes also 
includes foam (pheṇa), and the plantain tree (kadali).  We will see that Śaṅkara adopts 
these very same similes throughout his works. 
 
                                               
84 Vidyāraṇya, in his Jīvanmukti Viveka (73) adopts the view that enlightenment which arises from 
“merely hearing” (aśravaṇa mātreṇa) scripture, is due to virtues accumulated in the past (purva puṇya 
puṅja paripakeṇa).  On this, Śāntideva would agree.  Of course, Śaṅkara’s argument with regard to 
Śūdras (see note 73 on p114) amounts to the same thing.  In other words, “sudden” enlightenment in 
Advaita and Madhyamaka could be the result of a million lifetimes of hard work.  Cf. the V.C. (2) and 
the Gītā (7.19).  On the split between the Vivaraṇa School and the Bhāmatī School on the means to 
liberation, see Ram-Prasad (2001a: 197ff) and Roodurmun (2002: 209ff). 
 




Turning to the Vedic literature, the term ‘māyā’ (pre-Śaṅkara) had been used in a 
variety of ways, the enquiry into which would be a major study in itself.
86
  Dasgupta 
(1975) thus states that Śaṅkara “never tries to prove that the world is māyā, but 
accepts it as indisputable” (Vol.I: 435).  Yet we can distinguish two strands of māyā-
talk in Śaṅkara’s work, one cosmological and the other epistemological.  Now 
Hamilton (2001: 130) has oddly claimed that Śaṅkara never used the term ‘māyā’, 
preferring the term ‘avidyā’.  Here, she seems to want to dismiss the cosmological, 
whilst covering all the epistemological ground through the term ‘avidyā’.  Not only is 
this false, but Hacker actually selected ‘māyā’ (along with ‘avidyā’, ‘nāmarūpa’ & 
‘īśvara’) as one of the tell-tale signs that a text was authentically ascribable to Śaṅkara 
(in Halbfass, 1995: 57-100).   
 
By defining Śaṅkara as the author of the B.S.Bh, Hacker’s method was to take this 
text, the “main pillar of Advaita Vedānta” (Roodurmun, 2002: 9), as the standard text 
against which all others should be checked.  Now, in one passage of this commentary, 
Śaṅkara claims that absolute consciousness (vijñāna dhātu) may appear diversely due 
to either avidyā or māyā (B.S.Bh. I.iii.19).  In another, Śaṅkara states that, just like a 
magician (māyāvin) who does not believe his own illusions to be real, so brahman is 
unaffected by this “cyclic world of māyā” (saṃsāra māyayā) (B.S.Bh. II.i.9). He then 
quotes the following verse from Gauḍapāda’s Kārika (1.16):  
anādi māyayā supto yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyate | ajam anidram 
asvapnam advaitaṃ budhyate tadā 
 
When an individual sleeping under the influence of beginningless 
māyā is awakened, he then realizes the birthless, sleepless, dreamless 
non-dual [i.e. turīya] 87  (B.S.Bh. II.i.9).   
                                               
86 Again, see O’Neil (1980). 
 





Moreover, Śaṅkara states that “the teacher [i.e. Gauḍapāda] was well-versed in the 
traditional view of Vedānta” (vedāntārtha saṃpradāya vidbhir ācāryaiḥ) (ibid.), 
leaving us in no doubt about his loyalty.
88
  So not only did Śaṅkara adopt the word 
‘māyā’, he claims the doctrine to be traditional (saṃpradāya).  Indeed, the theory 
played a pivotal role in Śaṅkara’s system. 
 
Our task then is to explain what Śaṅkara meant by ‘māyā’.  The problem, as just 
noted, is that there seem to be two distinct meanings of ‘māyā’ in his work.  One type 
of māyā-talk is that found particularly in the Gītā Bhāṣya.  It refers to a kind of 
creative power which emanates from Kṛṣṇa-as-Viṣṇu (Bh.G.Bh. 7.13).  It is made up 
of the three attributes (tribhir-guṇa) of being, and is sometimes used synonymously 
with ‘prakṛti’. 89   When conceived negatively, mankind are said to be deluded 
(mohitaṃ) by māyā (Bh.G.Bh. 7.13-15).  Kṛṣṇa is said to “move” (bhrāmayan) beings 
“through māyā” (māyayā) (Bh.G. 18.61), to which Śaṅkara adds, “through 
concealment” (chadmanā) (Bh.G.Bh. 18.61).  For the purposes of this comparative 
thesis, I propose to bracket this cosmological notion of māyā, focussing on the 
epistemological māyā (=avidyā), the version most adopted in his major works.90 
 
Now, some scholars (Otto 1957: 93; Torwesten, 1991: 123) claim that, through the 
notion of māyā, Śaṅkara tried to explain the world away.  However, Śaṅkara actually 
                                               
88 In stark contrast to Śaṅkara, Gauḍapāda (c.7th century) never uses the term ‘avidyā’, yet the term 
‘māyā’ appears in his Kārikā in over a dozen verses.  Roodurmun (2002: 11) traces Śaṅkara’s use of the 
concealing nature of avidyā to the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (2.5). 
 
89 This take on māyā is more typical of Rāmānuja and Madhva than of Śaṅkara (see Chari, 2005: 81). 
 
90 The Gītā is a text least amenable to Śaṅkara’s usual Advaitin metaphysics.  Thus, Otto (1957: 104) 
claimed that Śaṅkara “rather forces the text” into an Advaitin interpretation.  And Suthren Hirst (2005) 
stated that Śaṅkara had to “add a layer of interpretation not present in the text” (p134). 
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uses the concept of māyā in an attempt to explain the world in a way that would 
cohere with Advaita metaphysics.  The notion that the world is dream-like or illusion-
like is not to suggest that it is not real, it is to highlight that what we take to be real is 
in fact just a “faint reflection of what is truly real” (Taber, 1983: 1).  We see the world 
as if through a mirror.  Yet, like Śāntideva, Śaṅkara is not saying that such reflections 
are totally non-existent.  Thus, Śaṅkara writes that “An illusory image cannot exist 
without a substratum” (mithyā vikalpasya nirnimittatvānupapatteḥ) (Mā.U.Bh. 7).  
That substratum is brahman. 
 
The individuated self (jīva) is said to be a mere reflection of the true Self (brahman). 
This notion of “reflection” (chāyā) is brought out by a number of analogies, including 
the reflection of one’s face in a mirror (U.S. Metric, 12.6), the reflection of the sun in 
water (Ch.U.Bh. VI.iii.2), as well as the moon in water (B.S.Bh. III.ii.19).  However, 
Śaṅkara’s three favourite analogies, which crop up throughout his works, are all to be 
found in the following verse: 
yathā svayaṃ prasāritayā māyayā māyāvī triṣvapi kālepu na 
saṃspṛśyate, avastutvāt, evaṃ paramātmāpi saṃsāra māyayā na 
saṃspṛśyata iti  |   yathā ca svapnad dṛg ekaḥ svapna darśana 
māyayā na saṃspṛśyate |   prabodhasaṃprasādayorananvāgatatvāt | 
evam avasthā traya sākṣy eko ‘vyabhicārya vasthā trayeṇa 
vyabhicāriṇā na saṃspṛśyate  |  māyā-mātraṃ hy etat yat 
paramātmano ‘vasthā trayātmanāvabhāsanaṃ rajjvā iva sarpādi 
bhāvenati  |   
 
As a magician is not himself affected at any time [past, present or 
future] by the magic he conjures up, it being unreal, so also the 
supreme Self is not affected by this cyclic world of māyā.  As one 
who dreams is not affected by the illusion of dreaming, because that 
illusion does not persist in him during clear wakefulness, so also the 
one, unchanging witness of the three states is untouched by the three 
varying states.  This appearance of the supreme Self in identity with 
the three states is mere māyā, as in the case of the rope appearing as a 




Thus, we have: 1) the illusion (māyā) created by the magician (māyāvin), 2) the dream 
(svapna) world, and 3) seeing a rope (rajju) as a snake (sarpa).  What does Śaṅkara 
want us to understand from these examples?  He wants us to see that although the 
world may seem manifold, everything is in fact grounded in brahman, their “inner-
being” (antar-bhāvaḥ).  This universe is ultimately reducible to “mere conscious 
being” (sac cin mātraṃ) (U.S. Metric, 17.13).   Now, when a magician creates an 
illusion, he knows it to be an illusion.  Equally, when brahman-knowledge is gained, 
the manifold world of apparently individuated selves will be seen to be but one 
singular, non-dual (advaita) consciousness.  The brahman-knower is not fooled by the 
appearance of the world.  Its illusory manifestations simply “vanish away like 
apparitions in a dream” (svapna prapañca vat pravilīyate) (B.S.Bh. III.ii.21). 
 
When one is dreaming, one may imagine beings and objects to be in certain odd 
spatial relationships to each other.  However, when one awakens, these visions are 
sublated (bādha) by the awakened mind which knows the dream content to be false 
(Ch.U.Bh. II.xxiii.1).  In one sense, we might say that, “dreams are false and illusory 
whereas waking experience is veridical, having an external cause” (King, 1995: 171).  
But we should not forget that this fact is “not grasped by one while dreaming” (Ram-
Prasad, 2002: 81).  Also, for Advaita, cognitions are “considered innocent until proven 
guilty” (Deutsch, 1973: 87), i.e. they are prima facie justified.91  Dreams are real to 
the dreamer, and that experience, though illusory, is valid until later contradicted.   
 
Therefore, Śaṅkara draws on this dream analogy to make the point that, just as a man 
who awakens from a dream knows it to be illusory, so a man who awakens to 
brahman-knowledge knows this world of multiplicity to be illusory.  True, if dreams 
                                               
91 Cf. Lehrer’s (2000: 71ff) comments on the “fallible foundationalism” of Thomas Reid. 
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are ultimately false, then so is normal waking experience, but dreams are not “false”, 
as such, to the dreamer.  The world is deceptive, but not false.  After seeing through 
this deception, the old relationships he had with people, gods, rituals, desirable 
objects, etc. no longer apply to the brahman-knower.  In other words, Śaṅkara is not 
trying to deny the external reality of the world, but wants us to see the potential for its 
transcendence.   
 
Third, we come to the famous Indian ‘snake/rope’ analogy.  A person sees a coiled 
object in the corner of a dark room and imagines it to be a snake.  As they get closer, 
they realise it is only a rope.  Thus, perception can be sublated by a second perception.  
Just so, when a man realises brahman-consciousness, his old view of the world is 
removed.  Of course, his old perception was not entirely false, for there was in fact a 
rope there giving rise to the mistaken cognition of a snake.  As such, the views of 
those yet to know brahman are provisionally true, merely awaiting sublation.  In this 
sense, Śaṅkara’s epistemology is ‘realistic’ in that it “posits that every cognition 
points to an objective referent” (Grimes, 1991: 292).  This epistemic ‘realism’ is 
particularly brought out in his attack on the Mahāyāna Buddhists, and especially the 
Yogācāra (see Chapter 4.1). Up until the ultimate Self is realised, objects are objects, 
and individuals are individuals.  That, along with karma, is what makes rebirth and 
social interaction possible.  That is why traditional ethics must remain in place (see 
Chapter 4.3).  Śaṅkara wants to posit a transcendence of ritual, not a rejection of it.  
He writes: 
anupamardita bheda pratyayavat purūṣa viṣaye prāmāṇyopapatteḥ 
svapnādi pratyaya iva prāk prabodhāt  | 
 
It is reasonable that their validity will continue with regard to a 
person who has not gotten rid of the conviction of separation; as in 
the case of dream experiences, etc. (which remain valid) before one 





Not only is it reasonable, it is necessary, because negative karma accrues to those who 
do not do their duty: 
bheda pratyayavān anupamardita bheda buddhir vidyayā yaḥ, sa 
karmaṇy adhikṛta 
 
The obligation remains for those whose conviction of separation has 
not been destroyed by knowledge (Ch.U.Bh. II.xxiii.1). 
 
Thus, Śaṅkara’s goal is to “assimilate ... ritual into his grand metaphysical project” 
(Ram-Prasad, 2007: 116).  In this grand scheme, God may shape and maintain the 
world, and even guide those of inferior wisdom, but he has very little to offer those 
sharp-minded ones who can grasp the true (Advaitic) meaning of the Vedas.  In terms 
of Śaṅkara’s central project of gnoseological liberation, God plays no real part.  Nor 
can he play any part; for Īśvara is defined by Śaṅkara as brahman limited by avidyā 
(B.S.Bh. II.i.14).  Bondage is said to be a result of the play (līlā) of Īśvara (B.S. 
II.i.33) in combination with our own lack of insight.  While ritual action requires 
Īśvara’s presence, liberation, for Śaṅkara, is a gnoseological project in which there is 
no room for subject-object duality.  That is why Śaṅkara adopts the term ‘avidyā’ 
much more frequently than ‘māyā’.  Working ‘māyā’ into his preferred terms of name 
and form (nāma-rūpa) and nescience (avidyā), Śaṅkara states that God’s māyā is the 
cause of the “non-determinable” (anirvacanīya) reality or non-reality of name and 
form, and thus “God conforms to the limiting adjuncts of name and form created by 
nescience” (evam avidyā kṛta nāma-rūpa upādhy anurodhīśvaro bhavati) (B.S.Bh. 
II.i.14).  There is little room here for a theistic soteriology.  It would be yet another 
case of the blind leading the blind.  Only an enlightened teacher can remove the 
“blindfold” (abhinahanaṃ) (Ch.U. VI.xiv.1) from one’s eyes and help one grasp the 




Given that the world is illusion-like, and given that Īśvara is its primal cause, we may 
ask how the māyā-thesis affects Śaṅkara’s ethics.  Matilal (2004) has claimed that the 
“pervasive view” amongst Western Scholars is to see Advaita as positing that “reality 
is only an illusion” (p34).  He thus adds that it is the “general belief” that Advaita 
would use this māyā argument to solve the problem of evil (p41).  However, Śaṅkara 
does not use it.  Nor does he hold Īśvara at fault.  Rather, in his passing remarks on the 
potential problem of Īśvara’s injustice (vaiṣamya) and cruelty (nairghṛṇya) (B.S. 
II.i.34), framed, by an opponent, as the problem of unequal distribution of suffering 
amongst beings (B.S.Bh. II.i.34), Śaṅkara blames the beings who have generated their 
own karma in past lives, and indeed in past world cycles, for “the transmigratory state 
has no beginning” (anāditvāt saṃsārasya) (B.S.Bh. II.i.35).   Elsewhere, Śaṅkara 
suggests the wise student should reflect on rebirth thus: 
 sa yadi brūyāt - anyo ‘haṃ śarīrāt  |  śarīraṃ tu jāyate mriyate, 
vayobhir adyate, śastrāgnyādibhiś ca vināśyate, vyādhyādibhiś ca 
prayujyate  |  tasmin ahaṃ svakṛta dharmādharma vaśāt pakṣī nīḍam 
iva praviṣṭaḥ punaḥ punaḥ śarīravināśe dharmādharma vaśāt 
śarīrāntaraṃ yāsyāmi, pūrvanīḍavināśe pakṣīva nīḍāntaram  |  evam 
evāham anādau saṃsāre devamanuṣyatiryaṅ nirayasthāneṣu 
svakarmavaśād upāttam upāttaṃ śarīraṃ tyajan, navaṃ navaṃ cānyad 
upādadāno, janma maraṇa prabandha cakre ghaṭīyantravat 
svakarmaṇā bhrāmyamāṇaḥ krameṇedaṃ śarīram āsādya saṃsāra 
cakra bhramaṇāt asmān nirviṇṇo bhagavantam upasanno ‘smi saṃsāra 
cakra bhramaṇa praśamāya  |  tasmān nitya evāhaṃ śarīrād anyaḥ  |  
śarīraṇy āgacchanty apagacchanti ca vāsāṃsīva puruṣasyeti ||  
... ācāryo brūyāt – sādhv avādīḥ, samyak paśyasi  |  kathaṃ mrṣāvādīḥ, 
brāhmaṇa putro ‘donvayo brahmacāry āsam, gṛhastho vā idānīm asmi 
paramahaṃsa-parivrāḍ iti     || 
 
If he says “I am different from the body.  The body is born and dies, is 
eaten by birds, destroyed by weapons and fire, etc., subject to disease, 
etc.  I have entered into this [body], like a bird its nest, on account of 
the merit and demerit of my own actions.  Again and again as a result of 
merit and demerit, when the body is destroyed, I shall enter into 
different bodies, like a bird entering a different nest when the previous 
one is destroyed.  Thus am I in this beginningless transmigratory 
existence, giving up old bodies and assuming new ones, in the realms of 
gods, men, animals and hells.  On account of my own actions, I am 
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forced to rotate in the endless cycle of birth and death as if on a water-
wheel.  In the course of time I have obtained this body.  I am sick of 
this cycle of transmigration and have come to you, Sir, in order to put 
an end to this cycle of transmigration.  Therefore, I am eternal and other 
than the body.  Bodies come and go, like the clothes of a person”… 
[Then] the teacher should say “You have spoken well, you see 
correctly.  [So] why did you wrongly say ‘I am the son of a Brahmin, of 
such and such a family, I was a student (or householder) and now I am a 
wandering highest ascetic’.” (U.S. Prose, 1.12-13). 
 
This student here accepts that he has been to blame for his own suffering due to his 
clinging to the body.  And so, while Īśvara sees to it that all beings get the fruits they 
deserve, he did not create those beings ex nihilo and is thus not to blame.
92
  If this is 
so, then he is equally powerless in preventing their exit from the field of play.  Those 
who overcome their karma (through knowledge) have no need to turn up for the next 
round of games (see Chapter 5.1).   
 
Śaṅkara, the exegete, must continue to ground his thesis in the Upaniṣads themselves, 
but then the interpretation he gives is often under challenge from other schools of 
thought.  It is therefore noticeable that Śaṅkara often marks a controversial 
interpretation with the insertion of an opponent’s doubts (pūrva pakṣa), which he then 
replies to.  These exchanges are of great interest, for they not only highlight the 
integrity of the author, but also offer the reader the opportunity to enter into the midst 
of an ancient debate.  At the other extreme are those passages for which he offers 
merely a philological repetition of terms.  These “pseudo-silences” may also throw 
some light on his thoughts towards the scriptures.  It will also be interesting to see 
how Śaṅkara deals with those aspects of the texts and his Hindu tradition which do not 
fit comfortably with his non-dual metaphysics and with his preferred ascetic mode of 
religious life.   
                                               
92 Incidentally, Śaṅkara does say that a Creator God who did create the world ex nihilo would be to 
blame (B.S.Bh. II.i.35). 
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Yet, my intention is not to judge him, but to see what for him is an ultimate truth, to 
see how he argues for a hierarchical categorization of non-dual over dual, to see why 
he put so much emphasis on renunciation, and to see what he takes to be the correct 
behaviour of a brahma-vid.   
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3.2 Approaching Śāntideva 
 
As with Śaṅkara, I prefer not to see Śāntideva as an innovator in the usual sense of the 
word.  For one thing, he never saw himself as one.  Though perhaps written as a 
typical counter to pride (Pelden, 2007: 36), Śāntideva introduces the BCA (1.2a) with 
the modest claim that he has “nothing novel whatsoever to say here” (na hi kiṃcid 
apūrvam atra vācyaṃ).  He begins the Compendium (Ś.S. 1.22) in a similar manner.  
Sweet (1977) thus concluded that Śāntideva was “essentially a transmitter and not an 
original philosophical thinker” (p15).  Nevertheless, I wish to claim that there remains 
something quite unique about his work, especially the BCA.  What I find most 
interesting in Śāntideva, just as we find in Śaṅkara, are the dramatic extremities of his 
expression, and the tension that this creates.   
 
The tension arises through the equal need Śāntideva’s Mahāyāna tradition has placed 
on him for the two necessary virtues of wisdom and compassion.  The tension 
between the cognitive and the affective is found throughout his work.  It is as if he 
stands on a metaphysical tight-rope between two worlds, one of transcendent wisdom, 
the other of active compassion in a provisional world.  By wisdom (prajñā), the 
Mahāyāna, and especially the Madhyamaka School, can be taken to mean the insight 
into emptiness (śūnyatā).  This includes the emptiness of all personhood (pudgala 
śunyatā) and the emptiness of all experiential elements (sarva dharma śunyatā), both 
claimed by Śāntideva to be essential to perfect wisdom (Ś.S. 242).  Wisdom (prajñā) 
has been defined by Prajñākaramati as: “The discriminative understanding of the 
reality of dependently-arisen phenomena just as they are” (yathāvasthita 
pratītyasamutpanna vastutattva pravicaya) (BCA. Pañjikā, 344).  This wisdom can be 
seen as a response to the so-called heretical view of permanent objects (satkāya dṛṣṭi) 
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which Śāntideva condemns (Ś.S. 242).  Compassion (karuṇā, daya, kṛpā) can be taken 
to mean the will to lead all beings to liberation from suffering.  As with Mill’s 
conception of the breadth of human sympathy (Util. V.20), the Mahāyāna Buddhist 
sees this as extending to all sentient beings.   
 
Dayal (1970: 42-45) has made the claim that Śāntideva, in his stress on compassion, 
seems to ignore wisdom altogether.  He says that the “later” period of the Mahāyāna 
sees a shift in emphasis from wisdom to compassion, pointing to a parallel shift from 
the cult of Mañjuśrī to that of Avalokiteśvara. 93  Kinnard confirms that, in India, 
Avalokiteśvara became more “popular” than Mañjuśrī (in Keown & Prebish, 2007: 
82).  Nevertheless, there are two difficulties with Dayal’s thesis.  First, Śāntideva took 
Mañjuśrī as his patron deity (BCA. 10.51-58 & Ś.S. 365).  Second, Dayal has placed 
too much weight on the word prajñā, whilst ignoring the fact that emptiness (śūnyatā) 
and no-self (anātman) are particular cases of the wisdom aspect.  In fact, Paul 
Williams (1998a) has argued that Śāntideva takes the doctrine of non-substantiality 
(niḥsvabhāvatā) to such a limit that he might have destroyed the bodhisattva path.  
That, in my eyes, he does not destroy the path is due to the extraordinary emphasis he 
places on compassion, which allows him to compromise wisdom (see Chapter 6.1).  
Here Dayal is quite correct in noting the heightened status that Śāntideva grants to 
compassion, but he is wrong to place too much faith in a single passage of the 
Compendium (Dayal, 1970: 42), where Śāntideva seems to advocate the notion that 
compassion includes all the other perfections (Ś.S. 286).  For, in the same 
Compendium, we also find the statement, “All things, my Lord, are wisdom” (sarva 
dharmā bhagavan bodhi) (Ś.S. 257).  And in the BCA, it is said that “It is for the sake 
of wisdom that the Buddha taught this entire collection” (imaṃ parikaraṃ sarvaṃ 
                                               
93 These are the two Great Bodhisattvas of Wisdom and Compassion, respectively. 
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prajñarthaṃ hi munir jagau) (BCA. 9.1a).  The Compendium, in fact, sees wisdom 
and compassion as complementary.  Thus, it says, “From action whose essence is 
emptiness and compassion, there is the purification of karmic fruit” (śūnyatā karuṇā 
garbhaceṣṭitāt puṇya śodhanam) (Ś.S. 270, Kārikā 21b).  The Buddha is praised as 
“the possessor of unequalled wisdom” and the “most compassionate” (Ś.S. 319).  
Overall, Śāntideva places equal emphasis on compassionate activity and wisdom.  
Nevertheless, they are often found to be in dynamic tension.   
 
A comment is due on two further aspects of Śāntideva’s heritage: 1) tantra, and 2) the 
three-body (tri-kāya) thesis.  Now we can agree with Vaidya (1961) when he talks of 
Śāntideva representing an “advanced stage of Mahāyāna Buddhism” (p.viii), yet is 
there really a “slight tinge of Tāntrism” (ibid.) in his work?  Sharma (1990) claims 
that Śāntideva studied both “sutra and tantra” (p. x).  This is important to the present 
thesis for a tantric slant would most certainly affect Śāntideva’s views on asceticism 
and women.  Now it would be to the advantage of Tibetans if they could claim 
Śāntideva as a Tantrika, and in fact they do (Gyatso, 1994: 368).  However, even 
while claiming that the attribution of a number of Tantric texts to him is “credible”, 
the Padmakara Translation Group (1999: 179) state that “there is no hint of tantric 
teachings” in either the BCA or the Compendium.  For this reason, Western scholars 
have been reluctant to grant tantric status to Śāntideva (Clayton, 2006: 33).  In fact, it 
could be argued that his rhetoric on bodies (BCA. Chapter 8), especially women’s (see 
my Chapter 7) is particularly non-tantric.  Indeed, Tribe even uses Śāntideva’s BCA as 
the example of a non-tantric attitude (in Williams, 2000a: 199 & 240).  So even 
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though, in the 8
th
 century, tantric approaches “dominated Buddhist practice in India” 
(Tribe, in Williams, 2000a: 194), Śāntideva was immune to it.94 
 
As for the three-body (tri-kāya) thesis, we should consider Mrozik’s (2007: 7) 
conclusion that there is “not a single reference” to this doctrine in the entire 
Compendium.  It is certainly true that there is no thorough discussion of the doctrine, 
and nowhere are the three bodies spoken of together, but there are hints of its 
inclusion (Ś.S. 24 & 159).95  If we turn to the BCA, there is again no explicit reference 
to this doctrine.  However, there is one possible linguistic pun on the nirmāṇa-kāya 
(BCA. 5.57), highlighted by Crosby and Skilton (1995: 159, n.5.57).  Furthermore, 
Śāntideva opens the text (BCA. 1.1a) with a verse of praise to the “Dharma-bodies of 
the Buddhas and their children” (sugatān sa sutān sa dharma-kāyān).  So perhaps the 
three-body thesis is assumed, as Matics (1971: 125) suggests.  On the other hand, 
whilst showing some minor influence from “buddha-nature” (tathāgata-garbha) 
thought in the Compendium (Ś.S. 172)96, there is no mention of it in the BCA.  Also, 
                                               
 
94 Śaṅkara has also been linked with a number of tantric texts by the Advaita tradition, but none of these 
texts are taken to be authentic by the academic circle.  However, some writers (e.g. Cenkner, 1983: xiv) 
do draw on them.  I will not.  In fact, Cenkner notes that while Tantric teachers are said to have 
“mysterious power” (p27), in Śaṅkara’s description of a teacher, these powers are “absent” (p43). 
 
95
 I agree with Mrozik’s (2007: 42-44) interpretation of the one reference to “Dharma-kāya” (Ś.S. 159) 
as most probably being a reference to a purified physical body, for the text speaks of the possibility of 
physically touching it.  However, the reference to a “Dharma-śarīra” (Ś.S. 24) is a little more 
problematic, for it appears as a result of right knowledge (jña) and is said to remain intact after the 
donation of body parts.   
 
96 Śāntideva quotes the Tathāgatakoṣa Sūtra here, including the notion that “All things are originally 
pure” (ādi śuddhān sarva dharmān) (Ś.S. 172).  Śāntideva uses it to show that any sin can be purified 
through right view.  That is, having buddha-nature need only imply that “all sentient beings have minds 
which can change and become Buddha’s minds” (Williams, 2009: 113).  Whether or not Śāntideva 
should be seen as an “anti-essentialist” (Harris, 2011: 116, n.23) is an open question.  The BCA also 
claims that “beings are pleasant by nature” (sattvāḥ prakṛti peśalāḥ) (6.40).  But this also seems to be 
another skilful teaching, here aiming at tolerance.  Simply contrast this with other verses in the BCA 







while including a quote from the Śrī-mālā Sūtra in the Compendium (Ś.S. 42), he does 
not draw on its famous passage on the tathāgata-garbha and the dharma-kāya.  So we 
may conclude that the tri-kāya doctrine and the tathāgata-garbha doctrine did not 
play a major role in his system.
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Nevertheless, rather than say outright that there is no three-body doctrine in Śāntideva, 
it is preferable to say that Śāntideva’s soteriology is “upward” looking, not descending 
(avataraṇa), and that his resolve to return to this world is a mundane one based on 
karma and what I have called a “voluntary delusion”.  It is not the result of the 
manifestation of physical (nirmāṇa) and mental experience (sambhoga) form bodies 
(rūpa-kāyā), as is the case in Tibetan tantra, and indeed in Candrakīrti (MMA XI.14 
ff).  Hence, we must assume the ‘avatāra’ in Bodhi-caryā-avatāra to mean 
“undertaking” (Crosby & Skilton, 1995: xxx) or “entering” (Brassard, 2000: 12) the 
path, rather than, the more literal “descending”.   
 
Thus, Śāntideva’s bodhisattva should not be compared with either Kṛṣṇa or the Hindu 
avatāra ideal.  Likewise, the yogi of the Gītā has not attained his position from the 
“top-down” (Malinar, 2007: 117), and Kṛṣṇa as avatāra (Bh.G. 4.6-8) is thus “unique” 
(p135).
98
  It is therefore my contention that Śaṅkara has a right to take Kṛṣṇa’s wilful 
manifestation as being unique to the Lord (Bhagavan).  Nelson (1996) has examined 
the similarities between the idea of the jīvan-mukta and Kṛṣṇa, and feels that these 
                                                                                                                                       
 
97 We might say that Śāntideva, like Nāgārjuna, sits closer to the ‘self-empty’ side of the Tibetan ‘self-
empty’/‘other-empty’ (Tib: rang stong/gzhan stong) debate (see Williams, 2009: 112-115).  It is thus 
interesting to note that Hookham (1991: 153) associates the self-empty view epistemically with an 
emphasis on analysis, and ethically with an emphasis on purity and monastic discipline; which seems to 
fit Śāntideva quite well.  However, Hookhams’ definition of self-emptiness as the “empty nature of 
illusory phenomena that are not actually there” (p149) is a little dubious. 
 




concepts are “very close” (p41), yet he also admits that Kṛṣṇa may be a “special case” 
(p42).  Along with Brodbeck, I believe Kṛṣṇa is better seen as a “cosmic archetype” 
(in Mascaró, 2003: xxiii).  So it would be unwise to over-draw the parallels between 
Kṛṣṇa and Śaṅkara’s brahman-knower.  In fact, the Gītā states that a knower of the 
Self is never born again (Bh.G. 5.17, 8.15 & 13.23).   Even the very verses in which 
Kṛṣṇa’s cyclic re-creation through māyā is explained (4.6-8) are followed by stating 
that one who knows this is never reborn (4.9).  A knower, then, even in the Gītā, is not 
obliged to come back for the benefit of mankind, though Kṛṣṇa himself takes on that 
burden.  So while later Advaitin devotees would worship Śaṅkara as an avatāra (see 
Cenkner, 1983: 153), there is nothing in his writings to suggest he was such a figure or 
that he held any such aspiration to be one. 
 
The exact dates of Śāntideva are as yet unknown.  Clayton’s (2006) is perhaps the 
most recent detailed attempt at placing a date on him.  The dates she settles on are 
“somewhere between the last half of the sixth and the first half of the seventh 
centuries CE” (p31).  However, Paul Williams (2009: 66) seems to ignore this 
interpretation, and the second edition of his Mahāyāna Buddhism maintains the dates 
of 695-743.  If we compare the dates Clayton (2006) gives for Śāntideva with those 
Williams (2009: 66) and Ruegg (1981: 71) give for Candrakīrti, 600-50, then Clayton 
would put Śāntideva before Candrakīrti.  This she admits would “contradict all 
traditional chronologies” (Clayton, 2006: 31).  The Padmakara Translation Group 
(2004: 356, n.4) offers the dates for Candrakīrti as the “first part of the seventh” 
century.  For Śāntideva, they offer the traditional dates of somewhere between 685 
and 763 (trans. Padmakara, 1999: 178), the dates first offered by Bhattacharya (in 
Clayton, 2006: 32), and the ones found in Crosby and Skilton (1995: viii).   This early 





 (who visited India in 671-695 and 630-645 respectively), and the later 
limit, based on the fact that Śāntarakṣita (d. circa. 790) quotes from the BCA, do seem 
quite convincing.  Clayton (2006: 32) accepts the latter limit but not the former, but I 
see nothing in Clayton’s argument to make me want to shift Śāntideva back a century.  
It is probable that Śāntideva and Candrakīrti were more or less contemporaries.  They 
both aim their attacks at their rival Mahāyāna school, the Yogācāra, and they both 
adopt a similar line of argument, the reductio ad absurdum (prāsaṅgika).  I think we 
may continue to assume that Śāntideva lived in the first part of the eighth century.100  
That is enough for us to assert that Śaṅkara and Śāntideva appear to have lived more 
or less at the same time.  We may also assume, until further studies prove otherwise, 




Unfortunately, if we do question the link between Candrakīrti and Śāntideva, and even 
worse, if we place him pre-Candrakīrti (as Clayton does), we lose the right to assume 
that Śāntideva accepts the systematic structures of Candrakīrti, namely, the ten-stage 
(daśa-bhūmi) bodhisattva path, explicitly adopted by Candrakīrti in his 
Madhyamakāvatāra.102  This is problematic, for the stages allow the Mahāyāna to 
claim that, above a certain level, one can break the monastic rules through the doctrine 
of “skilful-means” (upāya-kauśalya).  This doctrine became a “guiding principle in 
the ethics” of Mahāsattvas (i.e. high level bodhisattvas) (Tatz, 1994: 2).   
 
                                               
99 Also known (in Pinyin) as Yi-jing and Xuan-zang respectively. 
 
100 For a complete attempt at the chronology of the Madhyamaka School, see Ruegg (2010: 13-36). 
 
101 The earliest mention of the Advaita-darśana in a Buddhist treatise is in the 8th century Pañjikā (328) 
by Kamalaśīla (Ruegg, 2010: 31). 
 
102 I thank Roy Perrett for pointing this out (personal communication). 
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Before we examine this problem, we also need to question whether Śāntideva even 
accepts the complete path of the six perfections (ṣaḍ pāramitā).  This is important in 
its own right, for it would establish Śāntideva as a Mahāyāna gradualist.  Moreover, it 
was the apparent use of this thematic structure which, according to Ruegg (1981: 82), 
constituted his “significant contribution” to the Madhyamaka School.  Now, Chapters 
6 to 9 of the BCA do in fact follow the perfections of “patience” (kṣānti), “effort” 
(vīrya), “meditation” (dhyāna) and “wisdom” (prajñā).  This leaves out the first two 
perfections, “generosity” (dāna) and “morality” (śīla), which is no minor omission.  
Even so, these are not neglected, as such, and it may be said that, in the BCA, 
“Instruction has been given in all six perfections” (Crosby & Skilton, 1995: 133).  
Tibetan commentators have struggled with this possible omission, proposing that 
generosity is dealt with in Chapter 10, or that morality is covered by Chapter 5 (e.g. 
Gyatso, 1994: 6).  Nevertheless, if we take seriously the challenge that this may not be 
the case, we might turn to the Compendium for support.  We will also find proof there 
that Śāntideva did in fact accept the ten stages. 
 
First, with regard to the six perfections, Śāntideva lists them all (Ś.S. 16), discusses 
their correct practice (61, 89-90, 187 & 219), and argues against the concept of a 
“wisdom-only” stance, stressing the necessity of all six perfection (97).  In fact, the 
Compendium defines the Mahāyāna as “Those who course in the perfections, it is they 
that embrace the Mahāyāna” (ye sad pāramitāsu carantī te pratipanna ihe mahayāne) 
(Ś.S. 4).  Hence, we can safely suppose that he accepts the traditional gradualist 
Mahāyāna path, and that he has rightly been taken as a “source of inspiration” for that 




Second, the Compendium quotes extensively from the Daśabhūmika Sūtra, which is 
not only the “locus classicus” (Huntington, 1989: 19) of the ten bodhisattva stages; its 
very title means “The Sūtra of Ten Stages”.  Śāntideva also refers to at least three of 
the stages: the first, the stage (bhūmi) of joy (pramuditā) (Ś.S. 10), the seventh, the 
stage (pada) of skilful-means (upāya-kauśalya) (167), and the eighth stage of 
immoveable (acala) resolve (Ś.S. 103).  Finally, the Compendium distinguishes 
between those who have entered the stages (bhūmi praviṣṭam) and ordinary people 
(pṛthag jana) (140).   
 
There are also signs that Śāntideva draws a distinction between those who have 
attained to stages and those who have not.  So, reflecting on the Upāyakauśalya Sūtra, 
Śāntideva seemingly equates those who follow the six perfections with those who 
have not attained (alabdha) the stages.  And while he claims to personally follow the 
six perfections, he feels he has no right to comment on the behaviour of those who 
have attained to the stages (Ś.S. 168).  This is no doubt because the Upāyakauśalya 
Sūtra (112) itself states that skill in means is the outcome of the perfection of wisdom 
(the sixth perfection).  Thus, pace Clayton (2006: 95 & 105), we can assume that he 
places some importance on the ten bodhisattva stages.  From this analysis, we know 
that Śāntideva accepts the traditional Mahāyāna doctrine that after a certain level, 
mahā-sattvas can break the monastic code without reproach, assuming their actions 
are performed altruistically.   
 
We can now place the following verses in their full context: 
uttarottarataḥ śreṣṭhā dāna pāramitādayaḥ   | 
netarārthe tyajecchreṣṭhāmanyatrācāra setu taḥ   || 
evaṃ buddhvā parārtheṣu bhavet satatam utthitaḥ   | 




Each of the perfections, beginning with generosity, is superior to its 
predecessor.  One should not neglect a higher one for a lower one, 
unless because of an established rule of conduct.  Realising this, one 
should always be striving to benefit others.   Even that which is 
[normally] prohibited is permitted for the compassionate who can 
foresee a benefit (BCA. 5.83-84). 
 
Yet it may well be that, in many cases, it is only the mahā-sattvas who can foresee the 
benefit, and for the vast majority, rules of conduct dominate.  This is the essence of 
Mahāyāna ethics.   
 
Now many scholars have claimed that the Mahāyāna movement in India was not a 
sect (Gombrich, 1988: 112; Williams, 2009: 3), and that those monks who saw 
themselves as Mahāyāna would have adhered to the same vinaya or prātimokṣa 
(monastic code) as the other monks.  It is claimed that no Mahāyāna Vinaya was 
produced in India (Gombrich, 1988: 112; Williams, 2009: 4).  Chinese pilgrim, Fa-
hsien, in the 5
th
 century, while noting one town that had separate colleges for the 
Mahāyāna, did not distinguish an exclusive Mahāyāna sect (Cousins, 1997: 386).  
Hsüan-tsang (Pinyin: Xuan-zang), writing in the mid 7
th
 century, noted that Mahāyāna 
and Śrāvaka monks lived together at Nālanda University (Gombrich, 1991: 82a).  Half 
a century later, I-tsing (Pinyin: Yi-jing), noted a similar situation, with the monks 
sharing a common Vinaya (I-tsing, 2009: 14; Williams, 2009: 5).   
 
Nevertheless, there are indications in the Compendium that things may have changed 
somewhat by Śāntideva’s time.  For one thing, Śāntideva distinguishes between the 
Śrāvaka-Vinaya (Ś.S. 135 & 168) and his own Compendium, which he calls a 
Bodhisattva-Vinaya (Ś.S. 366).  In the middle of the Compendium (190) he asks, 
“What form of learning is praised in the Bodhisattva-Vinaya?” (kim ākāraṃ śrutaṃ 
bodhisattva-vinaye praśastam).  Now it hardly seems logical that this could be 
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referring to his own text, so he could either be talking about another Vinaya text, or he 
is talking about the Bodhisattva Code in general terms.  But then he also quotes 
extensively from a so-called Bodhisattva-Prātimokṣa (Ś.S. 11, 17, 19, 20, 34, 36-7, 
55, 125, 144 & 188), a text which has never been located.  Yet its reference here is 
enough for us to question the notion that the Mahāyāna never thought of themselves as 
a sect.  The Compendium (11-12) also talks of taking the Vow of Discipline (saṃvara) 
in the presence of a “guru” who follows the Bodhisattva precepts (bodhisattva 
śikṣapada).  So the aspiring Mahāyāna novice (śrāmaṇeraka) would be unable to take 
his vows with a non-Mahāyāna teacher.  Also, as Mitomo (1991: 17) points out, 
Śāntideva takes refuge in the “assembly of bodhisattvas” (bodhisattva gaṇaṃ) rather 
than the traditional saṅgha (BCA. 2.26).  Despite these specifically Mahāyāna rituals, 
Śāntideva states (Ś.S. 61) that the third root transgression (tṛtīyā mūlāpattiḥ) of a 
bodhisattva is to claim that he need not keep to the monastic ethical rules (pratimokṣa-
vinaya śila).  But the actual rules he has in mind are not obvious.  Clearly, further 
historical research, which is outside the purview of this present thesis, is called for.
103
  
What we can conclude is that Śāntideva was following more than one standardised 
mode of conduct. 
 
Now, Prajñākaramati claims that Śāntideva was a member of the Madhyamaka School 
(in Vaidya, 1960: XI) and all scholars accept this.  The Madhyamaka School, as it 
became known, derives its name from the Sanskrit for “middle way” (madhyama 
pratipada), which here denotes a conceptual method, which vows never to fall into 
either of the extreme views of eternity (śāśvata) or annihilation (uccheda).  The 
                                               
103 One might start with a study of the Akāśa-garbha Sūtra, on which Śāntideva drew many of his 
Bodhisattva Rules (Ś.S. 59ff).  Further, one may study Asaṅga’s Bodhisattva-Bhūmi, which Harvey 
(2000: 133) sees as the “locus classicus for instruction of new Bodhisattvas until the eighth century, 
when it was partly superseded by the system of Śāntideva”.  Also see Tatz (1986) and Chappell (1996). 
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founding text of the tradition, from which the school’s name can be gleaned, is the 
Mūla-madhyamaka kārikā by Nāgārjuna.  Nāgārjuna is thus considered the “source or 
originator” of the Madhyamaka School (Ruegg, 1981: 4).  Most scholars agree that 
Nāgārjuna can either be dated to the first or second century (Garfield, 1995: 87 & 97) 
or the second or third (Williams, 2009: 24).  Ruegg (2010: 16) decided on 150-200.   
Westerhoff (2009: 5), citing recent research by Walser, also accepts the late second 
century.  Inada’s (1993: 29) dates of c.150-250 may therefore be taken as the 
consensus.  The central claims of the Mūla-madhyamaka kārikā (hereon MMK) are 
that all ‘things’ (dharmā) are empty of inherent existence (svabhāva); that is, no thing 
has own-being (sva-bhāva).104  It is suggested that to understand the Buddha’s law of 
dependent-origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is to understand what the Madhyamaka 
means by emptiness (śūnyatā).  There is no doubt that Śāntideva’s main text, the BCA, 
accords with the basic tenets and methodology of the MMK, and can therefore be 
called a “mainstream” Madhyamaka text (Ruegg, 1981: 83).   
 
However, Mrozik (2007) claims that Śāntideva’s Compendium, while clearly 
Mahāyāna, “should not be read as an exemplar of Madhyamaka thought” (p16).  To 
some extent this is true.  While there are clear Madhyamaka ideas to be found in the 
text, perhaps they are not quite as extensive as some suggest (e.g. Sweet, 1977: 3).  As 
neither scholar backs up their view, we might note a number of classic Madhyamaka 
themes: the denial of individuality (242), the denial of an ultimate agent (253), the 
emptiness of the aggregates (238) and of all experiential elements (117 & 242), the 
non-reflexive nature of consciousness (235), the nirvanic state of all elements (251), 
                                               




and the two domains of discourse (244 & 250).  But more importantly perhaps, I can 
find nothing in the Compendium that the Madhyamaka would outright reject.  
 
Dayal (1970: 45) claims that the “later Mahāyāna reverts to the old ideal of celibacy 
and forest-life”.105  Now there is indeed internal evidence in the BCA that Śāntideva 
favours the forest-life. For example, he writes: 
caturbhiḥ puruṣair yāvat sa na nirdhāryate tataḥ     | 
āśocyamāno lokena tāvad eva vanaṃ vrajet     || 
 
In the meantime, before he is carried away by four [pall-bearers] with 
the worldly lamenting, he should depart for the forest (BCA. 8.35). 
 
And again: 
evam udvijya kāmebhyo viveke janayed ratiṃ     | 
kalahāyāsa śūnyāsu śāntāsu vanabhūmiṣu     || 
dhanyaiḥ śaśāṅka kara candana śītaleṣu ramyeṣu harmyavipuleṣu 
śilātaleṣu   |   niḥśabda saumya vana māruta vījyamānaiḥ caṅkramyate 
parahitāya vicintyate ca  ||   
 vihṛtya yatra kva cid iṣṭa kālaṃ śūnyālaye vṛkṣa tale guhāsu     | 
parigraha rakṣaṇa kheda muktaḥ caraty apekṣāvirato yatheṣṭaṃ     || 
svacchanda cārya nilayaḥ pratibaddho na kasya cit     | 
yat saṃtoṣa sukhaṃ bhuṅkte tad indrasyāpi durlabhaṃ     || 
 
Thus, one should recoil from the passions and generate delight in 
solitude, in tranquil forests, empty of strife and trouble.  On delightful 
rock surfaces, cooled by the sandal-balm of the moon’s rays, stretching 
as wide as palaces, fanned by the silent, gentle, forest breezes, the 
fortunate ones walk, contemplating the welfare of others.  Passing one’s 
time anywhere, in empty dwellings, caves, at the foot of a tree, free 
from the bother of protecting one’s property; one lives as one pleases, 
free from concern.  One’s conduct and dwelling are one’s choice.  Tied 
to no one, one has a level of happiness and contentment which is 
difficult to obtain, even for gods (BCA. 8.85-88).  
 
Furthermore, Chapter XI of the Compendium is actually entitled “In Praise of the 
Forest” (araṇya saṃvarṇanaṃ).  There is also some evidence in the Compendium 
(Ś.S. 64 & 114) that Śāntideva favours the meditating monk over what Sponberg has 
                                               
105 For some early Buddhist views on forest-life, see Cooper & James (2005: 120).  On the “revaluation 
of the wilderness” in the Upaniṣads, see Olivelle (1992: 44-46). 
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called the “monastery-bound textual redactors” (in Keown & Prebish, 2007: 89).  The 
Compendium even talks of the bodhisattva never making the monastery (vihāra) into a 
home (Ś.S. 137).  Nevertheless, the Compendium continually glorifies the study of 
religious texts, even claiming that a bodhisattva should be “diligent in reading and 
reciting” (pāṭha svādhyāyābhiyukta) (Ś.S. 16).  Needless to say, Śāntideva was 
himself a great scholar who clearly had a huge library at his fingertips.  He certainly 
did not write the Compendium in a forest.  As with celibacy, the forest-life was part of 
Śāntideva’s “ascetic” discourse, meant for the commencing-bodhisattva, but not 
meant for the more active bodhisattva, and certainly not to be taken as indicative of 
his complete ethical system.  This is consistent with the Buddha, who “recommended 
forests and lonely places only as ideal sites for training in meditation, but never for 
living” (Darmasiri, 1989: 14).   
 
Like Śaṅkara, Śāntideva was against pure book-learning, but he saw it as a necessary 
qualification to higher knowledge (see Chapter 5).  And, as Śāntideva’s BCA and 
Śaṅkara’s U.S. demonstrate, a written text can be put at the service of both meditation 
and compassionate activity.  And again, like Śaṅkara, Śāntideva takes renunciation of 
social duties as essential for the path of seeing.  Nevertheless, both the bodhisattva 
and the brahma-vid return to social conventions in order to pass on their realisation 
(see Chapter 6).  Hence, for both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, we need to think in terms of 
ethical domains. 
 
With particular reference to ethics, Goodman (2009) has recently gone as far as to 
divide the Mahāyāna into pre-Śāntideva and post-Śāntideva.  His logic seems to be 
based on the idea that Buddhism has tended to move from being a rule-
consequentialism to an act-consequentialism, with Śāntideva being pivotal in this 
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shift.  If nothing else, it goes to prove just how relevant the study of Śāntideva is to 
Buddhist ethics.  Goodman (2009) sees him as “the greatest of all Buddhist ethicists”, 
and as the one who “comes closest to a worked-out ethical theory” in the Western 
sense (p89), rightly describing Śāntideva’s ethics as “radical altruism” (p90).  
Nevertheless, most of what Śāntideva wrote was based on earlier sūtras, so to divide 
Buddhism into pre- and post-Śāntideva is always going to beg the question.  
 
With reference to metaphysics, like Śaṅkara, Śāntideva stresses the illusory nature of 
existence.  He therefore holds a very similar māyā-thesis, though one without the 
“curious double meaning” (Otto, 1957: 87) found in the Vedānta.  Given that Śaṅkara 
borrowed from Gauḍapāda, who borrowed from Nāgārjuna, it is no surprise that 
Śāntideva should describe the illusory-like world in similar terms: 
māyopamaṃ jagad idaṃ bhavatā naṭaraṅga svapna sadṛśāṃ viditam  |   
nātmā na sattva na ca jīvagatī dharmā marīci-daka-candra-samāḥ   || 
 
This world is like an illusion, to be understood as like a theatre, a 
dream.  There is no self, no being, no life; all “things” are like a mirage, 
like the moon’s reflection in water (Ś.S. 319). 
 
Similarly, in the BCA: 
dṛśyate spṛśyate cāpi svapna-māyopam ātmanā     | 
cittena saha jāta tvād vedanā tena nekṣyate     || 
 
There is seeing and touching by a ‘self’, which is like a dream or 
illusion.  Sensation is not ‘perceived’ by consciousness, for they are 
born together (BCA. 9.99). 
 
And again, 
svapnopamāstu gatayo vicāre kadalī-samāḥ     | 
nirvṛtānirvṛtānāṃ ca viśeṣo nāsti vastu taḥ     || 
 
When analysed, the state of existence is dream-like, [insubstantial] 
like a plantain tree.  Thus, there is no substantial difference between 




The similarities with Śaṅkara are (by now) obvious.  When we dream, we see certain 
“objects” and believe them to be real.  On awakening, we realise that they were in fact 
a mental projection.  Likewise, when we realise emptiness, we will see that our lives 
up until now have been a mental projection.  Nothing is as solid as we believed; 
everything is but a reflection of what is truly real.  As with Śaṅkara, this does not 
imply that there is no external reality whatsoever and that things merely appear to the 
mind.  That is, Śāntideva does not proclaim that ordinary experience really is illusory.  
Rather, he advises us to take a sceptical approach to what we take to be truly existent.  
Things may or may not be out there, but they are never how we believe them to be.  
All we see are distortions of that reality.  Thus, King (1995: 25) states that “given the 
importance of the two-truths doctrine in both the Mahāyāna and Advaita, it is never 
the case that the world is simply unreal”.  This will hopefully become clearer when we 
analyse Śāntideva’s and Śaṅkara’s arguments against the Yogācāra (Chapter 4.1) who 
they both take to be actually denying external reality, using the dream not so much as 
an analogy, but as a way of claiming that we might always be dreaming and there 
might never be a need for externality to explain our internal reality. 
 
It is important to understand, then, that for Śāntideva, things are not literally created 
by the mind; they are rather warped by the mind.  It is in this sense that one’s world 
could be said to be ‘mind-only’.  Burton (2001) therefore seems wrong in claiming 
that, for the Madhyamaka School, “dependent origination of all entities means that all 
entities originate in dependence upon the mind” (p101). 106   In fact, Śāntideva 
specifically attacks this idea when he writes, “At no time was there a single cause that 
                                               




produced everything” (naikasya sarva sāmarthyaṃ pratyayasyāsti kutra cit) (BCA. 
9.13a), a thesis he accuses the Yogācāra School of holding.   
 
So, while an object’s existence is linked with the “interrelations between conceptual 
thought and perception” (Huntington, 1989: 50), this is not a mind-only thesis.  Thus, 
Śāntideva contends that, “Conception and the conceived are mutually dependent” 
(kalpanā kalpitaṃ ceti dvayam anyonyaniśritaṃ) (BCA. 9.108a).  That is, “all 
phenomena exist in a manner of appearing as varieties of dependent-arisings” (Gyatso, 
1975: 60).  Śāntideva clearly denounces the notion of citta-mātra (BCA. 9.29) and the 
idea that illusory objects are mind-created (see Chapter 4.1).  He asks the Yogācāra, 
“If illusion is really mind itself, what is seen by what?” (cittam eva yadā māyā tadā 
kiṃ kena dṛśyate) (BCA. 9.17a).  When Śāntideva claims that the lust for an illusory 
woman may still arise in the magician who created her (BCA. 9.30-31), he clearly 
believes that there are women more real than this illusory type.  Likewise, Candrakīrti 
argues against a mind-only, literal, interpretation of scripture (MMA. 6.84-88), and 
equally questions the notion of a mind creating its own dream world (6.47-48), and 
further argues that mental constructs are dependently arisen (6.88).
107
  The basic 
metaphysical point of the Madhymaka School (described in MMA, MMK and BCA), is 
that all is dependently arisen, and so “the unreality of the external object ... is not a 
tenet of the pure Madhyamaka schools” (Ruegg, 2010: 31).108   
 
Śāntideva writes: 
atha jñeya vaśaj jñānaṃ jñeyāstitve tu kā gatiḥ     | 
athānyonya vaśat sattvam abhāvaḥ syād dvayor api     || 
                                               
107 The intention of Candrakīrti, in these verses, is to say that “the Buddha was not laying the 
foundations for an idealistic philosophy” (Padmakara Translation, 2004: 370, n165).  Brassard (2000: 
137) thus seems to have misunderstood this passage. 
 




If consciousness is established on the strength of the cognized object, 
how does one arrive at the existence of the cognized object?  If they 
depend on each other for existence, then neither [ultimately] exists  
(BCA. 9.112). 
 
We can understand this better through the common notion of mutual relationships.  To 
take Śāntideva’s classic example: 
pitā cen na vinā putrāt kutaḥ putrasya saṃbhavaḥ     | 
putrābhāve pitā nāsti tathā sattvaṃ tayor dvayoḥ    || 
 
If there is no father without a son, how can there be an [independent] 
son?  With no son, there is no father.  Therefore, neither of them 
[consciousness or the object] exists [ultimately] (BCA. 9.113). 
 
The same argument can be found in Nāgārjuna’s works (see Westerhoff, 2009: 27-28).  
But clearly, the Madhyamaka are not saying that there are no fathers and no sons in 
the world, they are merely pointing to a “symmetric dependence relation” (p28). And 
whilst denying the greatest Father of them all, God (Īśvara), Śāntideva actually 
accepts the elements (earth, water, fire & air) that make up the world.  The 
dependence relationship here is one of their co-arising with their cognition. 
 
Thus, Śāntideva asks the Brahmins:   
īśvaro jagato hetuḥ vada kastāvad īśvaraḥ      | 
bhūtāni ced bhavatv evaṃ nāma mātre ‘pi kiṃ śramaḥ     || 
api tva neke ‘nityāś ca niśceṣṭā na ca devatāḥ     | 
laṅghyāś cāśucayaś caiva kṣmādayo na sa īśvaraḥ     || 
nākāśam īśo ‘ceṣṭa tvāt nātmā pūrva niṣedha taḥ     | 
acintyasya ca kartṛtvam apy acintyaṃ kim ucyate     || 
tena kiṃ sraṣṭrum iṣṭaṃ ca ātmā cet nanv asau dhruvaḥ     | 
kṣmādi sva-bhāva īśaś ca jñānaṃ jñeyād anādi ca     || 
 
If you say “God is the cause of the world”, please explain what God is.  
If it’s the elements, so be it, but why all this fuss over a mere name? 
Moreover, earth, etc [i.e. water, fire and air], are not one; they are 
impermanent, inert and in no way divine.  One can step on them, and 
thus they are impure.  These are not God.  Space cannot be God as it is 
inert.  Nor can the ‘self’ [be God] for it was refuted earlier.  And if 
creation belongs to that beyond conception, then what can be said of the 
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inconceivable?  What is it that he [God] wishes to create?  If [you say] a 
“self”, then surely this [on your account] is eternal, as are earth, the 
other elements, and God [himself].  [As for] consciousness, it arises 
from the cognised object and is beginningless (BCA. 9.118-121). 
 
In other words, awareness is always awareness of “something” which is itself inter-
dependent on other “things”, and so on, ad infinitum.  The Buddhist thus describes the 
world in terms of “dense networks of relationality and interdependence” (MacKenzie, 
2011: 255).  We can thus conclude that Śāntideva is not denying the conventional 
reality of the physical world.  Rather, he adopts a sceptical position towards what we 
intuitively take to be real.
109
    
 
When Williams (2000a) characterises the Madhyamaka as supporting the thesis that 
“Everything is foam which dissolves into nothing” (p150), we should not forget that 
foam is in fact not ‘nothing’.  So things are not “merely appearances” that “have no 
existence beyond this”, as Burton (2004: 81) claims, for even mirages and dreams are 
actual phenomena, which actually appear and have actual consequences. Objects and 
actions then are “real empirical phenomena, but are empty of anything more than 
empirical existence” (Garfield, 1995: 244).  Śāntideva makes this explicit: 
yathā nirātmānaś ca sarva dharmāḥ, karma phala saṃbandhā virodhaś 
ca niḥsvabhāvatā ca, yathā dṛṣṭa sarva dharmā virodhaś ca 
 
All experiential elements are selfless.  On the other hand, they are 
connected with the fruit of action.  All experiential elements lack own-
being.  On the other hand, there is an empirical world (Ś.S. 244).110   
                                               
109 As Matilal (2004: 62) notes, there is a difference between adopting a “sceptical method” and 
actually being a “sceptic”.  Śāntideva is first and foremost a Mahāyāna Buddhist, and his scepticism 
does not contradict his faith.  Yet he does question, not only the theses of his opponents, but also his 
own prima facie views.  One must remember that there are yogis of even higher wisdom to oneself 
(BCA. 9.4).  Likewise, there are ethical actions that you are currently incapable of understanding (Ś.S. 
168).  Hence, Śāntideva shares what Dreyfus and Garfield (2011) call the “deep tensions in 
Madhyamaka” (p117).  The debate about Buddhism and its connection with Scepticism can be followed 
in Burton (2001), Ganeri (2001), Garfield (2002), Matilal (2004), Dreyfus (2011b), and Dreyfus & 
Garfield (2011).   
 





At the ultimate level, there are no elementary ‘things’, and karma is fundamentally 
empty.  But at the conventional level, things function as things, and karma functions 
as a cause of action.  Hence, empirical phenomena are to be accepted “solely on the 
basis of their causal efficacy” (Huntington, 1989: 23).  Thus, a person is undeniably 
established as a being capable of performing functions.  As we noted above, even the 
Buddha is not excluded from this law (BCA. 9.9a).  The apparent contradiction 
between function and being is due to our own lack of insight into emptiness.  The 
worldly equate functional capacity with own-being (sva-bhāva), but the yogis see into 
the non-substantiality and other-derived nature (para-bhāva) of those functioning 
objects.  That is the basis of their dispute (BCA. 9.5).  
 
If there is anything like a true innovation to be found in Śāntideva it must be found at 
the breaking point of this tension of how to reconcile the ultimate truth of 
insubstantiality with the conventional truth of suffering beings.  As indicated above, I 
believe the key to understanding his thesis is located in verses 9.75-76 of the BCA, 
where he answers the doubt as to whom compassion ought to be shown if there are no 
ultimately existing beings.  His response is critical:   
kāryārtham abhyupetena yo mohena prakalpitaḥ  || 
 
For anyone who [our voluntary] delusion projects for the sake of what 




                                                                                                                                       
 
111 Since preparing this translation of the BCA, I have discovered that Sweet (1977), in an unpublished 
Ph.D., introduces the term “[voluntary] ignorance” in his translation (p97).  However, he introduces it 
at verse 9.52.  This seems incorrect, for the more obvious reading of this verse is to see the delusion as 
belonging to suffering beings, not to the bodhisattva.  So this verse should read: “Being able to remain 
in cyclic existence, free from attachment and fear, for the benefit of those suffering through their 
delusion - such is the fruit of emptiness” (BCA. 9.52).  Also, if you introduce the bodhisattva’s 
voluntary delusion here, then the next verse’s statement that “As such, there is no valid objection to the 
emptiness doctrine” (BCA. 9.53) would be put in jeopardy, for a deluded being may well be accused of 
holding deluded doctrines.  Introducing the voluntary delusion at 9.75 agrees with the delusional nature 
of the bodhisattva’s work in 9.76 and further highlights the constructively altruistic intent.  
151 
 
When the only delusion left in the bodhisattva is of this voluntary nature, it is also 
what keeps him in saṃsāra.  It is thus worth noting that the Oliners see the 
“voluntary” nature of an action as one of the four defining features of true altruism 
(Oliner & Oliner, 1992: 6).  Just as Śaṅkara claims that the brahma-vid is beyond 
injunctions, so the bodhisattva is under no coercion other than his own vow.   
 
And as to the question of the rationale of such an altruistic self-imposed duty, given 
the supposed ultimate lack of individuation, Śāntideva’s response is equally critical:  
duḥkha vyupaśamārthaṃ tu kārya moho na vāryate   || 
 
In order to bring about the end of suffering, the delusion which 
conceives the task is not restrained (BCA. 9.76b).   
 
As in the case of Śaṅkara, Śāntideva is willing to play the game of individuation so 
long as it benefits the other.  Here Dayal’s compassion-theory trumps Williams’ 
insistence on reason and logic, and Avalokita trumps Mañjuśrī.  We see that 
Śāntideva’s verses are often primarily persuasive, “emotional rather than 
argumentative” (Dayal, 1970: 45), “pragmatic, rather than systematic and 
philosophical” (Matics, 1971: 26).  We may glean that this is not enough for Williams 
(1998a), who, whilst admitting the apparent “triumph of rhetoric over reason” (p107), 
still insists on a rational ontology.
112
  All Śāntideva can offer is the Two Truths, the 
flickering between self and no-self.  Whether this is “rational” or not, I leave for the 
reader to decide.  However, I will continue to give him a sympathetic reading. 
 
Santina (1986) writes that the “Madhyamaka’s contention is not with the pragmatic 
interpretation of phenomena commonly accepted in the world” (p99).  That is, the 
                                               
112 Williams (2002) later wrote, autobiographically, that he would be the “first to separate coherent 
rational argument from preaching or emotional or psychological description” (p13). 
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contention is not with the common-sense view of external objects, but with their 
ultimate status.  In fact, Śāntideva ends his BCA with a rhetorical question that clearly 
acknowledges the central role of the conventional: 
kadopalambha dṛṣṭibhyo deśayiṣyāmi śūnyatām     | 
saṃvṛty ānupalambhena puṇya saṃbhāram ādarāt     || 
 
When, with this merit accumulated, will I respectfully teach this 
emptiness, through conventions, without projection, to those whose 
views are characterized by projection? (BCA. 9.167) 
 
By “without projection”, he means the ability to teach without believing there to be a 
teacher and without becoming attached to the hearer or the conventional words one 
uses.  Only when one can give without a sense of a giver can one be a true bodhisattva 
(Ś.S. 275).  Also, to believe in an individuated self is to be bound to its longings, “If 
one does not let go of self, one cannot free oneself from suffering” (ātmānam 
aparityajya duḥkhaṃ tyaktum na śakyate) (BCA. 8.135a).  So how could one free 
another?  But remember that Śāntideva has allowed a certain amount of “voluntary 
delusion” about other beings, thus reconstructing a receiver of the giving.   But if this 
compassionate outpouring begins to seep back into one’s own sense of selfhood, and 
one forgets how this self is constructed, then one must resort to its antidote, to 
“meditate on not-self” (nairātmya bhāvanā) (BCA. 9.77b). 
 
So while compassionate acts must be performed, they must be performed without a 
sense of one’s own self.  Better to sit in solitude and drop the sense of self than to act 
with the sense of self.  This partially justifies Arnold’s (2005) claim that “selflessness 
... is arguably what all Buddhist philosophy concerns in the end” (p118).  Yet one 
cannot act for others without a sense of their self.  This is at the very heart of the 
“tension” and “flickering” models I have proposed.  If the bodhisattva has the ability 
to flicker between relative and ultimate domains, then he is free to act as he likes; but 
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as soon as he starts to believe that he has a self, in the sense of a fixed owner of his 
actions, those very actions will be tainted.   
 
Śāntideva’s version of compatibilism suggests that we are free to act on our choices, 
but we are only truly free to choose when we have a consciousness which flickers 
between seeing emptiness and being caught by false illusions, and by clearly seeing 
the possibility that the latter can be negated.  The bodhisattva thus makes a deliberate 
choice regarding the notion of self.  It is not so much the case that the maintenance of 
the no-self position is more essential than compassion, but that “true” compassion 
cannot be maintained without the no-self position.  But as we have seen, neither can it 
be maintained without the notion of self.  Hence, we have a tension within awareness 
itself, as Brassard (2000: 133-134) has rightly suggested. 
 
When we compare Śāntideva with Śaṅkara, it is vital that we do not get confused here 
with the notion of “I” that needs to be denounced in order for true compassion to arise.  
It is not the ultimate ātman of Advaita that needs denouncing; it is egoism 
(ahaṃkāra).  And this denouncement is as applicable to Śaṅkara as to Śāntideva.  
Olson (1997), in his discussion of Śaṅkara, writes that “the renouncer tries to destroy 
all traces of the ego, the false notion of self” (p169).  Ram-Prasad (2001a) has spoken 
of ahaṃkāra as the “sense of self which is ego” (p168), and that it is jīva that has this 
‘I’-sense (ahaṃkāra), not ātman (p166).  More recently, he further confirmed that 
“many brahmanical thinkers” speak out against this “fraudulent (sopadha) sense of 
selfhood” (Ram-Prasad, 2011: 228).  Śaṅkara associates ahaṃkāra with ignorance 
(avidyā) (Bh.G.Bh. 7.4).  In the Viveka Cūḍāmaṇi, it is called “one’s enemy” (sva 
śātruṃ) (307).  In the Gītā, Kṛṣṇa continually teaches Arjuna the means to be “free of 
false ego” (Tripurari, 2002: 210).  The “absence of egoism” (anahaṃkāra) is praised 
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along with “non-attachment” (asaktiḥ) and a list of other virtues (Bh.G. 13.8).  Thus, 
the ‘I’, according to the Gītā, “denotes no metaphysical entity” (Brodbeck, in 
Mascaró, 2003: xx).  The ego, as “false centre” is therefore to be eliminated (Zaehner, 
1973: 21).  Ego’s absence is deemed possible, as ahaṃkāra is but the “defining mode 
of awareness of the individuated, unliberated self (jīva)” (Ram-Prasad, 2001a: 169); 
and as such, cannot survive liberating knowledge.   
 
The V.C. states that, “Even though completely uprooted, this gross egoism, if attended 
to by the mind for even a moment, returns to life” (samūlakṛtto ‘pi mahānahaṃ punar 
vyullekhitaḥ syādyadi cetasā kṣaṇam saṃjīvya) (309).  The V.C. then hammers home 
the need to return to absorption (samādhi) (310-355).  Thus, in the V.C. there is an 
explicit acknowledgement of oscillating between states of egoistic and non-egoistic 
modes of consciousness.  Nevertheless, the V.C. also defines a jīvan-mukta as “one 
who never has the idea of ‘I’” (ahaṃ bhāva na) (438). 
 
Even though we have decided not to take the V.C. as Śaṅkara’s own work, it is worth 
repeating what Śaṅkara wrote on the difference between self and egoism:  
svayaṃvedya tva paryāyaḥ svapramāṇaka iṣyatām   | 
nivṛttāvahamaḥ siddhaḥ svātmano ‘nubhavaś ca naḥ   || 
 
It must be accepted that [the self] is ‘self-evident’, which is 
synonymous with ‘self-knowable’.  And the experience of one’s [true] 





At this universal level, ātman comes to signify “almost the exact opposite” of ego 
(Torwesten, 1991: 50).  It is thus the false notion of self as a separate, independent 
                                               




being that is being attacked in both Advaita and Madhyamaka.  Nevertheless, 
Śāntideva does go further, when he writes: 
duḥkha hetur ahaṃkāra ātma mohāt tu vardhate     | 
tato ‘pi na nivartyaś cet varaṃ nairātmya bhāvanā     || 
 
However, egoism, which is the cause of suffering, increases from the 
delusion that there is a self.  If this [particular delusion] cannot be 
avoided, better to meditate on not-self (BCA. 9.77). 
 
This is where the anātman doctrine has its force.  It is indeed egoism (ahaṃkāra) that 
causes suffering (duḥkha), but the belief that one has a permanent centre, a true self 
(ātman), according to the Buddhist, increases the delusion, which itself causes egoism.  
Here Śāntideva would agree with Metzinger (2010: 208) that “there is no essence 
within us that stays the same across time”.  So we need always to distinguish between 
the denouncement of the ego (ahaṃkāra) with the absolute denial of the self (ātman).   
 
This is why Harvey has recently made the point that anātman should not be rendered 
“egoless” (in Keown & Prebish, 2007: 572).  All Indian schools argue the case for 
being egoless.  Moreover, it could be further argued that the ātman Śāntideva has in 
mind here is of the individuated kind, what Śaṅkara calls jīva or jīvātman.  As such, 
they might still agree with each other.  As just mentioned, the false notion of jīva falls 
away when one realises brahman-consciousness, thus jīva is not an irreducible entity.  
To re-iterate Śaṅkara’s position on liberation, the false self must be dropped in order 
to gain the true Self.   
 
But then, when we come to the notion of a “true” Self, there is no way of reconciling 
this position with the Buddhist.  The following attack by Śāntideva seems capable of 




nityo hy acetanaś cātmā vyoma-vat sphuṭam akriyaḥ     | 
pratyayāntara saṅge ‘pi nirvikārasya kā kriyā     || 
 
If the Self is eternal and without thought, then it is evidently inactive, 
like space.  Even in contact with other conditioning factors, what 





athāvikṛta evātmā caitanyenāsya kiṃ kṛtaṃ     | 
ajñasya niṣkriyasyaivam ākāśasyātmatā matā     || 
 
If the self is in fact unchanged, what is achieved by it having 
consciousness?  We might say that selfhood is like space, unconscious 
and inert (BCA. 9.69). 
 
Rather than seeing this immutable self as an obstacle to compassion, Śāntideva merely 
sees it as an unnecessary postulate.  Naturally, there is still much we could say here 
about modes of consciousness.  If consciousness is indeed local, or an occurrence 
within a local complex, as the Buddhist accepts (see Ram-Prasad, 2002: 6), then there 
is indeed no need, philosophically, for this ātman.  However, if, ultimately, there is no 
other conscious being apart from this pure consciousness, as Śaṅkara claims 
(Bh.G.Bh. 9.10); then its purpose is indispensable.  Now some (e.g. Ram-Prasad, 
2007: 125) may feel that this is an “astonishing” claim.  And given Śāntideva’s 
response to the Sāṃkhya School on the notion of an ultimate reality, it would seem he 
would agree.  Śāntideva writes: 
anyad rūpam asatyaṃ cen nijaṃ tad rūpam ucyatāṃ     | 
jñānatā cet tataḥ sarva puṃsāmaikyaṃ prasajyate     || 
 
If the different natures are not its true being, then explain what its own 
nature is.  If [you say] it is the nature of consciousness, then it follows 




While of major interest to the study of Indian epistemology, this argument need not be 
taken up here.
114
  All we need note is that the metaphysical and epistemological 
impasse between Advaita and Madhyamaka has been met.  Nevertheless, despite this 
impasse, so many commonalities remain.  This is the crux of my thesis. 
                                               
114 For further discussion, see Ram-Prasad, (2001a, 2002 & 2007) and Siderits, et al (2011).  
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4. Their Common Approach to the World 
 
This section will form the core of the “comparative” aspect of my thesis, for within it I 
wish to propose that Śāntideva and Śaṅkara, who, though sitting at polar ends of the 
Self-spectrum, will nevertheless go on to assume almost identical positions with 
regard to key doctrines.  It will be argued that their philosophical means and their 
gnoseological and ethical goals are so similar that they are able to take on a common 
opponent, defend a similar model of agency, and finally call for a form of conduct 
which is equally “provisional”.   
 
This section is thus divided into three parts: 
 
1) Their Common Denial of the Yogācāra Idealistic World-view 
2) Their Common Denial of the Ultimacy of the Individuated Self 




4.1 Their Common Denial of the Yogācāra Idealistic World-view 
 
Indian Mahāyāna is typically divided by scholars into two philosophical schools, the 
Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra.  As such, Huntington (1989) has referred to the 
Madhyamaka as the Yogācāra’s “most vehement opponent” (p62).  However, perhaps 
we will find, at least in his “major” works, that Śaṅkara was even more vehemently 
against the Yogācāra than either Śāntideva or Candrakīrti.  Before we look at 
Śaṅkara’s and Śāntideva’s critique of the so-called ‘Idealistic’ 115  views of the 
Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda School, it is worth heeding Huntington’s warning that we 
should not judge the Yogācāra solely on the basis of those accounts given by their 
opponents (ibid.) 
 
So let me start by saying that they may well not have been “Idealistic” in the Western 
sense of reducing all phenomena to mere ideas, to mental constructs.  First of all, it is 
clearly possible to coherently talk of our private mental representation of the world as 
merely-mind.  All we need mean by this is that we can never know the world directly, 
and must always rely on the mind for interpretation of perceptual data.  This is not 
idealism, but phenomenalism.  Yet the Yogācāra has often been labelled as the ‘Mind-
Only’ School.  Most importantly, for this thesis, Śāntideva (BCA. 9.29b) refers to 
their doctrine as “mind-only” (citta-mātra), and Śaṅkara (B.S.Bh. II.ii.18) labels them 
the “Followers of the theory that Only-Consciousness-Exists” (Vijñānāsti-mātra 
vādinaḥ).  What such commentators have in mind here is that the Yogācāra are 
                                               
115 While it may be true that “Western notions of “idealism” and “realism” have no Sanskrit 
equivalents” (Larson, 1997: 249), the Indian translators of Śaṅkara’s texts, Gambhīrānanda (B.S.Bh), 
Mādhavānanda (Bṛ.U.Bh) and Jagadānanda (U.S.) all refer to the Yogācāra as ‘Idealists’.  And it is 
evident that both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva see the Yogācāra as holding a mind-only doctrine that we 
might reasonably call ‘idealist’. 
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claiming that all experiential elements are in fact products of the mind, and that the 
mind is all that ultimately exists, that is, “metaphysical idealism” (Lusthaus, 2002: 5).   
 
Of course, a mind devoid of ideas, a pure emptiness, which seems to constitute the 
ultimate goal of the Yogācāra, would not have a place in the Western category of 
idealism (Ram-Prasad, 2002: 39).  In fact, one only reaches enlightenment when one 
destroys the “mind consciousness” (mano-nāma vijñānaṃ) (Triṃśika, 5).  This 
ultimate status amounts to the very opposite of a mind-created universe (Lusthaus, 
2002: 5).  We should not forget that Western Ideal-ism bases itself on “ideas”, not 
“ideals”, which is why Nuttall (2002: 43) suggested that Berkeley’s idealistic 
metaphysics might be better labelled ‘Idea-ism’.  But a state of mind which contained 
no such ideas or conceptual constructs would simply stand as pure consciousness, or 
perhaps flickering moments of cognition sans object.  This sounds very much like 
what Harvey (1995: 223) has called “Nibbānic discernment” in his interpretation of 
the final state of an arhat; a thesis which he admits is similar to that of the 
Yogācārin’s (p250).  Such an idea-free state cannot coherently be called Idealism. 
 
There is however a second problem.  If we analyze the Sanskrit phrase ‘vijñapti-
mātra’, a term the Yogācārins used to describe their own thesis, and indeed the 
opening words of Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā, we find that it could provide a variety of 
English translations.  For example, ‘vijñapti’ means ‘information’ (Monier-Williams, 
2002) or ‘perceptions’ (Grimes, 1996) or ‘representation’ (Keown, 2003).  So to hold 
a theory of ‘vijñapti-mātra’ need not bind one to the thesis that the world itself is 
mind-only.  Furthermore, given that the word ‘mātra’ may be equally translated as 
“mere”, we might in fact translate ‘vijñapti-mātra’ as ‘mere-representation’, a 
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rendering suggested by Kochumuttom’s (1989: 257) translation of Vasubandhu’s 
Triṃśikā, verse 17.   
 
Arnold (2005: 23) has noted that scholars continue to be split on the question of 
whether Yogācārins, like Vasubandhu and Dignāga, were presenting an “idealist 
metaphysics” or a “representationalist epistemology”, citing Hayes as a defender of 
the latter view.  Kochumuttom’s (1989) thesis is that the Yogācāra are really talking 
about mental construction (parikalita), and any claim that this was idealism would be 
a “gross misunderstanding” (p5).  Cook (1999) also denies that Vasubandhu’s work 
was idealistic, and suggests that the argument is one that claims that “any cognitive 
experience is distorted as soon as it occurs” (p374).  Thus, Lusthaus (2002: 6) states 
that ‘vijñapti-mātra’ should be seen as an “epistemic caution” and not as an 
“ontological pronouncement”.  Anacker (1998) also denies that Vasubandhu was 
really denying the existence of objects, claiming that what Vasubandhu is really 
getting at is that external phenomena are “only inferable” (p159).  We may compare 
Hume here, who states that “external objects become known to us only by those 
perceptions they occasion”, and thus, “we never really advance a step beyond 
ourselves” (Treatise, I.ii.6), and again, “philosophy informs us, that every thing, which 
appears to the mind, is nothing but a perception”, and it is only the “vulgar” who 
“confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a distinct continued existence to the 
very things they feel or see” (I.iv.2).  Such a stance is often labelled ‘scepticism’, not 
‘idealism’. 116   On such a reading of the Yogācāra, they would sit very close to 
Advaita’s “non-realism” (see Ram-Prasad, 2002) in which there is “no way of 
                                               
116 For a thorough discussion of what we might mean by the term “scepticism” and its potential 
application to the Madhyamaka School, see Arnold (2005, Part III).  I personally favour the view (held 
by Matilal) that both the Yogācārin and the Mādhyamika can be thought of as being, what Ram-Prasad 
(2002) calls, “sceptical in intent” (p71).  But Matilal (2004: 62) also suggested that Nāgārjuna was “not 
a sceptic, but a Buddhist, although he used a sceptical method”.   I would venture that this also applies 
to the Yogācāra. 
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establishing that the world is external to cognition” (p14), as all phenomenal content is 
“determined locally” (Metzinger, 2010: 10).   
 
The subsequent difference would then boil down to whether one then looks back from 
this intuition at the world and assumes its (external) reality, or whether one moves on 
to transcend it.  So framed, it is not an entirely ontological debate, but one framed 
within a “larger soteriological project” (Ram-Prasad, 2002: 39).  If the Madhyamaka 
cannot be properly understood when extracted from its soteriological aims, then nor 
can the Yogācāra.  They may well be accused of setting up an “idealist epistemology” 
(Ram-Prasad, 2002: 44), but their rationale may simply be to provide the practitioner 
with a platform for liberation from the world.  If this were the case, their ‘idealism’ 
parallels the soteriological thesis of both Advaita and Madhyamaka, in that all of them 
wish to cast doubt on what we commonly take to be the constitution and the limits of 
reality, thus leaving room for the possibility of transcendence and an ideal (i.e. 
perfect) form of living liberation, whether this be “romantic folklore” (Metzinger, 
2010: 9) or not.   
 
Now that we have given the defenders of Yogācāra a fair hearing, we also need to be 
fair to Śāntideva and Śaṅkara, who both took the Yogācāra as idealistic.  So in their 
defence, we can cite, for example, the following line from the opening verse of 
Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā, “vijñapti-mātram eva idam asad arthāvabhāsanāt”, which 
may be translated as, “All this is mere representation because of the appearance of 
non-existent objects” (1a).117  This goes beyond Hume, who, due to the coherence 
and constancy of appearances, found himself “naturally led to regard the world, as 
                                               




something real and durable” (Treatise, I.iv.2).  From here, it is quite easy to see why 
Śaṅkara might also refer to them the “Followers of the theory that Only-
Consciousness-Exists” (Vijñānāsti-mātra vādinaḥ) (B.S.Bh. II.ii.18) and why 
Śāntideva might label their doctrine “Mind-only” (citta-mātra) (BCA. 9.29b).118  It is 
also easy to understand why the idealistic label has stuck for so long. 
 
Śaṅkara also referred to the Yogācārins as “Vijñāna-vādī” (Followers of the theory of 
Consciousness) (B.S.Bh. II.ii.28).  Now ‘vijñāna’ had a technical meaning in early 
Buddhism, that of ‘consciousness’, being one of the five aggregates (skandhā).  The 
early Buddhists also talked of the five sense consciousnesses as types of vijñāna, with 
intellect acting as a sixth.  The Yogācāra School distinguished itself by proposing that 
there were in fact eight types of consciousness, including a store-house consciousness 
(ālaya-vijñāna).119  Matilal (1994) suggests that this was the Yogācāra’s “substitute 
for the self” (p287).  Yet, it should be emphasized that the Yogācāra claimed that it 
was the error of the seventh consciousness, the “tainted mind” (kliṣṭa-manas) to grasp 
at the ālaya as if it were a self (see Williams, 2009: 97).120   
 
We need to understand what it is that drives such an impassioned denial of their thesis 
by both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara.  It may well have been that the Yogācāra simply 
constituted a “formidable opponent” (Huntington, 1989: 60) to these schools.  They 
may have had either political or scholastic reasons for attacking one another.  Perhaps 
the Madhyamaka were responding to the claim that the Yogācāra was the third and 
                                               
118 Keown (2003: 341) cites the “influence of Tibetan doxological traditions” as the reason why the 
Yogācāra may be “incorrectly” labelled ‘citta-mātra’, but it was clearly a product of India. 
 
119 Like the Pāli texts, Śāntideva speaks of only six consciousnesses (BCA. 9.59). 
 




final turning of the wheel, the Buddha’s definitive (nītārtha) teaching.121  Ultimately, 
however, it will be argued here that, while the issue for Candrakīrti may well have 
been linguistic (Huntington, 1989: 66); the common motivator for Śaṅkara and 
Śāntideva is ethical conduct, and that neither of them could imagine how ethics could 
function within a mind-only paradigm.   
 
Nevertheless, our starting point continues on from the question of self.  The 
methodology here is to focus on Śaṅkara’s critique, whilst noting how similar 
Śāntideva’s critique is to it.  The reason for this is that Śaṅkara allotted significantly 
more space to the Yogācāra than did Śāntideva. 
 
Before we analyse Śaṅkara’s critique of the Yogācāra, it is worth noting a point made 
by Alston (2004), that Śaṅkara was “more concerned with protecting the students of 
Advaita from the seductions of a non-Vedic path than with an objective statement of 
what the opponents actually said” (Vol 4: 281).  Indeed, we may note two passages in 
the commentaries that do seem to point to this conclusion.  In one, Śaṅkara states that 
any teaching that opposes the Vedas was surely contradictory (B.S.Bh. II.ii.18).  In 
another Bhāṣya, he states that any theory that denies a self (ātman) over and above the 
body and intellect contradicts the Vedic path (Bṛ.U.Bh. IV.iii.7). However, such 
dogmatic claims aside, it seems to me that Śaṅkara did in fact offer a fairly reasonable 
depiction of certain strands of the Yogācāra.   
 
It is difficult to know exactly which strand Śaṅkara had in mind, but Alston (2004) 
suggests it was the doctrine “propagated by Dharmakīrti” (Vol.4: 282), as does Ingalls 
                                               





  Indeed, elsewhere, in his Upadeśa Sāhasrī (Metric, 18.142), 
Śaṅkara quotes an entire verse from Dharmakīrti (see Mayeda, 1992: 200, n100).  
Mayeda (p201, n.104) also traces some of the views attacked by Śaṅkara to Dignāga.  
Ram-Prasad (1993: 430) has also traced a verse of the Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya (II.ii.28) 
to Dignāga; though more generally he states that, “The Vijñānavādin that Śaṅkara has 
in mind looks very much like Vasubandhu” (Ram-Prasad, 2002: 40).  We can 
therefore state with some certainty that Śaṅkara knew the work of Dharmakīrti, as 
well as the work of Dignāga, and most probably that of Vasubandhu.  I would venture 
then that Śaṅkara had more than one strand of Yogācāra in mind, and we might add to 
the evidence the fact that he offers two competing views of their thesis on the final 
state of pure consciousness (Bṛ.U.Bh. IV.iii.7).    
 
Whichever strand he had in mind, it matters little to my main thesis.  My intention 
here is not to ascertain how justified Śaṅkara was in his critique, or to establish 
whether it was historically accurate.  I am more concerned here with what Śaṅkara 
actually said against the Vijñānavādin thesis and even more concerned with why he 
felt pressed to say it.  The same applies to the case of Śāntideva.   
 
While it is true that any system that denies the Vedas is a system to be denounced by 
an Advaitin, it is my contention that there are deeper reasons for the sheer volume of 
attention that Śaṅkara gave to the Vijñānavādins.  One reason, of course, is that he 
was well aware of just how close his own cognitive theory sat to theirs.  For example, 
Śaṅkara admits that their theory of the self-luminosity (sva-prakāśa) of cognitions, at 
least on the surface, looks very similar to his theory that the Self-as-witness is self-
                                               
122 Ingalls (1954: 299) also suggests that verses II.ii.28-32 of the Brahma Sūtra are later insertions.  I 
will not follow up this historical point here. 
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established, self-reflexive, and that it thus illumines cognitions (B.S.Bh. II.ii.28).  
Śaṅkara points out though, that if there is no Self behind the cognitions, throwing light 
on them, then what you have is tantamount to a fire burning itself (ibid.).   
 
Śāntideva uses two such metaphors to make exactly the same point in his criticism of 
the Yogācāra.  He states that “Just as a blade cannot cut itself, so it is with mind” (nac 
chinātti yathātmānam asidhārā tathā manaḥ) (BCA. 9.18a).  He goes on to state that a 
“lamp is not so illumined [by itself]” (naiva prakāśyate dīpa) (9.19a).123  He later goes 
on to say that whether the mind is luminous (prakāśā) or not (aprakāśā), it “cannot be 
seen” (dṛṣṭā na), so its discussion is “futile” (mudhā) (9.22).124  But for Śaṅkara, it is 
far from futile, for the luminous brahman is established by the Vedas, and is thus 
known on authority.  He will therefore argue for its existence on the basis of an 
analogy with a lamp, which, though illuminating other objects, still needs an external 
agent to perceive it, as does consciousness (Bṛ.U.Bh. IV.iii.7). 
 
There is much that could be said here regarding the nature of cognition; however, it 
would lead us away from the central theme of the thesis.  All I wish to show here is 
that Śāntideva and Śaṅkara have already found themselves a common opponent in the 
Yogācāra.  So far they have argued against them on sectarian grounds.  For Śāntideva, 
there is no ultimate mind lying behind the momentary cognitions.  For Śaṅkara, it is 
not mind or personal consciousness, but brahman-consciousness that lies behind those 
                                               
123 A similar argument appears in the Vigrahavyāvartanī (34), where Nāgārjuna states that “Fire does 
not illuminate itself” (na hy ātmānaṃ prakāśayaty agniḥ).  For further discussion of the fire analogy in 
Nāgārjuna, see Westerhoff (2009: 168-172).  Matilal (2004: 60) traces the related “light analogy” back 
to the Nyāya Sūtra II.i.9. 
 






  At this point then, the two philosophers remain divided essentially 
along ātman/anātman lines.  But this is all about to change as they come to share the 
same ethical concerns. 
 
The next stage of the debate is the question of subjects and objects, and their 
relationship to each other.  We need to bear in mind here that while a pot or a snake is 
merely an object; a person is potentially both a subject and an object. What is meant 
by ‘person’ here has nothing to do with the question of ātman.  The ‘person’, in the 
Indian context, is that who is stood before me, a man with a name and a family and a 
caste, born in such-and-such a village, holding such-and-such a trade.  There is 
nothing metaphysical about this.  Neither Śāntideva nor Śaṅkara wish to deny the 
person as an object.  Neither of them wishes to say that ‘you’ are not physically there.  
Neither of them wishes to say that your family never physically existed, that your birth 
was not a physical occurrence within space and time (see Chapter 4.2).   
 
Now it may well be that the Yogācārins never wished to be taken this way either.  
Perhaps all they wished to suggest was that a world out there could never be verified 
without recourse to consciousness.  Perhaps we should not see them as proposing a 
world of cognition-only, but of representation-only.  Be that as it may, historically 
they were taken to be denying an external world both by Śāntideva and Śaṅkara.  
Indeed they continue to be taken this way by the Tibetan Mādhyamikas126, and there is 
                                               
125 That the “I” (ahaṃ) is momentary (kṣaṇikatva) is also stated in the V.C. (293), where it is contrasted 
with the “witness” (sakṣī) which is “constant” (nityaṃ) (294).   
 
126 For example, the Dalai Lama (2002) states, “although the Mind-only School rejects the reality of a 
self and rejects the reality of an external, objective material reality, it nonetheless maintains that 
subjective experience – that is to say, the mind – does have substantial reality” (p102).  The late 
Chogye Trichen (2003) also states that, “according to the Mind Only school … all appearances are 
mind.  Nothing exists outside of the mind’s sphere of experience.  Mind is the substratum that creates 
and projects all phenomena” (p156).  Also see Hopkins (1996: 365ff). 
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certainly enough in the writings of the likes of Vasubandhu which would allow for 
this interpretation.  Again, whatever the historical or textual fact of the matter is, the 
work we need to do here is to understand why both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara would 
want to argue against such idealism.  For our purposes, we can ignore the name 
Yogācāra and focus only on the construction of their project as described to us by 
Śāntideva and Śaṅkara.  The key question to ask is: In what way does this project 
oppose what they wish to say about the world and our place in it? 
 
Beginning with Śaṅkara again, we need to realise just how close his ontology looks, 
on the surface, to that of the Yogācāra.  And this is so even in his post-Gauḍapāda 
period.  Let us take for example the famous Indian ‘snake/rope’ analogy.  First, let us 
examine it from a psychological perspective.  A person, through fear or whatever, 
imagines they see a snake.  As they get closer, they realise it is only a rope.  What are 
we to take from this?  All that is being pointed out here is that what we take to be the 
world (through perception) might not be the actual world.  The world that we see 
passes through mental filters which distort its reality.  In other words, the world is 
different from the way we perceive it.  Up to here, the Brahmins and the Buddhists 
would agree.  If we take this analogy of the ‘snake/rope’ one step further, what 
Śaṅkara is accusing the Vijñānavādin of doing is reducing the object to an ‘idea’, to 
cognition: 
vijñānādarthāntaraṃ vastu na ced abhyupagamyate, vijñānaṃ 
ghaṭaḥ paṭa ityevamādīnāṃ śabdānām ekārthatve 
paryāyaśabdatvaṃ prāpnoti   | 
 
If no object distinct from consciousness were admitted, then the 
words ‘cognition’, ‘pot’, ‘cloth’, etc., having the same meaning, 







On this account, a pot, or a cloth, or a snake would all be equal in being mere ideas 
within a subject’s consciousness.127  He goes on to state that we could not function in 
society if we did not assume that other beings were external to consciousness.  For 
example, to have a debate with an opponent, but to assume that this was all taking 
place at the level of cognition-only, would “put an end to all human interaction” 
(sarva saṃvyavahāra lopa prasaṅgaḥ) (ibid.).  This is an explicit reference to human 
conduct, i.e. to social ethics.  Human interaction, as we know it, simply could not take 
place if I assumed that ‘others’ were merely a figment of my imagination, an aspect of 
my own consciousness.  What would it mean to be ethical if I did not feel that I was 
interacting with other distinct beings?  Moreover, Śaṅkara points out that the 
teachings of the Buddhist path itself, which presuppose a distinction between means 
and the result, would be rendered useless.  In full: 
tathā sādhanānāṃ phalasya ca ekatve, sādhyasādhana bhedopadeśa 
śāstrānarthakya prasaṅgaḥ, tat kartuḥ ajñāna prasaṅgo vā   || 
 
Likewise, [if] the means [were taken as] being identical with the 
result, your scriptures, which assume a difference between them, 
would be useless, and the author [i.e. the Buddha] might well be 
charged with ignorance (Bṛ.U.Bh. IV.iii.7). 
 
The conclusion could not be any clearer: where there is no posited world of beings, 
there is no place for ethics.  No matter how much we seek to reduce existence to 
pure consciousness, in the final analysis, the “way to liberation lies in and goes 
through unliberated life” (Ram-Prasad, 2000: 184).  Furthermore, and this is vital, the 
Yogācāra are being accused of putting the Buddha’s ethical teachings at risk! 
 
                                               
127 The positive side of this doctrine, of course, is that one could never be scared by a snake, or be 
seduced by an object if one saw it as mind-created.  This potential benefit of the Yogācāra view has in 
fact been pointed out by the current Dalai Lama (2002: 102). 
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Naturally, it could be argued that Śaṅkara’s own theory of brahman-consciousness as 
ground of all being, with ‘things’ being mere shapes of this Being (sat), is open to the 
same attack.  Ingalls (1954), even while limiting himself to the two “major” and 
“mature” works of Śaṅkara (p291), admits that, “If we are to adopt a metaphysical and 
static view of philosophy, there is little difference between Śaṅkara and Vijñānavāda 
Buddhism” (p304).  Even though Śaṅkara may have left idealism behind, he still 
continues to claim that everything is a manifestation of the one ground; Being itself.  
For example, “All things named ... are Being-only” (sad-eva ... sarvam abhidhānam) 
(Ch.U.Bh. VI.ii.1-3).  Snakes, pots, whatever: “all these are but different shapes of 
Being” (sat saṃstāna mātram idaṃ sarvam).  There is no snake (sarpa), only “rope”, 
not as “rajju”, but as “Sat”, Being itself.  Further on in the text (VI.iii.2), forms are 
said to be ultimately non-existent (anṛta).  Thus, Śaṅkara pushes the ‘snake/rope’ 
analogy beyond psychology into epistemology, and arguably into ontology.  It is no 
longer due to fear that one sees a ‘snake’, it is (more directly) due to ignorance: 
abrahma pratyayaḥ sarvo ‘vidyā mātro rajjvāmiva sarpa pratyayaḥ  |  
brahmaivaikaṃ paramārtha-satyam 
 
All concepts of non-brahman are mere ignorance, like the notion of a 
snake superimposed upon a rope.  Brahman alone is the ultimate truth 
(Mu.U.Bh. II.ii.11). 
 
But then this is all that the Yogācāra (as painted by Śaṅkara) are saying; ‘things’ are 
verily non-other than ground (ālaya).  So what is new in Śaṅkara is not that there are 
snakes or people out there, but that we must pretend that the snakes and people are 
real, that is real in the provisional sense of taking them seriously.  There are snakes 
and people, as it were, but, to the enlightened, they are really just modifications of the 
one true Being, never to be grasped at.  Nevertheless, for the sake of the majority, in 
everyday life, we must go along with the delusion that these ‘things’ are in fact real, 
and persons do in fact own their own lives and property.  So while “illusion cannot 
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last when the truth is known” (Dasgupta, 1975, Vol.I: 441), the illusory game can still 
be played.  In other words, when discussing ethics, we must accept the provisional 
playing field, for that is where most people sport.   
 
In the Upadeśa Sāhasrī, Śaṅkara also points out that before one realised that the 
‘snake’ was in fact a ‘rope’, the ‘snake’ did in fact have an underlying existence, 
namely, the rope (Metric, 18.46).  Thus, there is a real basis even for illusory 
existence.  So even if all phenomena were taken to be illusory, there would still be an 
underlying reality, brahman.  It might help to recall the analogy of the waves falling 
back into the sea (B.S.Bh. II.i.13).  The waves are transitory, but the sea still underlies 
them, just as the earth underlies a temporary pot.  Elsewhere, Śaṅkara offers the 
similar analogy of foam and bubbles on top of pure water; the elements of the body 
and the so-called individual self are like foam and bubbles of water (salila phena-




   
The trick he plays with the reader then is to attack the Yogācāra’s (ultimate) 
soteriological discourse with a (provisional) ethical argument.  The Yogācāra are in 
fact right to see things as illusory, as dream-like, but they are wrong in not taking this 
provisional world seriously.
129
  And the world, according to Advaita, is to be “taken 
seriously” (Ram-Prasad, 2002: 4).  Dreams prove only that cognitions may be sublated 
and thus point to the possibility that the world of name-and-form may be transcended, 
not that the world has no relative existence.  As such, Śaṅkara, without proving the 
                                               
128 Cf. S.N. III.140-142 
 
129 Actually, as Ram-Prasad (2002: 45) rightly points out, ordinary experience (especially suffering) is 




externality of the world, merely assumes it.  For this “pseudo-realist” move, Bhāskara 
charges Śaṅkara with hypocrisy, for it appears to contradict his Buddhist-looking 
māyā-thesis (see Ingalls, 1954: 303-304).  But the move is only hypocritical if we 
maintain an either/or discourse.  But Śaṅkara’s discourse, like Śāntideva’s, is 
both/and.  My contention is that Śaṅkara, like Śāntideva, wants us to see the illusion 
of the cake and eat it.
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  It is this move that will allow him to defend the ethics of the 
Bhagavad Gītā (see Chapter 4.3).  All we need do is assume that the world is out 
there, and hence Dharma can run its course.   True, with regard to such things as 
caste, gender, renunciation and celibacy, he will place certain boundaries around 
human interaction, leaving room for a transcendent domain for the few (see below).  
But there is nothing hypocritical about that.  If Śaṅkara can be accused of anything, it 
is elitism, not hypocrisy. 
 
Naturally, along with elitism comes a certain degree of arrogance.  In one single line 
of the Bṛ.U.Bh, Śaṅkara dismisses the followers of the Madhyamaka School, to whom 
he refers to as the “Followers of the Empty Doctrine” (Śūnya-vādi pakṣastu) (IV.iii.7), 
on the grounds that their doctrine “contradicts all means of valid knowledge” (sarva 
pramāṇa vipratiṣiddha).131  Unfortunately, he offers no explanation.  He says a little 
bit more in his B.S.Bh, where he implies that they refuse to accept the provisional 
reality which he finds essential for human interaction (II.ii.31).  Needless to say, I do 
not believe that this critique can stand up against Śāntideva.  For one thing, in the BCA 
(9.8a), Śāntideva states that there is no fault in the wise adopting conventional views 
                                               
130 See Burton (2004: 98). 
 




(na doṣo yogi saṃvṛtyā).  Furthermore, he later categorically denies that conventional 
ways of knowing are being denied: 
yathā dṛṣṭaṃ śrutaṃ jñātaṃ naiveha pratiṣidhyate     | 
satyataḥ kalpanā tv atra duḥkha hetur nivāryate     || 
 
The [ordinary] way of seeing, hearing or knowing is not here being 
refuted.  It is the reification of reality that is here refuted, as that is the 
cause of suffering (BCA. 9.25). 
 
I will return to this subject later (see Chapter 5.1).  But for now, allow me to show just 
how similar Śāntideva’s views are to Śaṅkara’s on this and related subjects.  Like 
Śaṅkara, Śāntideva finds the Yogācāra’s theory of non-externality as unreasonable as 
their theory of the luminosity of mind:  
yadā māyaiva te nāsti tadā kim upalabhyate     | 
cittasyaiva sa ākāro yady apy anyo ‘sti tattvataḥ     || 
cittam eva yadā māyā tadā kiṃ kena dṛśyate     | 
uktaṃ ca loka nāthena cittaṃ cittaṃ na paśyati     || 
 
 
[We ask] If, for you, the illusion does not exist [externally], what is 
there to be perceived?  Even if [you say] it is an expression of mind 
itself, [we object] that in reality it is something other [than mind].  
[We ask] If illusion is really mind itself, what is seen by what?  
Moreover, it was said by the World Protector [Buddha] that mind does 
not perceive mind (BCA. 9.16-17). 
 
 
It is quite evident here that Śāntideva wishes to distinguish between the Madhyamaka 
theory of illusion-like objects and the mind-only theory of the Yogācāra.  He wants to 
say that things (which will naturally include human beings), although they are lacking 
in permanence and independent existence, do nonetheless stand out there, external to 
consciousness.  He further wants to say that the mind is not to be taken as being self-
luminous.  And herein follows a lengthy discussion on why this cannot be so.  I do not 
wish to enter into this debate, for it is not of direct interest to my thesis, other than to 
note that his analogy of a knife not being capable of cutting itself (BCA. 9.18) is 
parallel to Śaṅkara’s claim that fire does not burn itself (B.S.Bh. II.ii.28).  Of course, 
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the reasons why they wish to deny the luminosity theory of the Yogācāra are totally 
opposed.  Śaṅkara wishes to establish a necessary witness (brahman) behind the 
workings of mind, whereas Śāntideva wishes to say that all is inter-dependent and that 
nothing is self-standing.  In other words, one attacks the Yogācāra in order to prove 
there is a self, and the other attacks it to prove there is no self.   
 
Here, as we might well have predicted, they will meet a metaphysical impasse.  On 
one side of the river, Śāntideva stands open to Śaṅkara’s attack that the Śūnyavādin’s 
doctrine “collapses like a well in sand” (sikatā kupa vad vidīryata) (B.S.Bh. II.ii.32).  
On the other side, Śaṅkara stands open to Śāntideva’s attack on those who would posit 
a more solid ground of existence.  And here the Yogācāra appear to be standing on the 
bridge being fired at from both sides.   
 
Śāntideva would no doubt take Śaṅkara’s attack on the chin, for he not only admits 
that his theory lacks any essential support; he even prays that all mankind adopt a 
view of things as being like space: 
sarvam ākāśa saṃkāśaṃ parigṛhṇantu madvidhāḥ    | 
 prakupyanti prahṛṣyanti kalahotsavahetubhiḥ    || 
 
Would that all mankind understood that all things are like space.  But 
they delight in festivals and get angry in disputes (BCA. 9.154).   
 
In the following exchange, we again see just how closely the Yogācāra stood 
metaphysically to the Advaitin, as Śāntideva responds to their attack on his 
supportless universe: 
asaty api yathā māyā dṛśyā draṣṭṛ tathā manaḥ     | 
vastv āśrayaś cet saṃsāraḥ so ‘nyathākāśa-vad bhavet     || 
vastv āśrayeṇābhāvasya kriyāvat tvaṃ kathaṃ bhavet     | 




Just as the illusion which is perceived lacks [ultimate] existence, so it is 
with the seer, the mind.  If [you think] cyclic existence must be 
supported by something truly existent, otherwise it would be like space 
...  [We reply] For you, the mind has been reduced to isolation, 
accompanied by non-existents.  How could the activity of the unreal 
[objects] proceed, even if supported by a real existent [i.e. pure mind]?  
(BCA. 9.27-28) 
 
While it is difficult to see just how this answers the question put forth, we can easily 
see how the final attack could apply to Śaṅkara.  Both Śāntideva and Śaṅkara are 
admitting that the illusion exists, but only the former is willing to say that there is no 
ground to which the illusion refers.  Indeed, Śāntideva will throw the accusation of a 
“space-like” ground in the face of the Brahmanical schools, likening ātman (BCA. 
6.29 & 9.69) and Īśvaraḥ (9.120) to space (vyoma, ākāśa), and asking how this so-
called God would add anything to our inter-dependent universe.  Like the Yogācāra’s 
luminous mind, it appears to Śāntideva as a barren concept.  The metaphysical 
impasse seems to defy common ground, but the ethical consequences of their 
positions most certainly do not. 
 
Notice here that we have a Buddhist school attacking another Buddhist school along 
with certain Brahmanical schools for holding to a metaphysical thesis that feels the 
need to posit an essential ground.  At the same time, we have a Buddhist and a 
Brahmin firing the same accusation at a second Buddhist school, that of denying the 
provisional ground for ethics.  The cross-cutting nature of Indian philosophy has 
thus been established.  Furthermore, the fact that one’s ultimate view on selfhood, 
though influential, is no give-away sign of one’s ethical project has been proven.  
Thus, I will call on scholars to reflect further on how they distinguish Buddhism from 




Having established these philosophical and disciplinary positions, a deeper 
investigation into their ethical projects will now follow (Chapter 4.3).  This will 
attempt to establish further historiographical claims as to their focus on traditional 
ethics and lineage at the price of their ultimate metaphysics.  But first we need to 




4.2 Their Common Denial of the Ultimacy of the Individuated Self 
 
Of all the topics under discussion, this is the key metaphysical similarity between 
Madhyamaka and Advaita.  Remember, the Madhyamaka School has said that there is 
no selfhood anywhere to be found.  Remember also that the Advaitin has said that all 
is but the one Self.   The former is saying that “you”, under ultimate analysis, are not 
to be found; the latter is saying that “you” are to be found, but only as “that” (i.e. tat 
tvam asi).  Hence, both are forced into the counter-intuitive position of denying that 
there is any individual unified self.  This further means that both must target the “I-
making” mechanism (ahaṃkāra) that leads most people to believe that they do in fact 
have a permanent centre, a lasting individuated essence.  We are never told that this 
sense of I-ness does not exist; rather, it is claimed to be a mistake, a mistake that 
blocks liberation. 
 
It is easy to see, in Buddhist terms, that in order to become selfless, one must drop the 
notion of self.  But it is less obvious, but equally crucial, that in Advaitic terms, in 
order to become Self (i.e. brahman) one must likewise drop the notion of self (jīva).  
When we grasp this truth, we are faced with the fact that the whole question of self in 
Western Philosophy has a whole different meaning to that in Indian Philosophy.  But 
equally, when a Buddhist realises that the Advaitin is also denying the individuated 
self, he is faced with rethinking what it means to distinguish Hinduism and Buddhism 
on the grounds of self and non-self.   
 
Murti (1980: 17) once noted that nowhere in the Pāli Canon does the Buddha deny 
brahman (as absolute); in fact, it goes unmentioned.  From this, I do not wish to 
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suggest that the Buddha left open the possibility of a Self, as some have suggested 
(see Harvey, 1995: 8).  Rather, I wish to suggest that the not-self of the Pāli Canon is a 
psychological thesis, a means of denying the inclination to claim possession of things, 
of clinging to the categories of “me” and “mine”.  In Harvey’s words, it is a “tool to 
cut off identifying with and clinging to things, including views” (in Keown & Prebish, 
2007: 570).  I then wish to show that Śaṅkara uses the denial of self in a very similar 
psychological fashion.   
 
Indeed, some scholars have hinted at this parallel before, but its implications have 
never been fully drawn out.  For example, Saddhatissa (1997) has noted that the ātman 
of the Upaniṣads, “signified the nonself rather than the self” (p133).  More recently, 
Ram-Prasad (2011: 230) writes: 
If by the use of the word ‘self’ we mean necessarily an individuated 
locus of consciousness idiosyncratically designated by the ‘I’, then the 
ātman of the Advaitins is not a self at all.  
 
For similar reasons, Grether (2007: 231) has called on scholars to simply stop 
translating ātman as “self”.  Unfortunately, we have yet to find a more suitable word, 
but that does not mean we cannot see the problem.  Clearly, along with the 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, both Śaṅkara and the Buddha are saying “not this, not this” 
(neti neti) or, as Harvey puts it, “this, this, this … is not Self” (in Keown & Prebish, 
2007: 571).  The V.C. states that “The body, consisting of arms, legs, etc. cannot be 
the Self” (pāṇipādādimān deho nātmā) (156).  Śāntideva offers a similar meditation 
(BCA. 9.78-87), beginning with “The body is not the feet, not the calves, not the 
thighs, and the body is not the hips” (kāyo na pādau na jaṅghā norū kāyaḥ kaṭir na 
ca).  The only thing these texts disagree on is what is left at the end of the process.  
Śaṅkara’s Advaita will insist that we are left with brahman, an absolute ground, a 
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singular Self.   The Buddha refused to speculate, and modern scholars are left to 
debate his silence (see Collins, 1982; Harvey, 1995; and Pérez-Remón, 1980).   
 
On the other hand, Śāntideva categorically denies the ultimate ground of the universe.  
He therefore denies both the self (writ small) and the Self (writ large).  The so-called 
ultimate Self is dismissed as “imagined” (kalpitam) (BCA. 6.27).  And even if it did 
exist conventionally, it would be dependent on something other (para-vaśaṃ) (6.31), 
and thus ultimately non-existent.  As for the individuated self, he writes: 
upadravā ye ca bhavanti loke yāvanti duḥkhāni bhayāni caiva     | 
sarvāṇi tāny ātma parigraheṇa tat kiṃ mamānena parigraheṇa     || 
 
All the misfortunes in the world, the hardships and the fears, many as 
there are; they all result from clinging to this ‘self’.  So for what is this 
clinging of mine? (BCA. 8.134) 
 
These are strong words indeed, attacking not so much the Brahmanical Self, but the 
“more deeply entrenched conception of the self” (MacKenzie, 2011: 241).  
Nevertheless, Śāntideva insists on acting towards the world as if it were inhabited by 
multiple selves.  This creates problems for a purely psychological interpretation of 
selfhood.  As stated above, there is definitely a certain advantage to be gained in 
taking Buddhism to be essentially psychologically driven; however, the Mādhyamikas 
tend to see anātman in philosophical terms.  Even if Garfield (1995) is right that the 
MMK of Nāgārjuna is “aimed primarily against philosophy” (p88), the Mādhyamikas 
have certainly offered a lot of philosophising in its defence! 
 
In the case of Śāntideva, I will attempt to show that he adopts both a psychological 
deconstruction and a philosophical deconstruction.  This lines up with de Silva’s 
(2000: 2) claim that the Buddha’s psychological analysis was “interlocked” with the 
philosophical facets of his doctrine.  Thus, in the BCA, we find such psychological 
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language as: “the body is not the feet” (9.78) and “the equality of self and other” 
(8.90) and the accepting of another’s body as ‘myself’ (8.112).  Here we can agree 
with Pickering (1997: 160) when he suggests that the Buddhist analysis of self lies 
somewhere between the “highly personalised” analysis of suffering and the 
“depersonalised” analysis of impermanence.  However, we also find Śāntideva using 
more philosophical language, such as: this “bundle devoid of self” (nirātmake kalāpa) 
(9.101), along with his metaphysical critique of the “imagined” (kalpitam) and 
“inactive” (akriyaḥ) ‘Self’ (6.27-30).  In this sense, the Mādhyamikas go one step 
further into the metaphysics of self than does early Buddhism.  As suggested by 
Hayes, post-Nāgārjuna, anātman becomes a “thoroughgoing metaphysical doctrine” 
(in Keown & Prebish, 2007: 29); there is literally “no self” to be found.   
 
Thus, anātman may rightly be translated as “not-self” or as “no-self” depending on 
whether it is a psychological or a philosophical claim.  So Harvey’s (1995: 7) 
argument about whether anātman is to be translated as “no-self” or “not-self”, at least 
within the Sanskritic context, is largely irrelevant, because neither of these positions is 
held with any consistency.  Furthermore, if Harvey is correct in claiming that the 
anātman doctrine should not generate the view, “there is no Self” (in Keown & 
Prebish, 2007: 570), then perhaps the Madhyamaka (including Śāntideva) are at fault.  
In no uncertain terms, the Compendium states that, ultimately speaking, there is no 
individuated self (ātmā/jīva) or essential person (pudgala) or independent being 
(sattva) (Ś.S. 172).  Moreover, the BCA not only claims that ultimately there is no self, 
but adds “I” (aham) and “body” (kāya) to the list of negations (9.56 & 9.83).132   
 
                                               




On the other hand, Śāntideva would certainly agree with Harvey that this view of no-
self “should not be clung to” (Keown & Prebish, 2007: 570).  For, according to the 
Madhyamaka, neither of the Two Truths exists ultimately.  So while Śāntideva (BCA. 
9.53) speaks of the validity of the doctrine of emptiness, he also notes that: 
tasmād bhāvo mṛṣā yo hi tasyābhāvaḥ sphuṭaṃ mṛṣā 
 
For, if the being of an entity is deceptive, clearly its non-being 
[i.e. emptiness] is equally deceptive (BCA. 9.139b).   
 
So we learn that, in line with Nāgārjuna’s “emptiness is the relinquishing of all views” 
(śūnyatā sarva dṛṣṭīnāṃ ... niḥsaraṇaṃ) (MMK. 13.8), Śāntideva teaches that even 
‘emptiness’ is empty of existence.  He sums up his understanding of the Madhyamaka 
position thus: 
śūnyatā vāsanādhānādd hīyate bhāva vāsanā     | 
kiṃcin nāstīti cābhyāsatsāpi paścāt prahīyate    || 
 
The influence of phenomena is removed by employing the influence 
of emptiness.  And even that emptiness is later eradicated by bringing 
to mind that “nothing [truly] exists” (BCA. 9.32) .133 
 
Nevertheless, when Śāntideva reinstates the world as inhabited by multiple selves, he 
does it from a volitional, rather than a metaphysical, standpoint.  To be sure, his 
metaphysics could not logically maintain such a reconstruction, either ontologically or 
motivationally, for he even denies that duḥkha ultimately exists (BCA. 9.88ff).   In 
other words, in the Madhyamaka context, we need to approach selfhood from a 
different direction depending on whether it is being philosophically/psychologically 
deconstructed or voluntarily/affectively reconstructed.   
 
                                               
133 Emptiness is like the soapy water we use to wash the dirt off our hands.  But we must still wipe off 




Summarising Metzinger’s work (in the Western contemporary philosophy of self); 
Ram-Prasad (2011: 224) notes that, it may well be impossible to both preserve a sense 
of “real self” and become convinced that intuitively there is “no such self”.  However, 
one can certainly convince oneself into accepting the delusion that others have a real 
(to them) self, to voluntarily reconstruct the “other” for ethical purposes.  Deluded 
beings continue to live in the conventional, and so the conventional world exists for 
them.  As Śāntideva puts it, “In fact, the conventional does exist from the other’s 
perspective” (atha sāpy anya saṃvṛtyā) (BCA. 9.106b).  As such, the “self-ascription 
of experience” (Ram-Prasad, 2011: 224) is from the point of view of the other, and the 
agent need not fully ascribe to it.  Therefore, ethics are more fundamental to Śāntideva 
than teachings about emptiness.    
 
Naturally, one might assume that it takes an act of a ‘concrete’ self to reconstruct the 
social world.  However, we can imagine the impetus of this reconstruction deriving its 
force from the Bodhisattva Vow.  By that I mean that the Vow is taken by one cluster 
of mental processes, while another cluster of mental processes (deeply affected by that 
Vow) is now causing the current reconstruction.  In Śāntideva’s terminology (BCA. 
9.117), it is due to the power of the preceding causes (pūrva hetu prabhāvataḥ).  The 
repeated reviewing of the Vow by a given continuum (saṃtāna) creates a certain mind 
set, a mind-of-compassion (dayā-cittaṃ) or concern (rakṣā-cittaṃ) (BCA. 8.110), 
which constantly seeks the opportunity to act for the benefit of others.  So while 
Garfield (2002) may have a point in claiming that “We act compassionately ... 
precisely when we act not from duty” (p192), my contention here is that the 
bodhisattva takes it as a ‘duty’ to become and thus be compassionate.  That is, the 
duty is surely of a different order than that which Garfield has in mind.  It is this 
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compassion-as-duty which imposes the reconstruction of the world and the will to 
embodied activity: 
evaṃ bhāvita saṃtānāḥ para duḥkha sama priyāḥ    | 
avīcim avagāhante haṃsāḥ padma vanaṃ yathā     || 
 
Those whose continuum is so developed, for whom the suffering of 
others is as dear to them [as their own], plunge into hell like swans 
into a lotus lake (BCA. 8.107). 
 
What I wish to highlight here is the use of the phrase “bhāvita saṃtāna” (developed 
continuum/stream), which demonstrates how Śāntideva wishes to avoid the notion of a 
bodhisattva as a substantial self.  This may be contrasted with the Pāli phrase “bhāvit 
atto” found in the Itivuttaka (Khuddaka Nikāya), which Harvey translates as “one of 
developed self” (in Keown & Prebish, 2007: 574).  In his choice of words, Śāntideva 
thus seems more anxious to show that there is no substantial self or person who gets 
developed; there is just development.  Even in the face of the notion of rebirth, he will 
ask, “Why should it be that a being counts as ultimately existing simply on account of 
its long-lasting continuum?” (dīrgha saṃtāna mātreṇa kathaṃ sattvo ‘sti satyataḥ) 
(BCA. 9.10b).  Long-lasting is still impermanent, and an impermanent ‘thing’ cannot 
be an ultimate existent.   
 
It is also interesting how Śāntideva uses the term haṃsāḥ (swans) to describe the 
actions of the bodhisattva, with Śaṅkara calling his monks “parama-haṃsāḥ” (U.S. 
Prose, 1.2), literally “supreme-swans”. 134   Of much greater interest, at least 
metaphysically, the person having developed such a citta is referred to in the Pāli 
Canon as a “mahāttā”, literally “great self” (A.N. i.249).135   Harvey has distinguished 
                                               
134 For the origin and prevalence of the term haṃsa, see Olson (1997: 19-22).  For the classification of 
renouncers in the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads, see Olivelle (1992: 98-100).  For example, the Āśrama 
Upaniṣad (4th century) places the parama-haṃsa at the top of a list of four types of renouncer. 
 
135 Cf. the Bhagavad Gītā’s use of ’mahātmā’ (8.15). 
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this mahāttā from the illusory “permanent” or “substantial” self, calling it a 
strengthened form of “empirical self” (in Keown & Prebish, 2007: 573). In fact, 
Śāntideva also urges the bodhisattva to develop the “great-self of a Buddha” (buddha 
māhātmyaṃ) (Ś.S. 145) and to preach it (330).  Similarly, inner peace is spoken of as 
the “tranquillity of the great-self” (śama māhātmyaṃ) (119).  Śāntideva defines this in 
gnoseological terms, stating that it is “The capacity to produce the knowledge of 
reality as-it-is” (yathā bhūmata jñāna janana śaktiḥ) (ibid.).  But it would also seem to 
indicate a state of virtue with a predisposition to compassion.  Śāntideva (ibid.) writes 
that, “the bodhisattva who thus sees reality as-it-is feels a profound compassion for all 
beings” (yathā bhūmata darśino bodhisattasya sattveṣu mahā-karuṇā pravartate).  
Likewise, such bodhisattvas are later described as “great men” (mahā puruṣaṇām) 
who “with the Buddha’s virtues, they work for the good of the world” (buddha 
guṇebhi karonti jagārtham) (330).  As such, in denying their small self, both the Pāli 
Canon’s arhats and the Mahāyāna’s bodhisattvas are said to become great or 
immeasurable, selfless selves.  Nevertheless, in the BCA, Śāntideva makes a conscious 
effort to remain true to the metaphysics of person-as-continuum, “great” though that 
continuum may be. 
 
For Śaṅkara, there is only one Supreme Self (paramātman), and that is brahman.  It is 
unique, “only one without a second” (ekam evādvitīyam) (Ch.U.Bh. VI.ii.1). Thus, 
Kasulis’ (2005: 298) translation of ānatman as “no-I” hardly helps in distinguishing 
Buddhism from Hinduism, for Śaṅkara also denies the ultimacy of the “I” (aham).  






Let us begin with a summary quote from Alston (2004, Vol.3: v): 
Considered as a finite conscious being, the soul, for Śaṅkara, belongs 
to the realm of appearance.  In its true nature, it is the infinite non-dual 
Consciousness that is the sole reality underlying all appearance.  
 
This line of thought is to be found throughout Śaṅkara’s work and we could quote 
endless passages on this central subject of non-duality.  Let us focus then on his 
central work, the Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya and on how this position feeds into his ethical 
project.  First of all, Śaṅkara (B.S.Bh. II.iii.18) tells us that brahman, merely “appears 
to exist as an individuated self due to its association with limiting adjuncts” (upādhi 
saṃparkāj jīva bhāvenāvatiṣṭate).  In other words, it is purely due to our physical and 
mental make-up that we imagine there to be individuation of the Self (see Chapter 1).  
Consciousness is mistakenly taken to be local by the mind (manas), or intellect 
(buddhi), and thus one’s own fluctuating desires, joys and sorrows (which are mind-
created) are mistakenly associated with consciousness, when in fact consciousness is 
immutable (avikṛta).  It is this error that causes transmigration.  Śaṅkara (II.iii.29) tells 
us that “without these modes of intellect, there can be no transmigration of the pure 
Self” (nahi buddher guṇair vinā kevalasyātmanaḥ saṃsāritvam asti).  Here then lies 
the key to liberation: stop functioning through the limited intellect.  And we might 
recall that Śāntideva (BCA. 9.2b) also proclaimed that the intellect (buddhi) is 
incapable of understanding reality, for it is grounded in the conventional.   
 
Of greater interest here is that it must now follow that the apparent locus of individual 
agency and experience must be an illusion caused by this intellect.  Śaṅkara continues: 
buddy upādhi dharmādyāsa nimittaṃ hi kartṛtva bhoktṛtvādi 
lakṣyaṇaṃ saṃsāritvaṃ akartur abhoktuś cāsaṃsāriṇo nitya 
muktasya satātmanaḥ 
 
Though the Self is not an agent or an experiencer, and though it never 
itself transmigrates and is eternally free; it takes on the state of being 
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an agent and an experiencer due to the superimposed nature of the 
intellect as adjunct (B.S.Bh. II.iii.29). 
 
This gives Śaṅkara the platform he requires in order to make a number of important 
claims.  He can claim that (provisionally) there is an agent, and as such, whilst in and 
of this world, one has a responsibility to act in accordance with traditional Law 
(Dharma).  From here, it can also be claimed that (ultimately) there is no such agent, 
and thus one can transcend this world of transmigration.  Using this Two-Truths 
strategy, Śaṅkara therefore concludes that: 
paramārthatas tu na jīvo nāma buddhy upādhi saṃbaṃdha parikalpita 
sva-rūpa vyatirekeṇāsti 
 
Ultimately speaking, there is no such distinctive thing as an individuated 
self apart from that imaginary appearance created under the influence of 
the intellect acting as limiting adjunct (B.S.Bh. II.iii.30). 
 
And turning briefly to a more ‘minor’ text, Śaṅkara writes: 
na tatra kartṛtvaṃ bhoktṛtvaṃ vā kriyā kāraka phalaṃ vāsti, 
advaitatvāt sarva bhāvānām    | 
 
There can be no agentship, no enjoyership, nor any ritual action, 
means, or result, where all is reduced to non-duality (P.U.Bh. 6.3). 
 
This truth opens up the possibility of a person who has been taught and understood the 
fallacy of the intellect and the truth of brahman (see Chapter 5.1), a person who can 
act outside the normal restrictions of agent-based morality.  This is the world of the 
brahma-vid or jīvan-mukta, to be examined in Chapter 6.  For now, let us concentrate 
on how and why Śaṅkara and Śāntideva both defend a traditional ethics.  While so 
focused, let us not lose sight of the fact, emphasised by Ricoeur (1994: 18), and 
recently echoed by Zahavi, that the “identity of the self is only fully revealed the 




4.3 Their Common Response to Tradition-based Conduct 
 
The person before you is not an ultimate being.  Their apparent status as an 
individuated self is an illusion.  Their personal sense of self is based on a cognitive 
error.  Your view of them as a role-playing individual within a given social structure is 
based upon a socially-constructed delusion. Society is a mere designation, an 
aggregation of persons who have no ultimacy.  Thus far, Śaṅkara and Śāntideva 
appear to be in full agreement.  Hence, tradition-based conduct, which takes social 
categories as given, would seemingly be swept away by an insight into the ultimate 
nature of being.  There can be no class, no caste system, no nation and no rightful 
kingships.  There can be no monks, no laity, no men and no women.  And yet, given 
all of this, which flows so naturally from their revisionary metaphysics; both will 
make a space for their traditions.  Not only that.  Both will insist on their traditions.  
This insistence on tradition has three major impacts on this thesis:   
 
1) It gives us a window through which we can see into their usage of the 
Two-Truths doctrine.  That is, it highlights how both philosophers stand 
on a doctrinal tight-rope, pointing upwards, away from the world, 
whilst looking downwards at the world, condoning their respective 
tradition’s values.   
 
2) It emphasizes the point that ethics are central to both schools of 
thought, and that the idea of a world without ethics is repugnant to both.  
Even in vowing to renounce the world, they cannot forget the world.  If 
the renouncer was “dead to the world” (Thapar, 1988: 287), the world 
was certainly not dead to these renouncers.  Renunciation, then “does 
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not involve ceasing to have any actual relationship with its members” 
(Dumont, 1980: 185).  Rather, it points to a reorientation of that 
relationship.  It is this reorientation we must examine. 
 
3) It sets limits on my thesis.  Whilst it would suit my purposes to imply 
that by denying the ultimacy of the individuated self, the Madhyamaka 
and the Advaita schools are thus in general agreement, and therefore 
any distinction between them collapses, the fact that their traditions still 
remain intact proves the contrary.  Also, Śāntideva’s rejection of the 
Vedas (BCA. 9.42) is reason enough for him to be classed by Hindus as 
non-orthodox (nāstika). In other words, even though their metaphysics 
on individual agency should lead to the collapse of the distinctions 
between their forms of Buddhism and Hinduism, in fact they do not, 
because both insist on maintaining that distinction at the provisional 
level.  The most we can say, then, is that once we accept that the 
individuated self is being denied on both sides, we need to re-assess 
how we distinguish the two religions, not whether we should 
distinguish them.   
 
There is no doubt that both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva will say that the person needs to be 
transcended for the sake of liberation.  This agent comes to the respective tradition as 
a socially constructed being; made up of class, caste, family and duty.  They have an 
expected mode of conduct.  Both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva will say that this expectation 
is provisional.  It may generally be claimed that, in India, “proper conduct has counted 
for more than ideological purity” (Olivelle, 1992: 12), but would a revisionary 
philosopher agree with this?  What is “proper conduct” for one who has seen through 
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our social realities?  Also, given that the Mahāyāna had introduced the notion of 
skilful means, and given that Śaṅkara was intent on creating a Brahmanical monastic 
order, what are the implications for the notion that, in India, “orthodoxy is less 
important than orthopraxy” (Gombrich, 1988: 112)? 
 
In reading their response to traditional texts, the question is perhaps this: how much of 
a role does knowledge play in deciding on the right way to act?  In other words, who 
do the traditional rules apply to?  But there is also the more nagging question: why do 
these philosophers of non-individuation even care about the ethics of illusory 
individuals?  What is the place of provisional ethics?   
 
 Case 1: Śaṅkara 
 
As a champion of renunciation, Śaṅkara is faced in the Upaniṣads with the house-
holder’s claim to knowledge.  Likewise, he had to answer for their desire for women.  
I have argued that Śaṅkara can allow for this “lapse” in character by admitting that a 
knower may flicker between brahman-consciousness and habitual consciousness.   
His thesis is thus a practical one, based on the concept of latent tendencies (saṃskarā).   
 
Even though Śaṅkara speaks of the knower’s actions as non-actions; the notion that 
the knower was having sex without really having sex, or the notion that he was having 
sex purely for the sake of the other, did not occur to Śaṅkara.  Or if it did, he rejected 
it.  Unlike Śāntideva, Śaṅkara has no skill-in-means thesis to offer.  His ethical 
evaluation of the Upaniṣads is thus based on levels of knowledge and the lingering 
strength of past tendencies.  Just as Śāntideva was faced with late tradition texts and 
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re-evaluations of renunciation, so was Śaṅkara.  Written some centuries after the first 
Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad Gītā’s emphasis on a life of selfless action (i.e. karma-yoga) 
arguably confronts Śaṅkara-the-exegete with his greatest challenge.  How Śaṅkara 
reacts to this text is of supreme interest.   
 
Śaṅkara saw himself as a renouncer.  However, if we take this as our starting point, 
assuming that renunciation is the only option in Advaita, we run the risk of 
misunderstanding his position on conduct, i.e. Dharma.  So rather than start with 
Śaṅkara-the-renouncer, we might start with a hypothetical ideal type which Śaṅkara 
would have respected.  That is, we are searching to privilege the male, Brahmin, who 
lives a celibate life with his mind fixed on attaining the highest good, brahman-
knowledge.  This hypothetical ideal will help us to unravel the apparent contradictions 
in his works.  We need not take Śaṅkara himself as being a brahman-knower, merely 
as one advocating its attainment.  But we should also keep in mind that the attainment 
of knowledge is a gradual affair, and so other provisional options remain. 
 
With regard to literary methodology, we need to take account of all of Śaṅkara’s 
authentic works.  Nevertheless, it will bear fruit if we focus here on his commentary 
on the classic text on Hindu Dharma, the Bhagavad Gītā.  The reason for this choice 
is five-fold: 1) it is here where Śaṅkara faces his strongest exegetical challenge, 2) it is 
steeped in ethical language, 3) it presents an ethics within what many Indians see as 
“the illusory human drama” (Tripurari, 2002: 207), 4) it is open to multiple 
interpretations
136
, some of which challenge Śaṅkara’s own project, and 5) the story is 
a familiar one. 
                                               





Theodor (2010: 21-22) has also suggested that Vedānta would be “impoverished” 
without the Gītā.  At the provisional level of discourse, this is certainly true.  And it 
may also be true to say that our understanding of Śaṅkara would likewise be 
impoverished if we ignored his views on the ethics of the Gītā.   
 
The scene we have in mind finds the great warrior, Arjuna, overcome by compassion 
(kṛpayā), caught between his caste-bound duty to fight (kṣatriya-dharma), his duty to 
his family (kula-dharma) and the desire to flee the war and renounce.  What follows 
this moral dilemma is an “ethical and metaphysical answer to the question of 
renunciation” (Marcaurelle, 2000: 4).  We all know the story.  I request that, in 
addition to the usual battle scene, simply imagine Śaṅkara, the champion of 
renunciation, there alongside Kṛṣṇa.  Arjuna is begging them for counsel.  Now what 
would be the expected advice?  We all know Kṛṣṇa advises Arjuna to fight: 
tasmād asaktaḥ satataṃ kāryaṃ karma samācara     | 
asakto hy ācaran karma param āpnoti pūruṣaḥ     || 
 
Therefore, without attachment, always perform the obligatory duty, 
for by performing one’s duty without attachment, a person attains the 
Highest (Bh.G. 3.19). 
 
 
Renunciation then, for Kṛṣṇa, is not about giving up action and going off to find God 
in the forest.  Rather, Kṛṣṇa “redefines renunciation” (Davis, 2005: 171).  Kṛṣṇa 
reserves his highest praise, not for the renouncer who withdraws and abstains from 
worldly action, the type of renouncer we typically associate with Śaṅkara’s Advaita, 
but for the new type of “renouncer” who continues to fulfil his traditional role in 
society.  Renunciation, then, is karma yoga itself, which involves, not the renunciation 
of all action, but only the renunciation of the fruit of action.  Kṛṣṇa becomes the “only 
place for renunciation and attachment” (Malinar, 2007: 189).  Renunciation is thus 
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“rendered compatible with activism” (Perrett, 1998: 16), making it compatible with 
being a householder.   
 
This would all appear to come as a major challenge to Śaṅkara.  His ideal type, the 
ascetic (yatiḥ), is indeed one that gives up all ritual action, and is thus contrasted with 
the “man of action” (karmī) (Bh.G.Bh. 14.26).  According to Śaṅkara, only the former 
is worthy of the “highest” (paramām).  Thus Śaṅkara needs to find a way of 
interpreting the text that will allow him to maintain that the “highest” is the sole right 
of the ascetic renouncer, and that Arjuna-as-warrior is not qualified for it.   
 
One might assume that Śaṅkara would object to the life of the warrior as being 
“antithetical to the renunciatory ideal of nonviolence” (Johnson, 2004: xiii), and that 
he might beg Arjuna to renounce war.
137
  Along with Gandhi (2009), we might expect 
Śaṅkara to claim that, “perfect renunciation is impossible without perfect observation 
of ahimsa” (p. xxiv).  But this is not the route he takes.  If this “existential tension is 
the axial core of the Gītā” (Schweig, in Rosen, 2002: viii), it bypasses Śaṅkara. One 
might also expect a rejection of social norms and values, but there is no such 
rejection.  Rather than making overtly moral or social judgements of the situation, 
Śaṅkara makes a gnoseological one.      
 
Before we consider Śaṅkara’s response, let us zoom in on the language of the above 
verse (Bh.G. 3.19).  It is most significant that this verse begins with the word 
‘tasmād’ (Therefore).  If we look back at the previous verse(s), we might expect to 
                                               
137 For a discussion of violence (hiṃsā) and non-violence (ahiṃsā) in the Gītā, see Rosen (2002) and 
Kuznetsova (2007: 43ff). 
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find a reason why Arjuna should not renounce his kṣatriya-dharma.  However, it is 
not (explicitly) there.  The text states: 
yas tvātma ratir eva syād ātma tṛptaś ca mānavaḥ    | 
ātmany eva ca saṃtuṣṭas tasya kāryaṃ na vidyate     || 
naiva tasya kṛtenārtho nākṛteneha kaścana     | 
na cāsya sarva bhūteṣu kaścid artha vyapāśrayaḥ     ||  
 
But for a man who rejoices in the Self, is satisfied with the Self, and is 
content only in the Self, there is no duty to perform.  For him, there is 
no concern with performance or non-performance of action in this 
world, and he has no kind of dependence at all on any objectives of 
beings (Bh.G. 3.17-18). 
 
In fact, not only do these verses not explicitly supply the reason we were expecting, 
but they seem to be saying the complete opposite!  These two verses interrupt the 
argument somewhat, highlighting the tension between Dharma and mokṣa.  Zaehner 
(1973) even suggests that we might regard these two verses as a “later interpolation” 
(p169), but surely one needs to make such claims with care.  Perhaps Davis (2005) 
could be accused of ignoring these verses when he stated that “Renunciation of 
worldly actions”, according to Kṛṣṇa, was “not a legitimate option” (p174).  However, 
the issue may come down to how we interpret the “Therefore” of the verse 3.19.  
What Kṛṣṇa might be saying is this: “You, Arjuna, have now been told, not whether 
to fight or not fight, but how to fight.  That is, fight, not with a goal in mind, not with 
a personal concept of the fruit, not even with a notion of the objectives of your family, 
but fight selflessly”.  And to fight “selflessly” is to fight with no concept of 
individuality (ahaṃkāra), but with a concept of one “Self”, who is verily the Lord 
Kṛṣṇa.   On this interpretation, Davis appears correct. 
 
However, Śaṅkara does not see it this way.  For him, the “Therefore” has a totally 
different meaning.  Arjuna is not being told how to renounce, but not to renounce.  He 
is being told that he is not ready for total renunciation.  To make this point, Śaṅkara 
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needs to insert the explicit reason which he feels Kṛṣṇa made implicitly.  So just 
before verse 3.19, Śaṅkara (Bh.G.Bh. 3.18) inserts: “You [Arjuna] are not established 
in this perfect realisation” (na tvam etasmin … samyag darśane vartase).138  In other 
words, the interpretation he gives of Kṛṣṇa’s advice is something like: “If you, 
Arjuna, were established in the Self, then renunciation would indeed be the most 
reasonable option open to you, but you are not so established.  Therefore, go and 
fight”.  That is, Śaṅkara wants to say that renunciation is for those who have already 
renounced internally and are tired of cyclic existence (Bh.G.Bh. 15, intro).  Arjuna 
has not renounced in his heart; he is “not trying to bring about the end of the sequence 
of lives” (Brodbeck, in Mascaró, 2003: xv).  Nor has he seen through the delusion of 
his own agency.  This interpretation seems consistent with the Gītā (18.59), where 
Kṛṣṇa accuses Arjuna of acting out of egoism (ahaṃkāra).  That is, “Arjuna measures 
the legitimacy of action according to what it means to him” (Malinar, 2007: 72).  As 
we have already discussed in Chapter 3.2, this is seen as a vice by Kṛṣṇa, one which 
gets in the way of right knowledge.   
 
As also noted earlier, Śaṅkara links ahaṃkāra to basic ignorance (Bh.G.Bh. 7.4).  As 
such, one with ahaṃkāra could not be established in brahman.  Śaṅkara had already 
hinted at such a conclusion in an earlier verse: 
“kuru karmaiva tasmāt tvam” iti ca jñāna niṣṭhāsaṃbhavam 
arjunasya avadhāraṇena darśayiṣyati 
 
[By his statement] “Therefore139, undertake action”, [the Lord] will 
show how Arjuna is to be excluded from steadfastness in knowledge 
(Bh.G.Bh. 3, intro). 
 
                                               
138 There is no explicit statement in the Gītā that Arjuna is enlightened (Theodor, 2010: 45), yet the 
Dvaitin, Madhva, contra Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, interpreted it that way (Chari, 2005: 4).  Yet it seems 
clear that Arjuna was “under the delusion that the body itself is the self” (p20). 
 
139 Gambhīrānanda (trans., p131) rightly notes that this verse comes from the Gītā 4.15, but the logic of 




prak ātma-jñāna niṣṭhā yogyatā prāpteḥ tādarthyena karma-
yogānuṣṭānam adhikṛtena anātmajñena kartavyam 
 
Before one has acquired eligibility for steadfastness in the 
knowledge of the Self, it is the duty of one who does not know the 
Self, to undertake karma-yoga for that purpose (Bh.G.Bh.3.16). 
 
In other words, Śaṅkara seems to be saying that Arjuna would need to be enlightened 
before he could externally renounce.  In fact, he later states that an unenlightened 
person is incapable of totally renouncing (Bh.G.Bh. 18.48).  This agrees with the 
thesis that “Jñāna … goes hand in hand with Saṁnyāsa” (Tiwari, 1977: 10), and 
disagrees with the thesis that, “For the ideal kṣatriya, the sacrifice of battle becomes a 
form of total renunciation” (Rosen, 2002: 20).  For Śaṅkara, worldly action is always 
going to involve nescience, and the only true renunciation is the total renunciation of 
caste-based Dharma.  And for that, one needs to renounce one’s sense of “I”.  Action 
is said to be something “superimposed on the Self through ignorance” (ātmani 
avidyādhyāropitam) (Bh.G.Bh. 18.48), and so the call to duty is meant only for the 
“ignorant” (avidvāṃsaḥ) (18.66 & 3.25) and they should never relinquish it (18.48).  
Thus, Śaṅkara does not demand renunciation for everyone, but is selective, and 
prefers that those who are less than ready for renouncing the world continue to act in 
accordance with their Dharma. 
 
Now, while Arjuna may have been going through a “genuine dilemma” (Matilal, 
2007: 93), he also appears to be wavering between the larger Dharmic concern (loka-
saṃgraha) and egoistic concerns (Bh.G. 18.59).  Johnson’s (2004: 80) translation - 
“If, falling into such egoism ...” (yad ahaṃkāram āśritya) - truly brings this out.  In 
the Bṛ.U.Bh, Śaṅkara makes a number of concessions to the need for means other than 
knowledge (I.iv.7), and there speaks of the need to “mature one’s knowledge of the 
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Self” (ātma-jñāna paripāka) (IV.iv.7).  As knowledge of the Self must be continually 
re-established, outer renunciation is the most favourable lifestyle (III.v.1).  Therefore, 
in Arjuna’s case, one might expect Śaṅkara to recommend total renunciation.   
 
However, there is something else going on in Śaṅkara’s ethics.  The renouncer in the 
Bṛ.U. is also a Brahmin, whereas Arjuna is a Kṣatriya (warrior prince).140  Within the 
context of the Gītā’s ethics, it is therefore Arjuna’s duty to fight (Bh.G. 2.31), even if 
that duty is faulty (18.48).  In fact, it is part of his “own nature” (sva-bhāva) to fight 
(18.43), and it is futile to resist your “nature” (prakṛtiḥ) (18.59).141  But the notion of 
a caste-defining sva-bhāva seems to be in conflict with Śaṅkara’s non-dualism.142  In 
fact, Śaṅkara immediately follows his acceptance of the Gītā’s caste theory (Bh.G.Bh. 
2.11) with the remark that there is no multiplicity of selves (Bh.G.Bh. 2.12).
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Śaṅkara thus accepts the provisional ethics as presented herein, whist ultimately 
denying the multiplicity theory that underlies it.
144
  But elsewhere, Śaṅkara claims 
that one’s caste or one’s species is a result of past karma (B.S.Bh. II.i.34), which is 
beginningless (II.i.35-36), and nothing to do with Īśvara and/or ātman.  It is for this 
                                               
140
 It is interesting to note that both the Buddha and Śāntideva were of this class.  Nevertheless, whereas 
the renunciation of the ‘way of the warrior’ is usually attributed to Aśoka, the stories of the Buddha and 
Śāntideva tend to focus on their renunciation of royal power, pleasure and privilege. 
 
141 This should not be taken as a call to be “in harmony with nature” (see Malinar, 2007: 91).  Hence, 
Torwesten (1991) suggests that we read the Gītā as somewhere between the “Prussian adherence to 
duty” and the “Taoist wu-wei” (p98).  For a comparison with the ethics of Kant, see Mohanty (2007) 
and Matilal (2007). 
 
142 Note that the notion that one has an inherent duty to act in a certain way is a much stronger form of 
sva-bhāva than the one mentioned in Chapter 2, where Śaṅkara spoke of a person who “naturally has 
the notion of being an agent and an enjoyer” (kartṛ bhoktṛ sva-bhāva vijñānavataḥ) (Ch.U.Bh. Intro).  
On the notions of sva-dharma and sva-bhāva, see Olivelle (in Rosen, 2002: 99-116).  
 
143 See Zaehner (1973: 125). 
 
144 The Viśiṣṭādvaitin, Rāmānuja and the Dvaitin, Madhva both deny that the individuated jīva is one 
with paramātman; both seeing them as distinct real ontological entities (Chari, 2005: xxii).  
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reason also that Śāntideva (and Buddhism in general), whilst denying the ultimacy of 
Gods and selves, can maintain a karmic discourse which includes caste notions.  
 
We can summarise Śaṅkara’s position as: 1) Arjuna is not established in brahman-
consciousness, 2) Arjuna has not realised inner renunciation, 3) Arjuna is a warrior by 
caste, and 4) Arjuna must act as a warrior so long as he has failed to internally 
renounce his sense of “I”.   
 
Śaṅkara thus distinguishes two types of renunciation.  First, there is the (Gītā’s) 
renunciation of the karma-yogī, which incorporates “dedication to the Lord without 
hope of results [for oneself]” (īśvara samarpita rūpeṇa phala nirapekṣeṇa) (Bh.G.Bh. 
5.6).  For Śaṅkara, this is renunciation in a “secondary” (guṇavṛtti) or “figurative” 
(gauṇa) sense (Bh.G.Bh. 6.1).  Then, there is the “ultimate renunciation” (saṃnyāsa 
pāramārthikaḥ) for those “steadfast in the knowledge of the Supreme Self” 
(paramātma jñāna niṣṭhā) (Bh.G.Bh. 5.6).  According to Śaṅkara, Arjuna is qualified 
for the former, but not for the latter. 
 
The extension of this is that: 1) traditional ethics have their place for those who have 
not realised brahman as self, 2) the caste system supports such provisional ethics, and 
3) this system cannot be violated by any individual unless that so-called individual 
has realised that he has no ultimate individuality.   
 
And we can further judge that such an individual would be quite exceptional.  This is 
the gist of Śaṅkara’s insistence on provisional ethics.  In the Bṛ.U.Bh, he writes: 
na ca nāma-rūpa vyavahāra kāle tu avivekināṃ kriyā kāraka phalādi 




Nor do we deny the validity, for those without discriminating 
knowledge, of actions with their factors and results while the relative 
world of name and form exists (III.v.1) 
 
Again, in his B.S.Bh: 
nahyayaṃ sarva pramāṇa prasiddhe loka vyavahāre anyat tattvam 
anādhi gamya śakyate ‘pahrotum apavādābhāve utsarga prasiddheḥ 
 
For worldly behaviour, conforming as it does to all right means of valid 
knowledge, can only be denied when a different eternal order of reality 
is attained, such an exception aside, tradition should prevail (II.ii.31). 
 
Individual doubt about self and ethical conduct is thus to be resolved through the 
denial of one’s individuality and the realisation of a higher truth.  In one interpretation 
of the Gītā, this amounts to selflessly acting for the sake of God, becoming his 
“instrument”.  Where Olivelle (1992) sees the Upaniṣads as considering individuals as 
“complete in themselves” (p42); in the Gītā, these so-called individuals are given a 
mere role in this new socio-cosmic theology.  Their completeness ultimately lies in 
their true nature as ātman, but conventionally speaking, their completeness lies in 
their fulfilment of their duty to the Lord.  That is, “Kṛṣṇa proposes to eliminate the 
phenomenal person by making ... his goal impersonal” (Kuznetsova, 2007: 111).  
Arjuna is merely granted a “brief indulgence in individualism” (Olivelle, 2002: 115) 
before returning to his warrior nature.   
 
In Śaṅkara’s interpretation, the Gītā is consistent with the Upaniṣads in calling for the 
person to see the delusion of individuality (ahaṃkāra) and hence renounce society.  In 
this sense, we might say that one “still has a fair amount of free will” (Theodor, 2010: 
11).  Yet, those who do not see through this delusion are provisionally advised to 
continue to act as if they were an agent within a Dharmic social structure.  They are in 
fact compelled to act.  For Śaṅkara, this is how it ought to be.  That is, Śaṅkara 
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wanted the “vedic presumptions of varṇa and āśrama to be the foundation of lay life” 
(Tambiah, 1988: 318).  Ultimately speaking, Kṛṣṇa is the personification of brahman, 
announcing his awareness of his own non-dual consciousness, and as such, for 
Śaṅkara, he is the great teacher of Advaita metaphysics.  Provisionally, Kṛṣṇa stands 
as a personal God, to whom one devotes one’s actions, thus rendering them dependent 
on his Being.  At this provisional level, Śaṅkara might accept that Kṛṣṇa is in 
relationship with embodied selves.  This exclusive devotion is thought to weaken 
one’s attachment to selfish concerns.  It is an act of purification.  However, for 
Śaṅkara, such devotion could only serve as a step towards seeing the non-dual nature 
of brahman-consciousness and realising that worldly action is merely instrumental: 
kaṣāya pattiḥ karmāṇi jñānaṃ tu paramā gatiḥ   |  kaṣāye karmabhiḥ 
pakve tato jñānaṃ pravartate   || 
 
Impurities are removed by dutiful actions, while knowledge is the 
supreme movement.  When actions have burnt up impurities, 
knowledge emerges (B.S.Bh. III.iv.26).  
 
Provisional reality is therefore a necessary ‘playing ground’ for the vast majority of 
beings and ideally acts as a stepping stone to the realisation of the ultimate.  Within 
this provisional reality, Śaṅkara simply assumes the validity of the Hindu caste 
system.  Although such social categories have no meaning in ultimate terms, Arjuna is 
unquestionably treated as a Kṣatriya.  Beyond the gnoseological response he gives in 
the Gītā, Śaṅkara is unwilling to allow for a non-Brahmin to (externally) renounce, 
for only the male Brahmin is to be released from duty.  This is clearly stated in the 
Bṛ.U.Bh (IV.v.15) where both warriors and merchants are excluded from the path of 
the wandering mendicant.  Thus, being a Kṣatriya, “Arjuna is not qualified for 
steadfastness in Knowledge through monasticism in the primary sense” 




Again, in his non-commentarial work, Śaṅkara’s exclusions are made clear, where the 
pupil is defined as a pure Brahmin.  Śaṅkara writes: 
 tad idaṃ mokṣa sādhanaṃ jñānaṃ sādhana sādhyād anityāt sarvasmād 
viraktāya tyakta putra vitta lokaiṣaṇāya pratipanna paramahaṃsa 
pārivrājyāya śamadama dayādi yuktāya śāstra prasiddha śiṣya guṇa 
sampannāya śucaye brāhmaṇāya vidhivad upasannāya śiṣyāya jāti 
karma vṛtta vidyābhijanaiḥ parīkṣitāya brūyāt punaḥ punaḥ yāvad 
grahaṇaṃ dṛḍhībhavati     || 
 
The means to liberation is knowledge.  It should be repeatedly 
explained to the pupil until firmly grasped, to one who is indifferent to 
everything transitory, achievable through means, and who has no desire 
for sons, wealth, this world or the next, who has adopted the way of the 
highest ascetics, who is endowed with tranquillity, self-control, 
compassion, etc., possessed of the qualities of a pupil, well-known from 
the scriptures, if he is a pure Brahmin, who approaches the teacher in 
the prescribed manner, and if his birth, deeds, conduct, knowledge and 
family have been examined (U.S. Prose, 1.2).   
 
There is a clear social tension here.  For Śaṅkara, the Brahmin male is unique in his 
(albeit temporary) claim to individuality, and thus only he may follow his own will in 
renouncing worldly activities which include so-called ritual and reproductive duties.  
Mohanty’s (1997b) (mis)reading of Dumont that, it is only those who have achieved 
mokṣa who can be classed as a “true individual” (p299), seems faulty on three 
accounts: 1) the decision to renounce appears the more likely candidate for the first 
true act of individual will, 2) when one achieves mokṣa (especially from an Advaitin 
view-point) one’s so-called ‘individuality’ is seen through, as indeed Mohanty later 
notes (p301), and 3) Dumont (1980: 274) actually speaks of the renouncer’s 
discomfort with his newly-discovered individuality, an individuality he tries to 
transcend (p276).
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  It is thus the saṃnyāsin that Dumont has in mind.  And it is this 
decision to renounce duty (with non-individuality in mind) that Śaṅkara denies 
                                               
145 Of course, Dumont’s (1980: 64) distinction between theory and practice is relevant here, but I would 
argue that even here, the actual decision to renounce is an act of individuality, whereas the mukta 




Arjuna.  It does not, however, follow from this that Śaṅkara has “restricted 
enlightenment and even the aspiration to enlightenment to Brahmins”, as Olivelle 
(1993: 197) claims.  For, as we have seen in the case of Arjuna, one can still remain 
on the path of karma-yoga, with the intention of “purifying the mind” (sattva śuddhi) 
and “acquiring knowledge” (jñāna prāpti); only later, “renouncing all ritual action”  
(sarva karma saṃnyāsa), and aspiring towards “steadfastness in knowledge” (jñāna 
niṣṭhā) (Bh.G.Bh. 5.12).146   
 
Even where Śaṅkara claims that “knowledge of the Self” (ātma-jñāna) is “exclusively 
the cause of the highest good” (kevalasya niḥśreyasa hetutvam), and that, 
“steadfastness in knowledge combined with [ritual] action is illogical” (na jñāna 
niṣṭhā karma sahitā upapadyate) (Bh.G.Bh. 18.66); he goes on to say the Vedic 
injunctions have relative validity in that they “create the tendency of movement 
towards the indwelling Self” (pratyag ātmābhimukhyena pravṛtty utpādanārthatvāt) 
(ibid.).  That is, “Actions and attitudes contribute in changing the quality of the 
subject’s epistemic grasp” (Ram-Prasad, 2007: 114).  Hence, Śaṅkara shows himself 
to be one of those renouncers who “does not deny the religion of the man-in-the-
world” (Dumont, 1980: 275).  The worst we can say of Śaṅkara, then, is that he 
“presupposes a certain state of purification as a prerequisite” (Taber, 1983: 55) for 
receiving and achieving brahman-knowledge.  Whether this can be achieved in this 
life is an open question, but it is certainly open to future incarnations (see Chapter 7).  
So the question of whether Śaṅkara advocated the “liberation of all” (see Mohanty, 
1997b: 301) is an open one. 
 
                                               
146 This is confirmed in the V.C. (11).   
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In what way, then, does Śaṅkara deviate from tradition-based ethics?  Action, for 
Śaṅkara, is not only secondary to knowledge, but can get in its way.  He therefore 
reads Kṛṣṇa’s call to “Abandon all duties” (sarva dharmān parityajya) as a call to 
total renunciation of all actions (Bh.G.Bh. 18.66).  And for sure, if there is one verse 
in the Gītā that favours such a renunciatory interpretation, it is this one, even though it 
would “negate the entire preceding teaching” (Kuznetsova, 2007: 146).  In the 
Upadeśa Sāhasrī, this renunciation of all actions (tyakta sarva karma sādhana) is a 
sign of a brahma-vid (Prose, 1.6).  For Śaṅkara, a renouncer is only a renouncer if he 
focuses all his attention on knowing brahman, if he renounces all sense of doership; 
that is, if he is the highest form of renouncer, the so-called parama-haṃsa.  And, 
according to Śaṅkara, it is only the parama-haṃsa who can achieve knowledge of 
brahman (Ch.U.Bh. VIII.xii.1).   
 
Renunciation, then, is not an end in itself.  It is not simply renunciation from, but 
renunciation to, that matters.  Renunciation, for Arjuna, would simply have been a 
way of refusing to deal with the situation, and Śaṅkara would no doubt agree with 
Olivelle (1992) that a “renouncer who does not pursue knowledge is a false 
renouncer” (p79).  This is confirmed by Deutsch (1973), who interprets Śaṅkara’s 
fourth pre-requisite for the search of brahman (B.S.Bh. I.i.1), that of ‘mumukṣutva’, 
as a “positive longing for freedom and wisdom” (p105).147  It thus seems reasonable 
to believe that Śaṅkara senses that Arjuna did not have the pursuit of knowledge as 
his motivation for renunciation.   
 
                                               
147 The four prerequisites are: 1) discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, 2) dispassion 




Needless to say, Śaṅkara’s principal aim is not to exclude Arjuna from qualification, 
but to send a louder message, that only total renunciation of this life is sufficient for 
true liberation.  Gambhīrānanda (1984: 739), as a modern Advaitin, thus interprets the 
Gītā verse 18.66 as generally advocating monasticism, even though Arjuna would 
himself be excluded by his caste.  In other words, the Gītā’s words are not necessarily 
meant for Arjuna’s ears. 148   But this relies on a translation of ‘saṃnyāsena’ as 
“through monasticism”, the validity of which is questionable.  Again, the sectarian 
conflict that Gambhīrānanda faces could be overcome by simply allowing the sense of 
renunciation to have inner meaning.  Thus, Arjuna is indeed qualified to renounce all 
his past notions of duty, giving them up for a new form of non-attached action, 
grounded in steadfast devotion to Kṛṣṇa.  And as Kṛṣṇa warns, only one so devoted to 
him can so renounce his past duties (Bh.G. 18.67).  This is how Madhusūdana (16th 
century Advaitin), interprets the Gītā; hence, overtly disagreeing with Śaṅkara (see 
Marcaurelle, 2000: 199). 
 
There is one further factor we need to consider.  Marcaurelle (2000: 38) has puzzled 
over why Śaṅkara, in his non-commentarial work, allows for a student (brahmacārin) 
to be taught the truth of brahman (U.S. Prose, 2.45), even though he is not a 
paramahaṃsa parivrājaka.  My contention is, if we focus on the ideal type, rather 
than on renunciation, we will see that this student is in fact a male, Brahmin, celibate, 
intent on brahman-knowledge.  He is already one “sick of transmigratory existence” 
(saṃsārāt nirviṇṇa).  Compare:  
na saṃsāra sukhasya gandha mātram api asti iti buddhvā viṣaya 
mṛgatṛṣṇakāyā indriyāṇi nivartayet    | 
                                               
148 This follows the interpretation of Ānandagiri.  For a debate between Śaṅkara’s commentators, 






Realizing that there is not the least trace of happiness in cyclic existence, one 
should withdraw the organs from the objects which are comparable to a mirage 
(Bh.G.Bh. 5.22).  
 
It is this total renunciation of worldly existence that Śaṅkara admires.  Thus, in 
allowing room for such a student in his non-commentarial work, Śaṅkara is not 
showing the same “liberality” as the Upaniṣads (Marcaurelle, 2000: 37; Cenkner, 
1983: 49), but is simply admitting that renunciation may be an inner state rather than 
an outer one.
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  A celibate student with the sole desire for becoming brahman need 
not necessarily pass through the ritual of abandoning the way of action.  He already 
has renunciation in his heart, especially if he is the “constant” (naiṣṭhikaḥ) type of 
celibate student (brahmacārin), living in the teacher’s house for his whole life, that 
Śaṅkara champions (Ch.U.Bh. II.xxiii.1).   Elsewhere, Śaṅkara states that knowledge 
can be acquired by one who has been under the vow of brahmacarya for a year 
(P.U.Bh., intro), and later highlights that celibacy is an especially important factor 
(1.2).  Competent men are thus listed as celibates, forest-dwellers and monks 
(brahmacāri vānaprastha bhikṣuṣu) (1.16). 
 
In contrast to such competent men, Arjuna possesses neither this inner state nor the 
ideal outer state of being a celibate Brahmin.  To borrow Marcaurelle’s (2000: 91) 
terms, he fails both from the “end perspective” and the “start perspective”.  Without 
this inner renunciation of the self, actions, even those undertaken after formal 
                                               
149 If Upaniṣadic “liberality” implies “egalitarianism”, then we need to read this against Brian Black’s 
(2008) assessment that the “Upanishadic self is largely restricted to Brahmins” (p27).  As for the 
illegitimacy of reading modern concerns back into Śaṅkara, Suthren Hirst (2005) rightly states that to 
“foist feminist and egalitarian concerns upon him would be to misconstrue his social context” (p44).  
Saha’s (2009) description of Śaṅkara’s views on varṇa as “liberal” (p72) is more coherent in that he 
notes that one’s caste is not “intrinsic” to the jīva (ibid.), and so everyone is free to progress towards 
liberation (i.e. in future lives).  Saha, however, claims that this attitude of Śaṅkara constituted a “great 
departure from tradition” (p82).  For a critique of the inclusivist and egalitarian claims of Neo-Vedānta, 




renunciation, would still have consequences.  A person does not avoid incurring 
karma by (merely) abstaining from action (Bh.G. 3.4).  One should therefore never 
become attached to either results of action or to inaction (2.47).  But action is 
certainly superior to inaction (3.8a).  In any case, it is a physical impossibility not to 
act, for even basic bodily sustenance requires action (3.8b).  For Kṛṣṇa, what is called 
for is a devotional response to action in which the self is handed over to Kṛṣṇa (3.30) 
or brahman (5.10).
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  This kind of action is “obligatory action” (niyataṃ karma) 
combining the two traditional paths (3.3 & 3.7) of action (karma-yoga) and 
knowledge (jñāna-yoga).  Outer renunciation is ruled out as hypocritical (3.6), whilst 
action is sanctioned in that it originates from brahman (3.15).  Actions maintain the 
world (3.20), and the best action, even if done badly, is the one that follows your own 
inherent duty (sva-dharma) (3.35)
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, determined by your class (varṇa) (18.41-48), 
which Kṛṣṇa himself created (4.13).  
 
For Śaṅkara, “true renunciation” is accompanied by enlightenment.  More 
specifically, with world transcendence as its goal, true renunciation implies an 
ultimate understanding of self as brahman.  As such, without the doer, caste-based 
duty is unnecessary, and there is the knowledge that there is no jīva to hand over.  
Outer renunciation and inner renunciation are inter-linked.  Kṛṣṇa, in rejecting the 
Brahmanical way of the renouncer, opens the door to bhakti (devotion).  In denying 
the ultimacy of jīva, Śaṅkara makes bhakti a provisional mode of operation for those 
unestablished in the Self.
152
  The V.C. went on to give bhakti an Advaitin gloss, by 
claiming that, “The seeking after one’s own true nature is what is meant by devotion” 
                                               
150 Kṛṣṇa goes on to explain that He is brahman. 
 
151 Cf. Manu 10.97 (Olivelle, 2004: 186). 
 
152 For the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, Rāmānuja, bhakti-yoga is the main theme of the Gītā (Chari, 2005: xx). 
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(sva svarūpānusandhānaṃ bhaktir ity abhidhīyate) (31).  But Śaṅkara seems to accept 
the bhakti of the Gītā as a stepping-stone to dropping the false sense of “I”.  As such, 
neither Śaṅkara nor later Advaita were ever in true conflict with India’s most 
influential ethical text. 
 
What we have shown, by analysing his response to the Gītā, is that, despite all his talk 
of ultimate truth, Śaṅkara still falls back on the concept of class, of duty, of Dharma.  
Even so, he never willingly embraces this new type of “renouncer” that Kṛṣṇa so 
glorifies.  Whilst the Gītā claims that the devotee “attains the highest” (paramāpnoti) 
through unattached action (Bh.G. 3.19); Śaṅkara maintains that “Knowledge of the 
Self” (ātma jñāna) is “exclusively the cause of the highest good” (kevalasya 
niḥśreyasa hetutvam) (Bh.G.Bh. 18.66), the Advaitin view he holds in his Upaniṣadic 
commentaries (e.g. T.U.Bh. II.i.1 & II.viii.5).  
 
Nevertheless, the partial alignment of Advaita with the ethics of the Gītā has 
continued right up until the modern age, with Śaṅkarācārya Jayendra (b. 1934) stating 
that a Śaṅkarācārya must care for the “welfare of the world”, whilst a ‘mere’ 
jīvanmukta, like Ramana Maharshi (1879-1950), need not (Fort, 1998: 167).  
According to Fort (ibid.), Śaṅkarācārya Bharati Tirtha (b.1951) specifically relates his 
ethical outlook with the Gītā, especially where Kṛṣṇa states that though he has no 
need for action he still acts for the benefit of the world (Bh.G. 3.22-24).  My argument 
is that Śaṅkara exclusively offers the brahman-knower as a teacher, which is of 
course the origin of the title, Śaṅkarācārya. 
 
While it is true that Śaṅkara argues that “injunctions of dharma have no force” on the 
saṃnyāsin (Perrett, 1998: 57) and that he is “beyond the life-stages” (atyāśramin) 
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(Ch.U.Bh. II.xxiii.1); it is not so obvious, when it comes to the need for a teacher, 
whether “mokṣa precludes action, and hence dharma”, as Perrett (1998: 56) believes.  
In my opinion, the passing on of knowledge might well be seen as acting within the 
framework of Dharma.  Thus Olivelle’s (1986) assertion that a jīvan-mukta is 
“beyond dharma” (p18) may also need re-assessing.  I would argue that Śaṅkara, 
though little concerned with ‘universal responsibility’, was most concerned with the 
continuation of the lineage of brahman-knowers.  As with the Buddha, this passing on 
of salvific knowledge became his sva-dharma:  
dṛḍhagṛhītā hi vidyā ātmanaḥ śreyase santatyai ca bhavati   |  
vidyāsantatiś ca prāṇyanugrahāya bhavati naur iva nadīṃ titīrṣoḥ   | 
 
For when knowledge is firmly grasped it is conducive to one’s own 
welfare and to continuity.  And the continuity of knowledge is helpful 
to beings, like a boat to one wishing to cross a river (U.S. Prose, 1.3).  
 
As such, just as the Buddhist monk need not become socially isolated, so Śaṅkara was 
no “isolationist” (Tiwari, 1977: 127).  Nevertheless, Śaṅkara’s mission, like the 
Buddha’s, was soteriological rather than social.  He therefore asks that his lineage and 
teaching mission be continued by a certain type of person.  This is in line with the 
Upaniṣads, where the teachings ought only to be given to the eldest son or to a 
“worthy disciple” (C.U. III.xi.5).  Brian Black (2008) has noticed that in the early 
Upaniṣads, the “lineages from teacher to student became as important as family 
pedigrees” (p53).  Thus, we might need to qualify Olson’s (1997) assertion that the 
renouncer is “unconcerned with social lineage” (p65), for it is the renouncer-cum-
teacher who verily “sustains and transmits lineage” (Cenkner, 1983: 37-38).  But if 
this is so, might we not question why Cenkner also claims that Śaṅkara has 
“renounced normal society” (p38).  The thing is, the student comes to the teacher 
from that “normal society” and the teacher is therefore obliged to be involved in 
social correctness.  For, according to Śaṅkara (U.S. Prose, 1.2), among the things that 
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a teacher must check before giving the teachings to a potential pupil are his birth 
(jāti), his profession (karma) and his family (janaiḥ).  The student is also assumed to 
come to the teacher with a keen sense of caste and lineage (jāty anvaya) (1.16).  This 
does not sound like someone who is oblivious to normal social norms.  Śaṅkara is 
well aware of social norms.  His additional move then is to shift the teaching away 
from hereditary concerns, thus making way for a lineage, not just of Advaitin 
teachers, but of celibate Advaitin teachers.  We might note then that in the V.C. the 
guru tells the pupil that he has revealed the secret of brahman to him “as to one’s own 
son” (sva-suta vad) (575).  The Advaitin teacher essentially usurps the seeker’s real 
father, and may also rightly be called “father” (pitā).  This is so, because “through 
knowledge, he produces a [new] birth in brahman” (brahma śarīrasya vidyayā 
janayitṛtvān) (P.U.Bh. 6.8). 
 
Having given up the false sense of individuality; the teacher, in passing on his 
knowledge to a worthy pupil, truly acts selflessly.   This specific form of altruistic 
action does not go against Śaṅkara’s claim that action does not lead to liberation, for 
here the liberation in question is not the teacher’s and the action involved is both an 
ethically selfless and metaphysically self-less one.  Proceeding, as it does, from a self-
less person, it is therefore a non-activity.  As Śaṅkara states:  
viduṣā kriyamāṇaṃ karma paramārthato ‘karmaiva, tasya 
niṣkriyātma darśana saṃpanna tvāt    | 
 
Ultimately speaking, actions done by a man of knowledge are in fact 
non-actions, since he is endowed with the realization of the actionless 
self (Bh.G.Bh. 4.20).   
 
Thus, Śaṅkara need not be taken as contradicting his own thesis that, “steadfastness in 
knowledge combined with [ritual] action is illogical” (18.66).  However, we can 
question Śaṅkara’s insistence that, “the renouncer acts merely for survival purposes” 
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(saṃnyāsī jīvana mātrārtha ceṣṭaḥ) (4.19), for this takes no account of his other-
regarding activities, a necessary facet of the teacher’s life.  Thus, Mādhavānanda 
(trans. 2003: 167) notes two external activities of the brahman-knower: “satisfying 
the physical needs” and “teaching enquirers”.  Majithia (2007) thus predicts that 
Śaṅkara would not have denied that a brahman-knower “lives, breathes, eats, and 
even helps others attain enlightenment” (p245).  It is my contention that the latter of 
these activities is a case of what I call “constructive altruism”. 
 
One major reason why the ethics of Śaṅkara have been so neglected by scholars is 
that he downplays them in order to avoid the accusation of action, so strong was his 
wish to distance himself from those who followed ritual tradition.
153
  That is, Śaṅkara 
far too often over-states the mutual independence of knowledge and action.  
Nevertheless, even Śaṅkara, like Śāntideva, could not avoid the notion of a paternal 
pedagogue, acting solely for the benefit of others.  Thus, in the Bh.G.Bh., he follows 
the claim that the renouncer “does not engage in actions” (karmaṇi na pravartate) 
with this admission: 
saḥ kutaścit nimittāt karma parityāgāsaṃbhave sati karmaṇi tat phale 
ca saṅgarahitatayā sva prayojanābhāvāt loka saṃgrahārthe pūrvavat 
karmaṇi pravṛtto ‘pi naiva kiṃcit karoti, jñānāgni dagdha karmatvāt 
tadīyaṃ karma akarmaiva saṃpadyate 
 
But if, for some reason, it becomes impossible to abandon action, and 
he, for the sake of preventing people from going astray, and without 
attachment to the results due to the absence of any personal desire, 
were to engage in actions as he did before [realisation], he surely does 
nothing at all.  His actions are ‘non-actions’ because of his [past] 
karma having been burnt up by the fire of wisdom (B.G.Bh. 4.19). 
 
                                               
153 Of course, some say that Indian Ethics in general have been neglected by Western academia 




To give people spiritual guidance and thus help “prevent people from going astray” 
(loka saṃgraha) is Śaṅkara’s way of upholding Kṛṣṇa’s Dharma.154  Thus, Cenkner 
(1983) is wrong to claim that, “Altruistic and selfless activity is merely a prerequisite 
for knowledge” (p72).  In fact, I would say that, for Śaṅkara, altruistic and selfless 
activity only truly starts when one has the supreme knowledge.  For, while knowledge 
may “destroy the notion of doership” (kārakāṇy upamṛdnāti) (U.S. Metric, 1.14), it 
does not and cannot prevent the doing.  It is simply that this doing is done by one who 
has completely seen through the delusion of self-agency.  In this sense, knowledge 
does indeed affect action.  Yet, this action of the brahma-vid is hardly done to 
contribute to the maintenance of cosmic order.  Rather, it is aimed at the liberation 
from that very cosmos. 
 
This selfless person of Śaṅkara’s is more than just “one who sees inaction in action, 
and action in inaction” (karmaṇy akarma yaḥ paśyet, akarmaṇi ca karma yaḥ) (Bh.G. 
4.18a), he is a type unto himself.  He is a type drawn by equating the Gītā’s sthita-
prajña (man of steady wisdom) with a saṃnyāsin (Bh.G.Bh. 2.55-56), and the 
saṃnyāsin with the brahma-vid (2.59), and the brahma-vid with the jīvan-mukta (5.24 
& 6.27; B.S.Bh. I.i.4).  He is thus one who has attained “identification with brahman” 
(brahma nirvāṇam) in the autumn years of this very life (anta kāle) (Bh.G.Bh. 
2.72).
155
  This brahma-vid is a pure Brahmin male, a celibate, parama-haṃsa ascetic 
(U.S. Prose, 1.2), and “with the sole aim of helping others” (kevala parānugraha 
prayojana), “he wishes to makes use of knowledge” (vidyopayogārthīṃ) (1.6).  Yet, 
like the bodhisattva (BCA. 1.35), he does all of this effortlessly, “without attachment 
                                               
154 ‘Dharma’ derives from the verbal root ‘dhṛ’, meaning: ‘to preserve’, ‘to maintain’, ‘to fulfil a duty’, 
‘to draw the reins tight’, etc. (Monier-Williams, 2002: 519).   
 
155 Both the Bhāmatī and the Vivaraṇa Schools agree that the jīvan-mukta is equivalent to the Gītā’s 
sthita-prajña (Roodurmun (2002: 235). 
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to the results” (phale ca saṅgarahitatayā) (Bh.G.Bh. 4.19).  By passing on the 
knowledge of brahman to others, and by reconstructing their selfhood for 
soteriological purposes, his actions may rightly be called “constructive altruism”.  
Nevertheless, his vision is transcendental rather than social, his sole objective, to 
bring his disciples to the vision of brahman.   
 
  
 Case 2: Śāntideva 
 
Both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva see themselves as monks.  Both come from traditions 
where renunciation was seen as a viable option.  In fact, Buddhism began as the 
renunciatory religion par excellence.  Nevertheless, by the 8
th
 century, the 
Mahāyāna’s stress on the validity of lay practice would clearly be imposing itself on 
the tradition.  Celibacy would no longer express the “totality” of the monk’s life.  Yet, 
Harvey (2000: 92) has noted that, “while the Bodhisattva-path gives an increased 
scope for lay practice, the monastic life is still highly regarded”, citing Śāntideva in 
his defence.  But the argument should not be seen as simply one between monks and 
laity.  In response to Lamotte’s theory that the Mahāyāna arose amongst the laity, 
Williams (2009) has argued that, “Doctrinal innovation in Indian Buddhism was 
almost entirely the concern of monks” (p26).  He also argues that, in India, most 
religious change was initiated by Brahmins and renouncers (p24).    
 
Unlike Śaṅkara (and Nāgārjuna), Śāntideva was not a Brahmin, but he was a 
renouncer.  Yet he was a renouncer who had taken a vow to benefit all beings, and 
most beings, humans anyway, were not to be found in the forest.  Now, we have 
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already commented that Śāntideva did not write the Compendium in a forest, and have 
qualified Dayal’s (1970) claim about the later Mahāyāna reverting to the old ideal of 
celibacy and forest-life (Chapter 3.2). Nevertheless, Śāntideva can at times appear 
quite radical in his asceticism, which includes not only chastity, but vegetarianism 
(Ś.S. 131-134).156  He tells us that one must give up the society of householders and 
make one’s home in the forest (Ś.S. 46 & 106-107). What we need to do now then is 
to see how Śāntideva, the renouncer, deals with the question of lay ethics.  We need to 
see how he reacts to the Mahāyāna ideal of “maintaining close contact with the 
masses” (Mitomo, 1991: 15). 
 
Let us begin with the (2
nd
 century) Vimalakīrti-Nirdeśa Sūtra, which Sponberg 
described as a “proto-Madhyamaka” text (in Keown & Prebish, 2007: 802).  This 
‘early’ Mahāyāna sūtra prides itself on its radical break with Śrāvaka Buddhism, and 
is severely critical of monasticism. The hero is provocatively portrayed as a lay 
practitioner (upāsaka) who practices his skilful-means (upāya-kauśalya) in bars and 
brothels.  Surprisingly, Śāntideva does not shy away from the Vimala, acknowledging 
that male bodhisattvas “practice enjoyment among the sexual” (Ś.S. 325) and female 
bodhisattvas “become a courtesan to draw men” (326).  The theory that sex may be 
used as a skilful means to benefit others is also found in his discussion of the 
Upāyakauśalya (Skill in Means) Sūtra (Ś.S. 167), where the youthful (māṇavakaḥ) 
seventh-stage bodhisattva, Jyoti, (compassionately) allows a woman to ravish him 
after 42,000 years of celibacy!  So Śāntideva appears willing to condone such 
activities and to accept the authority of such sūtras even though he equally stresses the 
monastic life.  It seems that he would agree with Siderits (2007b) that the wisdom of 
                                               
156 With regard to Keown’s thesis (see Chapter 2), contrast Aristotle’s position that “all animals must 
have been made by nature for the sake of men” (Politics, I.8, trans. Barker, p23). 
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the likes of Vimalakīrti makes “rules of thumb unnecessary” (p294).  But it is plainly 
the case that such teachings are not for everyone.  And here we need also pay attention 
to Clayton’s (2006) twist on virtue ethics, whereby she states that it is the “character 
of the virtuous person that generates the norm” (p104).  This would amount to the 
claim that it is because Vimalakīrti is Vimalakīrti that he can do as he pleases. 
 
Nevertheless, we should not conclude from this that desire (rāga) is spoken of as a 
“virtue” by Śāntideva, as Keown (2001: 226) claims.  In fact, Śāntideva takes rāga to 
be a transgression (āpatti), just a lesser one than hatred (dveṣa) (Ś.S. 164).  That being 
said, ethical ambiguities do abound in the Compendium.  For example, while 
acknowledging the higher ethics of householders like Vimalakīrti, it also states that 
the bodhisattva’s objective is to release the whole world from the “bonds and cravings 
of the household life” (gṛha bandhana tṛṣṇā) (Ś.S. 330).  Such an exemplary one is 
described as desireless (niṣkama) and a follower of the “ten ways of [right] conduct” 
(daśa carya).  It is uncertain whether this refers to the ten novice vows (daśa śīlāni) or 
the ten wholesome actions (daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ).  To my knowledge, he only 
mentions the former once, referring to them as “daśa śikṣāpadāni” (Ś.S. 174) and 
comparing followers of these to those who follow either the five precepts (pañca 
śikṣāpadāni) or the 400 bodhisattva precepts (bodhisattva saṃvaraṃ 
caturvaraśikṣāpadaśataṃ).  In contrast, references to the daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ 
are found throughout the Compendium.  Now while he states elsewhere (Ś.S. 13) that 
following the ten wholesome actions leads to Buddhahood (daśābhi kuśalaiḥ karma 
pathhair buddhatvam), he also describes the benefits of supporting lay disciples 
(upāsakānāṃ) who follow this path (Ś.S. 87).  So it is clear that one need not 
denounce the household life to follow this path.  Whichever way we read ‘daśa 
carya’, the bodhisattva contradicts it by manifesting as a dancer, a musician, a king, 
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even a thief (Ś.S. 330-331).  For example, theft is second in the list of both the novice 
vows
157
 and the daśa-akuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ, a classic list of ten unwholesome 
actions.
158
  And in fact, Śāntideva not only cites this latter list (Ś.S. 60, 170 & 173), he 
explains in explicit detail the dire consequences of each unwholesome act (Ś.S. 69-75) 
as well as offering a worst case (agra) version of the list (Ś.S. 171-172).  Furthermore, 
enjoying music and dance goes against the seventh of the ten precepts of a novice 
monk.  Not to mention that the Compendium advises the bodhisattva to shun all 
interaction with kings (Ś.S. 47), with dancers (Ś.S. 48), indeed, with all house-holders 
(Ś.S. 52).  We are putting it mildly then, when we say that Śāntideva maintains an 
ambiguous position with regard to society and right conduct.   
  
There are two hermeneutical strategies we could adopt to explain this phenomenon.  
Either he does not agree with all the scriptures he quotes in the Compendium, or else, 
he suits his ethics according to the relative level of the practitioner.  Considering that 
we can also observe such opposing domains of discourse in his BCA, we can safely 
assume he is doing the latter.
159
  So, on the one hand, we have the commencing-
bodhisattva who requires an ascetic ethic and should live a solitary existence; on the 
other hand, we have an advanced bodhisattva who ought to use his skilful means to 
their fullest, mingling with all levels of society.  It is due to the acceptance of such 
gradualism that Śāntideva condones the teaching that: 
                                               
157 The ten vows are to refrain from: 1) killing, 2) theft, 3) sexual misconduct, 4) lying, 5) intoxication, 
6) eating after midday, 7) singing, dancing, playing music or attending entertainment programs, 8) 
wearing perfume, cosmetics and decorative accessories, 9) sitting on high chairs and sleeping on 
luxurious beds, and 10) accepting money. 
 
158 The ten unwholesome actions are: 1) killing, 2) theft, 3) sexual misconduct, 4) lying, 5) slander, 6) 
harsh speech, 7) gossip, 8) covetousness, 9) malevolence, and 10) wrong views (Ś.S. 69-75).  For a Pāli 
reference, see: M.N.iii.45-53 (trans. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi, 2001: 913ff).  For a Mahāyāna source, see the 
Avataṃsaka Sūtra (trans. Cleary, 1993: 487 & 1264). 
 
159 Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that he does disagree with some sections of some of 
the scriptures he quotes.  However, as a working premise, I have assumed that Śāntideva’s two texts do 
in fact represent his ideals. 
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ye ‘nupāya kuśalā bodhisattvāste rāga pratisaṃyuktābhya āpattibhyo 
bibhyati   |    ye punar upāya kuśalā bodhisattvāste dveṣaṃ 
prayuktābhya āpattibhyo bibhyati na rāga pratisaṃyuktābhya 
 
Those bodhisattvas who lack skilful means are afraid of transgressing 
through desire, but those in possession of skilful means fear 
transgressing through hatred, not through desire (Ś.S. 164-165).   
 
The “sine qua non of enlightenment” (Keown, 2001: 226), then, is not rāga, per se, 
but non-fear of acting on it, or the ability to “remain undisturbed” by it (Powers, 2008: 
212).  The lifestyle of the commencing-bodhisattva is summed up thus, “He should 
keep to the domain of conduct of non-union and purity” (ācāra gocaraḥ rakṣet 
asaṃsṛṣṭaḥ sucir bhavet) (Ś.S. 47).  This beautifully brings together both the Indian 
etymology of “celibate” (brahmacarya), as relating to the student (brahmacārin) and 
the Western etymology, as relating to being alone (Lat. caelebs) (see Olson, 2008: 5).  
The fact that this domain (gocaraḥ) should not be kept up indefinitely is immediately 
confirmed in the Compendium, where a “false” or “evil” ‘friend’ (pāpa mitra) is said 
to be one who tells the bodhisattva to work when he should be meditating and to 
meditate when he should be involved in action (Ś.S. 50).  In order to indicate 
Śāntideva’s ascetic views on the passions (kāmānām), Powers (2008: 213) offers the 
following verses from the BCA (translation mine):  
na śastraṃ na viṣaṃ nāgnir na prapāto na vairiṇaḥ     | 
kāmānām upamāṃ yānti narakādi vyathā smṛteḥ     || 
evam udvijya kāmebhyo viveke janayed ratiṃ     | 
kalahāyāsa śūnyāsu śāntāsu vanabhūmiṣu     || 
 
No sword, no poison, no fire, no precipice, no enemies can compare 
with passions when one remembers the torments of hell, etc. Thus, one 
should recoil from the passions and generate delight in solitude, in 
tranquil forests, empty of strife and trouble (i.e. BCA. 8.84-85). 
 
 
However, this only gives half the story.  It is in the Compendium where we find the 
other half, where we see just how influential the understanding of ultimate truth is to 
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the ethics of the bodhisattva.  It comes midway through Chapter 8 on the purification 
of misdeeds (pāpa śodhanaṃ) and follows a lengthy discussion of the ten 
unwholesome actions.  Here, the ethical thesis suddenly takes a radical turn (Ś.S. 
167ff).  Śāntideva here tells us that advanced bodhisattvas “may neglect the rules of 
conduct” (śikṣāṃ nikṣipet) if they should see (paśyet) greater advantage for beings 
(adhikaṃ sattvārtha).  This gains an epistemological basis when he claims that 
“misdeeds can be purified through a conviction of emptiness” (śūnyatādhimuktyā ‘pi 
pāpa śuddhir bhavati) (Ś.S. 171).   
 
So while forest-life and seclusion are certainly praised (BCA. 8.85-88), one should not 
get too comfortable in this life-style.  One should not become indifferent to learning, 
nor to compassionate activity (Ś.S. 50).  Hence, Śāntideva’s ethics are not simply 
gradualist; they also contain over-lapping realms of discourse.  The bodhisattva’s vow 
to save (trātum) all beings is there even at the ascetic stage.  The non-self doctrine is 
there even at the stage of activity.  In other words, the valid reasons to be active and 
the valid reasons to be passive are in constant tension.   
 
But what then of the divisions and distinctions that all of these moves imply?  How 
can they be maintained by a Mādhyamika who claims that all is empty?  For example, 
the Pāli Abhidhamma speaks of two types of sexual material phenomena (bhāvarūpa): 
the faculty of maleness (purisattam) and the faculty of femaleness (itthittam) (Vm. 
14.58).  Whilst it also claims that the terms “man” (purisa) and “woman” (itthi) are 
only conventionally (sammuti) valid (Bodhi, 2006: 26), the Buddha is said to have 
established a fourfold assembly (parisā), made up of male and female monastics and a 
male and female laity.  The Vinaya (monastic code) was drawn up under such an 
assumed categorisation.  This assumption of conventional categories is based on the 
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further assumption of the aggregates (skandhā) of form (rūpa) and consciousness 
(vijñāna).  Not only does Śāntideva follow traditional Buddhist metaphysics in 
denying ultimacy to the terms “man” and “woman”, he also claims that all aggregates 
are unreal (avastu) (BCA. 9.96b).  Men, women and aggregates are equal in being 
empty.  As such, he appears to leave himself no basis whatsoever for the categories 
which the Vinaya takes as its starting point.  I will deal with the issue of gender in 
Chapter 7.2.  Here, I will focus on the issue of conventional ethics.   
 
Śāntideva is well aware of the ethical problem posed by the denial of the aggregates.  
In the mouth of a Buddhist “realist” (perhaps a Sautrāntika), Śāntideva poses himself 
the problem: “If consciousness does not exist, there’s no evil in killing an illusory-
person” (māyā-puruṣa ghātādau cittābhāvān na pāpakaṃ) (BCA. 9.11a). If there are 
no aggregates, there is no consciousness (vijñāna/citta).  If there is no consciousness, 
then rebirth would be impossible.  If rebirth is impossible, this form (rūpa) belongs to 
no one.  And, anyway, if there are no aggregates, then form is also an illusion.  Thus, 
killing this person would not be of any account.  It would be like “killing” a man 
created by a magician.
160
   
 
In his Madhyamaka defence, Śāntideva turns the doubter’s challenge around.  For 
him, believing that you are a person, with your own consciousness, is the cause of 
‘morality’ and ‘immorality’.  He thus replies: “Rather, merit and demerit arise with 
the illusory consciousness” (citta māyā samete tu pāpa puṇya samud bhavaḥ) (9.11b).  
A similar quote from the Compendium may help here; “Where there is mind, there is 
                                               
160 The likeness to the ethical problem of the Bhagavad Gītā, presented by Kapstein (2001: 41) as “to 
slay a body is not to slay a person”, should not go unnoticed.  On the value of the ‘person’ in the Gītā, 




virtue and vice.  Where mind is not, there is no virtue or vice” (yatra cittaṃ tatra guṇa 
doṣāḥ |  nāsti niścittatāyāṃ guṇa doṣāḥ) (Ś.S. 122).  This would seem to put to death 
any notion that Mahāyāna Buddhism could be called a Virtue Ethics.  However, it 
would also seem to imply a classic “transcendency” thesis (see Chapter 2). 
 
There is an inherent tension in this view.  According to Śāntideva, those who amass 
merit (puṇya) are those possessed of knowledge (Ś.S. 4).  Also, the bodhisattva needs 
a mass of merit in order to benefit all beings.  He prays: 
kadopalambha dṛṣṭibhyo deśayiṣyāmi śūnyatām     | 
saṃvṛty ānupalambhena puṇya saṃbhāram ādarāt     || 
 
When, with this merit accumulated, will I respectfully teach this 
emptiness, through conventions, without projection, to those whose 
views are characterized by projection?  (BCA. 9.167)   
 
That is, the bodhisattva “must try to eliminate factors of reification without destroying 
confidence in persons, karma, and so forth” (Newland, 1999: 13).  But if the 
bodhisattva is to gain merit without projection or reification, then he must do it with a 
non-deluded consciousness.  But if this non-deluded consciousness is not their 
consciousness, then how does it accrue to them?  Indeed, when faced with such a 
question (from a virtual Yogācārin), Śāntideva simply reverses the question.  The 
question is this: “When even false perception no longer exists, by what is illusion 
perceived?” (yadā na bhrāntir apy asti māyā kenopalabhyate) (BCA. 9.15b).  This 
question makes more sense when placed alongside a later verse, where we find 
Śāntideva debating with the Sāṃkhya School.  Here he argues that consciousness is 
not a ‘thing’, but more like a moment: 
ajānānaṃ yadi jñānaṃ kāṣṭaṃ jñānaṃ prasajyate     | 
tenāsaṃnihita jñeyaṃ jñānaṃ nāstīti niścayaḥ     || 
 
If the non-perception of something is “consciousness”, then it follows 
that a piece of wood is [equally] consciousness.  This proves that there is 
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no [independent] consciousness in the absence of something to be 
perceived (BCA. 9.61). 
 
That is, on the Madhyamaka account, consciousness can only arise when there is 
something there to be conscious of.  So the Yogācārin’s question (above) can now be 
read as asking the Madhyamaka: when a bodhisattva no longer has a deluded 
consciousness, and if consciousness only arises in dependence on (illusory) objects, 
how does he perceive at all?   
 
As we have already noted (Chapter 2), Śāntideva will get around this issue by 
demanding an occasional voluntary entrance into a slightly delusional mode of 
consciousness, whilst denying the ultimacy of that consciousness.  In other words, he 
demands that the bodhisattva flicker between domains, deliberately accepting the 
illusion to be real.  This will be more fully examined in Chapter 6.1.  Basically 
speaking, Śāntideva advises the bodhisattva to maintain a provisional view of the 
world which includes a provisional view of objects and karma.  Hence, in this world, 
“happiness and suffering are the result of action” (karmaṇaḥ sukha duḥkhe ca) (BCA. 
9.122a).  This is in line with classical Hindu and Buddhist ethics and resists the 
“transcendency” thesis.   
 
In context, the ethical compromise allows him to share common ground with the 
Hindu virtual debater.  But the compromise stretches much further when a voluntary 
delusion is taken on, allowing him to remain in saṃsāra, and thus providing the basis 
for the continuation of a traditional ethics.  For Śāntideva, in denying that external 
objects exist at all (BCA. 9.16), the Yogācāra leave no ground for ethics to take place 
(BCA. 9.28) (see Chapter 4.1).  Likewise, Śāntideva will be forced into admitting that 
if beings are ultimately non-existent, then there are in fact no players within the 
220 
 
ethical sphere (BCA. 9.75).  We should therefore take Clayton’s (2006) claim that the 
need for morality, for Śāntideva, is “ultimately an illusion” (p97) in its total context, 
which, on my reading, includes the need for a voluntary delusion (BCA. 9.75-76).  
And, as already conceded, this delusion also opens the way to demerit (pāpa) and vice 
(doṣa).   Thus, karma continues to be accumulated by the continuum (BCA. 9.72).   
 
This means that the renunciation stage of the commencing-bodhisattva is paramount, a 
practice which sees morality (śīla) and meditation (samādhi) go hand-in-hand (Ś.S. 
121), culminating in the view of emptiness.  Hence, one should realise (darśinaḥ) the 
emptiness of all existents (sarva bhāva śūnyatā), but “without giving up the practical 
morality” (caryāyā aparityāgena) of the bodhisattva (Ś.S. 117).  Hence, the 
bodhisattva is in a position to choose when to act and when to remain aloof. 
 
Now Goodman (2009: 89ff), as part of his consequentialist thesis, thus talks of 
Śāntideva’s ethics as “balancing” the pros and the cons of an action.  But I am not 
convinced that ‘choosing’ requires ‘balancing’.  The only time I have noticed true 
balancing in the Compendium is when the question of whether to give to another 
bodhisattva is raised (Ś.S. 144), whereby the giver is “supposed to measure the 
relative level of skilfulness of himself and the recipient, and their respective capacities 
to help others” (Clayton, 2006: 144).  A clearer explanation is given in the BCA on the 
question of bodily sacrifice: 
sad dharma sevakaṃ kāya mitar arthaṃ na pīḍayet     | 
evam eva hi sattvānāmāśāmāśu prapūrayet     || 
tyajen na jīvitaṃ tasmād aśuddhe karuṇāśaye     | 
tulyāśaye tu tat tyājyam itthaṃ na parihīyate     || 
 
The body is the servant of the True Dharma.  One should not harm it 
for an insignificant benefit.  For it is the only means available for one 
to quickly fulfil the needs of sentient beings.  Therefore, one should 
not sacrifice one’s life for someone whose compassion is not as pure.  
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But for someone whose compassion is comparable, one should 
relinquish it.  That way, there is no loss (BCA. 5.86-87). 
 
A commencing-bodhisattva then, according to Śāntideva’s rule, should not, for 
example, give his body to save a starving animal (Ś.S. 51), despite apparent teachings 
to the contrary.  So, in reading the following verse, we need to keep in mind that this 
is not for all bodhisattvas: 
evaṃ parārthaṃ kṛtvāpi na mado na ca vismayaḥ     | 
 ātmānaṃ bhojayitvaiva phalāśā na ca jāyate     || 
 
Though acting in this way for the good of others, there is neither 
exhilaration nor pride.  Even when giving oneself [to animals] as food, 
the desire for [karmic] reward does not arise (BCA. 8.116).    
 
A commencing-bodhisattva will not have seen deeply enough into emptiness, having 
yet to reach the first bhūmi (see Pelden, 2007: 190).  They have yet to understand the 
dream-like quality of all phenomena.  Nor have they developed the wisdom that fully 
understands the consequences of their actions (see Gyatso, 1994: 160).  So the so-
called “frightening extremism of Buddhist ethics” (Goodman, 2009: 52) may only find 
expression on very rare occasions.  The gradualism of Mahāyāna ethics is perfectly 
brought out by Śāntideva: 
ādau śākādi dāne ‘pi niyojayati nāyakaḥ   | 
tat karoti kramāt paścād yat sva māṃsāny api tyajet   || 
 
At the beginning [of the path] the guide encourages the giving away of 
vegetables and the like.  Later on, by degrees, one is even able to give 
away one’s flesh (BCA. 7.25). 
 
Of course, in verses 5.86-87 (above), there is the implication that the commencing-
bodhisattva may well give his life for another bodhisattva who happens to possess 
even greater compassion.  It is thus problematic to take Śāntideva’s ethics as being 
“agent-neutral” or as a general ethics of “balancing” (see Goodman, 2009: 97-98).   
First, Śāntideva is explicitly against any act of balancing where he himself would 
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bring harm to somebody else.  He writes, “May I never be the cause of harm to 
another” (anarthaḥ kasyacin mā bhūnmāmālambya kadācana) (BCA. 3.14b).  One 
must assume that the personal tone of this verse is due to the fact that he never saw 
himself as someone who could do the kind of “balancing” calculations necessary for 
pure act-consequentialism.  Śāntideva tells us that the essential meaning (piṇḍārtha) 
of the Compendium, that which should “always be kept in the heart-mind of the 
bodhisattva” (bodhisattvena manasā nityaṃ dhārayitavyaḥ), is that “one should not 
harm” (na nāśayet) others (Ś.S. 127).  This follows the admonition that a bodhisattva 
must not conduct himself “like those who kill” (vadhaka sadṛśena) (Ś.S. 125).  
Remember, even bodhisattvas of skilful-means still fear (bibhyati) breaking the 
Vinaya code through acts which pertain to hatred (dveṣa) (Ś.S. 164-165).   
 
Second, verses BCA. 5.86-87 are quite the opposite of a universal ethics.  A 
bodhisattva is a type apart, he is not “merely one individual among many” (see Nagel 
below), but has a worth based on his relative compassion.  This is confirmed by the 
statement that a bodhisattva “can only be brought to ruin by the sin of defaming 
another bodhisattva” (Ś.S. 85).  To borrow Gethin’s (1998: 29) phrase regarding the 
Buddha, the bodhisattva is “sui generis”.  Indeed, it is from the bodhisattvas that 
Buddhas arise (Ś.S. 86).  Now, the notion that a bodhisattva may give his life for a 
more advanced bodhisattva may appear at first glance to be a virtue ethics, but even 
Clayton (2006: 109) admits that this logic, although based on the relative virtues of 
compassion, is in fact consequentialist.  The logic seems to be that a bodhisattva with 
greater compassion can (and will) do greater good, and therefore has more ‘right’ to 
survive.  It is difficult to say whether or not this involves a “hedonistic calculus” (de 
Silva, 2007: 231).  It is certainly a form of “weighing consequences” (Clayton, 2006: 
223 
 
109), but they are consequences that only involve harm to one’s own body, not to 
another.   To repeat: 
bahūnām eka duḥkhena yadi duḥkhaṃ vigacchati     | 
utpādyam eva tad duḥkhaṃ sadayena parātmanoḥ     || 
 
If the suffering of many disappears through the suffering of one, then 
that suffering must definitely be made to arise by one with 
compassion for oneself and for others (BCA. 8.105). 
   
On this altruistic account, the body is to be simultaneously protected and forsaken:   
tasmān mayānapekṣeṇa kāyas tyakto jagad dhite     | 
ato ‘yaṃ bahu doṣo ‘pi dhāryate karma bhāṇḍavat     || 
 
Therefore, disregarding myself, I forsake this body for the benefit 
of the world.  For this reason, though it has many faults, I endure it 
as an instrument of work (BCA. 8.184). 
 
Yet one should never forget the explicit gradualism in Buddhist ethics, which means 
that there are few guidelines which apply to all subjects.  So this ethical discourse 
should not be allowed to spill over into domains which do not involve other 
bodhisattvas.  Hence, if Buddhism ever truly “universalized” karma (Gombrich, 2009: 
44), the bodhisattva-ideal reversed it to a form of agent-dependency.  And this, despite 
the fact that they claim the agent has no ultimate existence. 
 
Interestingly, apart from the actions of a bodhisattva, Śāntideva has very little to say 
about conventional ethics.  This is surprising given that he offers his Compendium 
(Ś.S. 1) to all those of “like elements” (sama dhātu).  Despite this apparent 
universality, his focus is almost exclusively on either: 1) the compassionate activity of 
the bodhisattva, or 2) the renunciation stage as a necessary means to such activity.  
Thus, Paul Williams’ “like-minded friends” (in Crosby & Skilton, 1995: xxvi) gives a 
more accurate characterisation of his target audience.  His main contribution to lay 
ethics comes under the umbrella of faith (śraddhā).  He thus makes the overtly 
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religious claim that, “In a faithless man, pure conduct does not arise” (aśrāddhasya 
manuṣyasya śuklo dharmo na rohati) (Ś.S. 5).  This is even less inclusive than it 
sounds, for he also makes the more controversial claim that one without devotion 
specifically to the Buddha is of “evil mind” (pāpa mati) (Ś.S. 54).  It would seem 
then, that for Śāntideva, one who does not follow the “Compendium of Conduct” 
(śikṣa vrata) is simply immoral by default.  A discussion of non-Buddhist ethics is 
therefore futile.   
 
Buddhist monastic ethics receive rather more coverage.  It should be noted then that 
the Vinaya should not be disregarded by a bodhisattva just because he is following the 
Mahāyāna (Ś.S. 61 & 67).  Most of the discussion on monastic ethics surrounds what 
we might call etiquette, especially that of alms-collection (Ś.S. 127-135). This 
includes the condemnation of meat-eating (131-135), a Mahāyāna innovation which 
Śāntideva traces back to the (4th century?) Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Ś.S. 131).161  This is 
followed by a discussion of the correct use of medicine, robes, accommodation and 
protective charms (134-143).   Elsewhere, there is also a special section on the 
conduct code of the so-called “serving monk” (vaiyāvṛtyakara bhikṣu) who acts as a 
kind of errand-boy and door-keeper for other monks, as well as dealing with the 
saṅgha’s finances (Ś.S. 55-56).  The frightening consequences of their misdeeds are 
listed herein (56-59).   
 
Of course, monastic servants were “taken for granted” even in the Buddha’s time 
(Gombrich, 1988: 102), and in Sri Lanka, “monastic slaves” were bought with 
donations specific to that cause (p162).  This seems to argue against Thapar’s (1988) 
                                               
161 Of course, vegetarianism can also be found in the Mahābhārata (see Chapple, 2002: 149ff), which 
Chapple puts down to possible “Jaina influence” (p159). 
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notion of a monastery as an “egalitarian sanctuary” (p279).  Overall, there is enough 
evidence in Buddhist institutions to show that Gombrich’s (2009) suggestion that the 
“only true criterion of ranking people is moral” (p15) is simply false.  For one thing, 
Buddhism has clearly never valued nuns as highly as monks. And as Dharmasiri 
(1989) notes, “the Buddha never thought of the possibility of a classless society” (p66) 
and a “class structure” was always evident in the monastery.  And, of course, legal 
slavery was found in Aśoka’s India and even in pre-20th century Thailand (Harvey, 
2000: 188-189).  And needless to say, Buddhist monasticism has always survived on 
the back of lay donations and the theory that merit is thus gained.  Maybe this is one 
area where Buddhism and Aristotle truly meet.  As Stalley put it, “not everyone” can 
achieve the “good life”, and the “rest of us are best off serving those who can” (in 
Aristotle, 2009: xiv).  I will return to this question of so-called Buddhist 
egalitarianism in Chapter 7. 
 
Returning to the Compendium, following a short discussion of faith, Śāntideva moves 
on to discuss the importance of bodhicitta (the thought of enlightenment) and the will 
to liberate all beings (Ś.S. 5).  This is the crux of his ethics.  In the BCA (1.15), he 
divides bodhicitta into “aspiring” (praṇidhi) and “proceeding” (prasthāna), the former 
being a form of resolve towards enlightenment, the latter being actual engagement.  In 
the Compendium, Śāntideva describes the first in terms of an inner pledge, “I must 
become a Buddha” (mayā buddhena bhavitavyam) (Ś.S. 8).  In the BCA, he compares 
the difference between the two stages with the difference between thinking “I really 
should go to x” and actually going (BCA. 1.16).   
 
In the Compendium (Ś.S. 103), he gives a list of four stages of bodhisattva 
development: 1) the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta), 2) compassion (kṛpā), 3) 
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an immovable (acala) resolve, which seems to point to one who has reached the 
eighth bhūmi, and 4) enlightenment (buddhi). The ideal bodhisattva is then described 
as being “intent on the liberation of the whole world” (sarva jaga mokṣaṇodyata) 
(Ś.S. 104).  We will analyse the enlightened activity of such a bodhisattva in Chapter 
6.1.  But let us turn now to the ethics of the commencing-bodhisattva, starting with 
renunciation. 
 
As with Śaṅkara, we may divide renunciation here into inner and outer.  According to 
Śāntideva, “No mendicant is truly a follower of the Buddha’s religion who has not 
given up on existence” (yathā na te tathāgata śāsane pravrajitāḥ yeṣāṃ nāsti tyāga) 
(Ś.S. 8).  This is his inner renunciation.  As for outer renunciation, Chapter 8 of the 
BCA describes how the bodhisattva leaves for the forest in order to meditate on the 
insubstantiality of self and things.  This includes the renunciation of thoughts: 
kāya citta vivekena vikṣepatsya na saṃbhavaḥ     | 
tasmāl lokaṃ parityajya vitarkān parivarjayet     || 
 
With body and mind aware, distractions do not arise.  Thus, having 
renounced this world, one should avoid conjecture (BCA. 8.2). 
 
He goes on to deny society, his longing for a wife, his will to status and power, 
confronting and hopefully ‘dissolving’ the karma that got him where he is.  To aid 
him in his renunciation, he mocks society, mocks the value of family and 
relationships, mocks the notion of beauty, and basically derides people in general.  
This seems a far cry from the other-regarding ethics of a bodhisattva, and must 
therefore be treated as a means rather than an end.  It is a mental exercise undertaken 
in solitude, and should not be projected onto actual people.  In fact, Śāntideva asks the 
monk to be civil to those he happens to meet.  His ambivalent attitude is perfectly 
portrayed in the following verse: 
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bālād dūraṃ palāyeta prāptam ārādhayet priyaiḥ     | 
na saṃstavānubandhena kiṃ tūdāsīna sādhuvat     || 
 
One should steer clear of the immature.  On meeting, one should be 
pleasant, not intimate.  Be kind but indifferent (BCA. 8.15). 
 
I will try to demonstrate how this ethical oddity functions in Chapter 6.1.  For now, let 
us continue on our road to renunciation.  With the aid of meditation (samādhi), the 
renouncer denies the objective world.  We might say that he enters into a mind-only 
world.  As such, he sits very close to the Yogācārin, whom Śāntideva would normally 
see as a metaphysical opponent.  His temporary aim is to develop what we might 
(following Hume) call “monkish virtues”; that is: solitude, detachment, self-denial, 
self-chastisement, humility, and celibacy.  Like Śaṅkara, Śāntideva strictly imposes 
celibacy on his audience, with BCA verses 8.5-8 most likely being aimed at monks 
who have not come to terms with celibacy (Crosby and Skilton, 1995: 175).  His focus 
here is on one of the three marks of Early Buddhism, the impermanence (anitya) of 
worldly objects and relationships: 
kasyānityeṣv anityasya sneho bhavitum arhati     | 
yena janma sahasrāṇi draṣṭavyo na punaḥ priyaḥ     || 
apaśyann aratiṃ yāti samādhau na ca tiṣṭati     | 
na ca tṛpyati dṛṣṭvāpi pūrvavad bādhyate tṛṣā     || 
na paśyati yathā bhūtaṃ saṃvegād avahiyate     | 
dahyate tena śokena priya saṃgama kāṅkṣayā     || 
tac cintayā mudhā yāti hrasvam āyur muhur-muhuḥ     | 
aśāśvatena mitrena dharmo bhraśyati śaśvataḥ     || 
 
How can an impermanent being have attachment for impermanent 
beings, when a loved one may not be seen again for one thousand lives? 
Not seeing [them] one becomes disturbed and cannot remain in 
meditation.  And even on seeing them one is not satisfied.  As before, 
one is afflicted with longing.  One does not see reality as-it-is.  One 
loses drive.  One is consumed by grief, longing for contact with one’s 
beloved.  While uselessly preoccupied with these people, life gets 
shorter by the minute.  For the sake of a transient companion, the ever-




Virtues like detachment and chastity, however, are mere preliminaries; they are means 
to the renunciation of selfish desires. Ultimately, this is not a virtue ethics.  Through 
such renunciation, the monk is able to get a glimpse of emptiness, he understands 
impermanence, and he realises the selflessness of all beings.  For the Madhyamaka, 
only through an understanding of emptiness can awakening take place.  Thus, 
Śāntideva addresses the Śrāvaka monk, when he says: 
satya darśanato muktiḥ śūnyatā darśanena kiṃ     | 
na vinānena mārgeṇa bodhir ity āgamo yataḥ    || 
 
[You say] Liberation comes from understanding the [Noble] Truths.  
What then is the point of seeing emptiness?  [We reply] Because 
[Mahāyāna] scriptures say that there is no awakening without this path 
(BCA. 9.40). 
 
Through glimpses of emptiness and the loosening of personal identity, one is able to 
meditate on exchanging self for the self of others: 
ātmānaṃ ca parāṃś caiva yaḥ śīghraṃ trātum icchati     | 
sa caret paramaṃ guhyaṃ parātma parivartanam     || 
 
Whoever wishes to quickly save himself and others, should practice the 
supreme mystery, and exchange ‘self’ and ‘other’ (BCA. 8.120).  
 
Now we might wonder how a Buddhist, who is denying the existence of the self, 
could then go on to advocate a practice of exchanging one’s “self” for the self of 
another.  First of all, we might note that the trainee bodhisattva still has a sense of self.  
While the monk knows the self to be ultimately illusory, this sense of self is still quite 
real (cf. Albahari, 2006: 16-17).  Śāntideva writes: 
yasminn ātmany ati-snehād alpād api bhayād bhayam     | 
na dviṣet kastam ātmānaṃ śatruvadyo bhayāvahaḥ     || 
 
If, due to over-attachment to this self, even the slightest thing causes 
fear, should I not detest this self in the manner I hate the fearsome 




In other words, it is the denial of self that is at stake.  And second, this is no Lockean 
transference of consciousness (Locke, Essay: II.xxvii.15); rather it is to be seen as a 
mental exercise of putting oneself in another’s shoes, i.e. it is a program of 
imagination aimed at undermining the self.  One puts oneself in the place of the 
onlooker and looks back at one’s own mannerisms.  And so: 
hīnādiṣv ātmatāṃ kṛtvā paratvam api cātmani     | 
bhāvayerṣyāṃ ca mānaṃ ca nirvikalpena cetasā     || 
 
Taking an inferior, then a superior, and then an equal as ‘oneself’, and 
taking oneself as the ‘other’; with a mind free of conceptions, 
experience envy and pride (BCA. 8.140). 
 
In this way, the monk overcomes envy and competitiveness, and goes on to generate 
compassion for all beings.  We might note that “moral maturity” to this day is often 
measured by the degree to which one can “take the perspective of the other” (Scott & 
Seglow, 2007: 71).  However, at this point in the bodhisattva’s training, it is still a 
mental program, and the field must now shift to a more practical level.  Now the 
practical world the bodhisattva enters is one much different from the forest setting and 
the monastery setting which he is used to.  His monastic vows may well be 
compromised.  Śāntideva is aware of this, and allows for the breaking of the 
Pratimokṣa vows under certain conditions (BCA. 5.84).  For example, “At the time of 
giving, one may overlook such things as the moral code” (dāna kāle 
śīlopasaṃhārasyopekṣeti vistaraḥ) (Ś.S. 11).   
 
With the bodhisattva leaving the monastery, the distinction between the monk and the 
lay practitioner is potentially broken. However, there still remains the distinction 
between the homeless monk (pravrajya) and the householder (gṛhī).  Like Śaṅkara, 
Śāntideva clearly gives preference to the life of the former (Ś.S. 14), suggesting that, 
while both the lay disciple (upāsaka) and the monastic (bhikṣu) are worthy of gifts, 
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the monastic is infinitely more worthy (87).
162
  This forms part of the “dialectic of 
attachment and non-attachment to worldly life” as described by Thapar (1988: 274).  
But the fact that the bodhisattva may also be a householder complicates Thapar’s 
model of the householder as being “the source of dāna” (p283). In the Mahāyāna, the 
lay bodhisattva had a wider religious role to play.  Nevertheless, when giving 
(especially Dharma
163
), the monk is said to gain infinitely more merit than the 
householder (Ś.S. 144).  When it comes to the householder, Śāntideva is just as biased 
as Śaṅkara ever was.  In fact, the refrain “He has no yearning for wife, sons and 
daughters” (Ś.S. 14) might as easily have come from Śaṅkara’s pen.  Still, being a 
householder does not exclude one from being a bodhisattva (19 & 144), even if the 
household life does have “innumerable faults” (196).  While adultery is culpable by 
nature, having sex with one’s own wife is only culpable by convention (192).  One 
should therefore regard her with misgiving (78).  In other words, one must become as 
unattached as is reasonably possible within one’s social domain.  Mrozik (2007) thus 
talks of the “asceticized laity” (p35).  Still, a bodhisattva must give this household life 
up at some stage, for a householder can never become a Buddha (Ś.S. 193), 
asceticized or not.   
 
Interestingly, whereas the Gītā (3.6) describes the (external) renouncer as, a “self-
deluded hypocrite” (vimūdhātmā mithyācāraḥ), Śāntideva states that, one who leaves 
the household life is “free from deceit and hypocrisy” (māyā kuhā varjitāḥ) (Ś.S. 196).  
One can imagine Śaṅkara nodding in agreement.  Once again, it seems that the ethics 
of Śāntideva and Śaṅkara cut across religious boundaries and often pose more of a 
                                               
162 On the practice of giving (dāna) and the notion of worthy recipients in Indian ethics, see Heim 
(2007).  Also see Harvey (2000: 21-23). 
163 Thapar (1988: 289) notes that there is inscriptive evidence that monks and nuns also gave donations 
to the Saṅgha, thus further complicating the division of donor and receiver. 
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challenge to their own tradition than to the each other.  This is why a comparison of 
their ethics bears so much fruit for the study of Comparative Religion.   
 
In short, we have seen that both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva see the world through 
renouncer’s glasses, and yet both agree to play ball according to traditional rules.  
That is, traditional ethics survive both their ultimate discourses.  These traditional 
ethics are lineage-specific, which prevents Hinduism and Buddhism from collapsing 
into a single path.  We have also come to understand that both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva 
feel that those very rules can be side-stepped by the liberated few.  We will now 
attempt to discover exactly what it means to be liberated on their gnoseological terms, 
and how such liberating knowledge may be developed. 
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5. Knowledge and Liberation 
 
Here I will show that both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva wish to insist that liberating 
knowledge, i.e. enlightenment, is made possible through a certain insight, a 
realisation.  Both will link this realisation to their textual tradition, and both will claim 
that this realisation leads to the liberation from conditioned consciousness.  As we 
have seen, both have claimed that the average person inhabits a world we fail to know.  
While it is normal to think of knowledge in terms of distinctions and categorisations, 
both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva will insist that the intellect which makes such mundane 
distinctions is not only incapable of grasping the ultimate truth, but, in the final 
moments, actually stands as an obstacle to its dawning.  Our cognitive error is 
therefore self-imposed, and so we need to remove that ‘self’. 
 
From what we have heard about their respective metaphysics, it comes as no surprise 
that the final realisation they have in mind is different.  We should not be surprised by 
this.  Writing about philosophers in general, Lehrer (2000) opens his account of 
knowledge with the claim that “All agree that knowledge is valuable, but agreement 
about knowledge tends to end there” (p1).  And Śaṅkara can confirm that the same 
was true of philosophers in 8
th
 century India (B.S.Bh. II.i.11).  True, Śaṅkara also 
wants to say that “true realisation has no diversity” (samyag-jñānam eka rūpaṃ) 
(ibid.), and that “in liberation there can be no superiority” (na tu muktau kaścid 
atiśaya saṃbhavo ‘sti) (III.iv.52).  But then, as we have already mentioned, he would 
argue that the Mādhyamikas had taken hold of a mistaken view and that their search 
for liberation was incomplete.  And of course Śāntideva would say the same of the 
Vedāntin’s grasp of truth and their mistaken view of the self.  Hence, we see a strong 
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structural similarity between the two thinkers, whilst noting that ‘realisation’ or 
‘liberating knowledge’ has a different meaning for each tradition based on their 
conflicting metaphysics. 
 
For Śaṅkara, liberating knowledge can be restricted to the understanding of the non-
duality of consciousness in terms of the tropes of self and brahman.  Thus he will 
claim that enlightenment comes about when one realizes that all is indeed brahman.  
For Śāntideva, necessary knowledge is derivative of the understanding that all 
phenomena are inter-dependent and thus empty of inherent existence.  Thus he will 
claim that enlightenment comes about when one realizes that all is empty of 
independent existence.  But while the content claimed of the insight differs, we might 
note that if knowledge be taken as that which “rests on our capacity to distinguish 
truth from error” (Lehrer, 2000: 7), then both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva are clearly 
coaching us in the same direction.  For both agree that it is through this capacity to 
distinguish truth from error that one is said to be liberated from ignorance once and 
for all.  But ‘truth’ here is not to be taken as an objective fact about the state of things 
in the world, but rather as a conscious state which is free from error.  Such a liberated 
one is henceforth a teacher of men. 
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5.1 Śaṅkara: Liberation through Knowledge of Brahman 
 
The Vedic corpus is commonly divided into two categories, the section on rites 
(karma-kāṇḍa) and the section on knowledge (jñāna-kāṇḍa), where ‘jñāna’ indicates 
a state of consciousness which directly ‘knows’ brahman.    The latter section of the 
Vedas is referred to as the Upaniṣads.  The ‘Vedānta’, which literally means the end 
(anta) of the Vedas, and thus essentially equivalent to the Upaniṣads, came to be seen 
by many as the summit of the Vedas (Olivelle, 1992: 3).  Śaṅkara was a leading figure 
in the promotion of this line of thought, and worked tirelessly to strengthen its non-
dual interpretation, typically, but not exclusively, against his Mīmāṃsā opponents.164  
Śaṅkara thus distinguishes two types of knowledge, and claims that:  
karma nimitta vidyā pratyayayor virodhāt ... śāstra janya pratyayo 
vidyā rūpaḥ svābhāvikaṃ kriyā kāraka phala bheda pratyayaṃ 
karma vidhi nimittam anupamṛdya na jāyate, bhedābheda 
pratyayayor virodhāt    | 
 
Understanding determined by action and the ‘state of knowing’ are 
opposed to one another ... This ‘state of knowing’, in the form of 
realisation (born of scriptural understanding) cannot arise without 
demolishing the common notion regarding the differences between 
actions, accessories and results, which is the cause of rites and 
injunctions, because the two philosophies of difference and non-





Knowledge of brahman is clearly unlike other forms of knowledge.  It is said to be a 
“knowledge that is different from the known” (anya veda tad viditād) (Ken.U. 1.4).  
That is, it is neither factual nor empirical knowledge, nor the acquired experiential 
knowledge or instrumental knowledge required for action.  It is also said to be 
“beyond the unknown” (aviditād adhi) (Ken.U. 1.4).  It is a “higher knowledge” (parā 
vidyā) (Mu.U. I.i.4), brahman itself.   In Lipner’s (1997) words, “Brahman is reality-
                                               
164 For a balanced account of the debate between Advaita and Mīmāṃsa, see Ram-Prasad (2007: 101-
131).  See also, Halbfass (1983). 
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knowledge per se” (p311).  This makes it “totally ineffable” (vaktum śakyam eva na) 
(V.C. 482), for “brahman is inexpressible” (brahma nocyate) (Bh.G.Bh. 13.12).  
Elsewhere, Śaṅkara explains, “For nothing which lacks genus, etc. can ever be 
described in words” (na hy ajātyādimān kaścid arthaḥ śabdair nirūpyate) (U.S. 
Metric, 18.30).  And turning to scripture, Śaṅkara writes: 
sarvāsu hi upaniṣatsu jñeyaṃ brahma “neti neti”, “asthūlam anaṇu” 
ityādi viśeṣa pratiṣedhenaiva nirdiśyate, na “idaṃ tat” iti, vācaḥ 
agocaratvāt  || 
 
For in all the Upaniṣads, the knowable, brahman has only been indicated 
by negation of all attributes, such as “Not this, not this”, or “Neither 




Hence, brahman-knowledge is a knowledge which cannot be owned by an agent 
(kartṛ), “for the two contradictory notions, ‘I am brahman’ and ‘I am an agent’, 
cannot co-exist” (nahi brahmāsmi karteti viruddhe bhavato dhiyau) (U.S. Metric, 
18.225).  In fact, Śaṅkara explicitly denies that brahman (B.S.Bh. I.i.4) is an object of 
knowledge.  So when Olson (2011) calls nirguṇa-brahman an “object of knowledge” 
(p249), what he must mean is that nirguṇa-brahman belongs to the realm of vidyā as 
opposed to avidyā (the realm of ignorance).   In other words, it is a worthy subject of 
inquiry, all else being inferior, ultimately worthless.  Put bluntly, “inferior knowledge 
is no knowledge” (nikṛṣṭāyā vidyātvābhāvāt) (B.S.Bh. III.iv.52).  True knowledge, 
then, is that which remains after all inquiries are done, when the “desire to know 
ceases” (jijñāsā nivartate) (III.ii.22). 
 
Considering all that Śaṅkara says it is, and even more that which he says it is not, it 
would appear that this state of knowing (pratyaya) brahman is really more of a sense 
of conviction than of knowing about something.  Brahman is not ‘known’ 
representationally, but experientially.  This is no doubt a special type of experience, 
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one which arguably parallels the as-it-is-ness of the Buddhist.  In other words, it is an 
“enlightening knowledge” which illuminates the situation for what it really is (Lipner, 
2000: 67-68).  It is not that one has a self with the quality of consciousness which 
grasps brahman in a cognitive event; for it is said to be beyond (paraṃ) the 
propositional knowledge of beings (Mu.U. II.ii.1).  Strictly speaking, the “knower 
cannot be known by the knower” (na hi veditā veditur vedituṃ śakyaḥ) (Ken.U.Bh. 
2.1).  Hence, “realization is not of the ultimate, but it is itself the ultimate” 
(Klostermaier, 2007: 165).  So even firm conviction (niścitā pratipatti) that one knows 
brahman, though desirable, is equally questionable, for one might not fully know 
(Ken.U.Bh. 2.1).   
 
This state of knowing (pratyaya) therefore sits somewhat outside of the pramāṇa 
system and should not be equated with, say, the Nyāya’s valid presentational 
knowledge (pramā), which for Advaita, means un-contradicted (abādhita) cognition 
(see Dasgupta, 1975, Vol.I: 482-484).   Rather, this state of knowing falls into that 
category of which the “genuineness of the experience” is determined by an “external 
reference” (Flew, 2005: 145).  In contrast to external objects, brahman “possesses an 
inherent unknowability by normal faculties of knowledge” (Olson, 2011: 251).  Yet, 
experience of it sublates (bādha) all past knowledge.  Furthermore, it cannot be a 
(conventional) form of experiential knowledge, because the ‘object’ is non-different 
(abheda) from the ‘subject’.  It takes a skilful teacher to know whether the pupil has 
attained knowledge or not, and the rule-of-thumb seems to be, if he thinks he has, he 




So even the “all-knowingness” (sarva-jñātvam) of the yogi, who has perfected his 
sattva-quality
165
, does not touch brahman-knowledge, because the truth that is 
brahman is of a different order, being eternal (nitya) knowledge (B.S.Bh. I.i.5).  To 
know brahman is to share in the knowing that is brahman, it is to “become” (bhavati) 
brahman (Mu.U. III.ii.9).  The truth is that the self is reflexive-consciousness and this 
singular consciousness is brahman.  This state of knowing is therefore immediate and 
direct (sākṣāt) (Bṛ.U. III.iv.1).  It is a state which permits of no doubts (B.S.Bh. 
IV.i.15).  It cannot be attained through works, for as Śaṅkara tells us, work assumes 
the dualistic notion that there is a difference (bheda) between agent and results gained 
(Ch.U.Bh. II.xxiii.1). Nor is brahman-knowledge to be gained “through 
argumentation” (tarkeṇa) (Ka.U. I.ii.8-9), as it lies beyond the intellect. 
 
This higher knowledge is not the result of any active work, then, but dawns when 
physical and intellectual effort stop, when the individual rejects the adjuncts which 
separate him from brahman.  One gains knowledge of brahman through truly listening 
to one’s teacher (Ka.U.Bh. I.ii.8-9). All other instruments are ultimately “impediments 
to knowledge” (Taber, 1983: 31).  Hence, Śaṅkara concludes that brahman is to be 
known by the Vedas alone and not from reasoning (B.S.Bh. II.i.31).  Thus, 
authoritative word (śabda) from scripture (śruti) via teacher (ācārya, guru) is the only 
valid means (pramāṇa) for the final attainment of brahman knowledge.  That is, 
according to Śaṅkara, it takes a qualified teacher to advise whether one knows or not: 
śāstraṃ ca – “yady apy asmā imām adbhiḥ parigṛhītāṃ dhanasya 
pūrṇāṃ dadyāt etad eva tato bhūyaḥ” iti   |  anyathā ca jñāna prāpty 
abhāvāt  - “ācāryavān puruṣo veda”, “ācāryād dhaiva vidyā viditā”, 
“ācarāryaḥ plāvayitā”, “samyag-jñānaṃ plava ihocyate” ity ādi 
śrutibhyaḥ, “upadekṣyanti te jṅānaṃ” ity ādi smṛteś ca || 
                                               
165 According to Sāṃkhya, nature (prakṛti) is made up of three qualities (guṇā): sattva (purity), rajas 
(activity) and tamas (inertia).  The yogi becomes perfect by becoming pure-sattva (viśuddha-sattva). 




The scriptures also say “Even if one were to give him this [world] 
surrounded by oceans, filled with riches … this truly is more than that”.  
Since knowledge is obtained in no other way.  For the Śrutis say “He 
with a teacher knows”, “Knowledge learnt from a teacher …”, “The 
teacher is a boatman”, “His right knowledge is said to be a boat”, etc.  
The Smṛti also says “Knowledge will be imparted to you”, etc.  
(U.S. Prose, 1.3) 
 
So on the question of whether conviction = knowledge, or whether there is such a 
thing as self-authenticating experience, Śaṅkara may not appear quite consistent.  
Compare the above with this statement, quoted earlier: “For when somebody feels in 
his heart that he has realised brahman, and yet bears a body, how can this be contested 
by anyone else?” (B.S.Bh. IV.i.15).  However, I think we can reasonably take him to 
mean “anyone” except his teacher.   
 
Unfortunately, the addition of the teacher does not overcome the metaphysical 
problem of the need for an individual ‘experiencer’ who has an ‘experience’ which 
either does or does not require external validation (see Chapter 2).  If anything, we are 
now faced with a further individual, the teacher.  And it would seem that a teacher 
fully absorbed in brahman simply could not validate whether or not another was so 
absorbed.  My notion of flickering would however solve both these issues.  First, on 
my account, the teacher at the time of teaching would not be absorbed; but would be 
voluntarily within the provisional world.  Second, while the individuated self of the 
student may get lost in the ‘experience’ of brahman-consciousness; due to past 
tendencies, it inevitably returns.  
 
Such a state of brahman-consciousness is impossible for one who relies solely on the 
intellect in his search for knowledge.  On the limits of intellect, Śaṅkara writes: 
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yāvad ātma bhāvitvād buddhi saṃyogasya  |  yāvad ayam ātmā 
saṃsāri bhavati, yāvad asya samyag-darśanena saṃsāritvaṃ na 
nivartate, tāvad asya buddhyā saṃyogo na śāmyati   |   yāvad eva 
cāyaṃ buddy upādhi saṃbaṃdhaḥ tāvad evāsya jīvatvaṃ 
saṃsāritvaṃ ca   |    
 
As long as the contact between the self and the intellect necessarily 
follows, so the self is subject to transmigratory existence.  So long as 
there is no right seeing, so long as there is connection with this 
intellect, there will be no end to cyclic existence.  And this 
individuality and this transmigratory state will last as long as there is 
this connection with the intellect as adjunct (B.S.Bh. II.iii.30).  
 
 
So while no stranger to pure philosophising, it would appear that Śaṅkara is warning 
us that this state of knowing will forever elude one who limits himself to such modes 
of inquiry and dispute, the so-called “big-talker” (ati-vādin) (Mu.U. III.i.4).  Śaṅkara 
clearly wants to lead us to experience, not to argumentation, for it is in experience that 
we transcend this world.   
 
Nevertheless, he does so through, what Forsthoefel (2002) has called, “intellectual 
therapy” (p320).  Along with other more spiritual virtues, it is one’s intellectual work 
that gets one to the place where the intellect may be dropped.  In the Chāndogya 
Upaniṣad, Nārada, who begs Sanatkumāra to teach him about the Self (Ch.U. VII.i.3) 
is described as a “mere knower of the textual tradition” (mantra vit eva), but he is a 
knower of it.  Again, the man who has his “blindfold” (abhinahanaṃ) removed by the 
teacher is said to be intelligent (medhāvin) (VI.xiv.1).  In the Upadeśa Sāhasrī (Prose, 
1.2), the student is possessed of many excellent qualities, which include both 
“conduct” (vṛtta) and “learning” (vidyā).  Śaṅkara tells us that the Vedas assume that 
the person seeking a teacher is an intelligent man (purūṣa buddhi) (B.S.Bh. I.i.2).  
Thus, the worthy seeker must show himself to have “intellectual acumen” (Perrett, 
1998: 14).  It is due to the intellectual search and the student’s own exertions that he 
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now stands before the teacher.  This imposes upon the teacher the need for a 
“superlative degree of intellectual acumen” (Cenkner, 1983: 41).  Reflecting (manana) 
on the teacher’s words is the active counterpart to hearing (śravaṇa), and there is no 
doubt that hearing is “enriched by what the hearer brings to it” (Ram-Prasad, 2001a: 
201).
166
   
 
True, Śaṅkara critiques those “self-styled scholars” (paṇditaṃ manyāh), the 
“logicians” (tārkikā) who use reason as a substitute for the Vedas (Bṛ.U.Bh. II.i.20). 
Yet, despite citing the Kaṭha Upaniṣads’ (I.ii.8-9) claim that knowledge cannot be 
reached “through reason” (tarkeṇa) (Bṛ.U.Bh. II.i.20), in the very same Bhāṣya, 
Śaṅkara still adds “reasoning” (tarkataḥ) to the Upaniṣad’s classic statement on the 
matter (Br.U.Bh. II.iv.5).
167
  In fact, it has been claimed that reason is “paramount” in 
Śaṅkara’s system of liberation (Cenkner, 1983: 33).  His concern is really with the 
misuse, rather than the use of reason.  Reasoning is only acceptable when it is in 
accordance with the Vedas.  Śaṅkara, like other Hindu thinkers, thus warns against 
“rationalistic self-sufficiency” (Radhakrishnan, 1989: 23) or “dry” reasoning 
(Chakrabarti, 1997: 264).   
 
Nevertheless, Olson’s (1997: 168) claim that brahman-knowledge is “independent of 
man” needs qualifying.  Śaṅkara tells us that “brahman-knowledge is independent of 
man’s actions” (na puruṣa vyāpāra taṃtrā brahma-vidyā) (B.S.Bh. I.i.4).  He also 
says that the “realization of brahman is not determined by human effort” (sati apuruṣa 
                                               
166 The classic Advaitin methodological trio is hearing (śravaṇa), reflection (manana) and 
contemplation (nididhyāsana) (Bṛ.U. II.iv.5).   Also see the V.C. (70).  On varying interpretations of the 
“three methods” in Vedānta, see Ram-Prasad (2001a: 198-209), Cenkner (1983: 21-28 & 65ff), and 
Roodurmun (2002: 212ff).  Cf. the Theravāda’s D.N. (3.220). 
 




tantratvād brahma-vijñānasya) (Ken.U.Bh., intro), in that brahman-knowledge 
depends on brahman itself (B.S.Bh. I.i.4).  It is the “Self revealing Itself” (Cenkner, 
1983: 23).  Conventionally speaking, however, it is within the embodied human mind 
that knowledge dawns.  It is simply that, once at the threshold of knowledge, the 
mental apparatus should be silenced.  Śaṅkara states: 
api ca mithyā-jñāna puraḥsare ‘yam ātmano buddhy upādhi 
saṃbaṃdhaḥ   |   na ca mithyā-jñānasya samyag-jñānād anyatra 
nivṛttir astītyato yāvad brahmātmatānavabodhaḥ tāvad ayaṃ buddhy 
upādhi saṃbaṃdho na śāmyati darśayati ca 
 
Moreover, this connection of the self with the adjunct of intellect has 
forever been associated with misunderstanding and misunderstanding 
cannot come to an end except through right knowledge.  Hence, so 
long as there is no realisation of the Self as brahman, so long does the 
connection with the intellect persist (B.S.Bh. II.iii.30). 
 
The world of the intellect, like caste duties and associations, must be left behind.  
Only by renouncing all, even one’s own ‘personality’ (caste, family history, beliefs, 
etc), is the knowledge of brahman attained.  Of course, even the teacher must be 
“versed in the Vedas” (śrotriyaṃ) (Mu.U. I.ii.12), and the teachings he gives must 
include the great sayings of the Vedas.  Śaṅkara suggests the following format: 
pūrvam upadiśet  - “sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam”, 
“yatra nānyat paśyati”, “ātmaivedaṃ sarvam”, “ātmā vā idam eka 
evāgra āsīt”, “sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma” ityādyāḥ ātmaikya 
pratipādana parāḥ śrutīḥ     ||    upadiśya ca grāhayet brahmaṇo 
lakṣaṇam  –  “ya ātmāpahatapāpmā”, “yat sākṣād aparokṣād 
bhrahma”, “yo ‘śanāyāpipāse”, “neti neti”, “asthūlam anaṇu”, “sa 
eṣa neti”, “adṛṣṭaṃ draṣṭṛ”, “vijñānam ānandam”, “satyaṃ jñānam 
anantam”, “adṛśye ‘nātmye”, “sa vā eṣa mahānaja ātmā”, “aprāṇo hy 
amanāḥ”, “sabāhyābhyantaro hy ajaḥ”, “vijñānaghana eva”, 
“anantaram abāhyam”, “anyad eva tad viditād atho aviditāt”, “ākāśo 
vai nāma” ityādi śrutibhiḥ     || 
 
He should first teach the Śrutis which primarily present the oneness of 
Self, such as: “In the beginning, my child, this [universe] was existence 
only, one alone, without a second …”, “Where one sees nothing else 
…”, “All this is the Self”, “In the beginning, all this was but the Self”’, 
“Indeed all this is but brahman”.  After teaching these, he should help 
him, by means of the Śrutis, to grasp the marks of brahman, for 
example: “The Self is free from evil…”, “That brahman which is 
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manifest and directly known”, “That which is beyond hunger and 
thirst”, “Not this! Not this!”, “Neither gross nor subtle”, “This self is 
not this”, “It is the unseen seer”, “Knowledge, bliss”, “Real, 
knowledge, infinite”, “Invisible, bodiless”, “That great unborn Self”, 
“Breathless, mindless”, “Without and within unborn”, “Consisting of 
knowledge only”, “Without interior or exterior”, “It is indeed beyond 
the known and the unknown”, “Called space …” (U.S. Prose, 1.6-7). 
 
And so it is ultimately to Vedic revelation that reason is subordinated.
 
 The V.C. (58-
62) appears at variance on this point with the authentic works of Śaṅkara, even 
suggesting that the study of scripture is useless (58).  However, even here (33), the 
“guru” is said to be “versed in the Vedas” (śrotriya).  Despite all the rhetoric to the 
contrary, scripture is still seen as the “ultimate instrument to fashion the 
transformation of the mind” (Forsthoefel, 2002: 320). 
 
This intimate knowing of brahman, that results from such understanding of the Vedic 
teachings, does not lead to worldly gain, or even other-worldly gain.  Śaṅkara tells us 
that it is the way of a man who has “renounced” (virakta) all “seen” (dṛṣṭa) and 
“unseen” (adṛṣṭa) results (Ken.U.Bh., intro), meaning that even the wish for heavenly 
realms or bliss is to be denounced.  This amounts to an essentially negative liberation, 
a “freedom from”, what has been called the “minimal account of mokṣa” (Perrett, 
1985: 345).  ‘Knowledge’ then, in Advaitic terms, is really the removal of the 
apparatus of individuation.  There is nothing added.  One who knows simply becomes 
“identified with the eternal and unborn brahman” (paricchedyaṃ nityam ajaṃ 
brahma) (Ch.U.Bh. III.xi.3).   
 
Throughout his works, we see Śaṅkara’s goal as being that of a final state of brahman-
consciousness with the simultaneous release from the suffering of existence (e.g. 
B.S.Bh. I.iv.6 & IV.i.2).  As the Upaniṣads say, “a knower of the Self goes beyond 
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sorrow” (tarati śokam ātma-vid) (Ch.U. VII.i.3).  In Śaṅkara’s interpretation, this 
knowledge of self is achieved, not in the after-life, but “right here while alive” (ihaiva 
jīvan) (Ch.U.Bh. III.xii.9).  And subsequently, the renouncer “overcomes sorrow” 
(tarati śokam) “even while alive” (jīvan eva) (Ken.U.Bh., intro).  The soteriological 
goal then, for Śaṅkara, is to become such a jīvan-mukta (Mu.U.Bh. III.ii.9), apparently 
resting in the ultimate peace of brahmanhood (brahma-nirvāṇaṃ) (Bh.G.Bh. 2.72). 
 
As we shall see below (Chapter 6.2), this essentially negative thesis only presents 
itself as positive, as “freedom to”, when the jīvan-mukta is given the role of teacher.168  
This knowledge, when passed on from teacher to pupil, may rightly be called “saving” 
knowledge (Deutsch, 1973: 47), if by that we mean a knowledge which saves one 
from further rounds of suffering.  It is therefore interesting to note that, in the V.C. 
(35), the student’s supplication to the guru includes the phrase “save me” (mām 
uddhara).  When used in this pedagogical sense, the Buddha’s knowledge has also 
been called “saving knowledge” (Bastow, 1997: 412).  As Gombrich (2009: 78) states, 
“The nearest thing to a saviour that the karma doctrine allows is a teacher”.  And this 
seems as applicable to Advaita as to Buddhism.  Thus, Cenkner (1983) is justified in 
speaking of a “salvific relationship between teacher and pupil” (p15).  
 
But in truth, nothing is passed on, for brahman was already there in both teacher and 
pupil.  What takes place is therefore an “epistemic switch” (Ram-Prasad, 2001a: 211) 
to “precognitive knowledge” (Taber, 1983: 55).  It is like the boy who knew his group 
had started out as ten boys, but could now only count nine.  A passing man points out 
                                               
168 When Mumme asks whether the jīvan-mukta’s status is marked by “freedom from” or “freedom to” 
(Fort & Mumme, 1996: 264-267), she is questioning whether or not the jīvan-mukta is free “from” the 
law (Dharma), or free “to” follow it.  My concern here is more with the brahma-vid’s parallel with 




to him that he is the tenth boy and an “a-haa” experience takes place (T.U.Bh. II.i.1 & 
U.S. Metric, 12.3).  Nothing new has been added to the situation; only the ignorance 
of the boy has been removed.   Śaṅkara writes: 
na anātma lābhavat aprāptaprāptilakṣaṇa ātma lābhaḥ 
labdhṛlabdhavyayor bhedābhāvāt ...tasmād vidyayā tad apohana 
mātram eva lābhaḥ 
 
Unlike the attainment of things that are not-self, the attainment of the 
self does not involve the obtaining of something not previously 
obtained, because there is no difference between the attainer and what 
is to be attained ... Therefore, the attainment of [the self] is simply the 
removal of that [ignorance] through knowledge (Br.U.Bh. I.iv.7). 
  
So it would seem that, just as with Śāntideva above (BCA. 9.150), there is, in fact, no 
difference between being liberated and not being liberated.  Elsewhere, Śaṅkara 
confirms this in remarkably similar language: 
na hi vastuto muktāmuktatva viśeṣo ‘sti, ātmano nityaika rūpatvāt  |   
kiṃ tu tad viṣayā avidyā apohyate śāstropadeśa janita vijñānena  |  
prāktad upadeśa prāpteḥ tad arthaś ca prayatna upapadyata eva   | 
 
There is actually no difference between liberation and bondage. For, 
indeed, the self is always the same.  However, ignorance of this matter 
is removed by the knowledge that arises from the teachings of the 
scriptures.  But until one receives these, the effort put into attaining 
liberation is perfectly reasonable (Bṛ.U.Bh. IV.iv.6). 
 
Śaṅkara’s “na hi vastuto muktāmuktatva viśeṣo ‘sti” looks so much like Śāntideva’s 
“nirvṛtānirvṛtānāṃ ca viśeṣo nāsti vastu taḥ” (BCA. 9.150) it is almost eerie.  
Perhaps both are traceable to Nāgārjuna’s “na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃcid asti 
viśeṣaṇaṃ” (MMK. 25.19b).  All three lend themselves to the same translation.  The 
link between Śāntideva and Nāgārjuna is of course established, with Śāntideva 
recommending that one should consult Nāgārjuna’s work (BCA. 5.106).  As for 
Śaṅkara, we can only speculate.  Ram-Prasad (2001a: 210) wrote that Śaṅkara may 
have “deliberately or unwittingly” copied from Nāgārjuna.  But the evidence here 
shows an even closer relationship to Śāntideva’s wording.  It is indeed ironic that Otto 
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(1957) claimed that the doctrine that “Nirvāna and Samsāra are one and the same” 
would be “sheer madness on the basis of Śaṅkara’s teaching” (p150).   
 
On the basis that Śaṅkara accepts the notion of effort in attaining liberation, Taber 
(1983: 19) has spoken of Śaṅkara holding a “threefold scheme for liberation”, which 
involves preparation, insight and consolidation.  This is further evidence that the 
commonly held thesis that Śaṅkara denounces action is essentially false, as I will later 
demonstrate.  And as we saw in Chapter 4.3, Śaṅkara is further compromised by the 
fact that the Bhagavad Gītā went to great length in its glorification of action.  And so 
Śaṅkara, in accepting the Gītā’s authority, must allow for the notion of “non-attached” 
action as a form of renunciation.  It is thus accepted as a means to purifying the mind 
to make it ready for the realization of brahman.  This does not strictly mean that 
religious practices “cause” knowledge, as Taber (1983: 23) suggests; rather they 
prepare the ground, providing an opportunity to purify the mind, making it ready to 
receive the teachings which will cause knowledge to dawn (B.S.Bh. III.iv.26).   
 
Renunciation, then, is not necessarily physical renunciation, but more essentially 
involves an “inner” renunciation; the letting go of the notion that one is the ultimate 
agent of one’s actions.  But whether one remains embedded in the provisional world 
or (epistemically) rises up to the heights of the true world, one’s actions must be 
conducted selflessly.  That is Śaṅkara’s central ethic.  And such an ethic, at all levels, 
requires a certain degree of understanding.  At the highest level of understanding, 
where one sees the lack of individuated self, where one has gone beyond attachment 
to results, but even so continues to act towards others as if they had an individuated 




Clearly, if knowledge (vidyā) is the key to liberation, then nescience (a-vidyā), its 
literal Sanskritic opposite, is its enemy.  As we may gather from his use of the 
opposing terms ‘samyag-’ (right) and ‘mithyā-’ (wrong) jñāna (cognition), Śaṅkara 
tends to see ignorance more in personal, epistemological terms than in global, 
cosmological terms.  That is, his major focus is on man rather than on God’s power.  
Of the relationship between knowledge and nescience, Śaṅkara writes: 
na ca vidyāvidhye ekasya purūṣatya saha bhavataḥ, virodhāt 
tamaḥ prakāśāviva  
 
Knowledge and ignorance cannot co-exist in the very same person, 
for they are contradictory like light and dark (Bṛ.U.Bh. III.v.1). 
 
Now, it is clear from the context that Śaṅkara means knowledge of brahman (svarūpa-
jñāna) here, and not, as Grimes (1991: 298) claims, empirical knowledge (vṛtti-
jñāna).  For Śaṅkara continues, “Thus, the knower of Self must not be supposed to 
have any relationship with the sphere of ignorance” (tasmāt ātma-vidaḥ avidyāviṣayo 
‘dhikāro na draṣṭavyaḥ) (Bṛ.U.Bh. III.v.1).  Elsewhere (Mu.U.Bh. III.i.4), he does 
seem to be comparing light and dark in terms of empirical knowledge, but that is 
because he is arguing the other way around, that one involved in ritual actions cannot 
disport in the Self.  But in this same passage he also writes: 
ayaṃ tu vidvānnātmano ‘nyatpaśyati, nānyacchṛṇoti, nānyadvijānāti 
 
This enlightened man, however, does not see anything, does not hear 
anything, does not cognise anything other than the Self (Mu.U.Bh. II.i.4).  
 
Again, he asks: 
dṛśirūpe sadānitye darśanādarśane mayi   | 
kathaṃ syātāṃ tato nānya iṣyate ‘nubhavastataḥ   || 
 
How could there be [flickering between] seeing and not-seeing in me 
who is forever of the nature of [pure] seeing?  No experience, 




Śaṅkara thus appears to be asserting a constant, “context-free state of consciousness” 
(Ram-Prasad, 2001a: 171), which is permanently opposed to ignorance.  This is in 
direct opposition to my notion of flickering.  If this were his final word on the matter, 
then we would be faced with the same problem that has faced those scholars who have 
pondered the Mādhyamika’s (namely Candrakīrti’s) thesis that the Buddha’s pure 
mind is so non-conceptual that it would contain no cognitive images at all (see 
Arnold, 2005: 184).  That is, “pure consciousness” would be “indistinguishable from 
unconsciousness” (Perrett, 1985: 344).  Clearly, “life requires a richness of quality 
which neutral consciousness” could not explain (Ram-Prasad, 2001a: 167).  It is this 
richness of quality that my flickering model provides. 
 
As noted earlier, Śāntideva’s voluntary delusion saves us from such an investigation 
into the contents of a transparent consciousness.
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  And thankfully, as was mentioned 
in Chapter 2, Śaṅkara’s final word on the subject will save us again (at least with 
regard to the pre-death scenario), for it is in a sense another retraction of the above 
statements; for there is still the matter of past tendencies.  Let us remind ourselves 
then of the following admission: 
bādhitam api tu mithyā-jñānaṃ dvi-caṃdra jñāna vat saṃskāra vaśāt 
kiṃcit kālam anuvartata eva  | 
 
However, mistaken cognition, even when annulled, continues for a 
while owing to the influence of past tendencies, like the cognition of 
two moons [due to an eye condition]
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 (B.S.Bh. IV.i.15). 
 
Furthermore, Śaṅkara quite remarkably accepts that these past tendencies are stronger 
than this knowledge.  Hence: “The operation of [pure] knowing, being weaker than 
                                               
169 For an extended discussion of this in Buddhism, see Griffiths (1986 & 1994). 
 




they, is only one possible mode” (pakṣe prāptaṃ jñāna pravṛtti daurbalyam) 
(Bṛ.U.Bh. I.iv.7).   
 
Thus, we are surely justified in imagining the brahman-knower flickering between 
moments of ‘light’ and moments of ‘darkness’, or periods of samyag-jñāna and 
mithyā-jñāna.  It would seem that light and dark can co-exist in the very same person, 
but not at the same time.  Or we might say that the one ‘person’ flickers between 
imagining himself to be an individuated self and being in a non-individuated state of 
brahman.  In his brahman-moments, the imaginary individuated self disappears, and 
with it, desire for objects.  The V.C. merely confirms our suspicions that the early 
Advaitins acknowledged this flickering: 
jñāte vastuny api balavatī vāsanā ‘nādir eṣā kartā bhoktāpy aham iti 
dṛḍhā yā ‘sya saṃsāra hetuḥ  |   
 
Even after knowledge has been attained, there remains that     
beginningless, strong, obstinate impression that one is an agent and an 
experiencer; the cause of transmigration (V.C. 267a). 
 
It is due to this instability that renunciation is paramount, allowing time for full 
establishment in brahman.  Śaṅkara states that renunciation merely serves to mature 
(paripāka) Self-knowledge (Bṛ.U.Bh. IV.iv.7).  Thus, the world is not only there from 
the side of conventional truth, but, like brahman (Mu.U. II.ii.5), it may also act as a 
bridge, for liberation verily comes from within this world.  Individuation must 
therefore be “provisionally retained” (Ram-Prasad, 2001a: 171) in order to pass on 
that knowledge to the next generation of seekers.  But, while knowledge should be 
repeatedly explained to the pupil until firmly grasped (U.S. Prose, 1.2), it should also 




The teacher must therefore flicker between teaching others and absorption in 
brahman.  This is implicit in Śaṅkara’s notion that “total consummation in brahman” 
(brahmaṇi parisamāpti), or being “steadfast in brahman” (brahma-saṃstha), denotes 
the “absence of any other preoccupation” (ananya vyāpāra) (B.S.Bh. III.iv.20).  For it 
is clear that, in teaching others, one must assume an additional preoccupation.  Also, if 
the “Vedas are no Vedas” (vedā avedāḥ) in such a state of awakened consciousness 
(prabodhe) (B.S.Bh. IV.i.3), then surely the teacher must come out of this state in 
order to teach from them.  Hence, the only way the enlightened can help the 
unenlightened is by occasionally coming out of this state of absorption in order to 
share in the student’s distorted vision of reality.  Through such flickering, the knower 
is potentially fit for both domains.  And through such a theory of flickering, we save 
Śaṅkara from the charge of contradiction.   
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5.2 Śāntideva: Liberation through Seeing into Emptiness  
 
We have seen that liberation had a double meaning for Śaṅkara, being: 1) an end to 
nescience, and 2) an end to rebirth and suffering.  For Śāntideva, enlightenment does 
not naturally lead to liberation from cyclic existence (saṃsāra), for the bodhisattva 
has already denounced such liberation, both ultimately and conventionally.  
Ultimately speaking, there can be no ceasing of that which did not arise.  
Conventionally speaking, the Bodhisattva Vow will keep him in the round of rebirths, 
not through bondage, but through an act of will, through choice.  Unlike Śaṅkara, 
Śāntideva has no problem with action, for the bodhisattva does not resist the results of 
karma and may even risk some negative karma if the overall benefit is thought to 
outweigh the cost (see Chapter 6.1).  As such, Śāntideva can focus on putting an end 
to nescience in all beings without over-worrying about the possibility of gaining a 
karmic result, especially as accumulation of merit (puṇya) is simultaneously the 
elimination of demerit (pāpa).  The commencing-bodhisattva should even be willing 
to suffer a little in order to remove the suffering of others.  Śāntideva writes: 
kṛpayā bahu duḥkhaṃ cet kasmād utpadyate balāt     | 
jagad duḥkhaṃ nirūpyedaṃ kṛpā duḥkhaṃ kathaṃ bahu     || 
 
You may argue, “If compassion brings [us] so much pain, why force it 
to arise?”  But having determined the degree of suffering in the world; 
is the suffering from compassion so great?  (BCA. 8.104). 
 
For Indian Buddhists, like Śāntideva, knowledge is not an end in itself.  It is not so 
much knowledge that is at stake, but the subsequent reduction in suffering which is 
said to follow from such knowledge.  Whether this distinguishes Śaṅkara from his 
Buddhist contemporaries, as claimed by Ram-Prasad (2001a: 186-188), is open to 
debate, though I personally feel the question is perhaps one of emphasis rather than 
substance.  Ram-Prasad (2001a: 186-188) argues that Śaṅkara’s emphasis is on ending 
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“epistemic failure” rather than suffering.  However, near the close of the B.S.Bh 
(IV.iv.2), Śaṅkara states that “liberation is nothing but the cessation of bondage” 
(mokṣasya baṃdha nivṛtti mātrā), and in the U.S. (Prose, 2.45), we are told that the 
seeker of liberation ought to be “tired of the cycle of birth and death” (janma maraṇa 
lakṣaṇāt saṃsārāt nirviṇṇa), not tired of being ignorant.  Moreover, Śaṅkara goes far 
beyond the source text in his description of the suffering inherent in the act of birth 
(Ch.U.Bh. V.ix.1).  Saha (2009) therefore appears wrong to suggest that, for Śaṅkara, 
“Suffering is not a matter for [sic] experiencing any physical discomfort” (p28).  
Furthermore, we should not forget that, in India, re-birth implies re-death, and this 
may well be seen as the greater of the two evils.  And Śaṅkara tells us that “One who 
sees diversity in [brahman] goes from death to death” (mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya 
iha nāneva paśyati) (U.S. Prose, 1.26), whereas liberation puts an end to re-death 
(Bṛ.U.Bh. III.ii.10).171 
 
So while it is ignorance which binds the seeker, existentially, it is suffering which 
inspires the wish for knowledge.  Śāntideva makes this incredibly explicit when he 
writes, “Therefore, with the desire to end suffering, one should develop wisdom” 
(tasmād utpādayet prajñāṃ duḥkha nivṛtti kāṅkṣayā) (BCA. 9.1b).  Thus, he 
demonstrates the fact that “Buddhist ethics is based on the ultimate good, the 
liberation from suffering” (de Silva, 2007: 233).  Here, he appears to sit comfortably 
alongside the Śrāvaka Buddhist.  However, it is because this desire to end suffering 
extends to all other beings that, unlike the Śrāvaka, an end to rebirth plays no part in 
Śāntideva’s soteriology.   
 
                                               
171 Roodurmun (2002: 220) also suggests that Śaṅkara saw knowledge principally as a means of ending 
suffering.  Likewise, Potter (1981) claims that the “purpose of philosophy” for Advaita is liberation 
from the “bondage of rebirth” (p6).   
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Unlike the Śrāvaka, and indeed Śaṅkara, the bodhisattva is willing to be reborn in 
order to help other sentient beings.  The path he walks is one of accumulation of merit 
(puṇya saṃbhāra), through virtuous practice and meditation, finally leading to 
wisdom (prajñā) and higher knowledge (jñāna).  That is, he walks the traditional 
bodhisattva-yāna.  The path is thought to naturally lead to an insight into emptiness, a 
true cognition of how the world is.  Meditation leads to seeing.  Such a virtuous seer is 
henceforth possessed of the enlightened freedom to act for the benefit of all.  Śaṅkara 
thus sits closer to the historical Buddha here than does Śāntideva, for it was an 
innovation of the Mahāyāna to denounce the final liberation of nirvāṇa, and to see 
nirvāṇa in non-ultimate terms. 
 
Like Śaṅkara, one of Śāntideva’s first moves is to denounce the intellect (buddhi).  
Hence, as we saw in Chapter 2, reality (tattva) is said to be beyond the scope of the 
intellect (BCA. 9.2b).  He also went on to tell us that the mistake made by the 
common man (loka) is to imagine the objects within the world to be real (tattvataḥ), 
when they are in fact illusion-like (māyā-vad) (BCA. 9.5).  Therefore, he adds that “It 
is the reification of reality that is here refuted, as that is the cause of suffering” 
(satyataḥ kalpanā tv atra duḥkha hetur nivāryate) (9.25b).   
 
The only way that this reification can be annulled is through an insight into emptiness 
(śūnyatā), which, according to Nāgārjuna, corresponds with the cessation of 
discursiveness (prapañcopaśamaṃ) (MMK, Dedication).  Thus, we saw Śāntideva 
addressing the Śrāvaka monk: 
satya darśanato muktiḥ śūnyatā darśanena kiṃ     | 
na vinānena mārgeṇa bodhir ity āgamo yataḥ    || 
 
[You say] Liberation comes from understanding the [Noble] Truths.  
What then is the point of seeing emptiness?  [We reply] Because 
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[Mahāyāna] scriptures say that there is no awakening without this path 
(BCA. 9.40). 
 
We see here that Śāntideva does not try to justify emptiness in terms of a self-
validating experience (see Burton, 2004: 150), but gives a testimonial argument for its 
efficacy.   Of course, it is a testimony that his opponent, the Śrāvaka, will reject.  He 
therefore tries another tack, an assault on outward behaviour (that might as easily 
apply to the brahman-knower): 
kleśa prahāṇān muktiś cet tad anantaramastu sā     | 
dṛṣṭaṃ ca teṣu sāmarthyaṃ niḥkleśasyāpi karmaṇaḥ     || 
 
If liberation results from the destruction of the defilements, [as you 
say], it ought to follow immediately after.  Yet the influence of 
karma can still be seen in those [‘arhats’] who are free of 
defilements (BCA. 9.45). 
 
The mind might well have moments of purity without the realisation of emptiness, but 
it will continually return to normal states of ignorance; that is, it will oscillate.  This 
oscillation, however, is no voluntary flickering, for it is beyond the monk’s control.  
And so he tells the Śrāvaka monk: 
vinā śūnyatayā cittaṃ baddham utpadyate punaḥ     | 
yathāsaṃjñi samāpattau bhāvayet tena śūnyatāṃ     || 
 
Without emptiness, the fettered mind arises again, as in the case of the 
meditative state of non-perception; therefore one must cultivate 
emptiness (BCA. 9.48). 
 
In other words, it is not enough to settle on the ability to enter into certain higher 
states of consciousness.  One must attain a higher degree of wisdom.  Hence, we have 
to “train ourselves out of the automatic habit of projecting svabhāva [inherent 
existence] onto a world that lacks it” (Westerhoff, 2009: 13).  And thus, in the words 
of Nāgārjuna, “When ignorance ceases, mental formations will not arise” (avidyāyāṃ 




Śāntideva argues that the potential benefits of realising emptiness are two-fold; firstly, 
the power it gives one to act compassionately, and secondly, the guaranteed removal 
of both the defilements and the obscuration to omniscience.  While the arhat may 
have removed the defilements, they are still left with certain mental obscurations 
which prevent omniscience, and only the bodhisattva’s path of emptiness and skilful 
means can remove them: 
sakti trāsāttva nirmuktyā saṃsāre sidhyati sthitiḥ     | 
mohena duḥkhinām arthe śūnyatāyā idaṃ phalaṃ     || 
 
Being able to remain in cyclic existence, free from attachment and 
fear, for the benefit of those suffering through their delusion - such is 
the fruit of emptiness (BCA. 9.52). 
 
kleśa jñeyāvṛti tamaḥ pratipakṣo hi śūnyatā     | 
śīghraṃ sarva-jñatā kāmo na bhāvayati tāṃ katham     || 
 
Since emptiness is the antidote to the veil of afflictions and to 
obscurations of knowledge, how is it that one desirous of omniscience 





While Śāntideva goes to some length to explain what he means by emptiness, a more 
succinct definition was given by Nāgārjuna, said to contain the “entire Mādhyamika 
system in embryo” (Garfield, 1995: 304).  It runs, “Whatever is dependently arisen, 
that we call emptiness” (yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe) (MMK. 
24.18a).  In other words, because everything arises dependent on prior causes and 
conditions, there is no ‘thing’ which may be said to exist inherently without the need 
for such causes and conditions.  This lack of inherent existence (sva-bhāva) is called 
their emptiness (śūnyatā).  And the Mādhyamika assumes that everything, including 
                                               
172 Omniscience is a theoretical aim in Mahāyāna Buddhism, and is basically synonymous with 
Buddhahood (buddhatvaṃ), the pinnacle of the ten-stage path.  I will not take up the debate about 
literal or non-literal omniscience here as it plays no real part in Śāntideva’s ethics, which rely on the 
notion of voluntary delusion.  For an extended discussion, see Burton (2004: 37-40). 
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one’s mental states, is dependently arisen.  To understand this truth is to be liberated 
from the reification of imagined, self-standing ‘objects’, including the Yogācāra’s 
citta and the Brahmin’s puruṣa.  And as we have seen, to teach this ultimate truth 
without projection to those people whose views are characterised by projection is 
Śāntideva’s ultimate aim (BCA. 9.167).  As for the view of emptiness itself, Śāntideva 
advises the Śrāvaka that they should: 1) accept its validity as a teaching of the 
Buddha, and 2) meditate on it: 
tad evaṃ śūnyatā pakṣe dūṣaṇaṃ nopapadyate     | 
tasmān nirvicikitsena bhāvanīyaiva śūnyatā     || 
 
As such, there is no valid objection to the emptiness doctrine.  
Therefore one should meditate on emptiness without hesitation  
(BCA. 9.53). 
 
Buddhism has traditionally divided meditation practice into calm-abiding (śamatha) 
and insight (vipaśyanā).  The contrast is sometimes explained in terms of states of 
absorption (dhyāna) and modes of analysis.  Now, given that Śāntideva claims that 
even the higher absorptions do not guarantee insight into emptiness (BCA. 9.48), it 
would seem that what is required is some form of insight meditation.  In fact, we may 
reasonably assume that the practitioner “alternates between analytical and stabilizing 
meditation” (Hopkins, 1996: 89).  Thus, Śāntideva writes: 
kāya citta vivekena vikṣepatsya na saṃbhavaḥ     | 
tasmāl lokaṃ parityajya vitarkān parivarjayet     || 
 
With body and mind aware, distractions do not arise.  Thus, having 
renounced this world, one should avoid conjecture (BCA. 8.2). 
 
śamathena vipaśyanāsuyuktaḥ kurute kleśa vināśamityavetya     | 
śamathaḥ prathamaṃ gaveṣnīyaḥ sa ca loke nirapekṣayābhiratyā     || 
 
Knowing that one of well-attuned insight through tranquillity destroys 
the defilements, one must first seek tranquillity; and that by first 




Thus, Śāntideva calls for a state of inner-renunciation which will then allow the mind 
to settle.  From this state of tranquillity it is deemed possible to begin the analysis into 
the nature of consciousness and its relation to the world of ‘objects’.  We can then 
read much of the ninth chapter of the BCA itself as a form of analytical insight 
meditation.  The main analytical conundrum is that of the illusory nature of pseudo-
reality and its causes: 
māyayā nirmitaṃ yac ca hetu bhiryac ca nirmitaṃ     | 
āyāti tat kutaḥ kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatāṃ     || 
 
What is created by illusion and what by causes?  From whence do they 
come and where do they go?  This we must examine (BCA. 9.143). 
  
Relying on what he calls the “Mādhyamika style of reasoning” (Gyatso, 1975: 42), the 
Dalai Lama writes, “Once the referent object of the conception of inherent existence is 
known to be non-existent, one can easily ascertain emptiness” (ibid.).  The Dalai 
Lama then confirms Śāntideva’s assertion that the intellect is incapable of such a 
grasp on reality, but reminds us that this is a two-stage process which includes the 
intellect.  Thus, the Dalai Lama continues:  
With respect to a non-conceptual wisdom that apprehends a profound 
emptiness, one first cultivates a conceptual consciousness that 
apprehends an emptiness, and when a clear perception of the object of 
meditation arises, this becomes a non-conceptual wisdom (p55).
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Śāntideva muses: 
yadā na labhyate bhāvo yo nāstīti prakalpyate     | 
tadā nirāśrayo ‘bhāvaḥ kathaṃ tiṣṭen mateḥ puraḥ     || 
 
When one considers that the entity does not truly exist, and nothing is 
perceived, how could a baseless non-entity stand before the mind? 
(BCA. 9. 33) 
 
 
                                               
173 For a comprehensive study of emptiness meditation techniques in Tibetan Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, 




His response, taken by Ruegg (1981: 83) to be a “summing up of the central 
idea of the Middle Way”, runs:  
 
yadā na bhāvo nābhavo mateḥ saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ     | 
tadānyagaty abhāvena nirālambā praśāmyate     || 
 
When neither entity nor non-entity stands before the mind, because 
there is no other mode, the mind, without support, becomes tranquil 
(BCA. 9.34). 
 
This process of “self-critical rationality” (Ganeri, 2001: 47) is one of “shaking 
oneself free of habitual patterns of thought” (Huntington, 1989: 81).  One must 
“eradicate the innate non-analytical intellect that misconceives the nature of the 
person and other phenomena” as having inherent existence (Hopkins, 1996: 
30). Hence, one analyses the object of meditation until the “cognition of 
unfindability” arises with sufficient force (p64). 174   And, according to 
Śāntideva, we can be sure that we have come to the end of this process when 
there is no basis left for analysis: 
vicāritena tu yadā vicāreṇa vicāryate     | 
tadānavasthā tasyāpi vicārasya vicāraṇāt     || 
vicārite vicārye tu vicārasyāsti nāśrayaḥ     | 
nirāśrayatvān nodeti tac ca nirvāṇam ucyate     || 
 
[Objection] But when analysis is itself analysed by analysis, there is 
no end, since that analysis may also be analysed.  [We reply] But 
when the thing to be analysed has been [truly] analysed, there is no 
basis left for analysis.  Without basis, it ends.  That is said to be 
nirvāṇa (BCA. 9.109-110).175 
 
At this point, the yogi is unable to find any ‘thing’ to call an object.  One has here 
reached the “limit of analysis” where there is an “abandonment of affliction” 
(Kapstein, 2001: 217).  However, even when this emptiness has become a direct 
realization, flickering still occurs.  This is said to continue up until the eighth bhūmi; 
                                               
174 On the notion of unfindablity (anupalabdhi) of self, see Kapstein (2001: 77ff).   
 




for, until that stage of the path, the yogi is said to be incapable of consistently 
remaining in that direct realization of emptiness during the actual perception of 
phenomena (see Hopkins, 1996: 103-104). 
 
Now Śāntideva is well aware that he cannot help himself to the Indian pramāṇa 
system in order to justify emptiness, but he seems unconcerned by this: 
pramāṇam apramāṇaṃ cen nanu tat pramitaṃ mṛṣā     | 
tattva taḥ śūnyatā tasmād bhāvānāṃ nopapadyate     || 
kalpitaṃ bhāvam aspṛṣṭvā tad abhāvo na gṛhyate     | 
tasmād bhāvo mṛṣā yo hi tasyābhāvaḥ sphuṭaṃ mṛṣā     || 
 
[Objection]  If a means of knowledge is [in fact] not [ultimately] a 
means of knowledge [for you], then surely all gained by that means is 
falsely established.  Therefore the emptiness of phenomena is not truly 
ascertained [by a valid cognition].  [We reply]  Where there is no 
contact with an imaginary existent there is no grasping at its non-
existence.  For, if the being of an entity is deceptive, clearly its non-
being [i.e. emptiness] is equally deceptive (BCA. 9.138-139). 
 
In other words, as the ‘object’ under analysis is not truly existent, so its emptiness is 
not truly existent.  And so, when one’s insight into the illusory nature of phenomena is 
so strong that there is no expectation of contact between an individuated 
consciousness and a self-standing object, then emptiness is fully established.  There is 
no need for a positive perception of emptiness itself as there is no such self-standing 
emptiness.  It is not the case that an Absolute appears when the conventional ceases.  
Rather, in order to understand the non-substantial nature of a conventional ‘existent’ it 
is of value to first examine its imagined nature and then to remove one’s false 
perception of it as being a self-standing ‘object’.  The subsequent view of emptiness is 
thus free of reification.   
 
Beyond this point of realisation, one would need to voluntarily assume persons as self-
standing individuals in order to fulfil the Bodhisattva Vow (see Chapter 6.1).  While it 
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may be true that one might eventually reach such a level of clarity that one’s epistemic 
transparency would lead to a state where the “two cognitions [conventional and 
ultimate] no longer function alternatively or separately”, but “simultaneously” 
(Thakchöe, 2011: 49), Śāntideva’s solution appears a more realistic one.  Śāntideva 
reminds his bodhisattvas that they are not buddhas, but humans who must know their 
level of development.  Thus, Śāntideva’s is a traditional Mahāyāna cultivation of 
insight (vipaśyanā) through tranquillity (śamathena), with altruistic intent 
(bodhicitta), with the addition of a voluntary delusion.  Therefore, Śāntideva’s 
“emptiness-based altruism” (Clayton, 2006: 63) is one that involves an implicit 
flickering between the Two Truths.
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One question that remains unanswered is how wisdom should lead one to selfless 
action.  Is it that such wisdom (prajñā) makes one automatically moral?  Is it that 
without belief in a self, egoism naturally turns into altruism?  I have been able to glean 
at least four possible responses in Śāntideva’s works: 1) the weakening of craving, 
attachment and fear, along with an insight into non-self, makes one less self-centred, 
redefining one’s boundaries, leaving one more open to others; 2) an understanding of 
the inter-dependence of karmic relationships leads one to view others as being 
profoundly relevant to one’s own path; 3) when one has become free of the shackles 
of saṃsāra, one gains a deep sympathy for those that remain caught in it; and 4) one 
feels duty-bound via the Bodhisattva Vow to save others from suffering and to 
continue the Buddha’s lineage.  This seems to amount to a complete reorientation in 
one’s view of the world.  Śāntideva writes: 
                                               
176 Of course, all of these steps depend on the previous perfections, for which one may read the BCA 
itself.  One might also refer to Huntington (1989: 69-104).  This excellent guide to the bodhisattva path 




guṇo ‘paraś ca duḥkhasya yat saṃvegān madacyutiḥ    | 
saṃsāriṣu ca kāruṇyaṃ pāpād bhītir jine spṛhā    || 
 
Suffering has a further quality in that it inspires the desire for liberation. 
One feels compassion for those in cyclic existence, a fear of demerit, 
and a yearning for Buddhahood (BCA. 6.21). 
 
But we should not forget that a certain degree of bodhicitta was already present long 
before the view of emptiness.  And so throughout this chapter on patience (kṣānti), we 
find references to compassion.  Another quote shows how compassion appears as the 
antidote to anger and intolerance: 
kleśonmattī kṛteṣv eṣu pravṛtteṣv ātma ghātane     | 
na kevalaṃ dayā nāsti krodha utpadyate katham     || 
 
Driven mad by their defilements they resort to killing themselves.  How 
is it that you show no compassion, but become angry? (BCA. 6.38) 
 
Finnigan and Tanaka (2011: 229) have also highlighted how, for Candrakīrti, 
“compassion is the root of both the aspiration for enlightenment and nondualistic 
wisdom”.  So it might be suggested that “selfless concern” is in fact needed in order to 
“actualize the concept of emptiness” (Huntington, 1989: 84).  In other words, selfless 
action is partly the result of a selfless attitude previously developed which has already 
sensitized one to the suffering of others.  Thus, the Dalai Lama (1994: 114) suggests 
that while one may not need the first five pāramitās in order to realise emptiness, one 
certainly needs them if one wishes to benefit others.  One might therefore speak of the 
monk or the bodhisattva as having an “ethicized consciousness” (Gombrich, 2009: 
83).  Such an internalized compassion “imperatively compels us to act selflessly” 
(Thurman, 1976: 4), making one feel “obliged to go out and help others” (Dharmasiri, 
1989: 50).  That is why we sometimes need to think of Buddhist Ethics in terms of a 




It is the heightening of this sensitivity through the realization of the truth of inter-
dependence (Ś.S. 119) along with the constant reaffirmation of the Bodhisattva Vow 
which finally leads to a complete reorientation in one’s lifestyle.  Compassion is then 
in “profound accord with the knowledge gained through philosophical analysis” 
(Huntington, 1989: 102).  It thus becomes “effortless” (ayatnataḥ) (BCA. 1.35).  And 
it should by now be clear that there is no obvious “means/end distinction” (Siderits, 
2003: 111, note c) in Śāntideva’s bodhisattva path and that compassion runs right the 
way through.  The mind must return to bodhicitta over and over again, for wavering 
(dolāyamānaḥ) is inevitable (BCA. 4.11). 
 
Given that the virtues of the jīvan-mukta are also said to run right through (Fort & 
Mumme, 1996: 144), and given that Śaṅkara explicitly endorses such a thesis (U.S. 
Prose, 1.2-6), then it comes as no surprise that we can glean parallel responses in 
Śaṅkara on the link between brahman-knowledge and compassion.  This is so, even if 
Śaṅkara does claim that the jīvan-mukta’s “knowledge cannot supply any impulsion to 
action” (na ca tad vijñānaṃ karmaṇāṃ pravartakaṃ bhavati) (B.S.Bh. III.iv.8), for it 
is clear from the context that it is ritual action that is being denied.  Thus, we may still 
find: 1) a similar weakening of craving and attachment, along with an insight into the 
non-self of the jīva-trope giving rise to an unbounded view of reality; 2) a conviction 
in the one basic ground of being (sat) which leads one to view others as 
manifestations of the one source; 3)  a similar sense of freedom from the shackles of 
saṃsāra, leading to a sympathetic attitude to the seeker of liberation; and 4) a feeling 
of being duty-bound to protect others, along with a simultaneous need to continue the 




So once again, we see how close Śāntideva and Śaṅkara stand in both aim and 
method.  Both wish to be rid of reification, of false understanding.  Both describe this 
as a form of realisation that is beyond the intellect.  Both ground their views almost 
exclusively within their own textual tradition, in what Forsthoefel (2002: 320) has 
called the “external circuitry” of “text, tradition and teacher”.  While Śāntideva 
informs us that the Buddha’s word is to be taken as “truth” (bhūta) (BCA. 8.156), 
Śaṅkara states that any teaching that opposes the Vedas is contradictory by default 
(B.S.Bh. II.ii.18).  Moreover, both form hierarchies of knowledge within their 
tradition, claiming that certain practitioners know better than others and that certain 
textual statements are more definitive than others.  Both see the aim of their texts and 
the result of the eventual realisation as a reversal of the egoistic attitude, though both 
suggest that a hint of this non-egoistic attitude is in fact necessary for the path.  Both 
claim that realisation removes ignorance (avidyā) and leads to an end of suffering 
(duḥkha).  Both insist that renunciation is a necessary preliminary to insight, and that 
some form of inquiry into reality is necessary.  Both then claim that this inquiry must 
eventually cease, and both surprisingly devalue the rewarding bliss (ānanda) that their 
traditions assert arises at this juncture.  And finally, both will place their knowers-of-
reality in the role of teacher, whose “job” it is to show others that there is in fact no 
individuated self.  That is, both would agree with Dharmasiri (1989: 52) that, “The 
most important expression of the monks’ sympathy is their teaching”.  Thus, both 
Śāntideva and Śaṅkara advocate what Cooper and James (2005: 82) have called an 
“ethically charged form of knowledge”.   
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6. A Selfless Response to the World 
 
We have just drawn a distinction between the forms of liberation espoused by Śaṅkara 
and Śāntideva.  Both are now faced with the issue of the life that the “liberated” 
person lives before their physical death.  Both have nominated the life of teaching 
others as the perfect occupation.  Yet, due to their radically revisionary metaphysics, 
both are faced with a critical ethical question: How should such a ‘person’ respond to 
a world which is like an illusion?  In fact, we may well ask the deeper motivational 
question: Why should they respond to a world that is like an illusion?   
 
The question is perhaps more complex for Śaṅkara than for Śāntideva.  While it is true 
that both share the notion that we are kept in gnoseological bondage due to ignorance, 
they do not agree on what keeps us in the world.  For Śāntideva, it is the will to 
benefit other beings, the voluntary accumulation of merit (and thus positive karma) 
that keeps one in the world.  For Śaṅkara, the liberated person has gone beyond 
karma, and so no such accumulation could take place.  As a consequence of this 
metaphysics, it is only past karma that could keep one here.  Now, if knowing 
brahman is going to put an end to rebirth, and if rebirth is caused by karma, then the 
knowledge of brahman must also put an end to karma.  But if karma were to end with 
knowledge, then this body (which is the result of karma) must also (instantaneously) 
end.  The question thus arises, how does one who knows brahman continue to live?  
And so we will see that Śaṅkara is forced into denying that all karma is ended with 
knowledge of brahman.  Rather, some is and some is not.  This will amount to a 




We therefore need to be careful of the assertion that, for Advaita, karma is a 
“convenient fiction” (Deutsch, 1973: 69).  Deutsch clearly overstates his case (Nelson, 
1996: 30), for if karma was indeed some sort of heuristic device, then it was a sticky 
one, one which refused to go away after it had surpassed its usefulness.  Better to say 
that it was a meaningful notion which helped the Advaitins explain certain 
phenomena; such as bondage, class status, justice, morality, purification, and 
liberation; but a notion that only holds true for provisional reality.   
 
According to certain texts, all karma is reportedly burnt up when ultimate knowledge 
dawns (Mu.U. II.ii.8 & Bh.G. IV.37).  Nevertheless, the fact that the body of the 
seeker (which is the result of past karma) evidently remains intact even after 
brahman-knowledge has dawned forces Śaṅkara-the-exegete into a compromise 
whereby karma “crosses over” (as it were) into the terrain of the ultimate, with the 
jīvan-mukta’s mind flickering between absolute and provisional states.  In other 
words, the ultimate gnoseological life kicks in prior to the ultimacy of karma-less, 
incorporeal liberation (videha-mukti).  According to Śaṅkara, the liberated being 
(jīvan-mukta) must still live out a certain type of residual (prārabdha) karma, after 
which he will “fall”, as it were (Ch.U.Bh. VI.xiv.2).   
 
But, at this level of explanation, the concept of karma actually becomes in-convenient.  
As Śaṅkara’s own “objector” states: Why doesn’t the knower fall immediately on the 
attainment of knowledge?  How can one be sure that the knower’s karma will end at 
death?  How does one know that rebirth will come to an end? (Ch.U.Bh. VI.xiv.2).  
Śaṅkara’s response is that knowledge of brahman has eliminated past karma which 
has yet to bear fruit (saṃcita-karma), but the knower is still subject to past karma that 
has already begun to bear fruit (prārabdha-karma).  This karma does not affect his 
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conduct, and for the rest of his existence, his conduct is said to be “beyond good and 
evil” (Deutsch, 1973: 100).  This does not mean that he may act as he likes; rather, he 
has gone beyond the making of merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa), and will thus 
produce no future (āgāmi) karma.177   
 
His prārabdha-karma will naturally wear out with the passing of time, just as an 
arrow which has left the bow must travel and then come to a stop (Ch.U.Bh. VI.xiv.2).  
But the problem of the “delay” will not go away so easily, and even Śaṅkara, who 
claims that it is “illogical” (anupapannam) that one who has put an end to ignorance 
should take rebirth (B.S.Bh. III.ii.9), is later forced to admit that rebirth may be 
necessary if the knower is given a “mission” (adhikāra) by the gods (III.iii.32).  In 
order to answer the question of how long this mission will last, Śaṅkara again turns to 
the analogy of the arrow (ibid.), whereby the end of the mission means the falling of 
the man.  But the question of how long it takes for prārabdha-karma to end is never 
made clear, for it seems to be at the mercy of the gods.
178
  In other words, the 
“liberated” being does not as yet have the total freedom of action (kāmacāra) or self-
rulership (sva-raj) mentioned in the Ch.Up. (VII.xxv.2).  This sits in contrast to the 
bodhisattva, who makes it his own mission to return for the sake of other beings.  But 
in order to have his “own” mission, he must remain an ‘agent’, so the selflessness of 
the bodhisattva is again brought into question.   
 
For Śaṅkara, the teacher’s passing on of the knowledge of brahman produces no 
positive karma whatsoever for himself, for none of the knower’s actions bear any 
                                               
177 Cf. the Buddha’s description of a true monk (Dhp. 267) and a true Brahmin (Dhp. 412). 
 
178 Śaṅkara discusses divine missions here on his opponent’s terms.  There is no hint in Śaṅkara’s 




personal fruit (Ch.U.Bh.VI.xiv.2).  Of course, it will help the pupil toward removing 
past karma.  This act of teaching is not to be seen as an obligatory duty, but as 
selfless, spontaneous action, arising from within the jīvan-mukta’s very nature.  This 
spontaneity is indicated in the Upaniṣads by the notion of child-like behaviour, 
whereby the mukta acts “howsoever he may, being just so” (yena syāt tenedṛśa eva) 
(Bṛ.U. III.v.1).   According to the V.C., this includes a form of altruism: 
ayaṃ sva-bhāvaḥ svata eva yat para śramāpanodapravaṇaṃ 
mahātmanām   | 
 
It is the very nature of those of great-self to labour of their own accord 
in order to dispel the troubles of others (V.C. 38).  
 
And Śaṅkara seems to reinstate the notion of Dharma and duty, stating that the 
enlightened (vidvān) should act according to the laws of scripture (smṛti).  He seems 
rather cautious about the interpretation of the Upaniṣads, insisting that “howsoever he 
may” does not imply “disrespectful” (anādaraḥ) behaviour (Bṛ.U.Bh. III.v.1).  Rather, 
the teacher needs to act with a certain level of modesty, and so Śaṅkara reads “child-
like” (bālyena) to mean free from haughtiness (darpa) (B.S.Bh. III.iv.50).  As this 
teaching will necessarily include the use of the great sayings (mahāvākyā), we should 
also be cautious about such statements as, “The need for sacred texts loses its validity 
only for the adept” (Isayeva, 1993: 197).  Such language of transcendence, if limited 
to injunctions, may well be appropriate.  However, it is problematic once the 
brahman-knower takes on the ‘job’ of teacher (ācarya), and as such turns around to 
face the world.  It is with language that he turns around, and it is the language of 
scripture.  Thus, while the jīvan-mukta is beyond being directed by the scripture 
(B.S.Bh. II.iii.48), it is still his instrumental means of directing others.  Therefore, the 
“deep-rooted reliance upon the language of śruti” (Isayeva, 1993: 237) is a trait that 
the Advaitin adept never shrugs off, and its authoritative validity is demonstrated in 
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Advaita’s insistence on the śruti as enlightening device par excellence.  In fact, 
Śaṅkara explicitly rejects the idea that the Vedas become invalid after one has let go 
of the false sense of agency, for they remain meaningful with regard to knowledge of 
brahman (Bh.G.Bh. 18.66).  Thus, the need for sacred texts never loses its validity.  
When the Upaniṣads themselves speak of the Vedas as no Vedas (vedā avedāḥ), 
Śaṅkara glosses it as, “Since he transcends those rites, the Vedas are not the Vedas” 
(tat karmātikramaṇāt etasmin kālo vedā api avedāḥ saṃpadyante) (Bṛ.U.Bh. 
IV.iii.22).  In other words, he takes it to apply only to the pūrva section on rites, and 
the Upaniṣads are left untouched.  
 
For Śāntideva, it would seem to be a case of business as usual, for the bodhisattva has 
already been involved in selfless activity, and is now simply capable of more of the 
same.  From the early stages of the path, his actions have been motivated by the desire 
to liberate all beings.  But given that his vision of this world has so radically changed, 
that he has now attained to the level of “seeing” (the first bhūmi), we may well ask 
what it is like to see the world from the (subjective) position of emptiness.  For if one 
sees one’s non-self, who is it that acts, and whose intentions are carried out? 
 
Here I wish to introduce a hermeneutic device (Figs. 1 & 2), a new way of describing 
the vision of the metaphysical and ethical worlds of both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva.  I 
argue for a model which is more complex than the “either/or” model of Western 
philosophy, a model which may take us beyond the either-self-or-no-self parameters.  
In doing this, we will be forced into re-evaluating just where the borders lie between a 
tradition which supposedly believes in a ‘self’ and one which supposedly rejects it.  
When we combine both the ultimate world of metaphysics with the conventional 
world of ethics, that is, when we take the Two Truths together, we are forced into 
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acknowledging the relocations of self which take place in both Hinduism’s and 
Buddhism’s most revisionary exponents.  This relocation will lead to a model which is 
best described, not as “either/or”, but as “both/and”. 
 
Moreover, we need to enter into a debate, begun by Paul Williams (1998a), which 
questions Śāntideva’s insistence on the no-self position, even at the cost of the 
bodhisattva path becoming unjustified.  I argue for a model which is more complex 
than the either-self-or-no-self model that Williams assumes.  This will take into 
consideration the context of each chapter of the BCA as well as the Compendium.  The 
intention is to make use of the aforementioned hermeneutic device, a schematic 
diagram, to both challenge Williams’ dualistic approach, and provide the reader with a 
new point of entry into Śāntideva’s personal vision of the bodhisattva.  We have seen 
that, in order to attain ultimate realisation, according to Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, one 
must become cognisant of one’s selflessness.  It is not so much then that this 
selflessness is subsequently made central to their ethical systems; their ethics are 
rather embedded in this search for selflessness.   
 
Now Nagel (1978: 100) states that “Ethics is a struggle against a certain form of the 
egocentric predicament”.  We can see that both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva tackle this 
issue head on, destroying the very notion of ego as a persisting centre of 
individualistic thinking.  We have called their resultant activity “constructive 
altruism”.  According to Nagel (p3), altruism depends on: 1) recognising the reality of 
other persons, and 2) an equivalent capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual 
among many.  But have we not just witnessed both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva denying the 
reality of persons?  And can it be said that a brahman-knower or a bodhisattva are 




Both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva will deny that there is an ultimately individuated person 
to be recognised, but neither will deny that there is a “conventional person” there in 
front of them, with a name, a caste, a gender and a relative qualification.  As for 
whether they have the capacity to see themselves as “one individual among many”, we 
would then need to ask what an “individual” is.  For sure, they will both recognise that 
their bodies provisionally belong to a certain karmic history.  As for the mind, Śaṅkara 
will claim that unenlightened beings have their own mind (manas) which interferes 
with the pure consciousness of brahman, whereas the brahman-knower’s mind only 
minimally and infrequently interferes with brahman-consciousness.  As such, the 
jīvan-mukta both is and is not an individual agent, with the emphasis on the latter.  
Now Śāntideva will have the bodhisattva recognise the Vow (praṇidhāna) he took as 
his vow.  That is, the “Buddhist too requires an agent-oriented perspective to reach a 
more impersonal goal” (de Silva, 2007: 243).  Nonetheless, it is this vow which makes 
bodhisattvas different from other beings, in that they have a duty to be self-defacing.  
Furthermore, when the bodhisattva has seen the non-self of his own being, he does not 
allow that to be transferred onto other beings.   
 
Therefore, by seeing themselves as empty of individuated self, and yet continuing to 
see others as having an individuated self, the bodhisattva and the jīvan-mukta quite 
deliberately adopt a view which sees others as of a different kind.  In other words, 
they do not put their own self down, but rather emphasize the individuality of the 
other.  This is not a simple “other-regarding” ethics; it is an “other-constructing” 
ethics.  The bodhisattva agrees to acknowledge the personal suffering of the other, 
whilst the brahman-knower agrees to acknowledge the qualifications of the potential 
student, allowing them their badge of caste where no castes ultimately exist.  So, the 
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manner by which they create what we might see from the outside as an “altruistic 
situation” is done, not at the expense of their own self, but through the temporary 
elevation of the other, which is itself derived from a prior decision to see the world in 
conventional (and thus fabricated) terms.  Hence, I have spoken of “constructive 
altruism”, and as such, I re-define altruism. 
 
It could indeed be argued that altruism demands such an unbalanced view of oneself 
versus others.  For one thing, “self-sacrificial altruism would seem to entail a positive 
violation of principles of justice” (Krebs & van Hesteren, 1994: 126), stemming from 
the fact that such actors do not see themselves as “one individual among many”.  That 
is, it might be said that the heroes of this world see themselves as having a particular 
duty to act heroically, a duty that they would not demand of others (see Urmson, 
1958).  In fact, Smart (1973: 32) sees this as the distinguishing feature between 
altruism and utilitarianism.  We see that “Western altruism” demands a temporary 
“sacrifice” of self rather than a complete over-coming of the very belief in self.  The 
self is thus taken as being a thing which is normally constant, but which, under certain 
conditions, can be devalued.  We now know that this is in sharp contrast to both 
Advaita and Madhyamaka assumptions.  And with the emergence of non-self 




6.1 Śāntideva: Wisdom and Compassion – A Complex Model 
 
I would imagine that by this stage, Śāntideva’s altruistic intent has already been 
established.  He told us: 
mā bhūttan mama kuśala-mūlaṃ dharma jñānaṃ kauśalyaṃ vā yan 
na sarva sattvopajīvyaṃ syād 
 
May there be in me no root of good or knowledge of Dharma or 
skilfulness which is not of benefit to all beings (Ś.S. 33). 
 
In the BCA, he resolves thus: 
anya saṃbaddham asmīti niścayaṃ kuru he manaḥ     | 
 sarva sattvārtham utsṛjya nānyac cintyaṃ tvayādhunā     || 
 
So mind, make the resolve “I am bound to others”.  From now on, you 
must have no other concern than the welfare of all beings (BCA. 8.137). 
 
Śāntideva’s major task is the justification of this compassionate response towards all 
other beings despite their illusory nature.  Specifically, he wishes to persuade others to 
take on the Bodhisattva Vow to liberate all beings from suffering and from false 
seeing.  It would seem most likely that he is first and foremost appealing to Buddhist 
monks on the verge of taking the Bodhisattva Vow.  He may also be appealing to 
certain “Śrāvaka-oriented” monks whose primary intent is their own liberation.  That 
is, Śāntideva sees both hesitancy and reluctance towards altruism within his own 
Buddhist camp. 
 
What then would appeal to both of these groups?  The first doctrine that would appeal 
to them would be the First Noble Truth of the Buddha (see S.N. V.421), which is that 
all beings subject to conventional reality are in a state of suffering.  Because this 
audience would believe that all beings are subject to rebirth, they would envisage this 
suffering as endless.  But the Third Noble Truth states that the truth of nirvāṇa is an 
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end to suffering (ibid.).  So Śāntideva’s argument must appeal to a group of monks 
who perhaps regularly oscillate between meditational states of non-suffering and other 
more “ordinary” states.  If they do not so oscillate between states, they at least know 
that it is possible.  Further, as these monks have yet to be fully convinced of the 
benefits of taking the Bodhisattva Vow, we must assume (from Śāntideva’s 
perspective) that they have a tendency to be locked into durable states of self-interest.  
Put simply, his Buddhist audience wish to liberate themselves, and only themselves, 
from suffering.  So Śāntideva begins, quite predictably, with the basic truths of 
suffering, self-love (ātma-sneha), and the wish for happiness:  
parātma samatām ādau bhāvayed evam ādarāt     | 
sama duḥkha sukhaḥ sarve pālanīyā mayātma vat     || 
hastādi bhedena bahu prakaraḥ kāyo yathaikaḥ paripālanīyaḥ     | 
tathā jagad bhinnam abhinna duḥkha sukhātmakaṃ sarvam idaṃ 
tathaiva   ||  yady apy anyeṣu deheṣu mad duḥkhaṃ na prabādhate    | 
tathāpi tad duḥkham eva mamātma sneha duḥsahaṃ     || 
 
At first, one should meditate carefully on the equality of self and other.  
Thinking, “All experience happiness and suffering, [so] I should take 
care of them as I do myself”.  Just as the body with its many parts - 
divided into hands, etc. - is protected as one thing, so too should this 
[whole world of beings], which though divided, is undivided in its 
nature to experience suffering and happiness.  Even though my pain 
does not torment the body of others, that pain on the other hand is 
unbearable for me based on the love for myself (BCA. 8.90-92). 
 
 
His next move is to shift the focus onto the other:  
tathā yady apy asaṃvedyam anyad duḥkhaṃ mayātmanā    |  
tathāpi tasya tad duḥkham ātma-snehena duḥsahaṃ    || 
 
Although the suffering of another cannot be experienced by me 
personally, nevertheless, for him that pain is unbearable because of 
self-love (8.93).   
 
 
We might note here that Śāntideva has actually helped himself to one of Nagel’s 
conditions for altruism, which is the “capacity to regard oneself as merely one 
individual among many” (see above).  At this conventional level, persons are real 
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indeed.  If one has self-love, something which is said to subsist until the first bhūmi 
(Ś.S. 11), and if one accepts the general Buddhist truth that all beings (conventionally) 
suffer, then one must accept that others suffer.  One does not need to feel their pain to 
know that they have it.  All one needs to see is their self-love (which will show in 
their selfish behaviour) and their pain follows through inference.  We might write this 
logically as follows: 1) I suffer, 2) I am a self-loving human, 3) they appear (from 
their behaviour) to be self-loving humans; therefore 4) they suffer.  We have now 
created the ground for sympathy on purely logical grounds based on one’s own 
experience.   
 
This is not quite yet “compassion”, more a sense of sharing a common ground with 
others, an “interpersonal framework” (Wetlesen, 2002: 60).  It seems comparable to 
Hume’s notion of “sympathy”, which should not be confused with the sentiment of 
compassion, which is “merely one of its products” (Penelhum, 1993: 134).  Naturally, 
Śāntideva wants to go beyond mere participation in the emotional life of others, and 
wishes for a more pro-active stance.  While for Hume it might be enough to feel at one 
with others, for Śāntideva the goal is to become, not their equal, but their helper.  His 
is the kind of sympathy born of “unequal power”, derived from both the suffering 
other and from asymmetrical levels of wisdom (cf. Ricoeur, 1994: 191). 
 
It is interesting to note how Śāntideva goes through these steps.  For example, with 
regard to the fact that we all suffer, he could have just gone straight to the conclusion, 
on authoritative grounds, viz. the First Noble Truth; but this would not have involved 
the audience emotionally.  However, he makes no attempt to prove that pain is 
undesirable.  It is of course an accepted truth in Buddhism that suffering is not only 
felt, but is undesirable.  It is the basic reason why the audience became Buddhist 
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monks in the first place, the reason in which nirvāṇa finds its value.  But we might 
also note that it defies a rational explanation.  As Hume noted, if you ask a man why 
he hates pain, he cannot supply an answer (Enquiries, Appendix I, 244).  Pain and 
suffering are (conventionally) basic facts, assumed (by most) to be undesirable.  We 
can find statements to this effect scattered throughout the BCA.  For example:  
yadi tu svecchayā siddhiḥ sarveṣām eva dehinām    |  
na bhavet kasyacid duḥkhaṃ na duḥkhaṃ kaścid icchati     || 
 
If all sentient beings were to have their wish fulfilled, no one would 
suffer.  No one wishes for [their own] suffering (BCA. 6.34).   
 
 
He later extends this to give a more general account of the undesirability of pain itself, 
unrelated to the person who it happens to afflict:  
duḥkhaṃ kasmān nivāryaṃ cet sarveṣām avivādataḥ    |  
vāryaṃ cet sarvam apy evaṃ na ced ātmāpi sattvavat  || 
 
That suffering should be prevented, no one disputes.  If any of it is to 
be prevented, then all of it is.  If not, then that goes for me too (8.103).   
 
 
Put simply, either pain is to be accepted, including my own, or pain is to be tackled 
head on, including that of others.  And of course, no Buddhist can accept the first 
option.  But must they accept the second?  Logically they need not.  Not that they 
could claim that they are justified in willing pain on those they dislike, for this would 
go against the Buddhist ethics of non-harming (ahiṃsā).  What they might say is: “I 
feel my pain, and wish to be free of it, but I do not feel his or her pain in the same 
way.  I know they have pain, but what is that to me?”.  In other words, they may stick 
with self-love and go no further.   
 
However, this response is unacceptable, for Nagel (1978) is surely right when he says 
that, “in order to accept something as a goal for oneself, one must be able to regard its 
achievement by oneself as an objective good” (p86).  And in Buddhist terms, nirvāṇa 
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(viz. the end of suffering) simply must be taken by these monks as an objective good.  
What they are more likely to say then, is: “I feel my pain, I recognise that life is 
suffering and wish to be ultimately free of it.  I know others have pain and are subject 
to all kinds of suffering, but how am I to free them of it?  I can only free myself”.  
That is, “emotional empathy for pain, however intense, does not necessarily result in a 
helping response” (Oliner & Oliner, 1992: 174).  This may not be due to self-love, but 
more a sense of self-limitation.  If someone comes to me complaining of lung cancer, 
I am not uncaring if I fail to perform an operation on them.  The monks might 
therefore reasonably claim that “ought” implies “can”.  As the Compendium states, 
“There is no fault concerning matters beyond one’s powers” (anāpattiḥ sva śakty 
aviṣayeṣu kāryeṣu) (Ś.S. 15).  Hence, it is reasonable to accept that others suffer whilst 
maintaining the view that one lacks the means to put an end to this.  Of course, I could 
drive someone to a hospital, or even put bandages on their wounds, but this will only 
reduce their suffering, it will not put an end to it, and will certainly not put an end to 
the cycle of suffering (saṃsāra).  They may also say that, “one cannot purify 
another”, or that, “one should not abandon one’s own purpose for the purpose of 
another” (Dhp. 165-166).179  Taken this way, it would seem to parallel Nagel’s (1978) 
point that there are “certain ends and objects which one is in a logically better position 
to pursue for oneself than for others” (p129).   
 
The fact is that Śāntideva has still failed to establish a logical foundation for a life of 
selfless conduct.  His first response to this failure is an attempt to shorten the gap 
between the way his audience see their own plight and that of others.  He does this: 1) 
                                               
179 Naturally, the latter verse should not be taken as an outright rejection of compassion/altruism (see 
below), but rather seen in the soteriological context of nirvāṇa.  It does not mean that “the only real 
help is self-help”, as Matics (1971: 19) implies.  Nor should it be taken as proof of a transcendent self, 
as Pérez-Remón (1980: 28) suggests. 
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through a reiteration of the universality of pain, 2) by an appeal to sympathy, 3) by 
trying to weaken their self-love, and 4) by strengthening their compassion for others.  
Now, altruism, on Comte’s original account, involved the “subordination of self-love 
to meeting the needs of others” (Scott and Seglow, 2007: p16).  But Śāntideva first 
wishes to demonstrate an equal ground for concern before going on to the more 
developed subordination of selfish concern.  Thus: 
mayānyad duḥkhaṃ hantavyaṃ duḥkhatvād ātma duḥkhavat     | 
anugrāhyā mayānye ‘pi sattvatvād ātma sattvavat     || 
yadā mama pareṣāṃ ca tulyam eva sukhaṃ priyaṃ     | 
tad ātmanaḥ ko viśeṣo yenātraiva sukhodyamaḥ     || 
yadā mama pareṣaṃ ca bhayaṃ duḥkhaṃ ca na priyaṃ     | 
tad ātmanaḥ ko viṣeṣo yattaṃ rakṣāmi netaraṃ     || 
 
I should dispel the pain of others, just as I do my own, based on the 
fact that it is pain.  And I should help others for they are beings like 
me.  Since happiness is equally dear to me and others, what’s special 
about me that I strive after my happiness alone?  Since pain and fear 
are disliked by me and others, what’s special about me that I protect 
myself and not the other? (BCA. 8.94-96). 
 
At the conventional level of discourse, it would seem that he has gone as far as he can 
in his “logical” approach to compassion.  We have no need to qualify this with the 
metaphysics of non-self for he has yet to raise the issue.  At this level of discourse, he 
is in fact talking to those who still hold to the sense of self, a self equally prone to pain 
as all other selves.  With such rhetoric, he may well have convinced the more 
sentimental amongst the audience, but what of the hardened intellectuals?  I believe he 
realises that he needs a second approach, that is, the Two Truths.   
 
Before we go any further though, I would like to introduce the first of my diagrams 
(see Fig. 1 on p280).  With this diagram, I wish to introduce a new dimension into the 
debate, through which I hope to demonstrate that the Two Truths ought not to be seen 
in a dualistic manner.  To believe that all Śāntideva has open to him is either 
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conventional truth or ultimate truth is to miss a major dimension of his argument.  It is 
not simply a question of asking whether there is a self (ātman) or not a self (anātman), 
but about asking when one should see one way or the other.  That is, it is about 
flickering between these views.  I have added arrows to the axes to further indicate the 
constant shifts involved.  The upper section of the diagram maps the conventional 
world of the bodhisattva, a world where the ‘I’ exists on the bodhisattva’s side of the 
fence, and a world where other beings exist on the other side of the fence.  This world 
is neither empty of inherent existence, nor mind-created.  It is a world to be taken very 
seriously, a world run by karmic laws, where merit is accumulated and dispersed 
amongst the needy.  The lower section of the diagram maps the ultimate world of the 
bodhisattva, a world which offers him a means to renunciation from the evil world of 
the other.  It also offers him the opportunity to see the emptiness of his own self and 
the self of the other.  This diagram helps to highlight that the ‘other’ for Śāntideva is 
to be contrasted with the ‘me’, not with the ‘self’.  Thus, there appear to be four views 
open to Śāntideva: 1) I have a self which suffers and so do others, 2) I have a self 
which suffers whilst others are empty of self, 3) I have no self and neither do others, 
and 4) I have no self and yet others have a self which suffers. 
 
However, it is in fact even more complicated than that.  For one thing, in order to 
renounce, one must focus on one’s own suffering, whilst perhaps accusing the world 
of creating problems for oneself.  It is not enough to say “I suffer and they suffer”.  To 
gain distance, one must disparage the other.  That is, one must form a mind which 
rejects the world.  And so, in his earlier ascetic mode, Śāntideva wrote: 
ātmotkarṣah parāvarṇaḥ saṃsāra rati saṃkathā     | 
ityādy avaśyam aśubhaṃ kiṃ cid bālasya bālataḥ     || 
evaṃ tasyāpi tat saṅgāt tenānartha samāgamaḥ     | 




Self-aggrandizement, scorn for others, talk of the pleasures of life, etc.  
When two fools meet, all things disagreeable will certainly follow.  In 
this way, contact with [a fool] brings harm [to myself] and to him.  [So] 
I will dwell alone, happily, my mind undefiled (BCA. 8.13-14). 
 
If one moves from this mind-state and assumes common sympathy for others, one will 
need to remind oneself that others will not listen to reason.  People play deaf and 
dumb.  They hardly deserve to be helped.  Śāntideva writes: 
kṣaṇād bhavanti suhṛdo bhavanti ripavaḥ kṣaṇāt     | 
toṣa sthāne prakupyanti durārādhāḥ pṛthag janāḥ     || 
 
One moment they are friends, the next moment enemies.  In a pleasant 
situation they get angry.  Common people are impossible to please 
(BCA. 8.10). 
 
In fact, they are almost impossible to help: 
nānādhimuktikāḥ sattvā jinair api na toṣitāḥ     | 
 kiṃ punar mādṛśair ajñais tasmāt kiṃ loka cintayā     || 
 
Beings are of varying character.  Not even a Buddha could satisfy 
them.  Let alone the ignorant like me.  Thus why worry about the 
worldly? (BCA. 8.22). 
 
So the “Others/Not-self” quadrant includes a deconstruction process.  People to whom 
we are emotionally attached are rejected as being a ‘hindrance’ to my liberation: 
eka utpadyate jantur mriyate caika eva hi     | 
nānyasya tad vyathābhāgaḥ kiṃ priyair vighna kārakaiḥ     || 
 
Man is born alone and indeed he dies alone.  No one else shares his 
suffering.  So what’s the use of these “dear” ones, these hindrance-
makers? (BCA. 8.33)   
 
Clearly, where Śāntideva wants to have us, if we are to be selfless compassionate 
beings, is to see others as needy of our help, and to see our job as being that of the 
helper.  But he cannot have us believing too much in our own existence, for then we 
will fall into the ancient habit of putting oneself first.  Ideally then, the bodhisattva 
must see himself as having no-self whilst seeing others as suffering and of being 
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worthy of his help.  Thus, the Comtean subordination of self-love to meeting the needs 
of others is only a preliminary step in the process of becoming a bodhisattva, for it 
remains within the framework of an individualistic self-conception.  So the above 
verses which depend on this self-love (BCA. 8.94-96) still position the monk firmly 
within conventional reality. 
 
The bodhisattva must move on from this to see that there is in fact no self which 
requires subordination.  The love of self must be replaced by the knowledge of no-
self, but this knowledge of no-self must itself be over-ridden by the compassionate 
vow to liberate all other beings (who happen to believe they are selves).   
 
We are thus required to read the question of self and no-self within a complex 
framework of contexts.  While aware that there are other more social contexts within 
which Buddhism might allow for the notion of self, such as monastic/lay distinctions 
or king/subject relationships; here the term “context” is being used more in the sense 
of time than role.  In other words, though being a bodhisattva may indeed be seen as a 
role, it is one that depends on a progressive shift from right motivation through 
renunciation to selfless activity.  One’s view of self is therefore a function of one’s 
level of wisdom rather than of one’s social circumstance.   
 
There are perhaps two exceptions to this: first, in that a bodhisattva may 
(theoretically) remain in a state of mind which sees all as non-self so long as he is not 
confronted by a living being; and second, when a bodhisattva meets with another 
bodhisattva and must ask about their relative level of attainment.  The first instance 
implies that there are times when a bodhisattva will need to switch from seeing all as 
non-self to seeing the confronted being as taking themselves to have a self.  The 
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second instance demonstrates that even though a bodhisattva is said to have no self, 
that does not imply that all bodhisattvas are thus equal, and status does in fact play a 
part in their interaction (see below).  Let us now turn to the diagrammatic 





The above diagram represents a visual summary of the BCA. The key principle to 
grasp here is that Śāntideva is well aware that the would-be bodhisattva must have a 
keen sense of self-agency in order to take the vow to benefit all beings and to 
ultimately deliver them from suffering.  Likewise, he must see beings as existent in 
order to form the wish to benefit them.  If I do not exist, how can I take the Vow?  If 
suffering beings do not exist, how can one free them?  Indeed, why would one bother?  
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The active component of Buddhist ethics, then, cannot be based on the anātman 
principle, and the anātman principle should not be used to deny the conventional 
reality of persons.  The one who takes the Vow is a person: me; and the ones I vow to 
help are persons: Peter, Paul and Mary.  This is fundamental. 
 
But let us not forget Śāntideva’s predicament.  He has just managed to convince some 
sentimental listeners to turn towards the path of selfless compassion.  Perhaps this 
group has now gained “aspiring” bodhicitta (see BCA. 1.15-16), that is, the wish to 
benefit all beings.  But he is left with the hard-headed intellectual bunch.  As we have 
already suggested, the only strategy left open to him is the ultimate side of the Two 
Truths.  He needs to convince the audience that they are the same as all others, not 
only in their desire to be free of suffering (conventional truth), but in their non-being 
(ultimate truth).  His solution then lies in his ability to prove to others (or persuade 
them into believing) that they have no ultimate selfhood and that they must help 
others who equally have no ultimate selfhood, but suffer from the false belief that they 
do.  It is not that altruism directly follows from the insight into anātman; rather, one is 
made more available to others when one disregards one’s own needs, and this is felt to 
follow from the insight into anātman.   
 
He thus picks up on the everyday fact that we care about our own future.  This caring 
about our future may not appear strange, especially if we adhere to Nagel’s (1978: 38-
39) premise that we all take our future as being part of our own life.  But two Buddhist 
doctrines make it more peculiar than Nagel would admit.  First, the idea that the 
present mental self is but a momentary cognition to be succeeded by another 
momentary cognition, with the present physical self being a momentary arrangement 
of elements and conditions.  So your future “self” is not “you” (i.e. your present 
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bundle of form and mind states), but another such bundle as yet to arise.  Second, the 
belief in rebirth means that your “life” is better seen as your “continuum” (saṃtāna).  
In other words, it would seem that to care about this future bundle, whether in this 
life-span or the next life or ten lives down the line, is equivalent to caring for 
“another” being.  The question is therefore more subtle than a simple dilemma of 
prudence over altruism.   
 
There are two ways a Buddhist can go from here.  Either you see the stupidity of your 
ways and stop caring about yourself, or you make the sympathetic leap and see others 
as equally deserving of your care and attention.  That is, you either give up prudence, 
or you take up altruism.  In other words, Śāntideva’s argument could just as well 
motivate apathy as compassion.  Logically, of course, both options are open, but 
remember that the starting point was self-love.  So it would seem to be an assumption 
of Śāntideva that the first option is blocked by a natural inclination to care for your 
own “self”: 
tad duḥkhena na me bādhety ato yadi na rakṣyate     | 
nāgāmi kāya duḥkhān me bādhā tat kena rakṣyate     || 
aham eva tadāpīti mithyeyaṃ parikalpanā     | 
anya eva mṛto yasmād anya eva prajāyate     || 
yadi yasyaiva yad duḥkhaṃ rakṣyaṃ tasyaiva tan mataṃ     | 
pāda duḥkhaṃ na hastasya kasmāt tat tena rakṣyate     || 
ayuktam api ced etad ahaṃkārāt pravartate    | 
yad ayuktaṃ nivartyaṃ tat svam anyac ca yathā balaṃ     || 
 
If I don’t care about them because their pain does not afflict me, then 
why do I care about [my] future-body’s suffering when it doesn’t 
afflict [the current] me?  The notion “It is the same ‘me’ even then” is 
false.  Since it is one [person] who dies and quite another that is  
[re-] born.  If you believe that pain should be protected by whoever it 
belongs to, [note that] a pain in the foot is not of the hand, so why 
does one protect the other?  If it is argued that this is inappropriate as 
it proceeds from self-identity, then one ought to equally refrain from 





The final point then is surely not a recommendation, but a sarcastic punch-line.  
Clayton (2006: 64), through her assessment of the Compendium, comes to the very 
same conclusion: 
[J]ust as it is natural to do things now to benefit yourself in the future, 
even though it is not the same person, you should work to benefit 
other beings besides yourself in the present. 
 
Śāntideva has pointed out to his audience that the person they are to be in their next 
life is not the same person that they are now.  It is indeed the same ‘person-as-
continuum’, but not the same ‘specific-person’.  Thus, the ‘person’ who is reborn is 
“neither the same nor different” from the one that died (Collins, 1982: 190).  It is 
therefore not a total absurdity to care for the ‘person’ that you will be reborn as, just as 
it is not absurd for the hand to protect the foot.  But if it is not absurd to care for this 
future person, why not care for other people as well?  The response, of course, is that 
the person I will be in my next life is continuous with the person I am now in a way 
that other beings are not.   
 
It should be noted that I have taken what Paul Williams (1998a: 31) calls the 
“narrower” interpretation of Śāntideva’s verses.   The Sanskrit compound I have 
translated as “future-body’s suffering” (āgāmikāyaduḥkhān) (BCA. 8.97) might 
conceivably be translated as “body’s future suffering”.  This “wider” interpretation 
would be more problematic for Śāntideva, because he would then be implying that me 
(t1) and me (t2) are different persons.
 
 I do not think we need to take Śāntideva in this 
way, the reason being that he specifically mentions rebirth in the next verse. 
180
   
 
                                               
180 The Dalai Lama (1994: 102) seems to be working from a Tibetan text which suggests this “wider” 
application, but still finds it justifiable.  See Padmakara (2003) translation from the Tibetan text, which 
speaks of “my future pain” (p124).  However, I think that a defence of this “wider” position would be 
much more problematic. 
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Nevertheless, it would seem that if the audience did understand him on this wider 
interpretation, he would have even less success in convincing them that caring for 
others is logically equivalent to caring for one’s own self.  After all, it would seem 
only rational to brush one’s teeth at t1 to prevent suffering toothache at t2.  I would 
therefore reject Pelden’s (2007: 287) claim that it “makes no sense” to protect oneself 
from future suffering.  It clearly does make sense in the conventional world.  It would 
seem that Śāntideva needs to go back to the drawing board.  There is one move open 
to him, but it would seem to be based on a doctrine that his audience may not accept.  
He states that:  
ye kecid duḥkhitā loke sarva te sva-sukhecchayā   |  
ye kecit sukhitā loke sarva te ‘nya-sukhecchayā     || 
 
All those who suffer in the world do so because of their desire for 
their own happiness.  All those who are happy in the world are so 
because of their desire for the happiness of others (BCA. 8.129).   
 
He seems to think that this wins the argument, for he asks us rhetorically “Why say 
more?” (8.130a). But surely he does need to say more, for how, we may ask, could 
this doctrine possibly be proven?  The first premise clearly follows from the Second 
Noble Truth, which states that suffering is the result of selfish desire or craving (see 
S.N. V.421).  Thus all Buddhists ought to accept it.  But the second premise seems to 
assume an altruistic context, which is the very thing the audience has yet to be 
convinced of.  It assumes that happiness is the result of altruistic conduct, and that 
even the personal strife which this conduct generates is itself turned into a form of 
happiness.  Śāntideva seems to be asking how one could possibly be content without a 
sense of concern for others.  It is reminiscent of Ricoeur’s (1994: 180) claim that 
“self-esteem and solicitude cannot be experienced or reflected upon one without the 
other”.   This is not to be taken in the Aristotelian sense that the happy man needs 
friends (p182), but in the sense of what Scott & Seglow (2007: 125) call that “intrinsic 
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satisfaction” of the “saintly participation altruist”.  This inner-satisfaction must be 
more fulfilling than the so-called bliss (sukha) of a private nirvāṇa.   
 
As Śāntideva puts it: 
mucyamāneṣu sattveṣu ye te prāmedya sāgarāḥ     | 
taireva nanu paryāptaṃ mokṣeṇārasi kena kiṃ     || 
 
Those who over-flow with joy when beings are being liberated; it’s 
surely they that will be fulfilled.  What’s the point of ‘tasteless’ 
[individual] freedom? (BCA. 8.108). 
 
One is reminded of Levinas’ more overtly humanistic ethics of “being for-the-other”, 
described by Richard Cohen as taking precedence over, and being better than, being 
for-itself (in Levinas, 2006: xxvi), with both the descriptive and prescriptive 
connotations this carries.  While their cultural goals may vary, both are critical of 
those complacent ones who would neglect their moral responsibility.  But the “selfish” 
monk can still claim that his own liberation has a sweeter taste (for him) than the 
liberation of others.  Or once again, he can claim that he is simply incapable of 
liberating others, so the “tasteless” freedom will just have to do.  In other words, he 
can respond to both description and prescription. 
 
In fact, the debate would now appear to be over types of bliss, for even Śāntideva 
admits that the meditating monk is in bliss.  The argument pretends to be one of ‘bliss’ 
versus ‘higher bliss’, though it is no mere hedonistic argument. 181   If it were 
hedonistic, we could not make sense of the notion that the bodhisattva selflessly 
postpones his entrance into the bliss of Nirvana in order to be of benefit to others.
 182
  
                                               
181 For a discussion of relative bliss in early Buddhism, see Premasiri (1997).   Also see S.N. IV.225 & 
M.N. I.505-506. 
 




This issue is made more complex by the fact that Śāntideva will later claim that the 
Śrāvaka monk’s nirvāṇa is “poorly-established” (duḥ-sthitaṃ) (BCA. 9.44), and 
always will be unless he realises the emptiness of phenomena (9.48).  The debate then 
is not about bliss at all, but about the two pillars of Mahāyāna Buddhism, wisdom and 
compassion.   
 
Nevertheless, bliss is critical to the argument for two reasons.  First, it has become a 
resting place for those monks who falsely believe that they are liberated. The bliss or 
happiness (su-kha) they feel is of course the negation of the suffering (duḥ-kha) they 
had felt, and thus the fruit of the merit produced by following the Buddhist Path.  It 
could therefore be seen as the goal.  But Śāntideva sees bliss more as a means than as 
a goal.  In the hands of a bodhisattva, bliss is turned into a store-house of merit to be 
donated to the needy.  This is possible for the Mahāyāna tradition, for to them karmic 
fruitfulness is ‘empty’ and does not inherently ‘belong’ to any particular ‘being’.  In 
short, the bliss and non-abiding (apratiṣṭha) nirvāṇa Śāntideva has in mind trump the 
Śrāvaka bliss and private nirvāṇa through an inherent ability to benefit others.183   
 
In the BCA, we find this verse: 
evaṃ duḥkhāgni taptānāṃ śānti kuryām ahaṃ kadā     | 
puṇya-megha samudbhutaiḥ sukhopakaranaiḥ svakaiḥ     || 
 
When will I be able to bring relief to those in this hellish fire, with 
offerings of bliss flowing from the clouds of my merit? (9.166) 
 
                                               
183 This is a slightly different argument than that found in the Bhagavad-Gītā.  However, Malinar’s 
(2007) comment that chapter 14 “establishes Kṛṣṇa’s superiority by claiming that liberation in the god 
yields a happiness not to be found anywhere else” (p201) is equally relevant.  Malinar continues, “The 
latter claim is important, since ‘happiness’ is regarded as an element of liberation in other ascetic 




The “cloud” (megha) metaphor is also found in the Compendium with reference to the 
Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra (Ś.S. 122).  The mind (citta) of the bodhisattva must be supported 
by roots of goodness (kuśala-mūlaiḥ). “Clouds of Dharma” (dharma-meghāḥ) must 
flow from this mind.
184
  Here in the BCA, we see that a further analogy takes place 
between Dharma and bliss (sukha), such that merit (puṇya) rains down from the 
bodhisattva’s compassionate mind in the form of bliss.  And while the ‘Śrāvaka-bliss’ 
is to be enjoyed only by oneself, the ‘Mahāyāna-bliss’, like merit, is transferable.  
Clearly, this phenomenon of transfer of merit (pariṇāmanā) is central to 
understanding Mahāyāna ethics.185  Therefore, Śāntideva’s position on helping others 
may appear to be in direct opposition to the Dhammapada’s “one cannot purify 
another” and that “one should not abandon one’s own purpose for the purpose of 
another” (Dhp. 165-166).    
 
Of course, the Buddha also said, “Go forth, oh monks, for the benefit of the many, for 
the happiness of the many, out of compassion for the world” (Vin.1.21).  186   This 
verse has been called an “altruistic exhortation” (Lewis, 2005: 88), and is highlighted 
by such scholars as Collins (1982: 194), Cousins (1997: 388) and Goodman (2009: 
49) in defence of the apparent lack of emphasis on compassion in early Buddhism.
187
  
Nevertheless, Śāntideva’s final ethics do go beyond what is generally taken to be the 
                                               
184 Note that dharma-meghaḥ is also the name the Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra gives to the tenth bhūmi. 
 
185 For a useful overview of the literature on merit transference, see Clayton (2006: 76-88).  Bear in 
mind though that her claim that Śāntideva did not accept the notion of a “trace of impurity” (p87) is 
false once we understand his use of a voluntary delusion.  As for Clayton’s objection that Śāntideva’s 
ethics demand the elimination of kleśas (ibid.), my theory of flickering overcomes this. 
 
186 Also found in the Sarvāstivādin Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra (see trans. Kloppenborg, 1973) 
 
187 The anomaly could be explained as: “Do not put others before yourself until you have become an 
arahat”.  This would fit both scriptural contexts.  The Dhammapada speech, according to the 
commentarial story, was given to a single would-be arahat (see Narada, 1993: 150); the Vinaya speech 
was given to the sixty enlightened arahats (Kloppenborg, 1973: 43). Thus, the Buddha’s philosophy 
may be interpreted as, “One’s own house must be put in order before busying oneself with other 
people’s” (Cooper & James, 2005: 56). 
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Buddhist rationale for action, seeing the Śrāvaka emphasis on “renunciation and 
ascetic self-restraint” (Collins, 1982: 194) as a mere preliminary for selfless action in 
the world.  This distinction still remains even if we take on Gombrich’s (2009: 78-91) 
recent re-evaluation of the Buddha’s teachings on the four “boundless states”.  For, 
even if the bodhisattva-path is indeed a “restatement of the spirit of the brahma-
vihāras” (Smart, 1997: 87), and even if “compassion is replete in all strands of the 
Buddhist tradition” (Carter, 1997: 365), it is generally accepted that there remains a 
special emphasis on compassion and altruistic action in the Mahāyāna that went 
beyond that found in the early tradition.  So when Collins (1982) claims that 
Buddhism does not provide for either self-interest or “self-denying altruism” (p193), 
he was talking from within the Theravāda (monastic) tradition.  Contrast this with the 
following verses of Śāntideva: 
yadi dāsyāmi kiṃ bhokṣye ity ātmārthe piśācatā     | 
yadi bhokṣye kiṃ dadāmīti parārthe devarājatā     || 
ātmārthaṃ pīḍayitvānyaṃ narakādiṣu pacyate     | 
ātmānaṃ pīḍayitvā tu parārthaṃ sarva saṃpadaḥ     || 
durgatir nīcatā maurkhyaṃ yayaivātmonnatīchayā     | 
tāmevānyatra saṃkrāmya sugatiḥ satkṛtir matiḥ     || 
ātmārthaṃ param ājñapya dāsatvādy anubhūyate     | 
parārthaṃ tvenam ājñapya svāmitvādy anubhūyate     || 
ye kecid duḥkhitā loke sarve te sva-sukhecchayā     | 
ye kecit sukhitā loke sarve te ‘nya-sukhecchayā     || 
 
 
“If I give, what will I have?” – Such concern for oneself is demonic.  
“If I have, what can I give?” – Such concern for others is divine.  
Oppressing others for one’s own sake, one will roast in hell.  But 
from oppressing oneself for the sake of others, one always meets 
with success.  Distress, inferiority and stupidity are the result of 
desiring one’s own promotion.  By transferring that same desire onto 
others, one gains happiness, honour and intelligence. Putting others at 
the service of one’s own aims will lead to your own servitude. Putting 
yourself at the service of others will lead to your own [true] lordship.  
All those who suffer in the world do so because of their desire for 
their own happiness.  All those who are happy in the world are so 




While true that “oppressing oneself for the sake of others” is not Śāntideva’s final 
position, it is an important step towards a life of pure selfless activity.   
 
But returning to our blissful “selfish” monk, he may still feel unmoved by Śāntideva’s 
“my bliss is better than your bliss” argument.  And he is unlikely to accept that his 
liberation is poorly established.  So Śāntideva now adopts yet another tactic, the 
rhetoric of shame and blame.  He thus speaks to the ‘lazy’ and ‘proud’ monk in 
everyone present.  Thus, “We must cause him to fall from bliss, and continually 
appoint him distressful duties” (sukhāc ca cyāvanīyo ‘yaṃ yojyo ‘smad vyathayā 
sadā) (BCA. 8.154a); and again, more generally: “Make yourself fall from bliss and 
involve yourself in the suffering of others” (sukhāc ca cyāvayātmānāṃ para duḥkhe 
niyojaya) (8.161a).  But such self-punishing rhetoric may still fail to arouse the 
listener into compassionate action, though it might lead to a feeling of guilt. 
 
What Śāntideva seems to require then is a philosophical means of persuading the 
audience that their own self is ontologically equal to that of others.  One method is the 
famous “exchanging self and other” meditation (BCA. 8.140ff), mentioned above. 
Another method, which is more metaphysical in nature, is to offer a seemingly 
nihilistic evaluation of the person, whilst offering a universal view of pain: 
saṃtānaḥ samudāyaś ca paṅkti senādi van mṛṣā     | 
yasya duḥkhaṃ sa nāsty asmāt kasya tat svaṃ bhaviṣyati     || 
asvāmikāni duḥkhāni sarvāṇy evāviśeṣataḥ     | 
duḥkhatvād eva vāryāṇi niyamas tatra kiṃ kṛtaḥ  || 
 
Continuities and aggregates, such as queues and armies are fictitious.  
There is no one who is suffering.  Therefore, to whom will it belong?  
Without any exceptions, all sufferings are ownerless.  As pain is pain, 




The first line states that such wholes as ‘queues’ and ‘armies’ are fictitious, merely 
labels, placed on top of the separate parts to designate an object which is ultimately 
empty.  The implication is that the momentary aggregates likewise do not go to make 
up a ‘person’.  In defence of a similar sceptical thesis by Hume (Treatise, I.iv.6), 
Penelhum (1993: 141) writes, the “perceptions the mind has can well include 
perceptions of the series that constitute it, without there having also to be any 
supervenient subject beyond the series’ successive members”.  Pains are but 
perceptions, belonging to no one.  Post-reduction, there is ultimately no ‘person’ or 
‘self’ to whom pain belongs, no substance in which these sensations inhere.  There is 
an obvious problem here, which Paul Williams (1998a: 104-176) has so ruthlessly 
exposed.  Pain, on this account, appears to be free-floating.  But how are we to make 
sense of a free-floating pain?  Like Williams, I doubt that this is “rationally” possible.  
But unlike Williams, I do not think Śāntideva is open to the charge. 
 
While not the methodology I would normally condone; if we are going to hand-pick 
single verses for critique, then one text that may be open to the charge can be found in 
the Theravāda.  One of its passages reads: “For there is suffering, but none who 
suffers” (Vm. 16.90, trans. Ñāṇamoli).  As Pérez-Remón (1980: 11) has noted, the 
“moral self is utterly denied” here.  Now, the reason this is open to the charge of a 
free-floating pain is that, for the Theravādin, pain is generally taken to be inherently 
real.  Thus, Peter Harvey (1990) states that, “suffering is inherent in the very fabric of 
life” (p48).  And Sarah Shaw (2008) defines ‘dukkha’ as “an inherent, moving tension 
or dynamic that inheres in all existence” (p4).  Shaw goes on to claim that “the cause 




The problem here, from a Madhyamaka standpoint, is two-fold.  First, nothing has 
inherent existence (svabhāva), so an inherent suffering is a conceptual construction.  
And second, if we were to accept that dukkha did inherently exist, then it quite 
evidently is not caused by desire, for it must pre-exist desire.  Thus, to “put suffering 
on the same level as impermanence and nonself”; i.e. as one of the three marks of 
existence, is an “error” (Nhat Hanh, 1998: 21).  While the truth of suffering is thought 
by the Śrāvaka to be seen by a Noble’s wisdom, the Mādhyamika sees it as a truth 
merely for “conventional valid cognizers” (Hopkins, 1996: 290).  That is why the 
commentator of the BCA, Prajñākaramati, sees all but the Noble Truth of Cessation 
(nirvāṇa) as being conventional (saṃvṛti) truths, thus reducing the four truths to two 
(see Kapstein, 2001: 217-218).
188
   
 
Śāntideva therefore asks the Śrāvaka, “If suffering really exists, why does it not afflict 
people when they are cheerful?” (yady asti duḥkhaṃ tattvena prahṛṣṭān kiṃ na 
bādhate) (BCA. 9.88a).  That is, for the Mādhyamikas, pleasure (sukha) and pain 
(duḥkha) are impermanent phenomena and mind-dependent; whereas, for the 
Śrāvakas, “even happiness is to be seen as dukkha” (Harvey, 1990: 48).  So, just as 
Nāgārjuna did (see Westerhoff, 2009: 214), Śāntideva distances himself from the 
Śrāvaka, for whom suffering truly exists.189   
 
Of course, if the Śrāvaka maintains that suffering is the end result of the various limbs 
of dependent origination (see Anderson, 2001: 94-97), then they must give up the 
notion of its inherent existence.  Likewise, if the Śrāvaka truly wishes to claim that the 
                                               
188 Murti (1973: 19), seemingly independent of Prajñākaramati, comes to the same conclusion. 
 
189 However, it is not unimaginable that Śāntideva would freely adopt the Ābhidharmika perspective as 
an act of skilful means, as Harris (2011) claims.  Even so, we can construct a Madhyamaka case for 
altruism without this move. 
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four Noble Truths “do not have any permanent existence in the world” (p121), then 
once again they must give up the notion of dukkha’s inherent existence.  Suffering, 
under Madhyamaka analysis, must lose its universal position in Buddhist ontology.  
However, it is never quite dislodged from its soteriology.  While the “fact of ill cannot 
maintain itself against the fact of emptiness” (Conze, 2001: 111), the fact of emptiness 
must bend, as it were, to allow for the conventional truth of suffering in others.  
 
The problem that Śāntideva faces is that he needs to keep the language of suffering at 
the conventional level for it has obvious soteriological value.  Put simply, if there 
were no suffering in conventional reality, nobody would renounce. So, in denying 
suffering, Śāntideva does still seem to be committing a logical error.  He has to 
answer two questions: 1) if suffering does not exist conventionally, then why do my 
knees hurt? (Williams, 1998a: 156), and 2) if suffering does not exist ultimately, then 
why should I care about the imaginary suffering of others?   
 
Before we go any further, it is worth repeating that Śāntideva does not deny 
conventional reality.  He writes quite explicitly that: 
yathā nirātmānaś ca sarva dharmāḥ, karma phala saṃbandhā 
virodhaś ca niḥsvabhāvatā ca, yathā dṛṣṭa sarva dharmā virodhaś ca 
 
All phenomena are selfless.  On the other hand, they are connected 
with the fruit of action.  All phenomena lack own-being.  On the other 
hand, there is an experiential world (Ś.S. 244).   
 
Conventionally speaking, there is suffering and indeed, “All those who suffer in the 
world do so because of their desire for their own happiness” (ye kecid duḥkhitā loke 
sarve te sva-sukhecchayā) (BCA. 8.129a).  So, for this reason, we should renounce.  
Indeed, we should develop wisdom “with the desire to end suffering” (duḥkha nivṛtti 
kāṅkṣayā) (BCA. 9.1b).  In other words, not only does Śāntideva not deny pain 
293 
 
conventionally, but, like any good Buddhist, he makes it the starting point of the quest 
for wisdom.  And it is the ‘person’ that goes forth on this quest.  With wisdom as the 
updated goal, he states that, it is “the reification of reality” (satyataḥ kalpanā) that is 
the “cause of suffering” (duḥkha hetu) (9.25).  And so, he tells us that there is no ‘I’ 
whatsoever (aham eva na kiṃ) (9.56).  We discover that “the ‘I’ has no existence 
under analytical investigation” (aham apy asad bhūto mṛgyamāṇo vicarataḥ) (9.74b).  
When this becomes established, we are ready for the final altruistic both/and twist of 
his Two-Truth rhetoric.  Henceforth, monks, “Make yourself fall from bliss and 
involve yourself in the suffering of others” (sukhāc ca cyāvayātmānāṃ para-duḥkhe 
niyojaya) (8.161).  Where is Śāntideva here if not in the midst of our conventional 
world of happiness and suffering? 
 
This is not “incoherent” rhetoric, as Williams (1998a: 160) claims; it is simply 
Śāntideva’s both/and model at its most extreme.  If you argue: 
yadi sattvo na vidyeta kasyopari kṛpeti cet     | 
kāryārtham abhyupetena yo mohena prakalpitaḥ     || 
 
For whom is compassion if no beings exist?”  [We respond] For 
anyone who [our voluntary] delusion projects for the sake of what 
must be done (BCA. 9.75). 
 
If there is a “logical” incoherence here, then Śāntideva is saying “so be it”.  One needs 
to be able to flicker between these domains.  One has to live with such “friction” 
(Harris, 2011: 113); that is the bodhisattva’s task.  But if this flickering between 
seeing a self in others whilst maintaining the view of emptiness becomes problematic, 
and you start to imagine you have a self, then two paths open up.  First, you could use 
this self-love as a device, and: 
... yathārti śokāder ātmānaṃ goptum icchasi     |  




... in the same way that one desires to protect oneself from pain and 
grief, etc., so one should develop a mind of compassion and concern 
towards the world (BCA. 8.117). 
 
But if this prudence-cum-compassion method leads to one’s self-love becoming so 
strong that you start to care more for your own happiness than for that of others, then 
“better to meditate on not-self” (varaṃ nairātmya bhāvanā) (BCA. 9.77b).  Thus, it 
would seem that there are methods available for those who have become selfless and 
for those who still have a trace of self.  So Siderits (2003) is not quite right when he 
says that “one must become a truly empty person in order to effectively practice 
compassion” (p204).  This is an ideal, but it is not a pre-requirement. 
 
Returning to our audience, they may still be hoping for a rational explanation, and 
may find this reductionism question-begging: 
kāryaṃ kasya na cet sattvaḥ satyamīhā tu mohataḥ     | 
duḥkha vyupaśamārthaṃ tu kārya moho na vāryate     || 
 
Whose is the task to be done if there are no beings?  [Response] True, the 
work is indeed delusional, but in order to bring about the end of suffering, 
the delusion which conceives the task is not restrained (BCA. 9.76). 
 
As stated above, this voluntary delusion is the key to understanding Śāntideva’s 
ethics, and indeed it must fail to pass the rationalist’s criteria.  For how can we make 
logical sense of a voluntary delusion?  Nevertheless, that is how Śāntideva describes 
the move which one needs to make in order to admit a ‘person’ conventionally so as to 
avoid an ethical nihilism.   That is, Śāntideva agrees that ethics needs people.  So, 
while Wetlesen (2002) argues with Williams over whether Śāntideva’s conception of 
a person is reductive or non-reductive, the fact is, it is both.  Śāntideva reduces 
himself to a complex set of inter-dependent conditions with no underlying self, but 
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reconstructs the other to something more than that, i.e. an individuated person with 
their own valid hopes and fears. 
 
The question remains as to whether Śāntideva has gone off the Buddhist rails here, or 
whether he is in fact following a traditional view.  Now Harvey (1990) reads the 
Diamond Sūtra to be saying something quite similar, and so claims that the 
bodhisattva knows that there are no ‘beings’, but his skilful means “enables him to 
reconcile this wisdom with his compassion” (p121).  In fact, the Diamond Sūtra is a 
Prajñāpāramitā text which completely rejects the notion of ‘self’, claiming that a 
bodhisattva is unworthy of the name (i.e. “wisdom-being”) if he should hold such a 
notion (Vajracchedikā, Ch. 3).  But, as we have seen, Śāntideva allows for the notion, 
if, and only if, it applies impersonally and conventionally.  So Śāntideva appears even 
more conventional than the Diamond Sūtra.  Paul Williams (2009), for his part, draws 
on the Aṣṭa, another Prajñāpāramitā text, for what he calls the “clever means and 
stratagems” (p61) of the bodhisattva.  In this text, the bodhisattva refuses to realise the 
so-called “reality-limit” (bhūta-koṭi), the (inferior) nirvāṇa of the arhat (Aṣṭa. 373).  
He does this through an intense focus on compassion, which prevents him from falling 
into complete emptiness, which would lead to the “non-perception of any living 
being” (Streng, 1982: 93).190  According to Williams (2009), the bodhisattva is thus 
“able to combine simultaneously his direct meditative awareness of emptiness with 
awareness of others” (p61, emphasis mine).  In other words, rather than attain the 
transparent mind of a Buddha, he opts for a flickering both/and mode of cognition.
191
  
Now, Śāntideva sits much closer to this Aṣṭa-model than to the Vajracchedikā, for he 
                                               
190 Streng (1982) has listed four possible meanings of “reality limit” in the Aṣṭa. 
 




deliberately holds ‘persons’ as a support, so as never to fall into either the nirvāṇa of 
the arhat or into ethical nihilism.  We thereby see that the move to re-instate the 
individuated person is not unique to Śāntideva, but has scriptural support.   
 
Why Paul Williams (1998a) picks out Śāntideva for particular attention is therefore 
puzzling.  There has to be more to it than that “unresolvable struggle between 
Reductionists and non-Reductionists” (Kapstein, 2001: 44).  It would seem that 
Williams assumes Śāntideva to be denying the person at both the ultimate and the 
conventional level.  Yet, we have already shown that Śāntideva does in fact accept 
reality at the conventional level.  Now Siderits (2000: 416) has stated that Śāntideva’s 
arguments would indeed break down if he were denying the person at the 
conventional level, however, he does not believe that he is so denying the person.  He 
therefore, like me, disagrees with Williams’ conclusions (p412).192  But before we 
close the door on the debate, let us re-examine the particular verses which Williams 
selected for critique. 
 
In the first set of verses selected by Williams (1998a: 29-51) (i.e. BCA. 8.97-98), 
Śāntideva is simply saying that the person when reborn is a different “specific” person 
than the current “specific” person which is “me”.  He wrote:   
tad duḥkhena na me bādhety ato yadi na rakṣyate     | 
nāgāmi kāya duḥkhān me bādhā tat kena rakṣyate     || 
aham eva tadāpīti mithyeyaṃ parikalpanā     | 
anya eva mṛto yasmād anya eva prajāyate     || 
 
If I don’t care about them because their pain does not afflict me, then 
why do I care about [my] future-body’s suffering when it doesn’t 
afflict [the current] me?  The notion “It is the same ‘me’ even then” is 
false.  Since it is one [person] who dies and quite another that is  
[re-] born (BCA. 8.97-98). 
                                               






He is not denying either of those persons conventionally here, nor is he is denying 
consciousness-as-continuum which links those two persons.  In fact, verse 8.107 reads 
“those whose continuum is so developed” (evaṃ bhāvita saṃtānāḥ).  This continuum 
even survives the ultimate analysis of Chapter 9.  Thus: 
hetumān phala yogīti dṛśyate naiṣa saṃbhavaḥ     | 
saṃtānasyaikyam āśritya kartā bhokteti deśitaṃ    || 
 
“The cause is connected with the fruit” [you say].  But such an event 
is never seen.  It is taught that there is an agent and an experiencer [of 
the fruit merely] in terms of a unity of the continuum (BCA. 9.72). 
 
 
There is simply no way that Williams (1998a) can maintain the claim that Śāntideva 
sees the relationship between my current life and my future lives as one of “complete 
otherness” (p41).  It is “other”, in that I may not even be a human being in my next 
life, but it is not unrelated to my current continuum.  So, rather than Williams’ 
“somewhat selective reading of the text” (Wetlesen, 2002: 34), we need to pay 
attention to the context in order to understand Śāntideva’s true meaning.  For example, 
in verse 8.98 (above), Śāntideva is simply downplaying this continuum-aspect and 
focusing on the specific-person-aspect, because that has more persuasive force in this 
stage of the meditation.  Williams fails to grasp the difference between these two.  In a 
later work, Williams (2002, Appendix I) does seem to pay lip service to the true 
Buddhist position, but still claims that “in terms of personal survival, being causally 
dependent upon the one that died is irrelevant” (p200).  But how is it irrelevant?  To 
grasp Śāntideva’s self-model, one needs to be quite flexible with regard to self and 
persons, but Williams appears rather one-dimensional.  Of course, as already 
mentioned, Śāntideva’s argument would have less force if he were talking about me 
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(t1) versus me (t2) in this present life; but as Williams himself points out (1998a: 31-
33), in the Sanskrit text, this is not the case.   
 
In the second set of verses selected by Williams (1998a: 104-176) for critique (BCA. 
8.101-103), Śāntideva is simply denying ultimate existence to the person, whilst 
admitting conventional existence to pain.  People are like armies, made up of parts, 
with no ultimate status.  Conventional pains are thus ultimately ownerless.  In full: 
saṃtānaḥ samudāyaś ca paṅkti senādi van mṛṣā     | 
yasya duḥkhaṃ sa nāsty asmāt kasya tat svaṃ bhaviṣyati     || 
asvāmikāni duḥkhāni sarvāṇy evāviśeṣataḥ     | 
duḥkhatvād eva vāryāṇi niyamas tatra kiṃ kṛtaḥ  || 
duḥkhaṃ kasmān nivāryaṃ cet sarveṣām avivādataḥ    |  
vāryaṃ cet sarvam apy evaṃ na ced ātmāpi sattvavat  || 
 
Continuities and aggregates, such as queues and armies are fictitious.  
There is no one who is suffering.  Therefore, to whom will it belong?  
Without any exceptions, all sufferings are ownerless.  As pain is pain, 
it should be warded off.  Why put restrictions on this?  That suffering 
should be prevented, no one disputes.  If any of it is to be prevented, 
then all of it is.  If not, then that goes for me too (BCA. 8.101-103).   
 
The Dalai Lama (1994) summarises these verses thus, “Although the “I” does not 
truly exist, in relative truth everyone wants to avoid suffering” (p103).  It is because 
Śāntideva’s rhetoric flickers back and forth between domains that this is difficult to 
grasp.  I therefore agree with Pettit (1999: 129-130) that Williams’ critique of 
Śāntideva appears “fundamentally misguided”.  Nevertheless, I will respect Williams’ 
issue with the notion of altruism as normally understood, and thus demand that from 
now on we call Śāntideva’s ethics “constructive altruism”. 
 
Whether this is an altruism of “complete rationality” (Williams, 1998a: 29) is for the 
reader to decide.  But note that Williams himself warns us that we ought to take such 
writings as the BCA as “counselling” rather than as “abstract statements about the 
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universal way things actually are” (in Crosby & Skilton, 1995: p. xv).  Williams also, 
quite rightly, notes that the BCA is a “meditation manual” (p. xxvi), a point he repeats 
in his own work (Williams, 1998a: 29).  So perhaps, as Pettit (1999: 134) suggests, we 
may need more than just “philosophical reflection” to understand Śāntideva’s 
ethics.
193
  Perhaps Madhyamaka philosophy only makes real sense as an “expression 
of an entire form of life” (Huntington, 1989: 59).  However, I believe that we have 
been able to save Śāntideva’s ethics on the basis of the Two Truths without having to 
claim a need for “meditative and moral practice” (Wetlesen, 2002: 53), or being in a 
“trance” of some kind (Matics, 1971: 29).  In other words, we might rightly claim to 
have a rational explanation for “constructive altruism”, so long as one understands 
that the ‘person’, for Śāntideva, is this embodied being, but that this ‘person’ is also 
empty, in the sense that me at t3 is not exactly the same me as at t1 or t2, but is 
nevertheless conditioned by them. 
 
In fact, when examined in its entirety, Śāntideva’s ethics accept the conventional 
person in a fuller manner than many other Mādhyamika exponents.  For example, 
Candrakīrti distinguishes between ordinary perfections and supramundane perfections 
(MMA. 1.16). A supramundane form of giving (dāna) would have “no conception of 
the fundamental real existence of the giver, gift or receiver” (Williams, 2009: 51), the 
so-called “three-fold purity” (Conze, 2001: 18) of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras (see 
Conze, 1975: 50).  It is an “unqualified rejection of any reified concept of giver, gift 
or recipient” (Huntington, 1989: 70).  This threatens to make the Levinasian “face-to-
face encounter” of giving (see Heim, 2007: 192) rather faceless.   
 
                                               
193 Paul Williams (2002: xiii) later confessed that his meditation was mainly on paper. 
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But, as argued throughout this thesis, Śāntideva’s altruism is indeed a “qualified” one.  
While the notion of ‘altruism’ is denied by Levinas (2006: 55) on the grounds that the 
impulse to give derives itself from the ‘Other’; in Śāntideva, the ‘Other’ must first be 
constructed, deriving its force from the Bodhisattva Vow.  Śāntideva’s ethics of 
“constructive altruism” thus appears as a Buddhist compromise on self, allowing for 
the qualified notion of a receiver, if not for a giver (which is non-existent) or a gift 
(which is illusory) (Ś.S. 270-275).  Thus, an ultimately understanding giver gives an 
ultimately understood gift to a constructed receiver.  The other person’s face is given 
new life through the bodhisattva’s compassion.  For Śāntideva then, it is a clear case 
of the ends (the reduction in overall suffering) justifying the means (voluntarily 
adopting a fabricated view of the situation).   
 
Note that by saying that the delusion is “not restrained” (BCA. 9.76), there is the 
implication that the bodhisattva is indeed free to restrain it.  This would mean that a 
superior bodhisattva could apply his wisdom to the delusion that saw the other person 
as real, but chooses not to.  At this level, dualistic appearances would not interfere 
with his non-dualistic vision of emptiness unless he forces the interference.  It is not 
the case that the bodhisattva maintains a slightly delusional mentality which allows 
for a mildly delusional view of beings as real, the kind of “madness” that Burton 
(2004: 85) suggests.  It is more a case of willing the subordination of wisdom to 
compassion.  Again this highlights the advantage of taking the mind as flickering 
between seeing things as existent and non-existent, and then having the freedom to act 
accordingly, either on the basis of wisdom or on the basis of compassion.   
 
If we now return to Fig. 1 (on p280), we see that we now have the entire picture of the 
path before us.  The bodhisattva, in the Me/Self quadrant, sees the suffering of the 
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provisional world.  He sees the error of his ways, both ethical errors and cognitive 
errors.  He regrets his ethical errors and prays for forgiveness of sins.  This person-as-
continuum thus vows to change his ways and to generate enough merit to liberate all 
beings.  Misdeeds are ‘dissolved’ or ‘purified’ by a combination of prayer and the 
realisation of emptiness.  Merit is accumulated through the practice of the six 
perfections.  The first steps to realising emptiness are a certain form of moral conduct 
conducive to the denial of the egoistic self.   
 
The bodhisattva thus shifts into the Me/Not-self quadrant.  He works on renunciation 
of self.  He wishes to be self-reliant, but without the notion of a self.  Naturally, a 
denial of the self is itself an act of self, which demonstrates the preliminary nature of 
this stage of renunciation.  In this quadrant, we find the bodhisattva’s denial of 
society, family, and status, his renunciation of selfish desires.   This is followed by the 
subsequent glimpses of emptiness, growing out of an inferential understanding of the 
teachings, and the realisation of impermanence and the selflessness of all beings.  
Subsequently, “The influence of phenomena is removed by employing the influence 
of emptiness” (śūnyatā vāsanādhānāddhīyate bhāva vāsanā) (BCA. 9.32a).  
  
Through the loosening of his personal identity, he meditates on exchanging his self for 
others (parātma parivartanam), a now standard popular method of generating 
empathy in Tibetan Buddhism.  We can thus deduce that the term ‘ātma’ in 
“parātma” (i.e. “para ātma”) (BCA. 8.120) has no metaphysical implication, but 
implies the taking up of a different view-point.  In fact we can again relate Śāntideva’s 
psychology with what Hume called “sympathy”.  Thomas’ explanation of Hume 
captures this practice perfectly: “I might imagine what it would be like to go through 
what you are undergoing and in some way I reproduce in myself what you are 
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experiencing” (Thomas, 1993: 57).  Through such meditation, the bodhisattva 
overcomes envy and competitiveness, creating a basis for generating empathy and 
compassion for all beings.   
 
At this point it is still a mental program, and the field must now shift to a more 
conventional worldly level.  As stated by Oliner (2003: 210), “just thinking 
empathetically is not in itself altruistic”.  Thus, even the “truly imposing altruistic 
impulse” (Huntington, 1989: 19) and the feeling of “compassion and loving kindness 
to the depths of one’s being” (Lewis, 2005: 110) are insufficient.  We do not become 
virtuous by ourselves but are “made virtuous through relationship with others” 
(Mrozik, 2007: 10).  In short, “Altruism must entail action” (Monroe, 1998: 6).  But in 
shifting the field to the external world, in wishing the well-being of “real” others, the 
bodhisattva has to re-instate them, reconstruct them.  This is a move that may not so 
readily occur to most Western ethicists, and hopefully our explanation of Śāntideva 
will help future discussion of ethics within other forms of non-self metaphysics. 
 
Returning to the diagram (on p280), the bodhisattva thus moves out of the Others/Not-
self quadrant and into the Others/Self quadrant.  People suffer, they need help, they 
deserve help, and surely in the past they have helped “me”.  Karma, though empty, is 
meaningfully re-instated.  We might recall (from Chapter 2) that people “may well 
behave at a high level in one domain and at a low level in another” (Krebs & van 
Hesteren, 1994: 107).  My quadrants can thus be seen as “domains” in which shifts of 
cognitive maturity take place, sometimes through meditational progress, sometimes as 
a voluntary fall.  The bodhisattva moves back to the Me/Self quadrant and reinforces 




ākāśasya sthitir yāvad yāvac ca jagataḥ sthitiḥ   | 
tāvan mama sthitir bhūyāj jagad duḥkhāni nighnataḥ   || 
 
So long as space remains, so long as the world remains, so will I 
remain, to dispel the suffering of the world (BCA. 10.55). 
 
If he acts on this vow, if his resolve remains steady, then he becomes a true 
bodhisattva.  If his mind is still prone to wavering, and if he continues to choose to 
benefit others over himself, then he is surely a true altruist, even in the Comtean sense 
of the word.  But once he firmly grasps that there is no self, and has the need to delude 
himself about the self of others, then his ‘altruism’ is of a different kind, it is 
“constructive altruism”, which relies on skilful means. 
 
Yet an ethics that bases itself on such a tension between the ultimate and the 
conventional is bound to be unstable.  It is an ethics which can be explained, but 
hardly justified.  It may even be an ethics that we find difficult to accept, given our 
modern emphasis on the body and the rights of the individual.  Moreover, it is a risky 
ethics.  What happens if I spend so much time in the Others/Self quadrant that the 
conventional notions of their worldly reality start to filter back into the ultimate 
notions of my bodhisattva reality?  If too much time is spent in one domain, could it 
be that one’s cognitive level might fall irreparably into an old stage-structure?  It is 
worth reminding ourselves of Śāntideva’s solution:  
duḥkha hetur ahaṃkāra ātma mohāt tu vardhate    |  
tato ‘pi na nivartyaś cet varaṃ nairātmya bhāvanā     || 
 
However, egoism, which is the cause of suffering, increases from the 
delusion that there is a self.  If this [particular delusion] cannot be 
avoided, better to meditate on not-self (BCA. 9.77).   
 
Egoism (ahaṃkāra) is to be stamped out because it is the biggest obstacle to 
liberation.  But to see others as non-existent is the biggest obstacle to compassion.  It 
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is through flickering between these views (these quadrants) that one is able to remain 
on the Bodhisattva Path.  If one becomes too deluded by compassion, one shifts the 
focus to not-self.  If one becomes too wise, as it were, through an intense realisation of 
emptiness, if one “destroys the bodhisattva path”, to use Paul Williams’ phrase, then 
one needs to re-instate beings through a “voluntary” or “deliberate” act of delusion.   
 
This deliberate act needs to become habitual: 
yathātma buddhir abhyāsāt sva kāye ‘smin nirātmake     | 
pareṣv api tathātmatvaṃ kim abhyāsān na jāyate     || 
 
In the same way that, through habit, the idea of a ‘self’ arose about 
this, your own body, though it is without self, will not the ‘selfhood’ 
also arise through habit with regard to others? (BCA. 8.115) 
 
He then turns this into an injunction: 
tasmād yathānyadīyeṣu śukra śoṇita binduṣu     | 
cakartha tvam ahaṃkāraṃ tathānyeṣv api bhāvaya     || 
 
Therefore, just as you have formed the notion of individuality from 
the drops of [your parents’] sperm and blood, so you must develop the 
notion regarding others (BCA. 8.158). 
 
There is still something to be said for Nagel’s (1978: 88) point that “recognition of the 
reality of others depends on a conception of oneself”.  Śāntideva accepts this view, but 
with a slight modification.  The recognition of oneself as being real is applicable to the 
past, whereas the recognition of the reality of others is applicable to the future.  It is 
through the memory of the former notion that the latter notion is to be constructed.  
But the former notion is then to be dropped.  For example, the body is important to the 
other, but it must be transcended by a bodhisattva.  It must be placed at the service of 
those others.  Of course, one would still recognise a body and a need to eat, but its 
impermanence and interdependence would be a feature of that recognition. That is, the 
bodhisattva both experiences the conventional world whilst perceiving it as a 
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fabrication.  So when Nagel (1978: 101) states that “it must be possible to say of other 
persons anything which one can say of oneself”, we need to qualify this.  For my 
purposes, I will qualify it here in terms of flickering, and note that the bodhisattva 
could say he exists or does not exist as a self, and could say that others exist or do not 
exist as selves, but opts to say that he does not exist as a self but others do.   
 
If we were to place Śāntideva’s bodhisattva into Bernard Williams’ case study 
situation (see p59 above), he might report that (ultimately speaking) he neither 
believed himself to be either A or B.  He might therefore add an unexpected 
dimension to the case (though one that may become more and more familiar in 
Western thought).  Yet one would imagine that (despite struggling with the non-
altruistic response required of the test), he would posit B’s mind to be the most 
relevant factor in the A-body-or-mind/B-body-or-mind enigma.  We therefore see that 
it remains possible for Śāntideva’s bodhisattva to speak of others as he speaks of 
himself, but he chooses not to do so.  Rather, like the jīvan-mukta, he chooses to 
participate in the “magic show”.  The delusion is not restrained, allowing him to take 
the perspective of the suffering other. 
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6.2 Śaṅkara: Living Liberation – The True Place of Action 
 
Much of the inspiration for this chapter comes from the following verses and the 
Advaitin concept of the “living-liberated being” (jīvan-mukta).  Here, Śaṅkara 
describes how such a person has apparently reached the final goal of life, wishing for 
nothing further, established as he is in brahma-nirvāṇa:   
saḥ yogī brahma-nirvāṇaṃ brahmaṇi nirvṛtiṃ mokṣam iha jīvann eva 
brahma-bhūtaḥ san adhigacchati prāpnoti   || ... 
jīvan-muktam ‘brahmaiva sarvam’ ity eṣaṃ niścayavantaṃ brahma-
bhūtam akalmaṣaṃ dharmādharmādi varjitam   || ... 
sthitvā asyāṃ sthitau brahmayām yathoktāyāṃ antakāle ‘pi antye 
vayary api brahma-nirvāṇaṃ brahma-nirvṛtiṃ mokṣam ṛcchati 
gacchati   |   kimu vaktavyaṃ brahmacaryād eva saṃnyasya yo 
brahmaṇy eva avatiṣṭhate sa brahma-nirvāṇam ṛcchati iti   || 
 
That yogi, having attained the final state, even while living, absorbed 
in brahman, he is satisfied, liberated ... A living-liberated being, 
having certitude that brahman is all, has become pure consciousness, 
taintless and free from merit and demerit  ... It is said that he remains 
established in this state in the autumn years of his life, free, absorbed 
and satisfied in brahman.  What need is there to say that he who has 
abided in brahman during his whole life, from celibate pupil to 
renunciate, alas attains the final peace of brahmanhood  
(Bh.G.Bh. 5.24, 6.27 & 2.72). 
 
But even more inspiring is the way in which Śaṅkara deals with the following verse 
from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.  In this commentary, we find Śaṅkara’s theory of 
lineage and salvation.  A man finds himself lost in this world.  Not even God has 
shown mercy on him.  He is anxious to find direction.  Luckily for him, there are those 
who know reality, the ultimate and the provisional.  They can guide him.  Through 
their speech, the blindfold is gradually removed and the newly enlightened man can 




But unlike the picture painted above, we do not simply find our way and leave it at 
that.  We do not sit in absorption longing for the final release of death.  Rather, we 
stand at the side of the road and wait for those who may also want to find the 
promised land, and slowly-slowly, we remove their blindfold.  Only then may the 
body fall off.  Thus, we begin our interpretative journey, as Śaṅkara did, with the 
Upaniṣads, whose ethics of “non-attachment and altruism” (Lipner, 2010: 261) are 
here enriched even further by Śaṅkara’s exegesis.  The square brackets are included to 
express a number of Śaṅkara’s separate comments which I find particularly poignant:  
tasya yathābhinahanaṃ pramucya prabrūyād “etāṃ diśaṃ gandhārā 
etāṃ diśaṃ vraja” iti sa grāmād grāmaṃ pṛcchan paṇḍito medhāvī 
gandhārān evopasampadyetaivam evehācāryavān purūṣo veda tasya 
tāvad eva ciraṃ yāvan na vimokṣye ‘tha sampatsya iti (Ch.U. VI.xiv.2). 
 
If a [kind (kārūṇikaṃ)] person [a knower of Self (brahmātma-vidaṃ), 
who is free from bondage (vimukta bandhanaṃ)] were [out of 
compassion (kārūṇikena)] to remove the blindfold from the eyes of a 
man [lost (diṇmūḍhaḥ) in a forest (araṇye)] and say, “The land of 
Gandhāra lies this way.  Walk in this direction”, and if he who 
received this instruction, being an intelligent man, by asking his way 
from village to village, verily reached the land of the Gandhāras 
[attaining peace and happiness (āpanna nirvṛtaḥ sukhyabhūt)]; so in 
the same way a man [who has been forced to inhabit (praveśitaḥ) this 
‘forest’ of a body (dehāraṇyaṃ) by the ‘thieves’ of merit and demerit, 
etc. (puṇyāpuṇyādi taskaraiḥ)] having [by some merit or other (cideva 
puṇya)] met with a [preeminent (atiśaya)] teacher [becomes 
dispassionate towards cyclic existence (viraktaḥ saṃsāra 
viṣayebhyaḥ) and when told “you are not a transmigrating being” (nāsi 
tvaṃ saṃsārī) - “you are that” (tat tvam asi)] acquires knowledge in 
this world [attaining his own true self (svaṃ sad-ātmānam 
upasaṃpadya)].  For him the delay lasts only until he becomes 
liberated [i.e. attains immortality (amṛtatvameti) when the body falls 




From the above comments, the picture painted by Śaṅkara is in near-perfect harmony 
with that painted by Śāntideva.  There are two issues the latter could possibly have 
with this; one ethical, the other metaphysical.   
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First, the notion of a final resting place would be resisted by Śāntideva on the grounds 
of an apparent lack of compassion.  But then Śāntideva has the same issue with the 
Buddhist “Śrāvaka” monks.  And note that Śaṅkara explicitly adds here that the 
teacher teaches “out of compassion” (kārūṇikena), as he does elsewhere (U.S. Prose, 
1.6).  In other words, the removal of the blindfold is both an altruistic act and a duty.  
It simultaneously saves the seeker from further suffering, while continuing the 
Advaitin lineage of knowers.  So the disagreement is really about commitment to 
rebirth rather than compassion per se (as it arguably is with the Śrāvaka).  Thus, the 
altruistic nature of the jīvan-mukta remains intact despite the denial of rebirth.   
 
The second issue would be that, while Śaṅkara finds non-duality in “Being” (sat), 
Śāntideva would find his non-duality in Nāgārjuna’s equation of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa 
(MMK. 25.19).  However, as we saw in Chapter 5.1, perhaps even this can be 
overcome to some degree by Śaṅkara’s assertion that “There is actually no difference 
between liberation and bondage” (na hi vastuto muktāmuktatva viśeṣo ‘sti) (Bṛ.U.Bh. 
IV.iv.6).  The difference, however, would re-appear in the line that follows: “For, 
indeed, the self is always the same” (ātmano nityaikarūpatvāt) (ibid.).  And so we are 
back to our polar Self/Not-Self metaphysical differences.  But we have known that 
from the start.   
 
What remains startling is just how close Śaṅkara and Śāntideva still stand given this 
enormous difference in metaphysical doctrine.  Running through the above comments 
to the Chāndogya, one is simply amazed at the similarities.  We have the teacher 
painted as an all-knowing, kind-hearted helper, who takes it upon himself to direct 
others out of compassion.  The person that comes to him, even though intelligent, is in 
some sense lost.  The allegorical scene of this compassionate response is a forest, just 
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as it is in the Mahāyāna Aṣṭa Sūtra (see Conze, 1973: 223).  The lost person does not 
turn to God for help, but turns to a fellow human being.  There is no grace or divine 
intervention here, there is only the teacher.
194
  If it were not for this fearless guide, we 
would all be lost in the wilderness.
195
   
 
Śaṅkara here appears to share with the Buddhist, what Collins (1982: 10) calls, a 
“pragmatic agnosticism”.  The first step in this pragmatism is to turn away from the 
world of sense pleasures.  Therefore, in line with Śāntideva (BCA Chapter 8), Śaṅkara 
adds his signature doctrine of a prior need for renunciation of the physical world.  
Hence, we have the negative evaluation of the body, this so-called “forest of a body” 
(dehāraṇyaṃ), described in graphically foul terms.  In fact, Suthren Hirst draws our 
attention to this very passage (and Ch.U.Bh. V.ix.1), under the sub-heading of 
“Renunciation”, where she states that, these lists are “reminiscent of ... Buddhist 
cultivations of mindfulness” (Suthren Hirst, 2005: 74).  This list includes: phlegm, 
blood, fat, flesh, semen, worms, urine, and faeces.
 
 And, of course, Śāntideva’s 
meditation at BCA 8.40ff has this very intent of renunciation of the body.  For 
example, Śāntideva writes:  
yadi te nāśucau rāgaḥ kasmād āliṅgase ‘paraṃ     | 
māmsa kardama saṃliptaṃ snāyu baddhāsthi pañjaraṃ     || 
 
If you [believe you] have no passion for what is foul, why then do you 
embrace another, a cage of bones bound by sinew, smeared with slime 
and flesh? (BCA. 8.52) 
 
 
                                               
194 When Ram-Prasad (2001a) states that, “the Advaitic path to liberation is still one walked by the 
subject unassisted by a higher power” (p217), he is denying the need for a God, not the teacher 
(personal communication).  On the need for a teacher in Advaita, see Suthren Hirst (2005: 49). 
 




Śāntideva even describes people as “moving skeletons” (calat kaṅkālā) (BCA. 8.70), 
just as the V.C. likens the body to “living corpses” (ārdra śavā) (297).  
 
Having dispensed with what the pupil is not, i.e. this body; the Advaitin teacher then 
tells him what he is.  Of course, Śāntideva adopts a similar meditation on the body and 
aggregates at BCA 9.56ff to demonstrate that no self can be found.  Śaṅkara will use 
the same deconstruction of the provisional to show that “you are that” (tat tvam asi), 
the ultimate.
196
  Once again, it would seem that it is only the Self-doctrine that divides 
the two philosophers.   
 
Finally, having had his blindfold removed, the seeker has succeeded in finding his 
way, and is no longer in a state of anxiety, but is content.  But Śaṅkara’s altruistic 
ethics prevents the ascetic from buying a one-way ticket to the forest.  Rather, like the 
bodhisattva, he re-enters the social arena as a paternal guide. 
 
And so we will discover that so much of what we have said about Śāntideva’s ethics is 
also true of Śaṅkara.  He too sees the world in negative terms, but ultimately grounds 
human suffering in our confusion about the world rather than the world itself.  He too 
is motivated by the wish to liberate beings from saṃsāra, and so he too, if restricted to 
his ethics of liberation, might well be labelled a “negative consequentialist”.  
Unfortunately, his arguments are far more scattered than Śāntideva’s.  As Roy Perrett 
                                               
196 Harvey (1995: 21) notes that, in India, “the religious life was popularly equated with ‘seeking for 
Self’”, and certain passages in the Buddhist Canon show the Buddha loosely using this notion in a non-
metaphysical sense.  For Conze, this “hunt” for the “true self” left room in Buddhism for the notion of 
an “Absolute in man” (Conze, 1973: xv).  For a sustained argument for a “transcendent” self in 
Buddhism, see Pérez-Remón (1980).  For a critique of Conze’s and Pérez-Remón’s positions, as well as 
others who saw room for a self in Buddhism, see Harvey (1995: 17-19).  For a model based on the 
useful distinction between self and the ‘sense of self’, see Albahari (2006).  Cf. Damasio (2000). 
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once quipped, if Śāntideva wrote too little, Śaṅkara wrote too much.197  This means 
that, in the case of Śāntideva, the researcher is faced with having to fill in the “gaps”, 
perhaps being welled from other Mahāyāna texts; whereas in the case of Śaṅkara, the 
researcher is faced with having to reconcile conflicting textual accounts.  With regard 
to Śaṅkara, then, it is perhaps asking too much of the reader to assess the validity of 
my schema in Fig. 2 (on p312).  I trust, however, that any reader convinced of the 
validity and/or utility of Fig. 1, will now be willing to accept a parallel schema for 
Śaṅkara.   
  
As with Śāntideva, I feel that the best way to avoid an either/or reading of Śaṅkara’s 
work is to place it in schematic form, highlighting the shifts that he makes.  The 
horizontal axis will remain the same as before (see Fig. 1, p280), with the distinction 
between ‘Me’ and ‘Others’.  When discussing Śāntideva, we saw how this distinction 
allowed the bodhisattva to divide the world into those who had taken the Bodhisattva 
Vow and those who had not.   Śaṅkara can similarly use the distinction to distinguish 
between those who are qualified (adhikāra) for brahman-knowledge and those who 
are not.  In making this distinction, the focus is on the most extreme case, which is 
that the candidate must be a qualified male Brahmin.  This case has already been 
argued for in Chapter 4.3.  If this remains controversial, I qualify it by claiming the 
Provisional/Me quadrant to be representative of an “ideal” personality.  As argued in 
Chapter 4.3, this would include the celibate student (brahmacārin).  Allow me then to 
simply introduce the diagram with no further ado and to base my following account on 
the summary it offers: 
 
                                               







The first thing one should notice about this diagram is that the vertical axis no longer 
represents ‘Self’ versus ‘Non-self’, but ‘Ultimate Reality’ versus ‘Provisional 
Reality’.  It should also be noted that ‘Ultimate Reality’ maps onto the realm of ‘Self’ 
as brahman.  The notion of ‘Ultimate Reality’ went unstressed in my explanation of 
Śāntideva, because, unlike Śaṅkara, he offered no absolute transcendence thesis.  In 
other words, placing these diagrams side by side, one might immediately notice the 
circularity of Śāntideva’s model as opposed to the upwardly transcendent nature of 
Śaṅkara’s model.  I have therefore left out the arrows.  Instead, ‘Ultimate Reality’ is 
shown as being a funnel-shaped space that one visits rather than being an absolute 
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alternative to ‘Provisional Reality’.   This allows for my notion of flickering or 
oscillating between realities; the more one transcends, the wider the funnel, and the 
more time spent in ‘Ultimate Reality’, that being the (blissful?) consciousness of 
absolute being.  
 
So while the commencing-bodhisattva entered the path at the level of ‘self’, the 
Advaitin pupil (śiṣya) enters the path at a level of ‘not-Self’.  His notion of “My 
ātman is of the same nature as brahman” is in fact a lower level of understanding 
about ātman.  He has yet to realise that his jīvātman and the ātman that is brahman are 
one and the same.  That is, the ‘Provisional Reality’ of the pupil belongs to a world-
view which assumes the self to be of the same nature as brahman, but still 
independent of brahman.  The pupil still belongs to the provisional ethical world of 
Dharma, with its caste roles.  That is why he continues to proudly see himself as a 
Brahmin male.
 198
  He is one to whom the teacher might say: 
 naivaṃ somya pratipattum arhasi, pratiṣiddhatvād bheda pratipatteḥ |  
kathaṃ pratiṣiddhā bheda pratipattir ity ata āha – “anyo ‘sāv anyo 
‘ham asmīti na sa veda”, “brahma taṃ parādād yo ‘nyatrātmano 
brahma veda”, “mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati” ity 
evam ādyāḥ     || 
 
“My child, you should not hold such a view, for it is forbidden to 
hold a doctrine of difference”.  [If the student] then says “Why is the 
doctrine of difference forbidden?”, [the teacher quotes] “He who 
thinks he is one and He [brahman] another, does not know”, “The 
Brahmins reject him who believes Brahmins to be other than Self”, 
“One who sees diversity in [brahman] goes from death to death” 
(U.S. Prose, 1.26). 
 
                                               
198 Interestingly, Theodor (2010) has recently mapped the Two Truths on top of the Gītā’s ethics, 
giving rise to a three-tier hierarchical interpretation of the Gītā, which shares a number of features with 
my interpretation of Śaṅkara’s ethics.  Had Theodor drawn his “somewhat graphical description” (p18), 
he would have had a vertical axis with Dharma at the bottom and mokṣa at the top.  Our horizontal axes 
would, however, remain quite dissimilar.  The pupil in my “Me/Provisional” quadrant (see Fig.2) 
appears to be in a similar mental condition as Theodor’s so-called “second-tier” yogi, still “convinced 




This view of an individuated self with caste affiliations must now be transcended.   
Whilst the life of the brahmacārin has been one of outer-renunciation, the path now is 
one of inner-renunciation.  This gradual path may take many years.  Thus, we must 
imagine a mind that flickers between the provisional and the ultimate truth.  The path 
which Śaṅkara lays out for the Brahmin male is one that requires both intellectual 
knowledge and direct knowledge.  One begins the path as a student of the Vedas.  One 
ends the path when one comes to understand that all is brahman.  Hence, there is an 
obvious ascendency involved.  It is for this reason that Fig. 2 begins in the lower left 
quadrant, as opposed to the upper left in Fig. 1 (p280).  The person in this quadrant is 
a male Brahmin and a seeker of liberation.  He is not as yet at the same stage as the 
bodhisattva, and need not have any altruistic motives.  He is formally equivalent to a 
“selfish” Buddhist monk, seeking liberation for himself.   
 
It is only when he is established in brahman-consciousness that the knower turns 
round and offers this knowledge to those qualified to receive it.  The student then 
becomes the teacher.  These knowers of brahman, forever engaged in the practice of 
“knowledge and absorption and so on” (jñāna dhyānādi) (Mu.U.Bh. III.i.4) are said 
by Śaṅkara to be the “only true men of action in this world” (eveha kriyāvān) 
(ibid.).  The action that Śaṅkara has in mind clearly includes the passing on of this 
knowledge to others.  Action, then, does not stop when realisation is attained; rather it 
starts when realisation is attained. 
 
This shows that knowers do not literally give up action, only the making of further 
karma, in the sense of that which creates positive or negative consequences and 
rebirths.  When Śaṅkara speaks of the giving up of “karma” it is shorthand for 
“karma-sādhana” (ritual action).  As pointed out by Kuznetsova (2007: 35), the 
315 
 
“most significant dimension of karma is the ritual act”, and thus, for the renouncer 
movement, the “elimination of karma means principally the elimination of rites” 
(ibid.).  And so, as already mentioned, when Śaṅkara writes that, “steadfastness in 
knowledge combined with action is illogical” (Bh.G.Bh. 18.66), he is speaking of 
ritual action.  Elsewhere, he makes this explicit: 
 tasmāt pratiṣiddhatvād bheda darśanasya, bheda viṣayatvāc ca 
karmopādānasya, karma-sādhanatvāc ca yajñopavītādeḥ karma-
sādhanopādānasya paramātmābheda pratipattyā pratiṣedhaḥ kṛto 
veditavyaḥ  |  karmanām tatsādhanānāṃ ca yajñopavītādīnāṃ 
paramātmābheda pratipatti viruddhatvāt  |  saṃsāriṇo hi karmāṇi 
vidhīyante tat sādhanāni ca yajñopavītādīni, na paramātmano ‘bheda 
darśinaḥ  |  bheda darśana mātreṇa ca tato ‘nyatvam     || 
 
As the doctrine of difference is forbidden, so ritual actions which 
assume the domain of difference, and the sacred thread, etc., which 
are the means to their performance, are also forbidden.  It should be 
known that the prohibition to undertake rites and their means 
derives from the knowledge of non-difference with the Supreme 
Self.  For these rites and means to them, such as the wearing of 
threads, are at variance with the view of one’s non-difference with 
the Supreme Self.  Rituals and means, such as the sacred thread are 
indeed enjoined upon a transmigrator [but] not upon one who holds 
the view of non-difference with the Supreme Self.  That one is other 
[than brahman] is due only to the [error of] accepting the doctrine of 
difference (U.S. Prose, 1.30). 
 
Now it is evident that this prohibition (pratiṣiddha) of ritual action (karma-
sādhana) is not a prohibition of all action, for it appears in a text used for 
teaching purposes, which is itself an action (karma).
 
 Much confusion would 
be overcome if scholars and translators were more careful about the 




                                               
199 Chari notes that sometimes where Śaṅkara took karma to mean “deeds” [e.g. in his reading of the 
Gītā’s, “karma undertaken for a sacrifice gets totally destroyed” (Bh.G.Bh.  4.23)], Rāmānuja took it to 
mean “past karma causing bondage” (Chari, 2005: 38).  Yet Śaṅkara does sometimes take karma in this 
latter sense [e.g. in his reading of the Gītā’s, “The fire of knowledge reduces all karma to ashes” 
(Bh.G.Bh. 4.37)].  Clearly then, this ambiguity has been around for some time and has contributed 
towards many sectarian debates and scholarly misunderstandings.  Śaṅkara is no doubt partially 




So just like Śāntideva’s bodhisattva, we can imagine the jīvan-mukta as “acting nobly 
in the world” (lokāryaṃ kurvan) (Ś.S. 363), dedicated to his pupils.  Indeed, this need 
for an enlightened teacher is much more explicit in Śaṅkara than in Śāntideva.  True, 
Śāntideva (Ś.S. 34-42) speaks highly of the relationship with a “kalyāṇa-mitra” (lit. 
“good-friend”), and thus all bodhisattvas are to be treated as one’s “instructor” (śāstṛ) 
(53).  He also speaks of the advantage of taking the Vows with a “guru”, namely the 
“intense shame” (tīvram apatrāpyaṃ) that would follow if one broke them (11-12).  
He also laments at the difficulty in finding enlightened teachers (buddhotpādo 
‘tidurlabhaḥ) (BCA. 9.162a).  Nevertheless, he also allows for the taking of the 
Bodhisattva Vow in the “absence of a good friend” (kalyāṇa-mitrasya abhāve) (Ś.S. 
12).  Moreover, he follows his famous rendition of the Bodhisattva Vow
200
 (363) by 
vowing to become his own teacher (ātmācarya), forming a private student-teacher 
relationship with himself; becoming his own master (gurur-ātmanaḥ).201  And while, 
at the very end of the BCA (10.58) he thanks his “kalyāṇa-mitraṃ” for their 
“prasāda” (kindness, inspiration), nowhere does Śāntideva actually state that one 
needs a teacher in order to realise emptiness.  So while this need not contradict Matics 
(1971: 49) claim that, for Śāntideva, a “Guru is indispensable”, it does leave that 
possibility open. 
 
In contrast, for Śaṅkara, knowledge of the Vedas must be imparted by a knower of the 
Vedas, and knowledge of brahman must be imparted by a knower of brahman 
                                               
200 This is a slightly modified version of the one found at BCA. 10.55 (quoted on p303). It runs:  
“So long as space remains, so long as the world remains, so will I remain, acting nobly in the world, 
aiming towards enlightenment” (yāvad ākāśa niṣṭhasya niṣṭhā lokasya saṃbhavet   |  tāvat sthāsyāmi 
lokāryaṃ kurvan jñāna puraḥsaraḥ) (Ś.S. 363). 
 
201 Cf. Dhammapada:  “Oneself is indeed one’s master, for who else could be one’s master? With 
oneself well-restrained, one gets a master hard to find” (attā hi attano nātho ko hi nātho paro siyā   | 
attanā va sudantena nāthaṃ labhati dullabhaṃ) (verse 160).  The V.C. (54-55) also puts the emphasis 
on one’s own effort. 
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(Ch.U.Bh. VI.xiv.2).  In fact, Śaṅkara sees no other way to liberation, and therefore, 
until one is liberated, he urges “constant reliance upon the guru” (Cenkner, 1983: 32).  
The following citations make his intention clear: 
anyathā ca jñāna prāpty abhāvāt - “ācāryavān puruṣo veda”, 
“ācāryād dhaiva vidyā viditā”, “ācarāryaḥ plāvayitā”, “samyag-
jñānaṃ plava ihocyate” ity ādi śrutibhyaḥ, “upadekṣyanti te jṅānaṃ” 
ity ādi smṛteś ca || 
 
Since knowledge is obtained in no other way.  For the Śrutis say “He 
with a teacher knows”, “Knowledge learnt from a teacher …”, “The 
teacher is a boatman”, “His right knowledge is said to be a boat”, etc.  
The Smṛti also says “Knowledge will be imparted to you”, etc.  
(U.S. Prose, 1.3). 
 
The Brahmin pupil (śiṣya) must therefore search for his teacher (ācārya), who must 
subsequently assess his qualities: 
tad idaṃ mokṣa sādhanaṃ jñānaṃ sādhana sādhyād anityāt 
sarvasmād viraktāya tyakta putra vitta lokaiṣaṇāya pratipanna 
paramahaṃsa-pārivrājyāya śamadama dayādi  yuktāya śāstra 
prasiddha śiṣya guṇa sampannāya śucaye brāhmaṇāya vidhivad 
upasannāya śiṣyāya jāti karma vṛtta vidyābhijanaiḥ parīkṣitāya 
brūyāt punaḥ punaḥ yāvad grahaṇaṃ dṛḍhībhavati     || 
 
The means to liberation is knowledge.  It should be repeatedly 
explained to the pupil until firmly grasped, to one who is indifferent to 
everything transitory, achievable through means, and who has no 
desire for sons, wealth, this world or the next, who has adopted the 
way of the highest ascetics, who is endowed with tranquillity, self-
control, compassion, etc., possessed of the qualities of a pupil, well-
known from the scriptures, if he is a pure Brahmin, who approaches 
the teacher in the prescribed manner, and if his birth, profession, 
conduct, knowledge and family have been examined (U.S. Prose, 1.2). 
  
We see here that the pupil is explicitly restricted to the Brahmin class, and that his 
caste is also to be assessed based on family and profession.  The pupil must have 
given up any wish for sons, which shows the stress that Śaṅkara placed on chastity.  
But it also highlights the one-pointed nature of Śaṅkara’s view of renunciation.  It is 
an all-or-nothing stance which explicitly rules out the life of the householder.  It also 
rules out any desire for another “world” (loka), by which he means heavenly realms.  
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As with early Buddhism, Śaṅkara sees these realms as limited due to their 
impermanence, that is, one must someday fall from them.  The only true liberation is 
total liberation, the complete merging with brahman (Ch.U. VI.xiv.2). 
 
Despite the seemingly world-denying tone of this verse from the U.S., it is important 
to note that the pupil must have compassion (daya) as one his chief characteristics, 
alongside the more renunciatory virtues of tranquillity (śama) and self-control (dama).  
And we have already seen how, in the Ch.U.Bh, Śaṅkara speaks of an auspicious 
meeting with a compassionate knower of the self who teaches the seeker the truth of 
non-duality (Ch.U.Bh. VI.xiv.2).  We also find Śaṅkara advocating the need for 
compassion in Bṛ.U.Bh (V.ii.3), where daya is one of the so-called “three Da’s” that 
one must practice, the other two being “self-control” (dāmyata) and “generosity” 
(datta) (Bṛ.U. V.ii.1-3).  But the virtues of compassion and generosity only have 
validity when they are applied.  They become crucial when the pupil himself becomes 
a teacher, who must selflessly give his knowledge to others.   
 
Indeed, Śaṅkara’s G.K.Bh. ends (Salutation, 2) by thanking his parama-guru (great 
teacher, or teacher-of-my-teacher) for teaching the truth of the Vedas “out of 
compassion” (kāruṇyād) for the benefit of all beings (bhūta hetu).  Also, in the V.C. 
(35), the guru is addressed as an “ocean of compassion” (kāruṇya sindhu). 202  Written 
in these terms, these salutations might well have been addressed to a bodhisattva.   
Indeed, Śaṅkara demands all of the following qualities of his Advaitin teachers: 
ācāryas tūhāpohagrahaṇa dhāraṇa śama dama dayānugrahādi 
sampanno labdhāgamo dṛṣṭādṛṣṭa bhogeṣv anāsaktaḥ tyakta sarva 
                                               
202 While noting their eulogistic format, Suthren Hirst (2005: 11-13) has highlighted similar comments 
from Śaṅkara’s students about his compassion.   Naturally, the ethical prescriptions Śaṅkara imposes on 




karma-sādhano brahma-vid brahmaṇi sthito ‘bhinnavṛtto dambha 
darpa kuhaka śāṭhya māyā mātsaryānṛtāhaṃkāra mamatvādi doṣa 
varjitaḥ kevala parānugraha prayojano vidyopayogārthīṃ  
 
Now the teacher is one who is able to grasp the pros and cons of an 
argument, who understands and remembers them, who has 
tranquillity, self-control, compassion, kindness, etc., versed in the 
scriptures, unattached to enjoyments (visible or invisible), having 
abandoned all ritual actions, he is a knower of brahman, he is 
established in brahman, breaking not the rules of conduct, free from 
faults such as: deceit, pride, trickery, wickedness, deception, envy, 
falsehood, egoism and selfishness.  With the sole aim of helping 
others, he wishes to make use of knowledge (U.S. Prose, 1.6). 
 
This verse is simply over-flowing with information.  We can immediately note how 
both the pupil and the teacher are to be possessed of tranquillity (śama), self-control 
(dama) and compassion (daya).  The teacher is distinguished from the student by 
being a knower of brahman (brahma-vid), established in brahman (brahmaṇi-sthita).  
In other words, his knowledge of brahman is immediate; he is literally one with 
brahman and has no other self but brahman.  While he should remain detached from 
the world, the list of virtues makes it unlikely that he could be described as discarding 
social mores.  In fact, on a virtue ethical account, he would seem like a model citizen.  
Surely, his compassion need not be restricted to the teacher-student relationship. 
 
Halbfass (1991: 384) speaks of the freedom of the jīvan-mukta as being “carefully 
channelled” by conservative traditionalism.  In more positive terms, Mumme claims 
that the Advaitin jīvan-mukta will “naturally observe dharmic norms” (Fort & 
Mumme, 1996: 266).  Potter (1981: 37) also claims that the mukta’s ethical training 
and liberation will guarantee an honest and helpful response from the liberated 
teacher.
203
  This accords with the Vedāntic mystical notion that, “Inner perfection and 
outer conduct are two sides of one life” (Radhakrishnan, 1989: 108).  Established in 
                                               




brahman, having no further goals, the jīvan-mukta stands beyond egoism and 
selfishness.  Such a parama-haṃsa is said to be selfless (nirmamaḥ) (Jā.U. 6).204  And 
yet, according to Śaṅkara, this ideal saṃnyāsin “does not transgress the limits of 
moral propriety” (Mu.U.Bh. III.i.4) (trans. Gambhīrānanda, 1989, Vol. 1: 144), his 
behaviour is never “disrespectful” (anādaraḥ) (Bṛ.U.Bh. III.v.1).   
 
Nevertheless, this selflessness does not imply an absence of activity.  On the contrary, 
the teacher remains in society with “the sole aim of helping others” (keval 
parānugraha prayojana) (U.S. Prose, 1.6).  This perfectly parallels Lewis’ (2005) 
depiction of the altruism shown by the bodhisattva who remains in saṃsāra “for no 
other goal than assisting others” (p97).  And although, unlike the bodhisattva, the 
jīvan-mukta does not vow to return to this world of suffering; his acceptance of the 
duty to pass on the knowledge of brahman ensures that beings will continue to be 
liberated by his pupils.   The outcome is therefore the same, and can be compared to 
the Buddha’s refusal to enter parinirvāṇa until he had disciples that could continue his 
work.  And so, by claiming that the life of the brahman-knower is constructively 
altruistic, we must also question Perrett’s (1998: 54) assertion that “mokṣa is the good 
life rather than the moral life”.  For Śaṅkara, it is both. 
 
We might also compare the jīvan-mukta’s “constructive altruism” with Davis’ (2005) 
treatment of the altruistic form of rulership as recommended in the Mahābarata.  
Davis suggests that “The altruistic dharma of a king … lies in renouncing personal 
aims in favour of seeking to “benefit the world”” (p167).  The jīvan-mukta, by 
                                               
204 While we have no commentary by Śaṅkara on the Jābāla Upaniṣad, or any other so-called 
Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad (see Olivelle, 1992); Śaṅkara does quote from it with reference to the lifestyle of 
the mendicant (parivrājakaḥ) or highest renouncer (parama-haṃsa) (Ch.U.Bh. II.xxiii.1), and again 
with reference to renouncing from the state of a student (B.S.Bh. III.iv.17). 
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contrast, has already renounced everything, including this world and the next, and, as 
such, no longer has any personal aims.  The brahma-vid need do nothing.  His selfless 
following of the Dharma is therefore effortless.  Yet, it is with time and effort that he 
teaches the truth of brahman.  So while he need do nothing, he does do something.  So 
he does not leave “all activity and repose in oneness”, as Otto (1957: 207) claims.  
Rather, he acts from that place of oneness, "out of that consciousness” 
(Radhakrishnan, 1989: 357).  This constitutes his own form of altruistic dharma, 
where dharma stands more for conduct than duty.  For if duty is a “thing that can be 
exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt” (Util. 5.14), then his teaching is no duty.  
Better to see it as a spontaneous and compassionate gift.  And as Mill noted: “No one 
has a moral right to our generosity and beneficence” (5.15).205 
 
It is quite interesting that according to Green’s (2005) strict definition of altruism as 
“intentional action for the welfare of others” which has “only a neutral or negative 
consequence on the actor” (p191), Śaṅkara’s jīvan-mukta, who is “free from merit and 
demerit” (dharmādharma varjitam) (Bh.G.Bh. 6.27) would seem to pass the test 
where the bodhisattva might fail.  The bodhisattva fails if he continues to accrue merit 
by his positive actions, and he will continue to accrue merit until he reaches the stage 
of an enlightened arhat.  At such a time, the arhat is said to create no new karma, 
having passed beyond merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa), due to the destruction of the 
three roots of unwholesome action.  However, they are still subject to past karma, and 
may still experience physical, if not mental, pain (Miln. 44-45).   But as we know, 
Śāntideva has imposed a voluntary delusion on his bodhisattva, so karma and merit 
must still be functioning.  Significantly, Śāntideva also argues that karma still 
                                               
205 Whether or not such generosity or compassion should be “strictly optional” and whether or not 
liberalism is thus “deficient” (Garfield, 2002: 187-205) is open to debate. 
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functions in the arhat (BCA. 9.44-48), just as Śaṅkara admits that karma still 
functions in the brahma-vid (Ch.U.Bh. VI.xiv.2).   
 
We might stop to question here whether Śāntideva, in dedicating all his merit to others 
(BCA. 9.166-167), has thereby transcended a “eudaemonist interpretation” (Goodman, 
2009: 92).  The only problem with this non-merit-making thesis is that the act of 
dedication (nāmanā, pariṇāmanā) traditionally forms part of a seven-limbed practice, 
as found in the Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra.206  Śāntideva recommends this practice for the 
accumulation of merit.  In fact, Chapters 2 & 3 of the BCA may well be seen as an 
extended version of this practice (Crosby & Skilton, 1995: 9-13).  But even so, 
whether merit is accumulated or not, this does not render it “eudaemonistic” or selfish, 
for this accumulation is itself sought with the sole intention of fulfilling the 
Bodhisattva Vow.  Śāntideva states that: 
puṇya dānād api yat puṇyaṃ tato ‘pi na vipākaḥ prārthanīyo ‘nyatra 
parārthāt  
 
In that merit which arises from the donating of merit, there is no 
ripening, except for another’s benefit (Ś.S. 147).    
 
Thus, Śāntideva’s ethics do indeed transcend a eudaemonist interpretation.  The 
situation is much clearer for the brahma-vid, who is claimed by the Upaniṣads to be 
beyond the making of new karma (Mu.U. II.ii.8), a claim Śaṅkara explicitly endorses 
(Ch.U.Bh. VI.xiv.2).  The brahma-vid is therefore a definite candidate for altruism 
according to Green’s strict criteria.  Unlike the bodhisattva, the brahma-vid has no 
need to ‘generate’ an altruistic motivation; he teaches spontaneously.  Nevertheless, 
he still needs to empathise with the pupil.  The pupil believes he is an individuated 
self.  Even if he believes he has a relationship with brahman, it is still based on a 
                                               
206 Dayal (1970: 54-8) is wrong to claim that it was Śāntideva who formulated this practice.   
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notion of ‘me’ and ‘Him’.  So it would seem that the brahman-knower still needs to 
alternate between ultimate reality and provisional reality.  But how is he to do this?  
The problem is similar to one we faced with regard to the fully enlightened Buddha.  I 
therefore believe it better to understand the brahman-knower as flickering between 
these two realities.  Like Śāntideva, Śaṅkara does not provide us with a positive theory 
of how such flickering would work.  However, he does, reluctantly (Bṛ.U. Bh. I.iv.10) 
and unwittingly (U.S. Prose, 1.2) admit that it must so occur.  Thus, the brahma-vid 
who also “knows” his wife and the brahma-vid who sees fit to examine the pupil’s 
credentials must rely on flickering cognition.   
 
One thing worthy of note is that Śaṅkara’s constructive altruism is mainly towards 
people who are overtly seeking his help.  They come to the teacher as “seekers” of 
liberation.  The V.C. thus speaks of the brahman-knower as acting “through others’ 
wishes” (parecchayā) (539).  Adopting Nagel’s (1978: 81) words, the teacher’s 
actions are “motivated by reasons which the other person’s interests provide”.  The 
power structure is also quite clear, the pupil having already conceded a lack of 
knowledge.  Of course, in this case it also happens that the interests of the teacher and 
pupil coincide, the teacher having once been a seeker himself.  The teacher is simply 
one (admittedly profound) leap ahead of the pupil, and the pupil is potentially set to 
become a teacher himself.  One is reminded of Foucault’s (1982: 782-785) notion of 
“pastoral power”, a power which concerns individuals rather than whole communities, 
a power which is “salvation oriented”. 
 
In contrast, the so-called other-regarding ethic of Śāntideva’s advanced bodhisattva is 
aimed at all beings, whether they overtly realise that life is suffering or not.  They thus 
vow to lead to nirvāṇa all those without refuge: the foolish, the ignorant, and the blind 
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(Ś.S. 287-289).  He is therefore open to the criticism that some beings might not wish 
to be “liberated” or “perfected”.  Of course, Śaṅkara may also help others who do not 
wish to be helped, but Śāntideva’s ethics do seem to spread a wider net.  Kantians may 
therefore point out that Śāntideva’s ethics go beyond the “duty of love”.  They may 
insist, with Baron (1997), that “we are not to seek to perfect others” (p14), nor “decide 
for them what their ends should be” (p15).  It could then be argued that this is not 
other-regarding at all, for the incentive to act comes from the bodhisattva’s projection 
of a Buddhist doctrine (i.e. suffering, nirvāṇa, etc), not from the other person’s overt 
interests.  Furthermore, it would seem that the motivating factor is the bodhisattva’s 
own desire to liberate all beings.  This appears to contradict the bodhisattva’s vow to 
work only if it is in the “interests of others” (Ś.S. 117).  It may also go against 
Śāntideva’s own (Kant-like) claim that: 
na yuktaṃ svārtha dṛṣṭyādi tadīyaiś cakṣurādibhiḥ     | 
na yuktaṃ syandituṃ svārtham anyadīyaiḥ karādibhiḥ     || 
 
It is not right for example to set the eyes of others onto your own 





However, it would also seem rather perverse to treat this ‘desire’ for the happiness of 
others, or the ‘desire’ to end suffering on a par with egoistic desires.  Levinas (2006: 
30) asks himself if the “Desire for Others” stems from appetite or generosity.  
Śāntideva writes: 
ataḥ parāthaṃ kṛtvāpi na mado na ca vismayaḥ     | 
na vipāka phalākāṅkṣā parārthaikānta tṛṣṇayā     || 
 
Actually, though acting for the good of others, he neither feels 
exhilaration nor pride, nor desire for the resulting [karmic] reward, 
with a thirst solely for the welfare of others (BCA. 8.109). 
 
                                               
207 Cf. Kant’s famous: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity ... never simply as a means, 
but always at the same time as an end” (Kant, 2005: 106-107). 
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Śāntideva’s other-regarding ethics, notably similar here to the ideal of the Gītā, are 
anything but “egoistic”.  And even Kantians would agree that “We are very much 
obliged to try to alleviate suffering” (Baron, 1997: 15).  Following Nagel (1978: 121), 
we might see this desire of the bodhisattva in purely impersonal terms, re-writable as 
“If only all beings were liberated from suffering”, a statement which seems devoid of 
egoity.  Sober and Wilson (1998), drawing a distinction between “ultimate” (i.e. 
irreducible to other desires) and “instrumental” desires, have claimed that “altruists 
have ultimate desires concerning what they think will be good for others” (p230, 
stress mine).  Foucault (1982) has also spoken of “pastoral power” in terms of 
“ultimate” soteriological aims, and has suggested that such power “cannot be 
exercised without knowing the inside of people’s minds” (p783). Sober and Wilson 
(1998) further suggest that an “altruist may want others to have what they actually 
want for themselves; alternatively, an altruist may want for others something they 
have never thought of” (p230).    
 
Consider again Śāntideva’s position.  On one side, there are those who are ignorant of 
their true state: 
aho batātiśocya tvam eṣaṃ duḥkha ugha vartinām     | 
ye nekṣante sva dauḥsthityam evam apy atiduḥsthitāḥ     || 
 
Alas! - The extremely grievous condition of these beings that exist in 
this flood of suffering, not seeing their own state, while remaining in 
such wretchedness (BCA. 9.163). 
 
 ajarāmara līlānām evaṃ viharatāṃ satām     | 
 āyāsyantyāpado ghorāḥ kṛtvā maraṇam agrataḥ     || 
 
For people live on like this, pretending they will never grow old or 





On the other side, there are those bodhisattvas, “in whom there is born a concern for 
the welfare of others beyond that which they have for themselves” (yat parārthāśayo 
‘nyeṣāṃ na svārthe ‘py upajāyate) (BCA. 1.25b).  This may well be typical of the 
“Well, saṃsāra is painful, though you do not feel it to be” attitude that Chakrabarti 
(1983: 168) claims the “liberation-obsessed philosopher” throws at others.  Yet we 
ought to remember that even Mill’s idea of democracy was a decision-making process 
for “the good of the people, not the will of the people” (Skorupski, 1998: 25).  Mill’s 
society was one where the intellectual elite had an “obligation to exercise moral and 
intellectual influence” (p29).  Surely, no one would disagree that our modern forms of 
democratic government continue to abide by this principle.   
 
And even if all this sounds rather paternalistic, then Śāntideva would say, so be it.  In 
the Compendium, we see the bodhisattva “appointing himself as a father to all beings” 
(pitṛ samam ātmānaṃ sarva prajāyāṃ nitojayamānaḥ) (Ś.S. 23).208  It could hardly be 
any more paternalistic, but it is a trait that Śaṅkara shares (Bh.G.Bh. 4.19).   And 
assuming it to be of ultimate benefit to others, and so long as it honours a code of 
“pastoral delicacy” (Matics, 1971: 60), which we trust would involve both sensitivity 
and respect, it seems difficult to denounce; unless, of course, one has a very different 
definition of liberation.  After all, even Freud (2008) suggested we behave like an 
“understanding teacher” (p55) providing the other with “a knowledge of the way 
                                               
208 Kṛṣṇa is also called the “father” (pitā) of the world (Bh.G. 11.43), though clearly on a much grander 
scale.  While the bodhisattva and the jīvan-mukta may teach and protect others like a father-figure, they 
are not world creators; unlike Kṛṣṇa, who is said to be the “seed-giving father” (bīja-pradaḥ pitā) 
(Bh.G. 14.4) as well as the “mother” (mātā) (9.17).  Thus I think we should resist the temptation to 
parallel Kṛṣṇa with a bodhisattva.  Also, Śaṅkara takes Kṛṣṇa to be a teacher (guru) who is greater than 
any other (Bh.G.Bh. 11.43).  Thus, we should not even take the parallel between Kṛṣṇa and the 
brahma-vid (see Nelson, 1996) too far.  Perhaps Sharma’s (1990: 28-29) equating of Śāntideva’s 




things really are” (p57).    Freud called this process “education for reality” (p63); but 
what else have we been talking about? 
 
No doubt there is a glaring power gap here, and that may be worthy of further 
discussion, but the bodhisattva could simply argue that it is for the “ignorant” that he 
is most called on to act.  Just as Christ came to save the “sick” and the “sinners” 
(Mark, 2:17), so the bodhisattva returns to save (trātum) the “deluded” (mohitāḥ).  
Just as Kṛṣṇa acts in order to save the worlds from ruin (Bh.G. 3.22-24), so the jīvan-
mukta acts “for the sake of preventing people from going astray” (loka saṃgrahārthe) 
(Bh.G.Bh. 4.19).  Nobody would argue with the person who saved a blind man from 
falling off a railway platform, or persuaded the fool to stop hanging out of the carriage 
window, or prevented a child from crawling onto the tracks.  Such interventions are 
accepted by all ethical parties.  The argument is more about: 1) what constitutes 
‘blindness’, being a ‘fool’ or a ‘child’, and 2) what the correct, wise, and mature view 
of life ought to be.  It is not a question of whether we ought to tolerate power relations 
or not, for, a “society without power relations can only be an abstraction” (Foucault, 
1982: 791).  As such, modern ethicists, Freud included, would more likely start by 
criticising the metaphysical bases of such power relations (e.g. Smart, 1973: 5), rather 
than the use of power per se.  And needless to say, both Madhyamaka and Advaita 
Vedānta would be equally open to attack on metaphysical grounds.  
 
Focusing on Śaṅkara, we should note that not all seekers would be eligible for help, 
for not all would be of the right type, not all would qualify.  When Śaṅkara talks of 
“seekers of liberation” (mumukṣuṇā) he has in mind a male Brahmin of a certain 
educational background.  Of course, theoretically, when that student achieves self-
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realisation, thereafter “he and the teacher stand as equals” (Cenkner, 1983: 17).209  As 
for everyone else, Śaṅkara simply assumes that they ought to be involved in worldly 
pursuits, hopefully generating the karmic merit to be reborn in a situation that will 
allow them to become true seekers.   
 
These traditional assumptions on caste are even evident in the language of those who 
wish to deny caste differences.  Tiwari (1977), writing about Advaita’s monasteries 
(maṭhas) 210 , claims that, “There was hardly any scope for making a distinction 
between one caste or the other” (p132), a claim clearly at odds with the Upadeśa 
Sāhasrī.  But he then goes on to say that “Even though a śūdra, if you do good you 
become a Brāhmin” (ibid.). 211  In other words, the difference is no difference because 
it is temporary.  But the difference remains in the very language of such apologetic 
statements.
212
   
 
                                               
209 This is clearly not the case in real terms.  If it were, Śaṅkara would be treated just like any other 
teacher in the lineage, which he clearly is not.  Similarly, Cenkner’s suggestion that the early Buddhists 
accepted “equality between teacher and pupil” (p19) does not take into account the fact that disciples 
like Mahā-Kāśyapa, Mahā-Maudgalyāyana and Śāriputra were singled out by the Buddha, or that the 
tradition still sees the Buddha as being superior to all of them.  These monks have thus been singled out 
by the Mahāyāna, usually for ridicule.  Even Śāntideva singles out Mahā-Kāśyapa (BCA. 9.51).  Of 
course, theoretically, it could be argued that Śāntideva aims to bring all beings to the same level of 
Buddhahood (buddhatvaṃ) as the Buddha himself.  In the meantime, however, due to the Mahāyāna 
notion of stages, inequalities are bound to exist.  So, for instance, Śāntideva states that “the views of 
some yogis are superseded by the views of others of even higher wisdom” (bādhyante dhīviśeṣeṇa 
yogino ‘pyuttarottaraiḥ) (BCA. 9.4).  Inequality is thus a natural state of affairs. 
 
210 Tiwari (1977) introduces the maṭhas rather sceptically, using the phrase “If this were true” (p128); 
but then continues to discuss their social implications as though this fact were confirmed.  For a 
“hypothetical construction” of their creation, see Hacker (in Halbfass, 1995: 29).  Suthren Hirst (2005: 
26) has recently said that there is “no definite evidence” that Śaṅkara established any maṭhas.  For my 
thesis, it matters little. 
 
211 Śūdra: The lowest of the four classes in India, as listed in the Āpastamba Dharmasūtra (1.4); the 
other three being: Brahmins, Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas.  These first three were known as “twice-born” 
(dvija), because the males of these classes underwent an initiation after which they were “subject to the 
prescriptions of dharma”, thus constituting a kind of “second-birth” (Olivelle, 1999: xxxv).  Śūdra 
males, like the females of all classes, underwent no such initiation. The institution of Brahmanical 
renunciation therefore “disregards” Śūdras and women (Olivelle, 1992: 60).  Note though that these 
groups still “acknowledged the authority of the Vedas" (Lipner, 2010: 68). 
 
212 Lipner (2010: 141) has even noted such “inconsistency” in Gandhi’s rhetoric on caste. 
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The truth is this: for Śaṅkara, the final stretch of the path to liberation is grounded in 
the understanding of certain verses of the Upaniṣads.  And, of course, he believes that 
only certain people are capable of such an understanding.  This is not an agent-neutral 
theory.  Rather, his ethics are explicitly hierarchical.  For example, he writes, “Owing 
to the gradation of duty, there is gradation of qualification” (dharma tāratamyād 
adhikāri tāratamyam) (B.S.Bh. I.i.4).  His teaching is not for the “guidance of 
mankind”, as Tiwari (1977: 132) claims, but for the guidance of a select few (see 
Chapter 7).  Not only are certain castes excluded from the renouncer’s path to ultimate 
knowledge, but so are most women, at least in their present incarnation.  It is true that 
in the B.S.Bh., Śaṅkara states that Gārgī (a legendary female philosopher) was in fact a 
brahman-knower (III.iv.36-8), but his intention seems to be to make those not 
involved in ritual duty eligible for ultimate knowledge.  That is, he wants to make 
room for himself and his monastic following, one which did not include women (see 
Cenkner, 1983: 50).  The logic is this: if a woman (who is ineligible for rites) can be a 
brahman-knower, then so can an ascetic who has renounced rites.  In other words, 
ritual is irrelevant to knowledge. 
 
Again, women can of course be reborn as men and can then go on to qualify for the 
path of renunciation.  Just as all men have “equal opportunities, but not in this life” 
(Weber, 1958: 144), so it is with women.  Śaṅkara’s supporters could therefore claim 
that his apparent sexism is not entirely exclusivist.  Like those of low caste, they are 
“not doomed to be associated to any constant social label in different births”, as Saha 
(2009: 72) puts it.  Clearly, this concept of the temporary nature of one’s present 
incarnation is one that may not satisfy the modern woman of today.   It may also be 
small consolation to those of lower caste; nevertheless, it is a powerful concept, one 
which has been taken very seriously in India.  For example, the V.C. (2) states that, 
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“Liberation is not to be attained except through the well-earned merit of 100 million 
rebirths” (muktir no śāta janma koṭi sukṛtaiḥ puṇyair vinā labhyate).  As such, 
Tiwari’s apology (above) is not an invalid one, so long as one admits the elitism and 
inequalities involved.  
 
That Śaṅkara does not ultimately close the door on others, but merely tells them to 
“come back later” is a fact that should not be lost on us, regardless of our politics and 
scepticism.  After all, Śāntideva also talks of the immature and the unworthy as being 
disqualified from hearing the holy doctrine (Ś.S. 54).  Taber (1983) correctly notes 
that “virtually all systems of Buddhism presuppose some spiritual conditioning which 
prepares one for the truth” (p65).  Śaṅkara’s ethics then are not to be taken 
unquestionably as exclusive, just as Śāntideva’s ethics ought not to be taken 
unquestionably as inclusive.  Both throw out their doctrinal nets, yet both feel the need 
to scrutinize their takers.  Yet, going back to our Fig. 2 (p312), we see that the 
knowers are those who see through the illusion (māyā) of difference (bheda) and drop 
the individualistic notion of “I” (ahaṃkāra).  They are therefore beyond the society 
whose divisions they condone. 
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7. Marginal Cases 
 
Here I wish to reflect on what we have gathered so far, and I particularly want to re-
examine how the Two Truths are used with regard to the marginal cases of women 
and lower castes.  In calling them “marginal cases”, I am thinking from the 
perspective of Śaṅkara and Śāntideva.  I want to show that whatever they had to say 
about the level-playing surface that an ultimate view theoretically provides, they 
nevertheless continued to play their social games on an inclined field.  In other words, 
holding an ultimate view does not lead them to social egalitarianism.  Rather, life is 
seen as a cultural and soteriological “staircase” (Radhakrishnan, 1989: 366).  This ties 
in with Dumont’s (1980) claim that, in India, the “language of religion is the language 
of hierarchy” (p108).  Now while this need not necessarily lead to actual temporal 
power and/or authority, I have argued that it does in fact lead to an assumed “pastoral 
power”.  Having established the nature of this hierarchy, through a number of 
examples, I will then be asking whether we still have the right to apply the word 
‘altruism’ to their ethical views.  Put another way, we need to ask whether 
egalitarianism or impartiality are essential components of altruism. 
 
We have been searching for an approach to ethics which will allow us a direct 
comparison of the activities of a bodhisattva and a brahma-vid.  The notion of a 
selfless response to the world has proven itself a useful tool, and this led us to believe 
that perhaps the Western notion of altruism could provide us with the final key which 
would offer up a fundamental category within which to discuss these ethical systems.  
However, we have come across a number of problems.  First, we have been forced 
into noting that the standard Western notion of altruism assumes that the actor is fully 
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aware that they have a self, one which needs protecting; and that this self is being 
momentarily denied attention.  This notion is unacceptable to Śaṅkara, for his 
brahman-knower knows that he is one with brahman, and thus knows that he has no 
separate self which requires protection.  His selfless acts are not altruistic in the sense 
that they put the self down in order to hold the other in higher esteem.  There simply is 
no self to hold down.  I have, however, argued that this notion is acceptable to 
Śāntideva, so long as the monk has yet to have a full insight into emptiness.  Here, the 
monk is still subject to self-love (ātma-sneha) and has yet to throw himself into the 
Bodhisattva Vow.  A selfless act by such a monk would indeed be an altruistic one.  
But once the monk has had an insight into emptiness and has plunged into the life of a 
bodhisattva, he no longer acknowledges a self, and as such, his actions, though 
selfless, are not altruistic in the Comtean sense.  In fact, we have noted how, instead of 
putting himself down, the bodhisattva actually voluntarily inflates the other, creating a 
self where there was no self.  Thus, I have spoken of a “constructive altruism”.   
 
There are two more problems that our model of “constructive altruism” would need to 
face, one of which has been mentioned already.  This was the problem of doing things 
for others without their expressed consent, and moreover, possibly even against their 
will.  That is, the bodhisattva can see suffering that you cannot see, and has taken it 
upon himself to remove that suffering from you.  We tried to draw on Foucault’s 
notion of “pastoral power”, but saw that this is too limited, for Śāntideva’s “flock” 
seems to stretch further afield, and could potentially cross both cultural and religious 
boundaries.  For Śāntideva, so far considered, there are really only two categories of 
people, bodhisattvas and non-bodhisattvas, with the former having the responsibility 




This brings us to the second problem of our model of “constructive altruism”, the 
problem of partiality.  It is probably fair to say that the problem is more acute for 
Śaṅkara, who explicitly accepts Hindu class and caste categories.  Nevertheless, it is 
complicated by the fact that Śaṅkara holds that a brahman-knower does not see 
himself as being a Brahmin.  In fact, he should not even see himself as male.  Even so, 
when testing a student’s qualifications, he must be aware that the student needs to be 
both a Brahmin and a male.  This highlights two problems.  First, Śaṅkara’s ethics are 
clearly partial.  Second, his ethics rely on an application of the Two Truths, and only 
work if the brahman-knower simultaneously denies his own family background, 
whilst taking extreme care in analysing the family background of the applicant.  That 
is, the brahman-knower is selfless, but not just to anyone.  Not only is he partial, but 
he is partial in a way that seems inherently paradoxical.  The system only works 
because it relies on a Two-Truths philosophy embedded within a Hindu social context.  
It is altruistic only within this confined space.  In other words, it threatens to fail the 
Comtean notion of altruism on two accounts, by denying the self on the subjective 
side of the equation and by denying the equality of the objects on the other. 
 
Up to this point, it has been suggested that Śāntideva has only two ethical categories, 
the bodhisattva and the non-bodhisattva.  However, this is not the whole story.  Like 
the Buddha himself, he also discriminates between the lay and the monastic and 
between male and female.  While class and gender should not matter to the Buddhist, 
in fact they were “reinforced in institutionalized forms” (Kasulis, 2005: 303).  
However, we must hold Śāntideva more accountable than the Buddha, for the insight 
into emptiness that the Mādhyamikas posit as the turning point in one’s view of the 
world ought to overcome any such discrimination.  According to this account, all 
distinctions are unjustified.  And yet, we see them being argued for.  So while 
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Huntington’s (1989) claim that the bodhisattva “behaves in accordance with an ideal 
of impartiality” (p100) might only be intended to apply to those above the 7th stage, 
one may still wish to question its applicability on the ground.  And perhaps Williams 
(1998a) is over-hasty in assuming that Śāntideva’s arguments in the BCA are 
“intended to lead to altruistic action which makes no distinction between different 
persons” (p144).213  While some of his verses may imply this, the context also plays a 
part in the actions of the bodhisattva.  For example, while his argument at BCA 8.103 
(see p274 above) appears like a universal/egalitarian moral imperative, we have to 
remember that: 1) not everyone is a bodhisattva, 2) not all bodhisattvas have the same 
capacities, and 3) not everyone is ready to let go of duḥkha and saṃsāra.  So while it 
is a form of moral imperative, it has limited applicability.
214
  Hence, it could be argued 
that, in real terms, Śāntideva is just as partial as Śaṅkara.   
 
Rather than go into the whole question of inequality in their relative systems, let us 
simplify things by allocating a single area of social context in each system.  Let us 
compare how Śaṅkara handles the subject of class and caste with the way in which 
Śāntideva handles the subject of gender.  Both will claim that these categories are 
mere labels to be left behind, yet both will confirm these labels within their ethical 
systems. To reiterate, ultimately speaking, according to both Advaita and 
Madhyamaka metaphysics, these categories cannot stand up to analysis.  However, 
conventionally, they not only stand up, but Śaṅkara and Śāntideva continually prop 
them up.  Through these means, I wish to demonstrate how the conventional, and thus 
moral-making, ground of each tradition consistently manages to survive the ultimate 
                                               
213 Wetlesen (2002: 39) claims to have found “four different senses” of ‘altruism’ in Williams’ book.  
 
214 Wetlesen (2002: 42) hesitates here to call it a “moral imperative”, because he wants to take 
Śāntideva’s ethics as virtue ethics.  But, as argued in Chapter 2, Śāntideva adopts more than one form 
of ethical method. 
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level of discourse.  Needless to say, I am not simply trying to show how partial these 
thinkers were.  They were no doubt no more or less partial than any other thinkers of 
their time.  What I am trying to do is show how the doctrine of the Two Truths 
actually functions in practice. 
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7.1 Śaṅkara: The Reality and Non-reality of Class and Caste 
  
Earlier, I had been trying to argue that Śaṅkara’s teacher-student relationship could be 
seen as a particular manifestation of altruism.  This had seemed to be beyond debate.  
Then we brought in the notion of self, and we were asked whether a brahman-knower, 
apparently having no self, could in fact be altruistic at all.  It was decided that we 
would need to posit a more “qualified” form of altruism, one in which the self of the 
other was projected solely for their sake.  This we called “constructive” altruism.  We 
will now take this problem of altruism one step further.   
 
It may seem too obvious to state, but the notion of ethics also involves the notion of 
morality, and some scholars have attempted to divide the altruistic from the moral.  So 
while some scholars may be happy with me claiming that Śaṅkara’s and Śāntideva’s 
ethics are altruistic in some qualified manner, they may still propose that they are 
acting in ways that are less than moral.  I have already mentioned the problem of 
doing for others things that they have not willed you to do.  Here, however, I will 
focus on the debate from impartiality.  In their recent (mainly) historical account of 
altruism, Scott and Seglow (2007) begin by offering two hypothetical cases, which 
they assume give us reasons to doubt whether an altruistic act need always be classed 
as a moral one.  I wish to question this assumption.  Not that I am suggesting that all 
altruistic acts are de facto moral.  What I wish to question is the leap that Scott and 
Seglow make from partiality to immorality. 
 
The first hypothetical case is one of a “racist organ donor” (Scott & Seglow, 2007: 2) 
who wishes to donate his organs, but only to those of his own race.  This act is said to 
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be “altruistic, but hardly moral” (ibid.).  A similar (actual) case, involving the 
deceased person’s parents, is later claimed to be “morally condemnable” (pp127-128).  
Personally, I cannot see why the donors here are not acting morally, and I believe 
most people would object to them being called im-moral.  It certainly does not amount 
to a crime of any sort.  Even Singer (1972) concedes that “Most people reserve their 
moral condemnation for those who violate some moral norm” (p236).  To condemn 
such an act is to deprive the donor of freedom of choice, and in the case of the family, 
may lead to them being less altruistic in the future.  To be openly partial when 
giving need not exclude one from being moral.  This is an essential point.   
 
Let us put the partial-thus-immoral thesis to the test.  Are parents being “hardly 
moral” when they put their own children through school and college?  I think not.  
And even Scott and Seglow (2007: 38) have to admit that it is a “perfect duty” to look 
after one’s own children.  What about an elderly lady who leaves her house and 
wealth to her family on purely genetic grounds?  Is she being hardly moral?  I think 
the answer is once again negative.  And remember, in the above cases, we are talking 
of the donor, not of the surgeon.  If a white surgeon gave all available organs to white 
patients only, then that would indeed be condemnable.  But here we are talking of a 
dying person’s last wishes or a family in deep distress.  So while I (and possibly all 
Buddhists) would agree with Scott and Seglow (2007: 127) that such forms of 
partiality follow from over-attachment, I feel that to publicly condemn such an act is 
both wrong and counter-productive.  So how does this affect my thesis? 
 
Well, if I am right about this, then an Advaitin teacher passing on Vedic knowledge 
exclusively to Brahmins is not immoral.  In fact, his sense of exclusion is not based on 
over-attachment to the gift, but on a belief that the receiver needs to prove their worth 
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before receiving such a valuable gift.  As such, even a Buddhist must acknowledge 
this restriction for they too guard certain of their teachings.  Śāntideva himself states 
that a bodhisattva commits one of the root downfalls (mūlā pattīnāṃ) “if one 
communicates the doctrine of emptiness to those minds that are not as yet prepared” 
(śūnyatāyāś ca kathanāt sattveṣv akṛta buddhiṣu) (Ś.S. 67), a rule that is still 




The second hypothetical case, of an American citizen donating “huge sums” to fellow 
Americans (Scott & Seglow, 2007: 2), is even more controversial.  In order to claim 
that it “arguably offends the moral ideal of impartiality” on the grounds that these 
beneficiaries are “quite well off” (ibid.), one would first have to establish such an 
“ideal of impartiality”.  Partiality only opposes the “moral” within a certain negotiated 
ethics of justice, one which (arguably) few societies would accept.  Mill suggested 
that impartiality was not to be seen as a duty, and that condemnation of partiality was 
“rather the exception than the rule” (Util. 5.9).  Modern day Europe and America, on 
the whole, clearly do not accept impartiality as a duty.  And we can be quite certain 
that 8
th
 century India, with its own “meritorian concept of justice” (Dissanayake, 
1994: 275) did not accept it as a duty.   
 
Most people, be they American or Indian, would rather buy their own child a large 
birthday present than buy them a small one and the next-door neighbour’s child an 
equally small one.  There is nothing immoral in this seemingly natural response.  
Recall Mill’s “No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence” (Util. 5.15).  
Hence, Singer’s argument, which also uses the language of condemnation, is 
preferable to Scott and Seglow’s on two accounts.  First, in stating that “If we accept 
                                               
215 See, for example, Bokar (1997: 70) or Sonam Rinchen (2000: 129-130) 
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any principle of impartiality …” (Singer, 1972: 232), he at least recognises the if-
condition of the argument.  And second, his condemnation is of those who give no 
money to charitable causes (p235), not to those who give to the ‘wrong’ cause.   
 
While sympathetic to the possible egoistic nature of “in-group altruism” (Scott & 
Seglow, 2007: 4), I cannot accept that this makes such altruism “incompatible with the 
impartial demands of morality” (ibid.), for no such “impartial demands” have been 
established.  And if the problem lies in giving to people who are “better off” than 
some others, then by this account, if I give a donation to any human being, this could 
still be classed as “hardly moral” on the grounds that there was another human being 
somewhere or other who happened to be “worse off”.  This would basically leave our 
hands tied.  Furthermore, giving to the “worse off” goes against one of our most 
popular forms of giving, the giving of prizes.  Prizes, be they honorary awards or sums 
of money, are typically given to those who deserve them in some non-trivial way.  It is 
surely not immoral to give out a prize to the most deserving.  Rather, the opposite 
seems true.  Likewise, it is not immoral to give teachings to those who have proven 
themselves deserving of them.  After all, Western Universities typically restrict 
tertiary education to those who have proven themselves at the secondary level.   
 
It is indeed ironic, that in disagreeing on this issue as to what counts as a moral form 
of giving, Scott & Seglow have given weight to the point I made in Chapter 2, being 
that we simply cannot use virtue ethics as a basis for comparison.  Even we British-
educated males cannot agree on what constitutes the virtue of generosity.  For surely, 
if we are entitled to question the morality of a donation, then we are equally entitled to 




Moreover, as our discussion is one which involves religious values, we might ask just 
what is meant by the term “well-off”.  Although they only imply as much, I am 
assuming that Scott and Seglow’s (2007: 2) criterion for being “well off” is financial 
and that the “huge sums” they speak of are dollars and cents.  If so, it is a criterion that 
Buddhists and Advaitins would not accept, and clearly one that renouncers of any 
denomination, including the early Christians, would not accept.
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  It might be noted 
here that what we in English call a “renouncer”, the Indians call a “saṃnyāsin”, 
which in Sanskrit literally means “one who has laid it all down”; and what we in 
English call a “monk”, the Buddha called a “bhikku”, which in Pāli literally means 
“beggar”.  Now no one is financially worse off than a beggar who has laid all he had 
down.  So the “beggar you choose to give a few coins to in India” (Scott & Seglow, 
2007: 75) might well be a bodhisattva, and you might well receive a larger “sum” in 
return.  The currency of the “renouncer”, of course, is wisdom and merit, not dollars!  
In Śāntideva’s words, “The monks make virtue their object, not wealth” 
(nārthārthikāḥ pravrajitā guṇārthikā) (Ś.S. 115).  The wealth of a monk is measured 
in terms of his knowledge and his ability to teach.  So when we speak of the “well off” 
or the “affluent” (e.g. Singer), we might pause to consider the scope of our definitions.  
And once again, we should not question the ethics of those religions which see 
teaching, rather than charity, as the highest of gifts.  Whilst Śaṅkara and Śāntideva no 
doubt saw worldly pleasure as having a value of greater than zero, their central focus 
is clearly the highest good, that of ultimate knowledge. 
 
Needless to say, Scott and Seglow, like Singer, do indeed raise important questions 
with regard to giving, inclusiveness and exclusiveness.  Similarly, Nagel, who Scott 
                                               
216 We are once again reminded here of how terms have taken on new meaning under the influence of 
the welfare state (see Foucault, 1982: 784). 
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and Seglow (2007: 35) take as a model “impartialist”, has many interesting comments 
to make on the matter of partiality with regard to family, clubs, businesses and nations 
(Nagel, 1978: 130).  His focus is not so much on their “moral” nature, but on their 
subjective (versus impersonal) nature, which likewise puts limits on their altruistic 
force.  Nagel is not about to say that caring more for one’s own family is immoral.  
Rather, Nagel’s interest is that while to speak of the act of helping one’s family is 
objective, to actually help one’s own family is essentially subjective, and is based on 
relationships rather than objective reasoning.  It therefore sits outside his thesis that 
altruism follows from objective reasoning.  By contrasting such acts with “perfectly 
general altruism” (Nagel, 1978: 130), it is not clear whether Nagel thus sees such acts 
as non-altruistic, though Scott and Seglow (2007: 37) appear to take him this way.  It 
is particularly interesting, however, that Nagel (1978) adds a short note that 
“Religions present a more complex case” (p130, n.1), by which he must be taken to 
mean that religions are pre-disposed to partiality.  This point has already been 
discussed above (Chapter 2) with regard to the larger problem of comparing religious 
and secular ethics.  But to focus the discussion onto altruism, we might interpret 
Nagel’s point here as being one with Neusner & Chilton’s (2005), that “Each religious 
tradition frames altruism in its own context” (p.vii).  Let us then try to tease out the 
complexities of the religions under review.   
 
There are two reasons why Śaṅkara’s ethics may rightly be called “altruism”.  Oliner 
(2003: 15), in his interpretation of Comte’s definition of altruism, highlights two 
phases: 1) the eradication of self-centred desire, and 2) a life devoted to the good of 
others.  Both these phases are found in the path of the brahman-knower, whose task it 
is to drop the belief in the “I” (aham) and then to remain in society with the “sole aim 
of helping others” (U.S. Prose, 1.6).   In fact, not only does the brahman-knower give 
342 
 
up selfish desires, but in dropping the “I”, he even gives up unselfish ones.  This shift 
in motivation involves the “total de-identification from even the act of desiring itself” 
(Marcaurelle, 2000: 20).   
 
Naturally, as an Advaitin teacher, the main help that Śaṅkara has in mind is the giving 
of knowledge, and the “others” he has in mind are male-only Brahmins.  It should by 
now be obvious that it is not just any knowledge given by anyone.  It is a liberating 
knowledge given by one who has achieved all there is to achieve.  It is a type of 
knowledge that Śaṅkara believes will put an end to the other’s suffering.  The 
worthiness of the task is obvious.  The value of the gift is unmistakable.  It is for these 
motivational and consequentialist reasons that such a life is worthy of the name 
“constructive altruism”.  
 
Now clearly, Śaṅkara cannot offer people of other religions the chance of liberation 
through knowledge of brahman.  It would make no sense for him to offer this path to a 
Buddhist, for example, who denied the Self.  Surely we can glean nothing of his moral 
character from such exclusion.  Notably, the Diamond Sūtra excludes the hearing of 
its discourse from those who hold to the view of Self (Vajracchedikā, 15).  This shows 
that even Mahāyāna Buddhism, despite its apparent universalism, must exclude others 
who hold conflicting beliefs.  These are not merely cases of group loyalty.  Such 
exclusion does not imply that an Advaitin cannot give food to a hungry Buddhist, or 
vice versa; but the giving of teachings, this most sacred of transmissions, must 
necessarily be guarded.  This is simply a by-product of religious doctrine and has no 




Nevertheless, while certain religious and inter-religious exclusions seem 
unquestionable, we may still want to question why Śaṅkara denies access to this path 
to fellow Hindus on the grounds of their class, caste and gender.   After all, even the 
Gītā, while accepting the varṇāśrama, as Śaṅkara does (Bh.G.Bh. 18.44), still finds a 
privileged place for these groups, whereby, “No devotee of Kṛṣṇa, regardless of social 
status or gender, is lost” (Johnson, 2004: xvii).   Thus, Kṛṣṇa permits “each individual 
embodied self to reach the ‘highest self’” (Malinar, 2007: 11).  Certainly, on the basis 
of its metaphysics, Advaita seemingly offers the scope for transcending social and 
cultural boundaries.  As already discussed, the logical implications of non-dualism 
should verily forbid distinctions.  The central question thus remains unanswered: If 
knowledge and even existence reside in brahman, how can there be any distinction 
between classes and gender?  In asking this question, I will focus on the issue of class 
(varṇa) and caste (jāti).  My analysis will concentrate on Śaṅkara’s use of the Two 
Truths, rather than on the question of ‘discrimination’ per se, which is, after all, a very 
complex and controversial matter.  As such, my point can be made without referring 
to the issue of gender, an issue I will reserve for my discussion of Śāntideva.   
 
Now Nagel (1978: 99) suggests that altruism need not rely on a “mystical 
identification of oneself with other persons”, or on a notion of a “mass self consisting 
of all persons”.  We can therefore assume that Nagel would agree that altruism could 
be based on such notions.  And it would seem that Śaṅkara, at the ultimate level of 
discourse, can help himself to either of these conditions. We have already noted how 
Śaṅkara claims such a condition, when he quotes: “When a man sees all beings in this 
Self, and the Self in all beings, he feels no hatred” (Īś.U. 6).  The ethical point being 
made is that one who is fully satisfied can have neither desire nor hatred.  The further 
point being proposed here is that when one realises that there is only one Self, one 
344 
 
literally becomes brahman (Mu.U. III.ii.9), that is quality-less (nirguṇa) brahman, and 
a quality-less brahman is incapable of hatred because there is nothing ‘other’ than the 
self to either desire or hate.  The problem Śaṅkara then faces is how to reconcile this 
with the relative level of discourse.  Put simply, how can we all be the same, but 
different?  If, at the level of consciousness, I am brahman and you are brahman, and 
brahman is quality-less; then I share your consciousness, and they are both quality-
less.  If the reply is that there is no “I” and no “you”, then the question is: How can 
there be ground for a caste system? 
 
The only way of penetrating this dilemma is through the Two Truths.  On one hand, 
there is only brahman, and all beings share in being nothing but brahman.  On the 
other hand, there is the provisional reality in which we must maintain the codes of 
Dharma.  Where does this leave the question of class and caste?  The class or caste in 
which you are born is the result of the karma accumulated in one’s past lives.  In the 
commentaries, we find that Śaṅkara holds a particularly negative view of lower castes, 
which, if taken at face value, is even shockingly violent.  I am referring here to the 
pouring of lead into the ears of a Śūdra who accidently overhears the Vedas being 
taught, and the cutting off of his tongue should he repeat what he hears, and the 
cutting of his body into pieces should he dare commit any of it to memory (B.S.Bh. 
I.iii.38).  And while it may have scriptural backing (Gau.D.S. 12.4-6)
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; this is 
nothing short of barbaric.  It is thus hard to accept that Śaṅkara possessed a “critical 
attitude toward the Hindu caste system”, as suggested by Cronk (2003: 10).  Śaṅkara’s 
ethics on caste seem a far cry from Vivekananda’s (2009: 390) “hurting anyone, you 
hurt yourself”, the so-called Vedāntin “basis of ethics” (pp384-385), written in what 
Lipner (2010: 81) calls “the Age of the Śūdra”. 
                                               




Now Marcaurelle (2000: 32) has suggested that the Śūdras were only to be denied 
access to the Śrutis, and not necessarily brahman-knowledge.  This they could access 
through hearing the Purāṇas (Legendary Stories).  He therefore feels that scholars 
such as Mayeda and Halbfass were wrong in claiming that the former restriction 
implied the latter (p220, n.19).  Similarly, Cenkner (1983) has claimed that, “Social 
status does not stand in the way” (p49).  I am unconvinced.  For one thing, as Taber 
says, over-hearing the Purāṇas does not constitute an “established discipline of 
knowledge based on smṛti” (p694).  Second, Śaṅkara states that Śūdras lack scriptural 
ability (B.S.Bh. I.iii.34).   Third, Śaṅkara categorically states that a born Śūdra has no 
right to knowledge (I.iii.34-38).  And fourth, as Taber (2003: 694) again notes, had 
Śaṅkara wanted to extend the eligibility of knowledge to Śūdras, then the story of 
Jānaśruti (Ch.U. 4) would have given him the ideal opportunity.  However, in both the 
Ch.U.Bh (IV.ii.3) and the B.S.Bh (I.iii.35), Śaṅkara resorts to “ingenious exegesis” 
(Suthren Hirst, 2005: 43) to show that Jānaśruti is not really a Śūdra by caste or birth 
even though he is addressed as such.  Finally, Śaṅkara is so stubbornly against a Śūdra 
gaining knowledge that he claims that even those that did gain it, did so due to 
tendencies acquired in a past (non-Śūdra) life (B.S.Bh. I.iii.38).   
 
Now Marcaurelle (2000: 34) has also introduced Ch.U.Bh (V.xi.7) 
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 in order to show 
that Śaṅkara accepted that householders could receive the knowledge of brahman.  
Not only that; they receive it, not from a Brahmin, but from a king.  But what message 
does Śaṅkara take from this?  He tells us that, in requesting knowledge from one of 
“inferior caste” (jātito hīnaṃ), the “great householders” (mahāśālā), who incidentally 
                                               




were “Brahmins, deeply versed in the Vedas” (mahāśrotriyā brāḥmaṇāḥ), “abandoned 
their pride” (abhimānaṃ hitvā).  Hence, “seekers after knowledge should behave in 
the same manner” (C.U.Bh. V.xi.7).   He also tells us that the “import of the story” 
(ākhyāyikārthaḥ) is that a teacher should only impart knowledge “to competent 
persons” (yogyebhya) (ibid.).  In other words, the pupil must learn to be humble in 
front of the teacher, while the teacher must learn to discriminate between potential 
pupils.  Both these morals are clearly expounded in the Upadeśa Sāhasrī.  Thus, 
Śaṅkara states that the student “should also be guided in humility, etc., the virtues 
which are means to knowledge” (amānitvādi guṇaṃ ca jñānopāyaṃ samyak grāhayet) 
(U.S. Prose, 1.5).  As to who was competent; when Śaṅkara is free to speak his own 
mind, it is a pure Brahmin (U.S. Prose, 1.2). 
 
Now Marcaurelle (2000: 32) believes that such statements in Śaṅkara are exceptions 
to his normal inclusiveness.  I am not convinced.  For one thing, throughout the 
Upadeśa Sāhasrī, the teacher is explicitly told that he must use key phrases, literally 
“great sayings” (mahāvākyā), from the Upaniṣads in order to enlighten the pupil.  If 
this is so, even if certain non-Brahmins were allowed a hearing, the Śūdras would 
hereby be de facto excluded from the lesson.  Socio-religious circumstances “stopped 
all but brahmin men from having access to the intellectual culture of the philosophical 
tradition” (Ram-Prasad, 2001b: 378).  To be fair to Marcaurelle, Śaṅkara was not 
particularly consistent, as is shown by his commentary of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad 
(I.xi.2-4), where he states that “everyone has the right to knowledge” (sarveṣāṃ 
cādhikāro vidyāyāṃ).  Even here though, Śaṅkara’s objective is not to open up access 
to knowledge to all and sundry.  The main aim, as even Marcaurelle (2000: 31) 
himself admits, is to establish acceptance of the monastic’s right to knowledge 




Śaṅkara is thus abusing the notion of ultimate truth and its implied egalitarianism in 
order to gain an advantage for his group.  However, he does not remain true to this 
universal position, preferring to keep the classes where they are.  Whether Śaṅkara 
believed that Śūdras could have access to knowledge or not, the point still remains 
that he firmly accepted that class distinctions had validity and that people were far 
from being equal.  In the Ch.U.Bh, he even claims that only Brahmins are 
straightforward (ṛjava) by nature (sva-bhāvataḥ) (IV.iv.5), and also implies that non-
departure (na agaḥ) from truthfulness (satyāt) is a virtue solely belonging to the 
Brahmin (ibid.).  So I will stand by Mayeda (1988) when he states that Śaṅkara was 
“rather rigid and strict with respect to caste” (p191) and Halbfass (1991: 385) when he 
speaks of an “uncompromising adherence to an unequal, caste-bound access” to 
liberation.  Furthermore, no teaching on the ultimate truth changed this conventional 
view.  Fort (1998) thus states that “traditional Advaitins find the nondual truth 
irrelevant to equality in everyday social relations” (p174).  So while Śaṅkara clearly 
believed that the Self was devoid of class distinctions (B.S. I.i.1), and that the 
brahman-knower was thus beyond caste (Bṛ.U.Bh. II.iv.1); he still wanted the caste-
system to remain in place (B.S.Bh. I.iii.34), even to the point of being violently 
imposed.   
 
The most important point to take from this is that relatively speaking, there are caste 
differences, but ultimately speaking, there can be no castes. Now Mayeda (1988) 
claims that Śaṅkara may not have been “aware of any inconsistency” (p199), but I 
believe he was well aware of it.  The Two-Truths strategy allowed Śaṅkara the 
possibility of holding both views and alternating between them depending on the 
context.  That is why, in practice, he was able to adhere to caste distinctions.  This is 
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brought out quite vividly in the Upadeśa Sāhasrī, where the pupil (who must be a 
Brahmin in order to qualify as a pupil) is to understand that the Self is free of caste, 
etc, if he is to become a brahman-knower: 
 yatas tvaṃ bhinna jāty anvaya saṃskārāṃ śarīraṃ jāty anvaya 
varjitasyātmanaḥ pratyabhyajñāsīḥ brāhmaṇa putro ‘dīnvaya ityādinā 
vākyeneti   || 
 
Because, by your statement ‘I am the son of a Brahmin of such and 
such a family, and so on’ you have identified the Self, which is free 
from caste, family and rites, with the body, which is subject to different 
caste, family and rites (U.S. Prose, 1.15). 
 
Here we see a clear distinction being made between the body (which is subject to 
caste) and the Self (which is not subject to caste).  But more importantly, we have a 
distinction between provisional reality, which must be upheld if we are to limit the gift 
of brahman-knowledge to male-only Brahmin pupils, and ultimate reality, which must 
be understood if this knowledge is to dawn on the pupil.   
 
This leads to a vital point.  It is misleading to think of Advaita as a non-dual 
philosophy, without being clear what they are being non-dual about.  They are clearly 
not being non-dual about body versus Self.  They are not being non-dual when it 
comes to the question of caste.  They are not being non-dual with regard to gender.  
They are not being non-dual about other schools of thought.  They are not being non-
dual when comparing teacher and pupil.  Hence, from the empirical point of view, we 
see that Advaita admits of numerous distinctions.  Non-duality then, for Advaita, is of 
a very specific kind, it is the non-duality of the ātman and brahman, which, in a 
nutshell, means the non-duality of self-reflexive consciousness.   
 
In Śaṅkara’s Two-Truths model, castes and women can exist only in the conditioned 
domain (T.U.Bh. I.xi.2-4).  It is because the majority of us move within the 
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conditioned that the social norms must remain intact.  In other words, it is our own 
ignorance which gives rise to empirical distinctions.  However, it is my belief that we 
must see the brahman-knower’s consciousness as flickering back and forth between 
domains.  That is why there is no contradiction in the fact that a brahman-knower 
does not cognise women as women even though they are women. It is also why there 
is no contradiction in the historical fact that there has never been a female 
Śaṅkarācārya or an outcaste Śaṅkarācārya (see Knot, 1998: 80 & 93).  In fact, the 
Advaita order of renouncers, the Daśanāmi, does not accept women ascetics at all 
(Klostermaier, 2007: 299).  While this may be controversial, it is not contradictory. 
 
On one side, there is the conditioned, provisional world of ethics, in which Śūdras are 
Śūdras, women are women, teachers are teachers, pupils are pupils, and Brahmin 
males are Brahmin males.  On the other, there is the ultimate, unconditioned, world of 
knowledge,  “where one does not see anything else, does not hear anything else, and 
does not cognise anything else” (yatra nānyatpaśyati nānyacchṛṇoti nānyadvijānāti) 
(Ch.U. VII.xxiv.1).  In between, there is a door, (arguably) open only to the Brahmin 
male, who paradoxically, once through it, must come to realise that he is not a 
Brahmin or a male.  Holding the keys to the door is the brahman-knower who I 
believe flickers between the inner world of brahman and the outside world of caste, 
occupation and gender.  If we understand these two domains, and the line that stands 
between them, we understand Śaṅkara’s ethics. 
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7.2 Śāntideva: The Reality and Non-reality of Gender 
 
Unlike Śaṅkara’s system, there is no explicitly acknowledged class or caste system in 
Buddhism.  I stress ‘explicit’, because caste clearly plays an important didactic role in 
Buddhism.  For example, a virtuous Buddhist lay person may well expect to be born 
into a “good family”, which Keown (1996) defines as one “enjoying a privileged 
status in terms of caste and wealth” (p339).  Furthermore, the fact that the Buddha, in 
becoming an ascetic, gave up his rights to the throne, plays a major role in the story of 
Buddhist renunciation.  It is no coincidence that the same story is repeated with regard 
to the hagiography of Śāntideva.  Indeed, in the Mahāyāna, the bodhisattva is often 
depicted dressed like royalty; and in the Theravāda tradition, the bodhisatta is 
associated not only with Buddhahood, but with kingship.  It therefore comes as no real 
surprise that Śāntideva’s Compendium should assume that “Humans are superior to 
animals, high castes to low castes, men to women” (Mrozik, 2007: 8). 
 
Sweet (1977: 55) also points out how Śāntideva’s statement that “people are seen to 
be of two types, the ordinary and the yogis” (BCA. 9.3) should be seen as a Buddhist 
parallel to the “pretensions to hereditary spiritual superiority” of the Hindu Brahmin 
class.  And, needless to say, throughout the Compendium, Śāntideva explicitly accepts 
the hierarchy of the bodhisattva over the Śrāvaka.  He also warns the bodhisattva 
about giving the Buddhist doctrine “to those who are unworthy” (abhājanībūteṣu) 
(Ś.S. 54).  He is told to “live in a good caste” (106), which should not be one of the 
classic four castes (105).  He speaks of the negative influence of “inferior men” 
(anārya jana) (161).  Furthermore, the bodhisattva is specifically told to avoid the 
Caṇḍāla (outcaste) (48).  And one of the classic warnings against acting immorally is 
that one may be reborn as a Caṇḍāla (69).  Even an eater of meat is said to be reborn 
351 
 
as either a Caṇḍāla or a Pukkasa219, whereas one who avoids meat is either “born into 
a Brahmin family” (brāhmaṇeṣu ca jāyate) “or into a practitioner’s family” (atha vā 
yogināṃ kula) (133).   
 
Such caste-related karmic consequences are no different than those found in the Hindu 
texts.   So the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (V.x.7) likewise speaks of immoral behaviour 
leading to rebirth as a Caṇḍāla.  And the Bhagavad Gītā (6.42) even includes the 
exact same phrase: “or even into a practitioner’s family” (atha vā yoginām eva kula) 
with relation to the positive consequences of karma-yoga.  If nothing else, it shows 
that the “Hindu” class categories may play similar ethical roles in Buddhist rhetoric.  
And such caste categories have survived in Buddhism for 2,500 years.  In present day 
Sri Lanka, the monks hold an equivalent place to the Brahmins in India, and monastic 
communities favour certain castes to the extent that ordination may be refused to all 
other castes (see Gombrich, 1988: 143-175). 
 
This is by no means a modern phenomenon.  Thus, Mrozik (2007) has argued that 
despite a recent change in attitude, “premodern Buddhist literature indicates that social 
hierarchy was generally an accepted part of Buddhist life” (p69).  This is not to say 
that hierarchies are inherently wrong.  Nor do I claim that the Indians held a principle 
contrary to our modern society, as Dumont (1980: 2) did.  For surely the British that 
entered India had their own form of “subtle and deeply entrenched social hierarchy”, 
as Doniger (2010: 578) claims.  And it would be foolish to argue that it is no longer 
present in our European society.  My purpose then is simply to remove the notion that 
the Buddhists were somehow exempt from the concept of hierarchies and inequality.  
                                               
219 Pukkasa = Pulkasa (Bendall & Rouse, 1971: 131).  A Pulkasa is a low caste person born from 
parents of different classes.   See Gautama Dharmasūtra (4.19), Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra (1.16.11 & 
1.17.13), Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra (18.5), and Manu Smṛti (10.18). 
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Hence, there are a number of easily over-looked passages in the Pāli Canon that make 
it clear that from earliest times the Buddhists wished to be seen as a class distinct from 
the Brahmins.  I take this example from the Dīgha Nikāya (iii.84), which is normally 
read for its discussion of Dhamma-kāya.  Here I leave out that section and focus on 
what precedes it: 
Vāseṭṭha, all of you, though of different birth, name, clan and family, 
who have gone forth from the household life into homelessness, if you 
are asked who you are, should reply: “We are ascetics, followers of the 
Sakyan.”  He whose faith in the Tathāgata is … unshakeable by any 
ascetic or Brahmin, any deva or māra or Brahmā …, can truly say: “I 
am a true son of Blessed Lord, born of his mouth, born of Dhamma, 
created by Dhamma …” (trans. Walshe, 1987: 409). 
 
This passage highlights: first, that the person who leaves his home is socially 
constructed, second, that this constructed person, once homeless, may have an identity 
crisis, and third, that the Buddhists were to be seen, not just as ascetics, but as a 
particular type of ascetic.  It clearly shows that they wish to be distinguished from the 
Brahmins and other ascetics.  And it even uses language which “echoes word for 
word” (Gombrich, 2009: 189) the creation myth of the Vedas: “His [Puruṣa’s] mouth 
became the Brahmin” (Rig Veda, 10.90.12) (trans. Doniger, 2005: 31).  And while it 
may be true that the Buddha here wishes to parody the Vedic creation myths, he surely 
does it with the intention of creating his own sect, setting up his own teaching as the 
“true Veda” (Gombrich, 2009: 190). 
 
These examples indicate that even though the Buddhists ultimately claim that there is 
no abiding self, this does not prevent them from using conventional categories.  As 
Gombrich (2009) rightly claims, the Buddha clearly “recognized the conventional 
nature of the caste system” (p187).  I would suggest then that the commonly spouted 
view that Buddhists believe in the equality of all people (e.g. Isayeva, 1993: 22; Sen, 
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2005: 10) may well need to be qualified.  As these are complex issues embedded in 
the history of Indian culture, I prefer to focus on the example of gender categories as 
found in Śāntideva’s texts.   
 
Śāntideva could not deny the historical fact that women were allowed to join the 
Saṅgha.  He speaks of those nuns who take 500 precepts (Ś.S. 174).  While certain 
“ill-behaved nuns” (bhikṣūn duḥśīlāṃ) are to be shunned (Ś.S. 48), this does not apply 
to all nuns.  Women may also be allowed access to the bodhisattva path (Ś.S. 116) and 
its moral code (60).  Sometimes this inclusion has an edge to it, as when he says that 
“even women” (strīṇām api), which Mrozik (2007: 35) reads as “exceptional women”, 
can follow the path (Ś.S. 11).  But overall, women are certainly not excluded.  
Śāntideva thus includes quotes from scriptures which address women.  For example, 
he quotes the Gaṇḍavyūha, which addresses its discourse on the cultivation of purity 
to a female, which Śāntideva indicates by maintaining the feminine vocative ending 
(Ś.S. 180).  Furthermore, Śāntideva quotes from the Śrī-mālā Sūtra (Ś.S. 42), a 
Mahāyāna text which supposedly recounts a discourse between the Buddha and a 
queen.  In other words, Śāntideva does not hide the fact that women are very much 
part of Buddhist history. 
 
Nevertheless, Śāntideva often talks as if his audience were male-only.  The 
Compendium, “primarily represents a male monastic perspective” (Mrozik, 2007: 10).  
Similarly, the BCA was written for a “monastic audience which without doubt would 
have been predominantly male, if not exclusively so” (Crosby & Skilton, 1995: xxxv).  
And with this in mind, I have likewise tailored my translation accordingly.  Therefore, 
some of the apparent gender bias (in English translations) can be put down to 
translation choices.  For example, Rouse interprets “vīrya” as “manliness” (pp92, 99, 
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111 & 115), “manly effort” (p51), “manly strength” (p111) or “manly energy” (p122), 
where simply “effort” or “vigour” would suffice.  Some of the bias may also be due to 
the fact that Sanskrit uses masculine endings when both men and women may be 
implied.  So when Śāntideva talks of “men” or “sons” he should not always be taken 
as excluding women.
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  Some of the bias may also be due to the texts that Śāntideva 
is quoting from.  For example, he quotes the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna, which 
claims that “women are the root of ruin” (Ś.S. 72).  He then quotes from the 
Ugradatta-paripṛcchā, which suggests that a wife is “an obstacle to morality, 
meditation and wisdom” (Ś.S. 78), a common description of the eightfold path.  Of 
course, the act of editing is not restricted to the question of what to put in, but also 
what to leave out.  So it might be just as telling to note that, while there are in fact 
Buddhist stories which depict female bodhisattvas as using their beauty to positive 
effect, for example, that of Vasumitrā (Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra221), Śāntideva chose not to 
include this story, even though he quotes extensively from this sūtra.222 
 
Whether borrowed from other texts or not, there is no getting away from the 
abundance of sexism throughout the Compendium.  For example, the bodhisattva’s 
generosity is shown in the giving away of his wife (Ś.S. 20 & 27), a gesture that 
would no doubt stir some modern controversy.  And Śāntideva’s stress on celibacy is 
made clear when he says that a true bodhisattva has no wife (115).  Moreover, 
                                               
220 The same problem of translation can be found in Hindu texts.  For example, compare these two 
translations of the V.C. (verse 2) from writers who both take this to be the authentic work of Śaṅkara.  
The text says: “jantūnāṃ nara janma durlabhamataḥ puṃstvaṃ tato viprata”.  One translation runs: 
“For all beings a human birth is difficult to obtain, more so is a male body; rarer than that is 
Brāhmaṇahood” (Mādhavānanda, stress mine).  The other runs: “It is hard for any living creature to 
achieve birth in a human form.  Strength of body and will are even harder to obtain; purity is harder 
still” (Prabhavananda & Isherwood, stress mine).  One is inclined to agree with Forsthoefel (2002) that 
the former seems correct and the latter apologetic. 
 
221 See Cleary, 1993: 1270-1273. 
 
222 Mrozik (2007: 57), while noting the “flagrantly misogynist” passages in the Compendium, also 
makes the valid point that Śāntideva may not have had the complete texts available to him (p58). 
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unspecified misdeeds of a householder are said to result in his rebirth as a woman 
(69).  On the other hand, the passion of a woman, if directed towards a male 
bodhisattva, may lead to rebirth as a man (168).  Similar gender bias can be found in 
his own BCA, where he warns that a woman comes at a price (BCA. 8.71), and that a 
man wastes his wealth on a woman (8.42).  Moreover, when training oneself as a 
bodhisattva, one “should be made to behave like a new bride; modest, timid and kept 
in order” (sthāpyo nava vadhū vṛttau hrīto bhīto ‘tha saṃvṛtaḥ) (8.166).  And when 
one becomes a true yogi, one will know for certain that a woman is “aśuci”, that is, 
“foul” or, more literally, “impure” (9.8).  In fact, this verse prevents us from claiming 
that his sexism can be put down to the culture he grew up in, for he actually claims 
that the “worldly” disagree with the yogi on this one.  So, let us not deny the blatant 
sexism in his work.  Like Śaṅkara’s ethics, Śāntideva’s ethics were not egalitarian.223 
 
Having got this out in the open, let us get to the main issue, the philosophical problem 
with this rhetoric.  The problem, as I frame it, with this conventional and often 
derogatory view of women, is that Śāntideva, in both the Compendium and the BCA 
explicitly claims that there are no truly existing gender distinctions.  And as with the 
case of Śaṅkara, it is this manipulation of the Two-Truths doctrine, rather than 
discrimination per se, that I wish to explore.
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223 We should not take this too far in the other direction.  I am not suggesting that Śāntideva would not 
help a woman in distress or that Śaṅkara would not throw a rope to a drowning Śūdra.  Their 
“constructive altruism” would clearly allow for such responses. 
 
224 I am not claiming that the gender issue is not an important one; it is simply not the focus of this 
thesis.  Those interested in a more ‘feminist’ discussion of Śāntideva can do no better than read the 




Let us stay for a while with verse 9.8 of the BCA, for it does in fact highlight a number 
of interesting points.  But to put it into philosophical context, we also need to remind 
ourselves of the three verses which came before.  So we have: 
 
lokena bhāvā dṛśyante kalpyante cāpi tattvataḥ     | 
na tu māyā-vad ity atra vivādo yogi lokayoḥ     || 
pratyakṣam api rūpādi prasiddhyā na pramāṇataḥ     | 
aśucyādiṣu śucyādi prasiddhir iva sā mṛṣā     || 
lokāvatāraṇārthaṃ ca bhāvā nāthena deśitāḥ     | 
tattvataḥ kṣaṇikā naite saṃvṛtyā ced virūdhyate     || 
na doṣo yogi saṃvṛtyā lokātte tattva darśinaḥ     | 
anyathā loka bādhā syād aśuci strī nirupaṇe     || 
 
Ordinary people see existent things and imagine them to be real.  They 
do not see them as illusion-like.  This is where there is dispute 
between the worldly and the yogis.  Even what we call perceptible 
objects, such as form, are only established by popular consensus, not 
by any valid means of knowledge.  [However] such  consensus is 
wrong, for example, when ordinary folk view the impure as pure.
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The Protector [Buddha] taught of existents in order to guide people 
[gradually into the knowledge of emptiness].  If it is objected then that 
these [“entities”] are not really momentary, but only conventionally so 
... [the fact is that] there is no fault in a yogi adopting the conventional 
usage.  He has a better understanding of reality than the worldly.  
Otherwise, the objections of the worldly would invalidate the [yogi’s] 
determination of women as “foul”226 (BCA. 9.5-8). 
 
                                               
225 This is one of the four classic misconceptions of mankind as mentioned in the Pāli Canon (A.N. 
ii.52).  Here, one takes the impure/foul (asubha) to be pure/desirable (subha).  The same list of four is 
mentioned in Patañjali’s Yoga-Sūtra (2.5) and here the contrast is in fact between ‘aśuci’ and ‘śuci’.  
The other three misconceptions are the same in both texts: taking the impermanent (anicca, anitya) to 
be permanent (nicca, nitya), the painful (dukkha, duḥkha) to be blissful (sukha), and what is not-self 
(anatta, anātman) to be self (atta, ātman).   Now, the Śrī-mālā Sūtra (42) teaches that the Dharma-kāya 
of the Tathāgata does in fact possess these four positive qualities: “permanent”, “pleasure”, “self” and 
“pure” (trans. Wayman, 1990: 102).  The Sanskrit text is now lost, but a borrowed quote found in the 
Uttaratantra (35) shows this list to be śubha-ātma-sukha-nitya, as per Pāli text.  However, a later verse 
expands on why the Dharma-kāya is śubha (pure), stating that it is so because its nature (prakṛiti) is 
pure (śuddha) and all impure (aśuci) mental impressions have been removed (37).  We can therefore 
take aśubha and aśuci to be synonymous.  Cf. Śaṅkara’s description of brahman as “eternal, pure, 
enlightened, and free” (nitya śuddha buddha mukta) (B.S.Bh. I.i.1-2). 
 
226 I adopt the term “foul” here rather than “impure”, for that is how Śāntideva typically characterises 
women, and “foul” is a better opposite to “desirable”, which is how most “worldly” men see women, 
rather than as “pure”.  Mrozik has noted how even male bodhisattvas are meant to regard their own 
wives as “aśubha”, which, like me, she translates as “foul” (Mrozik, 2007: 91).  Also note that in 
Chapter 8 of the BCA, the terms ’aśuci’ (8.52) and ‘amedhya’ (8.56) are used synonymously, where the 
same ‘amedhya’ is often used with the sense of “filth” (8.50, 8.53, 8.57, 8.58, 8.59, 8.60, 8.61, 8.63, 
8.71) or even “excrement” (8.49, 9.135).  It should be mentioned that Śāntideva sees the average male 
body as foul too (BCA. 8.56).  Likewise, Śaṅkara took embodied existence as a fairly foul situation 
(Ch.U.Bh. VI.xiv.2); and both Śāntideva (BCA. 8.59) and Śaṅkara (Ch.U.Bh. V.ix.1) agree that the 
womb is a foul place to be born. 
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Now Arnold (2005: 202-203) has recently asked how the Buddha (S.N. III.138) and 
Mādhyamikas, like Candrakīrti (Prasannapadā, 370.6-8), can endorse the claim that 
“the world disputes with me, I do not dispute with the world” (loko mayā sārdaṃ 
vivadati, nāhaṃ lokena sārdhaṃ vivadāmi).  Arnold (2005) offers what he believes to 
be a “charitable reading” (p203), claiming that the Madhyamaka are really opposing 
the “Ābhidharmika version of Buddhist thought” (ibid.).  But as we can see from the 
above, Śāntideva is also arguing against conventional (i.e. common) views about 
women, just as he and all Buddhists argue against certain commonly held views about 
the self.  Arnold wants to say that the Buddhists are speaking purely at the ultimate 
level, and this saves them from falling into dispute with the worldly, and thus saves 
Arnold’s thesis of the Madhyamaka offering “transcendental arguments” (p139) rather 
than sceptical ones.   With regard to the question of self, Arnold is no doubt correct.  
However, Śāntideva also feels that the common man gets the conventional truth 
wrong too, and explicitly states that “common opinion” (prasiddhi) can be mistaken 
(mṛṣā).  In other words, the perceptions of the worldly are “inaccurate and 
interpretation-laden” (Burton, 2004: 35).  The Buddhist therefore stands alongside 
Lehrer (2000) when he cautions that “common sense should not be allowed to run 
unbridled in the epistemic field” (p72).  The Mādhyamika does not “enshrine every 
aspect of the worldly non-analytical intellect” (Hopkins, 1996: 435).  Thus, in 
Ganeri’s (2001) sceptical reading of Nāgārjuna, “common sense deceives us” (p46). 
 
Mrozik (2007) has rightly noticed how Śāntideva “goes to great length to undermine 
the conventional view that women’s bodies are desirable” (p91).  But further along, 
Mrozik seems to make the same mistake as Arnold by assuming that “conventional 
view/perspective” must mean “consensus” (p98).  And Huntington’s (1989) linguistic 
notion of conventional truth as “our shared sociolinguistic experience” (p48) does not 
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help us here, for Śāntideva is attacking the use of verbal descriptions by the 
unenlightened.  Mrozik (2007: 98) is therefore right in saying that the sexist remarks 
of Śāntideva cannot be wiped clear by an appeal to the Two Truths.   
 
For Śāntideva, conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) is not synonymous with “consensus” 
(prasiddhi).  Here Śāntideva, contra Candrakīrti (?), does not “let the mundane be just 
as it is seen” by the average person (see Arnold, 2005: 192), and, contra Arnold’s 
depiction of Madhyamaka, does in fact point to a “privileged level of description” 
(p203), that of the yogi.
227
  As Wallace notes, “The insights of the enlightened few 
may invalidate the consensus of the masses” (in Dalai Lama, 1988: 124, n.22).  This is 
the opposite of what Burton (2004: 120) calls the “epistemic modesty” of 
Mādhyamikas.  It is in fact a privileged level of description, and parallels what Olson 
(2011: 247) calls the “privileged point of view” of Śaṅkara.   
 
Of course, Śāntideva is not interested in whether women really are, ontologically, foul 
or not; he simply wants men to renounce their lust for them.  While I agree with 
Mrozik (2007: 98) that a Buddhist apologist cannot lean on the Two Truths to 
downplay such misogynistic statements, I contend that the 8
th
 century Śāntideva 
would offer no apology.  Śāntideva, as promoter of asceticism, clearly needed such 
views as women being foul on a conventional level for his call for renunciation.  The 
Buddhist needs to claim a privileged level of seeing for the yogi in order to add 
authority to their counter-intuitive claims.  So this combined attitude of elitism and 
                                               
227 Candrakīrti believes that all means of valid knowledge are “conventionally veridical” (Huntington, 
1989: 18).  But can this really be the same as ‘consensus’ when Candrakīrti describes common people 
as “blighted by the cataracts of ignorance” (Arnold, 2005: 149)?  Surely, the notion of “true-for-the-
ignorant” is very far away from our notion of ‘conventional’ (Cowherds, 2011: 12-13).  But see 
Tillemans (2011) on Kamalaśila’s critique of the notion of simply accepted belief (pratijñā mātreṇa 




sexism would have been taken for granted in his cultural milieu.  What allows the 
Mādhyamikas to “keep persons in play” (Arnold, 2005: 203), then, is not that they shy 
away from telling us how things really are, but by a voluntary delusion that (socially 
constructed) persons are indeed independently existent, and as such, open to 
conventional designation.  And here I agree with Arnold that their motivation is both 
soteriologically (p176) and ethically (p203) grounded.  It is in the conventional world 
where merit is accumulated and where people suffer.  That is why the Buddha 
provisionally (neyārtha) spoke of existents. 
 
However, this decision to live in the conventional world does not mean that the 
Buddhist must always defer to “ordinary intuitions”, as Arnold (2005: 117) suggests.  
Even though the bodhisattva may accept much of what Nāgārjuna called “worldly 
conventional truth” (loka saṃvṛti-satyaṃ) (MMK. 24.8), and might well participate in 
the established language games of his culture; the yogi sometimes has to step in and 
say: “I am sorry, but you are wrong here”.  Thus, yogis are entitled to use 
conventional language, like “pure” and “impure”, because they understand both the 
ultimate and the conventional better than ordinary folk.  That is, on my interpretation, 
they can flicker between domains without misinterpreting either.  
 
The ordinary person’s misunderstanding of ultimate reality is shown in his grasping at 
impermanent objects as if they were ultimately real.  And the ordinary man’s 
misunderstanding of conventional reality is demonstrated by his belief that women are 
anything other than foul.  The yogi is there to advise him that women are in fact foul, 
and that all objects are in fact illusion-like.  Even the most beautiful of women will 
become a heap of bones.  There is nothing inherent about her beauty, nothing 
permanent about the bliss she offers.  We are all food for worms.  Hence: 
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tāny evāsthīni nānyāni svādhīnāny amamāni ca     | 
prakāmaṃ saṃpariṣvajya kiṃ na gacchasi nirvṛtim     || 
unnāmyamānaṃ yatnād yan nīyamānam adho hriyā     | 
purā dṛṣṭaṃ adṛṣṭaṃ vā mukhaṃ jālikayāvṛtam     || 
tan mukhaṃ tvat parikleśam asahadbhir ivādhunā     | 
gṛdhrair vyaktīkṛtaṃ paśya kim idānīṃ palāyase     || 
 
They are nothing other than mere bones, independent [of you] and 
indifferent [to you].  Why don’t you willingly embrace them [now] 
and feel bliss?  That face, either you saw it as you tried to lift it up as 
it was lowered in modesty, or you never saw it as it was concealed by 
a veil.  As if unable to bear your hardship, the vultures have now 
exposed that face.  Look!  Why do you now run away?   
(BCA. 8.43-45). 
 
All this sits rather uncomfortably though with the contrary notion of the bodhisattva 
having a purified (viśuddha, pariśuddha) body (Ś.S. 307, 151), and especially so 
alongside the story of the Bodhisattva Priyaṃkara (Pleasure-Maker!) who when gazed 
upon could lead a woman into rebirth as a man (Ś.S. 168).  And if this privileging of 
bodhisattva bodies were not enough, we might introduce the story of the female 
bodhisattva, Candrottarā (Ś.S. 78-80), whose beauty, rather than being of benefit, 
actually has a “deleterious effect on men” (Mrozik, 2007: 56), by generating excessive 
lust in them.  The contrasts between men and women and between bodhisattvas and 
non-bodhisattvas could not be more blatant.   
 
Moreover, Mrozik (2007: 56) rightly highlights how Candrottarā’s virtue is proven, 
not only by her physical beauty, but by her “fine fragrance” (atigandha).  She later 
(p68) contrasts this with the way one who eats meat is said by Śāntideva (Ś.S. 132) to 
“stink” (durgandha) in their next life.  However, the implication of the following 
verse from the BCA is that all lay people stink: 
tūla garbhair mṛdu sparśai ramante nopadhānakaiḥ   |  
durgandhaṃ na sravantīti kāmino ‘medhya mohitāḥ   || 
 
Finding no pleasure in soft cotton-filled pillows, for they do not ooze a 




Even more informative, though, is the stress Śāntideva puts on the fact that the smell 
of perfume that a normal woman exudes is not inherently her own (BCA. 8.65).  This 
seems to contrast with the scent of a bodhisattva, which does seem to be inherently 
their own.  Moreover, he speaks of a woman’s foul stench as being “naturally her 
own” (sva-bhāva) (8.66).  In full: 
kāye nyasto ‘py asau gandhaś candanād eva nānyataḥ     | 
anyadī yena gandhena kasmād anyatra rajyate     || 
yadi sva-bhāva daurgandhyād rāgo nātra śivaṃ nanu     | 
kim anartha rucir lokastaṃ gandhenānulimpati     || 
 
Though applied to the body, this scent comes from the sandal-wood 
alone, not from anything else.  Why are you attracted to one thing by 
the scent of something else?  Rather it would be auspicious if its own 
natural smell prevented passion towards it.  Why do the worldly take 
delight in worthless objects, anointing it with scent? (BCA. 8.65-66) 
 
But how often have the Mādhyamikas claimed there to be no “sva-bhāva”?228  For 
Śāntideva, there just are no inherently existing ‘things’ with the power to exude 
inherently existing odours.  So is this not an example of the mistaken “belief in a real 
body” (sat kāya dṛṣṭi) that Buddhists accuse others of?  If so, the question - “Why are 
you attracted to one thing by the scent of something else?” (8.65b) – while persuasive, 
and mildly amusing, seems doctrinally contradictory.  Even so, the seeming 
contradictions can be reconciled, by which I mean coherently explained.   
 
One way would be to treat much of Śāntideva’s argument as a sceptical one (which I 
believe it is).  The attacks on women, for example, are there as a means of convincing 
                                               
228 Now it might be claimed that this is a weak, or conventional use of sva-bhāva, just like the one 
recorded in Chapter 2, where Śaṅkara spoke of a person who “naturally has the notion of being an agent 
and an enjoyer” (kartṛ bhoktṛ sva-bhāva vijñānavataḥ) (Ch.U.Bh. Intro).  But the question would then 
be, which meaning of sva-bhāva do the Mādhyamikas reject and which do they not, and whether they 
can be coherently distinguished.  For more on this debate, see Arnold (2005: 200-204).  Also, compare 
Manu (2.213) on the so-called “nature (sva-bhāva) of women”.  Also see Olivelle (2004: 39) and 




men to renounce lay life, not because that is how Śāntideva actually views women 
(although it may be).  As such, he does not have to actually believe his argument to be 
“true”; he only needs to feel that it is convincing and potentially efficacious. 229  As we 
noted in Chapter 3, Śāntideva’s verses are often primarily persuasive, and here we 
have just seen how irony plays a major part in that rhetoric.  Thus, Mrozik (2007) 
speaks of two types of bodily discourse, the “ascetic” and the “physio-moral”. 230  In 
his “ascetic” mode of discourse, Śāntideva claims that attachment to the body can only 
have negative results, whereas in the “physio-moral” discourse, attachment to a 
bodhisattva’s body can in fact have positive results (p83).  And because Śāntideva is 
particularly set on producing celibate male monastics, the “ascetic” mode sometimes 
trumps the “physio-moral”, thus allowing for the possibility of a positive (female) 
body directly leading to negative results (p87).  Of course, the effect is really 
“indirect”, and in the BCA, we often find Śāntideva ridiculing the man for being taken 
in by the woman (e.g. 8.54-69).  Mrozik (2007: 90) also notes this with regard to the 
Compendium; though she adds that Śāntideva sometimes “blames women for male 
sexual misconduct” (p91), an attitude Sponberg (cited in Mrozik, 2007: 91) has rightly 
called “ascetic misogyny”. 231   
 
A second way to reconcile the contradiction would be to rely on our old friends, the 
Two Truths.  Now Mrozik (2007) has claimed that the Two Truths “will not help to 
                                               
229 Gisela Striker held this view about the scepticism of Ancient Greece (see Arnold, 2005: 139). 
 
230 I share the term “ascetic discourse” with Mrozik, but for me it goes beyond the question of bodies, 
being a more general attack on society.  It thus contrasts with a much wider ethical discourse on the 
need to help all beings.  It is therefore about rejection versus embrace of the very same phenomena. 
 
231 Mrozik also notes that Olivelle has found similar attitudes to women in “some of the Hindu 
Upaniṣads” (ibid.).  Olivelle (1992: 77-78) wrote, “Women are depicted not only as exciting lust in men 
but also as active temptresses who demonically pull men away from the path of virtue”.  But then, 
Olivelle was not talking about just any Upaniṣads, but the so-called (by Paul Deussen) “Saṃnyāsa 
Upaniṣads”, those with a particular stress on (male) renunciation (p5). 
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reconcile the different discourses on women” (p98).  Her point is well taken, however, 
as stated above, to reconcile is not necessarily to apologise for the discourse, but may 
simply be to coherently explain it.  My whole thesis on the Two Truths has been 
modelled on the belief that there are two distinct modes of discourse at play, and that 
the writers alternate between them.  This is another way of saying that there are two 
“equally valid and valued approaches” (p98).  Mrozik asks if there are “ways of 
upholding conventional and ultimate perspectives simultaneously” (p99).  The answer 
is “yes”.  What follows is my own explanation of the how.   
 
What we have is a “woman” (who does not ultimately exist) giving off a smell (which 
does not ultimately exist) which is cognised by a recipient (who does not ultimately 
exist) as being “foul” (which is a mere conventional designation) 232 ; whereas a 
“bodhisattva” (who does not ultimately exist) gives off a smell (which does not 
ultimately exist) which is cognised by a recipient (who does not ultimately exist) as 
being “pleasing” (another conventional designation).  We would then expect a further 
argument from Śāntideva that would deconstruct this conventional situation, including 
the causal chain of sensation and the categories of “womanhood” and “manhood”.  
And this is indeed the route Śāntideva takes.  If one believed that there was in fact an 
“experiencer” of sensation, one should ponder on the following sceptical argument: 
yadā na vedakaḥ kaścid vedanā ca na vidyate     | 
tadāvasthām imāṃ dṛṣṭvā tṛṣṇe kiṃ na vidīryase     || 
dṛśyate spṛśyate cāpi svapna māyopam ātmanā     | 
cittena saha jāta tvād vedanā tena nekṣyate     || 
pūrvaṃ paścāc ca jātena smaryate nānubhūyate     | 
svātmānaṃ nānubhavati na cānyenānubhūyate     || 
na cāsti vedakaḥ kaścid vedanāto na tattvataḥ     | 
nirātmake kalāpe ‘smin ka eva bādhyate ‘nayā     || 
 
                                               
232 By conventional designation, I do not mean to imply that ‘foul’ is the conventional word used to 
describe women, it is not.  What I mean is that ‘foul’ is a dualistic notion used as a convenient form of 
linguistic expression so that one may be understood. 
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Since there is no knower of sensation, nor any sensation, why “oh 
craving”, having seen this, are you not torn asunder? There is seeing 
and touching by a ‘self’, which is like a dream or illusion.  Sensation 
is not ‘perceived’ by consciousness, for they are born together.  What 
came earlier is remembered by what arises later, it is not 
‘experienced’.  Sensation does not experience itself and is not 
experienced by another.  There is no experiencer, and therefore in 
reality there is no sensation.  So who, in this bundle devoid of self, can 
be afflicted by it? (BCA.9. 98-101) 
 
Thus, a bad smell should not affect you any more than a good smell should.  And what 
of the bodies from which these came?  If you believe that a man or woman, 
bodhisattva or not, is their body, meditate as follows: 
kāyo na pādau na jaṅghā norū kāyaḥ kaṭir na ca     | 
nodaraṃ nāpy ayaṃ pṛṣṭhaṃ noro bāhū na cāpi saḥ     || 
na hastau nāpy ayaṃ pārśvau na kakṣau nāṃsalakṣaṇaḥ     | 
na grīvā na śiraḥ kāyaḥ kāyo ‘tra kataraḥ punaḥ     || 
yadi sarveṣu kāyo ‘yam eka deśena vartate     | 
aṃśā aṃśeṣu vartante sa ca kutra svayaṃ sthitaḥ     || 
 
The body is not the feet, not the calves, not the thighs, and the body is 
not the hips.  It is not the belly, nor the back, nor is it the chest, nor the 
arms. It is not the hands, nor the sides, nor the arm-pit, nor the 
shoulder region.  The body is not the neck, nor the head.  What among 
these then is the body?  If you argue that the body is partially present 
in all of these, [We reply that] it is only parts that are parts, so where 
is the body itself found? (BCA. 9.78-80) 
 
Such a meditation should lead you to the conclusion that “there is no body” (nāsti 
kāya) (BCA. 9.83).  Could it be then that there is difference at a more elemental level?  
Could a woman perhaps be made of different atoms?  But, like Śaṅkara (B.S.Bh. 
I.iv.28, II.i.29 & II.ii.11ff), Śāntideva also denies the coherence of atoms: 
aṃśā apy aṇu bhedena so ‘py aṇur digvibhāgataḥ     | 
digvibhāgo niraṃśa tvād ākāśaṃ tena nāsty aṇuḥ     || 
evaṃ svapnopame rūpe ko rajyeta vicārakaḥ     | 
kāyaś caivaṃ yadā nāsti tadā kā strī pumāṃś ca kaḥ     || 
 
Even the parts can be broken down into atoms, and the atoms into 
directions.  Being without parts, the directions are space.  Therefore, 
the atom has no [ultimate] existence.  Who, upon reflection, would 
take delight in this dream-like form?  And since the body does not 




If there are no atoms, if atoms are but space, how can there be physical ‘men’ and 
physical ‘women’?  What would constitute them?  That is the question Śāntideva 
poses.  Now, if you say that men and women might have different types of 
consciousness, Śāntideva claims otherwise: 
vijñāna dhātu svena śūnyo nopalabhyate ‘nyatra vyavahārāt   |   
so ‘pi vyavahāro na strī na puruṣaḥ    | 
 
The ‘element’ of consciousness is empty by its very nature; it is 
unestablished except by conventional designation.  And even this 
conventionally [established consciousness] is neither ‘female’ nor 
‘male’ (Ś.S. 250). 
 
And if that were not clear enough, he repeats a little further along, “And that which 
lacks own-being can be neither ‘female’ nor ‘male’” (yac ca sva-bhāvena na 
saṃvidyate, na tat strī na puruṣaḥ) (Ś.S. 251).  In other words, for a woman to really 
be a woman, she would have to have own-being (sva-bhāva), but nothing has own-
being, everything is inter-dependent.  Thus, a woman cannot be a woman.   
 
If you are still unconvinced, and if, like the Advaitins, you distinguish between 
consciousness (vijñāna) and mind (manaḥ), you might still wish to claim that men and 
women have different types of mind.  If so, you need to meditate on these verses: 
nendriyeṣu na rūpādau nāntarāle manaḥ sthitaṃ     | 
nāpy antarna bahiś cittam anyatrāpi na labhyate     || 
yan na kāye na cānyatra na miśraṃ na pṛthak kva cit     | 
tan na kiṃcid ataḥ sattvāḥ prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ     || 
 
The mind is not located in the sense faculties, nor in form, etc., nor in-
between.  The mind is found neither internally, nor externally, nor 
anywhere else. That which is not in the body, nor outside it, nor inter-
mingled, nor separate; that is nothing whatsoever.  Hence, beings are 




Men and women then are equal in being empty of inherent existence and in being 
naturally liberated.  This is so because: 
yaśca saṃkalpo yaśca saṃkalpayitā ubhayametan na saṃvidyate  |   
striyāṃ strī na saṃvidyate   |   puruṣe puruṣo na saṃvidyate   | 
 
Neither the thought not the thinker exists.  In woman there is no 
woman.  In man there is no man (Ś.S. 245). 
 
But, you may ask, if the thinker does not exist, and if beings are naturally liberated, 
then what about the distinction between the ordinary beings and the yogis?  The 
answer, as we know already (Chapter 3.2), is that this distinction also breaks down: 
svapnopamāstu gatayo vicāre kadalī-samāḥ     | 
nirvṛtānirvṛtānāṃ ca viśeṣo nāsti vastu taḥ     || 
   
When analysed, the state of existence is dream-like, [insubstantial] 
like a plantain tree.  Thus, there is no substantial difference between 
the liberated and the non-liberated (BCA. 9.150). 
 
Once this distinction has been broken down, it also leaves the way open for the 
seemingly radical claim that the bodies of all beings are ultimately as equally non-
defiled (āśrava) as the Buddha’s (Ś.S. 230).  Now Mrozik (2007: 110) states that such 
a claim only occurs once in the Compendium, but compare: “All existents are 
originally pure” (ādi śuddhān sarva dharmān) (Ś.S. 172).  Both these quotes are used 
by Śāntideva to inspire the practitioner, making them believe that they can purify their 
bodies and their past karma, despite the apparent foulness of their bodies and the evil 
of their actions.  Thus, in the Compendium, if not in the BCA, Śāntideva occasionally 
adopts “buddha-nature” rhetoric for motivational purposes, which was probably the 
original intention of the tathāgata-garbha texts (see Williams, 2009: 104).  However, 
contra (?) the intention of the early texts (ibid.), it seems that Śāntideva did indeed 
draw ethical implications from this theory.  Comparing Śaṅkara’s argument in the Īśā-
Upaniṣad Bhāṣya (5-6) [see p26 above] it is tempting to see Advaitic influence here.  
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However, Williams (2009: 109) believes the influence was possibly the other way 
round, with Gauḍapāda being influenced by tathāgata-garbha thought.  Whatever the 
case may be, we continue to see the cross-cutting nature of Indian thought. 
 
Nevertheless, as we can see from the following exchange with the Yogācāra, 
Śāntideva does not want his theory to collapse into their mind-only thesis: 
vastv āśrayeṇābhāvasya kriyāvat tvaṃ kathaṃ bhavet     | 
asat sahāyam ekaṃ hi cittam āpadyate tava     || 
grāhya muktaṃ yadā cittaṃ tadā sarve tathāgatāḥ     | 
evaṃ ca ko guṇo labdhaś citta-mātre ‘pi kalpite     || 
 
For you, the mind has been reduced to isolation, accompanied by non-
existents.  How could the activity of the unreal [objects] proceed, even 
if supported by a real existent [i.e. pure mind]?  If the mind is free of 
objectivity, then everyone is a Buddha.  And so, even if ‘mind-only’ 
were posited, what benefit is gained? (BCA. 9.28-29) 
 
As we saw earlier (Chapter 4.1), Śāntideva here argues against the Yogācāra’s 
apparent denial of conventional reality (9.28).  But the following verse also seems to 
want to deny the Yogācāra’s thesis on account of its failure to distinguish the Buddha 
from others.  But, at the ultimate level, once we allow for the doctrine of original 
purity, it is difficult to see how these two models differ.
233
  At this level of realisation, 
who could ridicule the ordinary man for being foolish, or the woman for being foul?  
Śāntideva certainly could not: 
evaṃ śūnyeṣu dharmeṣu kiṃ labdhaṃ kiṃ hṛtaṃ bhavet     | 
sat kṛtaḥ paribhūto vā kena kaḥ saṃbhaviṣyati     || 
 
When all things are thus empty, what can be gained or lost?  Who can 
be honoured or humiliated by whom? (BCA. 9.151) 
 
                                               
233 This is one reason why Loy (1988) found such a “remarkable similarity” (p136) between Śaṅkara 
and Dōgen.  On the implications of original enlightenment for the theory of dependent-origination, see 
the so-called “Dhātu-vāda” debate in Hubbard & Swanson (1997). 
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In conclusion, men and women are different if and when we are caught in 
conventional reality.  The more the mind is fed by desire, the more mistakes one 
makes at the conventional level of understanding.  As soon as we get a glimpse of 
emptiness, the attachment reduces, desire weakens, resolve strengthens, and the 
illusion is deconstructed.  When this view is made strong, women are no longer seen 
as desirable.  Ultimately, ‘women’ do not exist as separate distinct objects.  They are 
empty of inherent existence, mere labels added to a certain formation of conditions.  
The same, of course, is true of ‘men’.  They are conceptual fictions.  There are no 
‘women’ to be desired and no ‘men’ to desire them.  Śāntideva uses provisional 
language because we are caught in the provisional realm.  He uses it to deter monks 
from their desire for women.  He uses it to dissuade the householder from having 
intercourse with his wife.  He knows that those who have a weak grasp of emptiness 
are always prone to wavering.  But that is not all his discourse is about.  Celibacy is 
but a step towards selflessness. 
 
Mrozik (2007) has claimed that the “primary goal” of the Compendium is “the 
eradication of male sexual desire for women” (p97).  But that is only one third of the 
story, the other components being the realisation of emptiness and the compassionate 
response to all beings.  Thus, Śāntideva writes: 
śūnyatā karuṇā garbha ceṣṭitāt puṇya śodhanam  || 
 
From action whose essence is emptiness and compassion, there is the 
purification of karmic fruit (Ś.S. 270, Kārikā 21b).   
 
And a little further on, he writes: 
iha  ... bodhisattvaḥ kāyaṃ jīvitaṃ ca parityajati, na ca punaḥ sad 
dharma parityajati   | 
 
Here, in this world ... the bodhisattva renounces the body and life, 




When sitting, he thinks, “May all beings sit on the thrown of wisdom” (sarva sattvān 
bodhi maṇḍe niṣādayeyam).  When he lies down, he thinks, “May every last being be 
led to final liberation” (sarva sattvān eva parinirvāpayeyam) (348).  Śāntideva thus 
uses provisional language to persuade us out of our state of self-serving ignorance into 
one of other-serving, selfless, compassionate action.  This is the main teaching that 
Śāntideva wishes the monks to understand.  Renunciation is but a prelude.   
 
In brief, to get a man to see how he is caught in saṃsāra, Śāntideva has to borrow the 
voice of the perfected yogi in order to paint woman as an impure object, one that 
ultimately brings suffering.  But to get a man to reach the threshold of transcendence, 
Śāntideva has to make him see that there are no men, no women, no self, no beings, 
and so ultimately, no yogis.  So the question arises: Are there no bodhisattvas after 
all?  Well, of course, a bodhisattva is only a bodhisattva when he knows that he is not 
a bodhi-sattva (Vajracchedikā, 3).  Such a ‘bodhisattva’ vows to save all ‘beings’, be 
they ‘male’ or ‘female’.  But upon liberation, he does not see them as male or female.  
As such, his “qualified altruism” is untouched by the question of gender.  
Nevertheless, it becomes that much more qualified by the fact that he no longer sees 
any self at all before him.  When he does happen to project such a self it is only for 
the benefit of that person.  That is “constructive altruism”.  If he gets caught by his 
own projection, and starts to really see a self there, then he needs to return to 
meditation on not-self.  That this projected person may (from their own side) not wish 
to be helped complicates the issue somewhat; but then, to save a man or woman from 
drowning (even if they are attempting suicide) is surely altruistic.  As such, my thesis 




And so, after this rather complex diversion into the marginal areas of caste and gender 
in both Śaṅkara and Śāntideva, I wish to reaffirm the point I made at the outset that 
the issue here is not one of social discrimination per se.  On the other hand, I refused 
to simply gloss over such discriminations, if only to discredit the appeal by their 
respective lineages to egalitarianism and universality.  Nevertheless, the essential 
point to be grasped here is the manner in which they both adopt the Two Truths.  
What we have seen is that both admit that ultimately speaking, there are no castes, no 
men, no women; indeed, no basis for distinction whatsoever.  However, when it 
comes to provisional ethics, to the need for renunciation, to the need for class duties, 
to the need for monastic segregation, etc, then for sure, differences are not only 
condoned, they are promoted and sealed with approval.  And yet, it has been argued 
that constructive altruism stands firm as the best way of characterising their ethical 





We began our comparison with a warning.  We prepared ourselves for the tensions 
and the ambiguities.  We did our level best to clear the area of gods and magical 
powers.  Our terrain was desolate rather than overgrown.  The religious quest started 
to appear as a philosophical problem, a human dilemma.  We were being faced with a 
number of particularly existential questions.  How could the intuitive among us 
continue to participate in a social game that was no longer believable?  How could one 
practice ethics amongst persons regarded as ignorant illusions?  Why should one not 
simply turn away from society; transcend this world of name and form? 
 
Then we met Śaṅkara, the Hindu, and Śāntideva, the Buddhist.  One would tell us that, 
in reality, there was nothing but brahman, nothing else was worthy of the name “real”.  
Even “we” were unreal in our present state of being.  And yet, with higher insight, we 
could change all of that.  We were also that reality, brahman.  We could be one in the 
knowing that is brahman, even whilst embodied.  We could be truly liberated in this 
life, a jīvan-mukta. The other would tell us that all was in fact empty.  There was no 
brahman; there was no self at all.  True, we were ultimately unreal.  Equally true, we 
could become liberated from nescience in this very life.  But our reality would only be 
found in the task of living, not in any ground of being.  Being was a state of acting, the 
way of the bodhisattva. 
 
It became apparent that, on both accounts, we were currently in a state of delusion, but 
one that could be seen through.  All we needed to do was recognise the truth.  They 
both called it ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya).  But despite their use of the same 
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terminology, their ultimate metaphysics seemed to sit on opposite sides of the Self-
spectrum.  And yet, when limited to this life, the role they offered seemed surprisingly 
similar.  Both would claim that the truth of non-individuation needed to be thoroughly 
grasped and subsequently spread to others.  The life-style was that of the wise and 
caring teacher, the compassionate guru.  The initial task was to deconstruct the self so 
as to become selfless.  The further task was to then reconstruct the suffering other, so 
as to be capable of empathising with their confused condition.  We were presented 
with two visions of the very same ethic, “constructive altruism”.  For Śaṅkara, it 
seemed largely limited to those who were willing and qualified to take the final 
epistemic leap into truth.  Others were advised to follow their own social duty.  For 
Śāntideva, the teaching of emptiness was equally reserved for the qualified few, 
though his compassion had the potential to include the helping of others in their quest 
for lesser goods than nirvāṇa. 
 
Thankfully, we were invited here in order to compare, not to choose.  And so, after 
flickering our way through two competing traditions, we have come to our 
comparative conclusions.  Having already announced their metaphysical differences, 
we should now take stock of their similarities, and, given their ontological starting 
points, it is an astonishing list.  A key feature for both writers was the need for 
renunciation of this world.  Both painted it as one of suffering, a magical show of 
charming temptations just waiting to dupe us out of our strength, out of our money, 
out of our minds.   Celibacy was seen as the key to liberating oneself from the 
bondage of family and home.  Asceticism was central to letting go of the body’s 
demands.  And so women were to be seen as dangerous, their bodies described in foul 
terms, their impermanence brought forward to the now.  They were walking corpses 
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just waiting to rot.  Nothing impermanent could have ultimate worth, and least of all 
the physical. 
 
We were invited into the religious circle.  But one could still go astray.  Not all that 
was on offer was for the good.  Śaṅkara would warn us against the way of action, 
which took knowledge as a mere means to ritual.  Śāntideva tells us never to emulate 
those lazy, selfish monks, who sit all day delighting in their own private bliss.  These 
paths were filled with subtle ignorance.  One needed to be of sharp faculty to see the 
implications.  Knowledge became the dominant quest.  This knowledge was claimed 
to be beyond the grasp of the intellect, an intuitive knowledge.  Nevertheless, it was a 
knowledge which gained its authority from scripture, its conscious experience merely 
confirming its validity.  Both would admit to partial knowers, to glimpses of truth and 
backsliding.  Thus, I proposed, we must imagine these partial knowers as flickering 
between ultimate and conventional modes of seeing. 
 
Those who had come this far, who had purified the mind, who had distinguished 
themselves from the flock, were now being invited to let go of all marks of difference.  
True liberation came when one understood that there was no ultimate difference 
between the liberated and the non-liberated.  Only such an insight could truly count as 
liberation.  Ultimately speaking, there was no duality between the ultimate and the 
conventional.  One who had grasped this truth could find their place in either domain.  
This truth was so precious, that it simply had to be passed on.  As Brahmā Sahampati 
once allegedly said to the Buddha (S.N. I.137), there would be those with little dust in 




And so, these knowers of reality were to take on the self-imposed duty of the 
compassionate teacher.  Being almost exclusively male, their role would be that of the 
“paternal pedagogue”, guiding the other out of the forest of the body, beyond the 
magic show of the mind, into the pure light of knowledge.  The path is a gradual one; 
it demands study, acumen, discipline, virtues.  Such work demands self-control, 
fearlessness and a complete lack of selfish interest, a prime candidate for Urmson’s 
(1958) category of “Saints and Heroes”.  But the rewards are boundless, an ineffable 
bliss, which is the bliss of knowing truth. 
 
Given these startling commonalities, I would like to propose that this comparison has 
shown itself to have import in three distinct areas of scholarship.  First, there is the 
philosophical conclusion, which shows how two very different – even radically 
opposite – views on cosmology of self and religious norms can generate strikingly 
similar accounts of the relationship between conduct and world in a ‘selfless 
framework’.  Despite their outright disagreement on the nature of the self, neither 
Śāntideva nor Śaṅkara required a view of the person as a stable individuated agent in 
order to posit a system of moral values that ought to be followed.  In fact, both would 
conclude that the very belief in oneself as a unified moral agent was counter-
productive to other-regarding moral thought.  Second, there is the historiographical 
conclusion, which demonstrates the limits and power of doctrinal commitments to 
metaphysics and ethics.  We showed just how committed these two thinkers were to 
the continuity of their lineages, both in terms of doctrinal commitments and normative 
conduct.  We saw how the language of ultimate truth set the limits on these 
commitments, but also how the very force of tradition tended to balance the weight of 
any ultimate assertions.  And third, there is the disciplinary conclusion, which 
highlights, not only the similarities between Buddhist and Brahmanical thinkers, but 
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how their methodologies and aims, and even their inter-sectarian differences, are in 
fact cross-cutting.  Thus, I proposed that the so-called ātman/anātman distinction 
between Hinduism and Buddhism needed further qualification.  We have seen, both 
verbally and graphically, how Śāntideva and Śaṅkara shift between notions of self and 
not-self depending on the context.  I thus presented a more nuanced approach to the 
question of self which took into consideration both the Two-Truths mode of discourse 
and the self-deluding form of emotive ethical rhetoric.  Finally, I would like to 
propose that these medieval Indian models may well prove themselves to be a 
valuable source of both metaphysical and moral inspiration to those of us who 
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